Douglas Kimzey v. Yelp! , 836 F.3d 1263 ( 2016 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DOUGLAS L. KIMZEY, pro se,                     Nos. 14-35487
    Plaintiff-Appellant/                    14-35494
    Cross-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                        2:13-cv-01734-RAJ
    YELP! INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee/
    Cross-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 2, 2016*
    Seattle, Washington
    Filed September 12, 2016
    Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, M. Margaret McKeown,
    and Andre M. Davis,** Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge McKeown
    *
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    **
    The Honorable Andre M. Davis, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2                          KIMZEY V. YELP!
    SUMMARY***
    Communications Decency Act
    The panel affirmed the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6) dismissal of Douglas Kimzey’s action alleging that
    Yelp! Inc. was liable for two negative business reviews
    posted on Yelp’s website.
    Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
    “immunizes providers of interactive computer services
    against liability arising from content created by third parties.”
    Kimzey alleged that Yelp was responsible for creating and
    developing content, and therefore did not enjoy immunity
    under the Communications Decency Act which only grants
    immunity if the computer service provider was also not an
    “information content provider.”
    The panel held that Yelp fell under the Communications
    Decency Act’s grant of immunity, and rejected Kimzey’s
    claims to the contrary. The panel held that there were no facts
    plausibly suggesting that Yelp fabricated content under a
    third party’s identity. The panel also rejected Kimzey’s
    theory that Yelp transformed a third party review into its own
    “advertisement” or “promotion.” The panel concluded that
    the proliferation and dissemination of content did not equal
    creation or development of content.
    ***
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    KIMZEY V. YELP!                                3
    COUNSEL
    Douglas L. Kimzey, Bellevue, Washington, pro se Plaintiff-
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    Venkat Balasubramani, Focal PLLC, Seattle, Washington;
    Aaron Schur, Yelp Inc., San Francisco, California; for
    Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    OPINION
    McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
    Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
    (“CDA”) “immunizes providers of interactive computer
    services against liability arising from content created by third
    parties.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
    Roommates.Com, LLC, 
    521 F.3d 1157
    , 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (en banc) (footnote omitted) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)). This
    case pushes the envelope of creative pleading in an effort to
    work around § 230.
    The complaint centers on two negative business reviews
    posted on Yelp’s website1 about Douglas Kimzey’s locksmith
    business. Instead of asserting that Yelp was liable in its well-
    known capacity as the passive host of a forum for user
    reviews—a claim without any hope under our precedents,
    1
    We have previously noted that Yelp “provides an online directory
    that allows registered users to post reviews and rank businesses on a scale
    of one to five stars” and, “[b]ased on these user rankings, . . . assigns
    businesses an overall ‘star’ rating.” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 
    765 F.3d 1123
    ,
    1126 (9th Cir. 2014).
    4                      KIMZEY V. YELP!
    such as Roommates.Com—Kimzey cryptically alleged that
    Yelp in effect created and developed content. Kimzey claims
    that Yelp is responsible for causing a review from another site
    to appear on its page, providing a star-rating function that
    transforms user reviews into Yelp’s own content, and
    “caus[ing] [the statements] to appear” as a promotion on
    Google’s search engine. This phrasing seeks to take
    advantage of the fact that the CDA’s “grant of immunity
    applies only if the interactive computer service provider is not
    also an ‘information content provider,’ which is defined as
    someone who is ‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the
    creation or development of’ the offending content.” 
    Id. at 1162
    (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)); see also FTC v.
    Accusearch Inc., 
    570 F.3d 1187
    , 1195 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The
    prototypical service qualifying for [CDA] immunity is an
    online messaging board (or bulletin board) on which Internet
    subscribers post comments and respond to comments posted
    by others.”).
    Kimzey apparently hoped to plead around the CDA to
    advance the same basic argument that the statute plainly bars:
    that Yelp published user-generated speech that was harmful
    to Kimzey. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 
    570 F.3d 1096
    , 1105
    (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that Yahoo! was immune from
    liability for negligently declining to remove indecent third-
    party content). We decline to open the door to such artful
    skirting of the CDA’s safe harbor provision. This case is in
    some sense a simple matter of a complaint that failed to
    allege facts sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its
    face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009). But it
    is also more consequential than that, given congressional
    recognition that the Internet serves as a “forum for a true
    diversity of . . . myriad avenues for intellectual activity” and
    “ha[s] flourished . . . with a minimum of government
    KIMZEY V. YELP!                       5
    regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)–(4). Kimzey’s effort to
    circumvent the CDA’s protections through “creative”
    pleading fails, and the district court did not err in granting
    Yelp’s motion to dismiss.
