State v. Guyton. , 135 Haw. 372 ( 2015 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-13-0000203
08-JUN-2015
09:19 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EVANS NATHAN GUYTON,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-13-0000203
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-13-0000203; CASE NO. 2DCW-12-0000362)
June 8, 2015
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
This case presents the question of whether the phrase
“residence, including yard and garage” in an injunction order
encompasses the outer area of the protected person’s 1,000-acre
property, far removed from the vicinity of the person’s home.
We hold that it does not.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Injunction Order and the Alleged Violation
John Varel owns, and lives with his wife on a one-
thousand-acre property in Waiheʻe, Maui County. On September 14,
2009, the District Court of the Second Circuit (district court) 1
granted a petition for injunction against harassment (Injunction
Order) filed by Varel, pursuant to Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 604-10.5(b) (Supp. 1999). The Injunction Order was directed
against Evans Guyton, and it was effective for three years from
the issuance date. The Injunction Order stated as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1. The Petition is granted.
2. The Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order herein is
made absolute as of July 21, 2009
3. The Respondent(s) and any othr (sic) person acting on
behalf of the Respondent(s) is hereby restrained and
enjoined from:
a.  Contacting, threating [sic], or physically
harassing the Petitioner(s) and any person(s)
residing at Petitioner(s)’ residence
b.  Telephoning the Petitioner(s)
c.  Entering or visiting the Petitioner(s)’
residence, including yard and garage and
 place of employment.
4. Said injunction shall be effective as of 9/14/2009
and shall be in full force and effect for a period of
month(s) 3 year(s) from said date unless terminated
or modified by appropriate orders by this Court.
(Emphasis added) 2
1
The Honorable Simone C. Polak presided.
2
The Injunction Order is a preprinted form completed by the
district court.
2
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Todd Arnold (Arnold), a private contractor farmer for
Varel, also resides on Varel’s property. On February 19, 2012,
at around 10:30 a.m., Arnold was hiking with his family on the
ridges located on Varel’s property. As they reached the area
toward the top of the ridges, Arnold observed Guyton dirt biking
in the company of other riders.
As a result of this incident, the State filed a
complaint charging Guyton, pursuant to HRS § 604-10.5(h), 3 with
the offense of violation of a restraining order or injunction.
Specifically, the complaint charged Guyton with “entering and/or
visiting the premises including yard and garage of the
residence, and/or place of employment” of Varel on February 19,
2012. 4
3
HRS § 604-10.5(h) states in relevant part as follows:
A knowing or intentional violation of a restraining order
or injunction issued pursuant to this section is a
misdemeanor.
4
The Complaint stated as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February, 2012, in the
Division of Wailuku, County of Maui, State of Hawaii, EVANS
NATHAN GUYTON did intentionally or knowingly violate a
restraining order or injunction, to wit, an Order Granting
Petition for Injunction Against Harassment, issued in DC-
TRO 09-1-0199, on September 14, 2009, by entering and/or
visiting the premises including yard and garage of the
residence, and/or place of employment of the other, thereby
committing the offense of Violation of Restraining Order or
Injunction in violation of Section 605-10.5 of Hawaii
Revised Statutes.
It should be noted that the charge in the complaint differs
from the language stated in the Injunction Order, in that the word
(continued. . .)
3
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B. Bench Trial
A bench trial commenced on February 22, 2013. Varel
described his 1,000-acre property as consisting of a commercial
macadamia nut farm, conservation land, and his residence. In
describing the expanse of his property, Varel testified that it
“runs about a mile and a quarter parallel to the highway and
then a mile and a quarter back all the way up to the watershed.”
According to Varel, his “residence is off to the right end” of
the 1,000-acre parcel.
Varel testified that he did not give permission to
anyone to use any portion of his property for dirt biking, that
he and his wife had been living on the property, and that he
sought and was awarded an injunction against Guyton in 2009. On
the day of the incident, he was on the mainland for a business
trip.
Arnold testified that he was working as a private
contractor farmer for Varel and that he was residing on Varel’s
property. At around 10:30 a.m. on February 19, 2012, after
three to four hours of hiking around the property, he came upon
Guyton as he and his family reached the “ridge area of the
property”--the “top ridges, not all the way, but up on the
(. . .continued)
“premises” appears only in the complaint and not in the Injunction
Order.
4
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mountain side”--located on the outer limits of Varel’s property.
According to Arnold, he recognized and was familiar with Guyton
because Guyton is generally known in the dirt biking community,
he had seen Guyton around town riding his truck and in areas
where Guyton rides his bike, and because of an earlier
encounter.
On the day in question, Arnold indicated that one of
the riders approached and told him that they had permission to
ride on that portion of Varel’s property. Arnold controverted
this claim, testifying that nobody ever had permission to ride
dirt bikes on Varel’s property. Arnold acknowledged that in the
vicinity of the area in which he observed the riders, there were
no “no trespassing” signs, since such signs are located only on
the front entrance of the property.
When asked how he was certain that the riders and
Guyton were on Varel’s property, Arnold answered, “Just being
out there as long as I had, I know where the ridge lines are. .
. . I know where [Varel] has pointed out to me.” Additionally,
Arnold also stated that he had seen the map of Varel’s property
and walked its boundary lines.
Varel was recalled by the State, at which point he
testified that the area where Arnold observed Guyton is about
half a mile into his property from the boundary line between his
property and the neighboring property. Varel also stated that
5
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during the injunction hearing, Guyton was shown a blown-up map
of his property indicating its perimeters, the area that it
covered, and neighboring properties. According to Varel, the
map indicated that the ridge where Arnold saw Guyton is part of
his property. Varel also confirmed that there were no “no
trespassing” signs in the area in which Guyton was seen.
The defense called Ryan Stewart as a witness. Stewart
testified that he had known and been acquainted with Guyton
through the motocross community and because they had previously
ridden dirt bikes together. According to Stewart, while he was
watching a motocross race on February 19, 2012, he observed
Guyton at the racetrack from between 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.
until about 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m. Stewart indicated that he
did not see Guyton leave the racetrack, but he acknowledged that
he saw Guyton only intermittently--about three to six times--
that day.
Guyton testified that he was a construction worker and
lived on Maui for approximately thirty years before retiring
about ten years earlier. Guyton stated that, on February 19,
2012, he watched a motocross race at a location about five or
six miles from Varel’s property. Guyton stated that he was at
the race from around 8:30 a.m. until approximately 4:00 p.m. and
then left to do some shopping. He denied ever going to Varel’s
6
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property and testified that he had never “seen [Arnold] in [his]
entire life.”
Guyton recognized a copy of the Injunction Order. He
indicated that he was shown a map of Varel’s property during the
2009 injunction hearing, but he stated that the map did not
specify the boundary lines of Varel’s property and that, in any
event, he was unable to comprehend it. Guyton stated that he
was not given a copy of the map that was presented during the
injunction hearing. He further testifed that he was familiar
with the portions of Varel’s property that are not enclosed by a
fence, the area of which constitutes about 75% of Varel’s
property. According to Guyton, the limited fencing around
Varel’s property is located “over where [Varel] lives,” with the
rest of the property having “no fence at all,” no “[n]o
trespassing signs, no posted nothing.” Guyton stated that
Varel’s property was previously owned by “Wailuku Ag” and was a
recreation area in which dirt biking was allowed. Guyton
acknowledged that he “know[s] now that it’s . . . Varel[’s
property], and it’s off limits . . . from the [injunction
hearing] three years ago. [He] know[s] that it’s his land, not
to go on it.”
In its closing argument, the State viewed the fact
that Guyton was shown a blown-up zoning map of Varel’s property
during the 2009 injunction hearing as constituting adequate
7
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notice of the area in which he was prohibited from entering.
The State also emphasized Guyton’s admission of his knowledge
that he was not allowed to go on Varel’s property.
During his closing argument, defense counsel contended
that Guyton was not aware that he entered Varel’s property
primarily because there were no “no trespassing” signs or fences
in the vicinity of the area in which he was allegedly seen by
Arnold. Further, defense counsel disputed the State’s claim
that the map shown to Guyton during the injunction hearing was
sufficient to inform Guyton of exactly where he was prohibited
from being present, arguing that the immensity of Varel’s
property made it impossible for Guyton to keep track of all of
the property’s boundary lines. In addition, defense counsel
argued that the Injunction Order did not clearly outline the
location of the property’s boundary lines, making it impossible
for Guyton to have had the necessary mental state required by
the offense with which he was charged. Defense counsel also
maintained that the entire 1,000 acres of Varel’s property
should not be considered as constituting the “yard” of Guyton’s
residence.