    BACKGROUND
    Yelp describes its websites and mobile applications as
    “provid[ing] a forum for members of the public—free of
    charge—to read and write reviews about local businesses,
    government services, and other entities.” Kimzey owns a
    locksmith business, Redmond Locksmith (aka “Redmond
    Mobile Locksmith”), that operates in the greater Seattle
    metropolitan area.
    In September 2011, a Yelp user identified as “Sarah K”
    posted a review of Kimzey’s business on the Yelp page for
    Redmond Mobile Locksmith:
    THIS WAS BY FAR THE WORST
    EXPERIENCE I HAVE EVER
    ENCOUNTERED WITH A LOCKSMITH.
    DO NOT GO THROUGH THIS COMPANY.
    I had just flew [sic] back from a long business
    trip with absolutely no sleep, had to drive into
    work right after getting off the plane. I was so
    tired that I locked my keys in the car. So
    when I realized what happened I called
    Redmond Mobile. The gentlemen [sic] on the
    phone told me that a technician would be out
    ASAP and quoted me $50 for the service,
    which seemed reasonable. $35 for the service
    call and $15 for the lock. The technician
    called and said he’d be at my office in 30 min,
    6                    KIMZEY V. YELP!
    an hour goes by and nothing. Call the
    company back to ask about the ETA and was
    greeted rudely by the person I had spoken to
    earlier. He took no responsibility. After the
    technician finally showed up, he was trying to
    charge me $35 for the service call and $175
    for the lock. I got 20% off after trying to
    argue with him about being late and the
    incorrect quote. Supposedly, the lock is $15
    and up. Bullshit. CALL THIS BUSINESS
    AT YOUR OWN RISK. I didn’t even need
    new keys. I just needed my car unlocked.
    Sarah K gave Redmond Mobile Locksmith a rating of one out
    of five stars. Approximately one year later, in early
    September 2012, a person identified as “D K. Of Redmond
    Mobile Locksmith” posted a comment under Sarah K’s
    review, stating, “Yelp has Posted a Fraudulent review on our
    Business.” The comment included a hyperlink to essentially
    the same “review posted about a fraud operation known as
    ‘Redmond Mobile’ (425) 318-4257,” which was not
    Kimzey’s business name. Then Sarah K returned. She
    posted an update to her review:
    I was just informed recently by a friend that
    this business has been trying to contact others
    on my friends list asking about my original
    review. A year ago, I had also received
    similar msgs from this business and also yelp
    requesting authentication of the review and
    the business directly asking me to take down
    the review because I must have gotten the
    company incorrect. So let me clarify, I do not
    work for a competitor of this business nor do
    KIMZEY V. YELP!                       7
    I appreciate this type of harassment. I’ve
    already confirmed to Yelp that indeed this
    review was meant for Redmond Mobile
    Locksmith and I have the receipt to prove it.
    I will be issuing an official complaint to Yelp
    about this now.
    Yelp’s administrative records showed that Sarah K was not
    associated with any internet protocol address associated with
    Yelp, nor was she ever employed by Yelp.
    Kimzey filed a pro se complaint in the district court
    alleging that Yelp is liable for the reviews by Sarah K under
    the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
    (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); the Washington Consumer
    Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.020; and
    Washington’s libel law. Specifically, the complaint alleged
    that Yelp “caused to appear a Libelous Per Se statement . . .
    on . . . Google.” By “caused to appear,” Kimzey seems to
    assert that Yelp found the review on another website and
    posted it as a comment on its own website. Kimzey asserted
    that Yelp went on to publish the statements by Sarah K as
    “advertisements” or as a “promotion” on Google as part of a
    “Traffic Acquisition” program. After clicking on the
    “promotion,” a Google user would be “directed to Yelp.com
    and then shown Yelp sponsored [sic] advertising.” At the
    center of this allegedly creative process was a star rating,
    which Kimzey alleged “Yelp has developed and created” by
    “design[ing] the star image and creat[ing] the color.”
    Kimzey also alleged that the content of at least the first
    review posted by Sarah K bore the indicia of an “illegal
    scheme . . . operated by the EL-AD Group, which uses
    thousands of fictitious locksmith business names on the
    8                          KIMZEY V. YELP!
    Internet in every major US city, to promote themselves.” The
    connection between Yelp and this claimed scheme was not
    clearly articulated in the complaint: Kimzey alleged that EL-
    AD’s purported statement “transitioned to Yelp.com and was
    linked to the Plaintiffs [sic] business name” where it then
    “transitioned to Google.com as a Yelp promotion.”