After the closing arguments, the district court stated
that it was having an issue with the term “yard” as used in the
Injunction Order, so the State provided a dictionary definition
of “yard” as “the grounds of a building or group of buildings;
8
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the grounds immediately surrounding a house; an area with its
buildings and facilities set aside for a particular business or
activity; an assembly or storage area as for drydocked boats.” 5
The State also responded to defense counsel’s arguments, urging
the district court to hold that the entire 1,000-acre land
surrounding Varel’s house “is his yard. The fact that his yard
is bigger and some people have a small yard, there’s nothing
prohibiting that.”
C. Judgment
At the conclusion of the trial, the district court
found that Guyton violated the Injunction Order and imposed a
fine of $500, which was stayed pending the outcome of Guyton’s
appeal. Judgment was entered on February 22, 2013. Thereafter,
the district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (FFCL) on April 1, 2013. 6 In relevant part, paragraphs 3
and 4 of the FFCL indicated that the district court found Arnold
and Varel to be credible witnesses. 7 In paragraphs 5 and 6, the
5
The State did not specify the dictionary from which it obtained
this definition. In his Opening Brief to the ICA, Guyton identifies the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary as the source of the State’s definition, which the
State confirmed in its Answering Brief.
6
The district court did not clearly differentiate in the FFCL its
findings of fact from its conclusions of law, both of which were aggregated
under one heading.
7
Paragraph 3 referred to a “John Barel,” not Varel. However,
based on the Injunction Order and trial transcript, this appears to be a
typographical error.
9
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district court found Guyton and Stewart not to be credible
witnesses. In addition, the district court concluded, in
paragraph 7 of the FFCL, that “[t]he language of the [Injunction
Order] is sufficiently broad to include in its prohibition[] the
place of the property where” Arnold saw Guyton.
II. APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
On March 19, 2013, Guyton filed a Notice of Appeal
from the Judgment. In his Opening Brief, Guyton contended that
the district court erred in adjudging him guilty of
intentionally or knowingly entering or visiting Varel’s
“residence, including yard and garage.” Specifically, Guyton
argued that the most reasonable construction of the term “yard,”
as used in the Injunction Order, should not encompass the entire
1,000 acres of Varel’s property. Guyton contended that, because
“yard” is clear and unambiguous and was not defined by the
Injunction Order or statute, its plain, generally accepted
meaning must control and such meaning does not contemplate the
farm and conservation land within Varel’s property.
Additionally, relying on the rule of lenity, Guyton
argued that any ambiguity that the ICA might find in the term
“yard” must be resolved in the light most favorable to him.
Recognizing that the canons of statutory interpretation upon
which he relied do not directly apply to the Injunction Order
because it is not a statute, Guyton asserted that these canons
10
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are equally applicable because “the injunction assumed the role
of a statute by having the same function as law.”
Guyton also argued that the State failed to prove that
he acted with the requisite state of mind, that he knowingly or
intentionally visited or entered Varel’s property, since the
precise location of its boundary lines was not known to him with
certainty. 8
In its Answering Brief, the State responded that there
was sufficient evidence at trial to support Guyton’s conviction.
The State argued that Guyton’s actual understanding of the acts
prohibited by the Injunction Order–-as could be gleaned from his
testimony at trial that he was aware that Varel’s property was
off limits to him–-undermined his claim that he should not be
expected to understand the term “yard.” The State also asserted
that even though the dictionary definition of “yard” that the
State provided at trial was incomplete, the district court
properly relied on it. Finally, the State contended that Guyton
acted with the requisite mental state based on his testimony
that he was very familiar with Varel’s property coupled with the
fact that a map of Varel’s property was shown to Guyton during
the 2009 injunction hearing.
8
Guyton, however, conceded that his conduct might have been
reckless, a state of mind that falls short of what is required by the offense
with which he was charged. See HRS § 605-20.6(h).
11
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On Febuary 5, 2015, the Intermediate Court of Appeals
(ICA) issued its Summary Disposition Order (SDO), which affirmed
the Judgment. The ICA majority held that Guyton’s conviction
was based on sufficient evidence, reasoning that the seventh
paragraph 9 of the district court’s FFCL
is not wrong because (1) the District Court convicted
Guyton based on his conduct of entering or visiting . . .
Varel’s . . . ‘residence’; and (2) there is substantial
evidence showing Guyton (a) knew that ‘residence,’ as used
in the injunction, encompassed Varel’s entire property . .
. and (b) knowingly entered or visited Varel’s property.
The Honorable Katherine G. Leonard, in her dissent,
concluded that “the State failed to establish that the area
where Guyton was observed “was part of ‘the premises including
yard and garage of the residence, and/or place of employment of
[John Varel].’”
In his Application for Writ of Certiorari, Guyton
reasserts the arguments that he made before the ICA.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The interpretation or construction of a judgment,
decree, or order “presents a question of law for the courts.”
Cain v. Cain, 59 Haw. 32, 39, 575 P.2d 468, 474 (1978).
Questions of law are reviewed under the right/wrong standard of
9
The seventh paragraph of the FFCL provides, “The language of the
[2009 Injunction] Order . . . is sufficiently broad to include in its
prohibition, the place on the property where the witness testified that he
saw Defendant on the day of the offense.”
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review. State v. Higa, 79 Hawaiʻi 1, 3, 897 P.2d 928, 930
(1995).
The standard of review in determining the sufficiency
of the evidence is “not whether guilt is established beyond a
reasonable doubt, but whether there is substantial evidence to
support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” State v.
Matavale, 115 Hawaiʻi 149, 157—58, 166 P.3d 322, 330–31 (2007);
accord State v. Monteil, 134 Hawaiʻi 361, 368, 341 P.3d 567, 574
(2014). Substantial evidence as to every material element of
the charged offense means “credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Monteil, 134
Hawaiʻi at 368, 341 P.3d at 574 (quoting Matavale, 115 Hawaiʻi at
158, 166 P.3d at 331) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Overarching Principles
The Injunction Order in this case prohibited Guyton
from “[e]ntering or visiting [Varel’s] residence, including yard
and garage.” The words “residence” and “yard” are not defined
in the Injunction Order. The primary issue is the meaning of
the phrase “residence, including yard” and whether it
encompasses the area in which Arnold observed Guyton.
In LeMay v. Leander, 92 Hawaiʻi 614, 994 P.2d 546,
(2000), this court held that to hold a party in civil contempt,
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“there must be a court decree that sets forth in specific detail
an unequivocal command that the contemnor violated.” 92 Hawaiʻi
at 625, 994 P.2d at 557. While LeMay involved a civil contempt
violation, its requirement of particularity and clarity in the
language of an order applies with at least the same force to
injunction orders prohibiting harassment, especially since the
violation of such an injunction order exposes the defendant to a
one-year jail sentence, see HRS §§ 604-10.5(h), 706-663 (1993)--
a consequence of greater seriousness than that carried by a
civil contempt citation. See Murray v. Murray, 60 Haw. 160,
162, 587 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1978) (“The significant and essential
characteristic of a sanction imposed for civil contempt is that
the penalty can be avoided by compliance with the court
order.”).
Thus, a prerequisite to punishing a person for
violating an injunction order issued under HRS § 604-10.5 that
protects against harassment is a court order that is “clear and
unambiguous,” LeMay, 92 Hawaiʻi at 625, 994 P.2d at 557, so as to
allow a person of ordinary intelligence to “ascertain from the
four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden,”
id. (quoting Dystar Corp. v. Canto, 1 F. Supp. 2d 48, 54 (D.
Mass. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
requirement is no more than a rule of reason because, as it is
for statutes, fairness and due process dictate that a court
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order must be sufficiently particular and definite so as to
clearly identify the conduct that it prohibits. See United
States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 659
(2d Cir. 1989) (noting that criminal contempt sanctions may be
levied only if predicated on a violation of “the specific and
definite terms of a court order”); 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 140
(stating that a court order that could support a contempt
sanction is one that describes, in “certain, clear, and definite
terms[,] . . . the duties thereby imposed or the actions
required or forbidden”); cf. State v. Xiao, 123 Hawaiʻi 251, 261,
231 P.3d 968, 978 (2010) (Acoba, J., concurring and dissenting)
(reasoning that statutes must be construed in a manner as to
clearly enunciate “what conduct is prohibited” so that
individuals subject to them “may choose between lawful and
unlawful conduct”). 10
B. The plain meaning of the words “residence” and “yard”
The phrase “residence, including yard” in the
Injunction Order is clear and unambiguous on its face. As such,
it leaves no room for interpretation, and its plain language
must control. Shade v. Kirk, 420 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Neb. 1988)
(“When the language of a . . . decree is plain and unambiguous,
10
See also In re Doe, 96 Hawaiʻi 73, 82, 26 P.3d 562, 571 (2001)
(stating that before a minor could be held in criminal contempt of court, the
“terms and operation” of the underlying court order must be readily
understandable to the minor).
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there is no room for construction . . . .”); Callan v. Callan,
468 P.2d 456, 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (accord); 50 C.J.S.
Judgments §§ 744-45 (accord); see Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United
Agri Products, 86 Hawaiʻi 214, 259, 948 P.2d 1055, 1100 (1997)
(according “plain meaning” to this court’s remand order in
construing its scope).
In effectuating its plain language, the words
“residence, including yard” must “be taken in their ordinary and
familiar signification, and regard is to be had to their general
and popular use.” See In re Taxes of Johnson, 44 Haw. 519, 530,
356 P.2d 1028, 1034 (1960) (quoting Advertiser Publ’g Co. v.
Fase, 43 Haw. 154, 160 (Haw. Terr. 1960)); see Sierra Club v.
Castle & Cooke Homes Haw., Inc., 132 Hawaiʻi 184, 191—92, 320
P.3d 849, 856—57 (2013) (noting that courts must “give words
their ordinary meaning unless something in the statute requires
a different interpretation” (quoting Saranillo v. Silva, 78
Hawaiʻi 1, 10, 889 P.2d 685, 695 (1995)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)); see also HRS § 1-14 (2009) (“The words of a law are
generally to be understood in their most known and usual
signification.”). 11
11
This court explained that looking to the common usage of words
when they are clear and unambiguous reflects
a rule of common sense, for it must be supposed that
the legislature, in enacting a statute, intended that
the words used therein should be understood in the
(continued. . .)
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In conducting a plain meaning analysis, “this court
may resort to legal or other well accepted dictionaries as one
way to determine the ordinary meaning of certain terms not
statutorily defined.” State v. Pali, 129 Hawaiʻi 363, 370, 300
P.3d 1022, 1029 (2013) (quoting State v. Kikuta, 125 Hawaiʻi 78,
96, 253 P.3d 639, 658 (2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Travelocity.com, L.P. v. Dir. of Taxation, 135
Hawaiʻi 88, 106—07, 346 P.3d 158, 175—76 (2015) (considering
dictionary definitions in conducting a plain meaning analysis).
The Oxford Dictionaries defines “residence” as “[a]
person’s home; the place where someone lives.” 12 “Yard” is
defined by the Oxford Dictionaries as “[a] piece of ground
(. . .continued)
sense in which they are ordinarily and popularly
understood by the people, for whose guidance and
government the law was enacted, unless there is
something in the statute showing that the words in
question were used in some other sense.
In re Taxes of Johnson, 44 Haw. at 530, 356 P.2d at 1034 (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
12
Oxford Dictionaries,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/residence
(last visited Apr. 22, 2015). In a similar manner, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary defines “residence,” in relevant part, as “the place where one
actually lives as distinguished from one’s domicile or a place of temporary
sojourn” or “a building used as a home.” Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residence (last visited Apr. 24,
2015). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “residence” as “[t]he place where one
actually lives”; “[a] house or fixed abode; a dwelling.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1502 (10th ed. 2014); see Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 738 A.2d 403,
404—05 (Pa. 1999) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of
residence).
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adjoining a building or house” or “[a]n area of ground
surrounded by walls or buildings.” 13
Based on its plain and generally known meaning, it is
clear that the phrase “residence, including yard,” as it is used
in the Injunction Order, is the house in which Varel lives and
the adjacent area surrounding it. 14
13
Oxford Dictionaries,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/yard#yard-2
(emphasis added) (last visited April 13, 2015). Yard may also refer to “[a]n
area of land used for a particular purpose or business,” e.g., a storage yard
or a dump yard. Id. This variation of the definition of yard is not
applicable in this case.
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines yard as “a small usually
walled and often paved area open to the sky and adjacent to a building”; “the
grounds of a building or group of buildings”; or “the grounds immediately
surrounding a house that are usually covered with grass.” Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/yard (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
At trial, the State defined “yard” for the district court as “the grounds
immediately surrounding a house” in accordance with the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary.
14
This result is the same regardless of whether the word
“including” is interpreted as a word of expansion or a word of limitation.
See Hawaiian Ass’n of Seventh—Day Adventists, 130 Hawaiʻi 36, 46, 305 P.3d
452, 462 (2013). As previous cases from this court have recognized,
“including” means either “an enlargement and has the meaning of and or in
addition to, or merely specifies a particular thing already included within
the general words theretofore used.” Id. (quoting Lealaimatafao v. Woodward—
Clyde Consultants, 75 Haw. 544, 556, 867 P.2d 220, 226 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If “including” were taken to mean as merely
specifying “a particular thing already included within the general words
theretofore used,” the definition of residence--the house where Varel
actually lives--would serve as the outer limit of what “yard” means, which
would exclude the outer ridges of Varel’s property where Guyton was seen. On
the other hand, if “including,” in this context, were taken to mean “and or
in addition to,” “yard” would be in addition to “residence”; however, the
plain meaning of “yard” would nonetheless exclude the outer ridges of Varel’s
property in which Guyton was present.
Additionally, under the “and or in addition to” definition of
“including,” “yard and garage” may be illustrative of other places that could
be added to “residence.” Id. This latter interpretation is the most far-
reaching and would render the phrase “residence, including yard and garage”
ambiguous in that it could encompass unidentified or remote locations on an
expansive property. Faced with ambiguity in such an instance, the phrase
(continued. . .)
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Accordingly, an interpretation that would place the
entire 1,000 acres of Varel’s property within the ambit of the
phrase “residence, including yard” would run contrary to its
“ordinary and familiar signification,” and such application is
therefore erroneous. In re Taxes of Johnson, 44 Haw. at 530,
356 P.2d at 1034. 15
C. The interpretation by the district court of the phrase
“residence, including yard” was incorrect.
The district court and the ICA applied a strained and
unnatural interpretation to the phrase “residence, including
yard” instead of applying its plain meaning. Consequently, the
words “residence, including yard” were interpreted to encompass
even the ridges located at the outer limits of Varel’s 1¼-
square-mile property, which could be accessed either by hiking
from within the property or by motorcycle through the
neighboring property.
Rather than enforcing the clear and unambiguous
language of the Injunction Order, the district court’s
interpretation expanded the meaning of “residence, including
yard” well beyond the ordinary and familiar signification of
(. . .continued)
“residence including yard” should be interpreted consistent with the known
and usual signification of these terms. See infra Part IV.B
15
The State’s use of the word “premises” in its complaint against
Guyton--a word that does not appear in the Injunction Order, see supra note
4--may be an implicit acknowledgement that the phrase “residence, including
yard” does not encompass the area in which Arnold observed Guyton.
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these words. 16 The district court’s interpretation deviated
from, rather than furthered, the requirement of specificity and
clarity in court orders, particularly because the violation
involved could carry criminal sanctions. See LeMay, 92 Hawaiʻi
at 625, 994 P.2d at 557. Because the phrase “residence,
including yard” is clear, the duty of the district court was to
enforce, and not to overextend, its plain meaning. See State v.
Palama, 62 Haw. 159, 161—62, 612 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1980)
(explaining that “when the language is plain and unmistakable,
the court is bound by” it, leaving “no room for judicial
construction”).
Even if we were to assume that the phrase “residence,
including yard” is ambiguous, the district court’s
interpretation was erroneous under comparable principles of
statutory interpretation used in resolving ambiguities within a
statute.
The first of such principles states that “[w]here the
meaning of a word is unclear in one part of a statute but clear
in another part, the clear meaning can be imparted to the
unclear usage on the assumption that it means the same thing
16
The preprinted, standard form used for the Injunction Order
provided a space for “[s]pecial conditions or modifications,” which would
have allowed the district court to indicate that the entire 1,000 acres of
Varel’s property were intended to be within the scope of the Injunction
Order.
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throughout the statute.” Kam v. Noh, 70 Haw. 321, 325, 770 P.2d
414, 416 (1989). This means that, “[i]n the absence of an
express intention to the contrary, words or phrases used in two
or more sections of a statute are presumed to be used in the
same sense throughout.” Id. at 325—26, 770 P.2d at 417 (quoting
Gaspro, Ltd. v. Comm’n of Labor & Indus. Relations, 46 Haw. 164,
172, 377 P.2d 932, 936 (1962)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, paragraph 3(a) of the Injunction Order
restrained and enjoined Guyton from contacting, threatening, or
physically harassing Varel “and any person(s) residing at
[Varel’s] residence.” (Emphasis added). To reside at one place
means “to live in a particular place” or “to exist or be
present.” 17 The phrase “reside at” contemplates living, existing
or being present in a specific and identifiable physical
structure, as compared to the phrase “reside in,” which is used
to refer to a general area or locality within which a person
lives. 18 Id.
17
Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/residing (last visited April 13, 2015).
18
These examples are provided by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary:
He resides in St. Louis.
He still resides at his parents’ house.
Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residing (last
visited May 26, 2015) (emphases omitted).
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Thus, it is clear from the phrase “person(s) residing
at [Varel’s] residence” that paragraph 3(a) specifically refers
to “residence” as a structure in which one could reside, such
that “[Varel’s] residence” could only mean the house where Varel
actually lives in--and not the entire 1,000 acres of property
within which his house is located. Under the rule elucidated by
Kam, therefore, the meaning of “residence,” as it is used in the
phrase “residence, including yard,” in paragraph 3(c) of the
Injunction Order is the same as the meaning of “residence” in
paragraph 3(a)-–the house in which Varel actually lives. Cf.
Kam, 70 Haw. at 325—26, 770 P.2d at 417 (holding that the word
“use” has the same meaning throughout the statute).
In addition, “the instant case arises under the penal
law, where the basic canons of statutory construction counsel in
favor of a less expansive definition” according to the rule of
lenity. State v. Bayly, 118 Hawaiʻi 1, 15, 185 P.3d 186, 200
(2008). This longstanding precept of statutory interpretation
states that “[w]here a criminal statute is ambiguous . . . the
statute must be strictly construed against the government and in
favor of the accused.” State v. Shimabukuro, 100 Hawaiʻi 324,
327, 60 P.3d 274, 277 (2002); see Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994). The rule of lenity can be considered
as a natural extension of the principle that the language of a
court order must be sufficiently particularized, clear, and
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unequivocal before its violation could be punished. See supra
Part IV.A.
If the court order is ambiguous and not readily
understandable, its language should be construed in favor of the
defendant. See State v. Sakamoto, 101 Hawaiʻi 409, 413 n.3, 70
P.3d 635, 639 n.3 (2003) (stating that a criminal statute will
not be interpreted expansively so as to increase the penalty
“when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a
guess as to what the legislature intended” (quoting Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978)) (internal quotation mark
omitted) (alteration omitted)). In NBA Properties, Inc. v.
Gold, 895 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1990), for example, the court
stated that ambiguities or omissions in a court order will be
read in favor of the person charged with contempt. Hence, any
ambiguity in the language of the Injunction Order must be
resolved in favor of Guyton. See State v. Woodfall, 120 Hawaiʻi
387, 396, 206 P.3d 841, 850 (2009) (concluding that an ambiguous
statute must be strictly construed against the government and in
favor of the accused); State v. Aiwohi, 109 Hawaiʻi 115, 129, 123
P.3d 1210, 1224 (2005) (accord).
Applying the rule of lenity, the meaning of the phrase
“residence, including yard”--construed in favor of Guyton--
should be the same as its plain and popularly understood
meaning--i.e., the place in which Varel actually lives and its
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immediate vicinity, and not inclusive of Varel’s entire 1,000-
acre property, particularly as to the remote area of the
property in which Arnold observed Guyton. Thus, even if the
phrase “residence, including yard” is considered to be
ambiguous, the district court’s unduly expansive interpretation
of the phrase was erroneous in light of the principles embodied
by both Kam and the rule of lenity.
D. The conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State, State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawaiʻi 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109,
1115 (2010), and according appropriate deference to the district
court’s credibility determinations, Monteil, 134 Hawaiʻi at 368,
341 P.3d at 574, the record demonstrates that Guyton was
observed by Arnold on the outer limits of Varel’s 1,000-acre
property. This area is outside of the meaning of “residence,
including yard,” which, interpreted under its plain meaning or
under principles of statutory construction, encompasses only the
house where Varel lives and the area directly adjacent to it.
See supra Part IV.A-C. Therefore, the conviction in this case
was not supported by sufficient evidence and must be reversed.
State v. Silver, 125 Hawaiʻi 1, 9, 249 P.3d 1141, 1149 (2011);
State v. Bannister, 60 Haw. 658, 660, 594 P.2d 133, 135 (1979).
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V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the ICA Judgment on Appeal and the
district court Judgment are reversed.
James S. Tabe /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
25