    Yelp moved to strike the complaint under Washington’s
    anti-SLAPP statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525, and to
    dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court
    granted the motion to dismiss, finding that § 230 of the CDA
    “immunizes [Yelp] from the entirety of [Kimzey]’s lawsuit”
    and that Kimzey “has not alleged non-conclusory factual
    content that is plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling him to
    relief.” The district court declined to rule on the anti-SLAPP
    motion.2
    ANALYSIS
    Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA “only protects from liability
    (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service
    (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of
    action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided
    2
    In the cross-appeal, Yelp argued that the district court erred by
    failing to rule on Yelp’s motion to strike under the Washington anti-
    SLAPP statute. Yelp argued that “[t]reating an anti-SLAPP motion as
    moot based on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal frustrates [the] purpose [of the
    anti-SLAPP statute], and treats the anti-SLAPP statute as a procedural
    rule, rather than one creating substantive rights and defenses.” The issue
    on cross-appeal is moot in light of the Washington Supreme Court’s
    invalidation of the Washington anti-SLAPP statute, which occurred after
    the district court’s dismissal and after the briefs on appeal were filed. See
    Davis v. Cox, 
    351 P.3d 862
    (Wash. 2015) (en banc).
    KIMZEY V. YELP!                               9
    by another information content provider.” 
    Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100
    –01 (footnotes omitted). Yelp is plainly a provider of
    an “interactive computer service,” see 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2),
    a term that we interpret “expansive[ly]” under the CDA,
    Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 
    339 F.3d 1119
    , 1123 (9th
    Cir. 2003). As we observed in Roommates.Com, “[t]oday, the
    most common interactive computer services are 
    websites.” 521 F.3d at 1162
    n.6. There is likewise no question that
    Kimzey’s claims are premised on Yelp’s publication of Sarah
    K’s statements and star rating.3 In other words, the claim is
    directed against Yelp in its capacity as a publisher or speaker.
    See 
    Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102
    . The remaining question is
    therefore whether the information was “provided by another
    information content provider.” 
    Id. at 1101.
    Although the complaint is far from lucid and the opening
    brief cryptic to the point of opacity, we discern two discrete
    theories of Yelp’s alleged authorship. The first, and the
    simplest, theory is that Yelp created the review, possibly by
    copying a review previously posted on another website. This
    echoes the complaint in our recent opinion in Levitt.
    
    765 F.3d 1123
    . There, a group of business owners alleged
    that “Yelp created negative reviews of their businesses and
    manipulated review and ratings content to induce them to
    purchase advertising through Yelp.” 
    Id. at 1127.
    3
    Kimzey’s claims under RICO and the Washington Consumer
    Protection Act, which mirror his defamation/publication claim, fall
    because he failed to allege key elements, such as “racketeering activity”
    and a “pattern of racketeering activity” under RICO, see 18 U.S.C.
    §§ 1961, 1962(a)–(c), or the capacity to “deceive a substantial portion of
    the public” under the Consumer Protection Act, see Hangman Ridge
    Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 
    719 P.2d 531
    , 535 (Wash.
    1986) (en banc).
    10                    KIMZEY V. YELP!
    We did not reach the CDA issue in Levitt, but we
    explained that for a plaintiff to “make a plausible claim that
    Yelp authored [a review], it must plead facts tending to
    demonstrate that the . . . review was not, as is usual, authored
    by a user.” 
    Id. at 1135.
    A careful reading of the complaint
    reveals that Kimzey never specifically alleged that Yelp
    authored or created the content of the statements posted under
    the aegis of Sarah K, but rather that Yelp adopted them from
    another website and transformed them into its own stylized
    promotions on Yelp and Google. We have no trouble in this
    case concluding that threadbare allegations of fabrication of
    statements are implausible on their face and are insufficient
    to avoid immunity under the CDA. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    (holding that a complaint must contain “sufficient factual
    matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
    
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007))). Were it otherwise, CDA
    immunity could be avoided simply by reciting a common line
    that user-generated statements are not what they say they are.
    It cannot be the case that the CDA and its purpose of
    promoting the “free exchange of information and ideas over
    the Internet” could be so casually eviscerated. See 
    Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122
    . This is not to say that CDA immunity
    extends to content created or developed by an interactive
    computer service; it does not. See 
    Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1162
    –63. But the immunity in the CDA is broad enough
    to require plaintiffs alleging such a theory to state the facts
    plausibly suggesting the defendant fabricated content under
    a third party’s identity. See 
    Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123
    .
    Here there are no such facts.
    The second, and more convoluted, theory is that Yelp
    transformed the review by Sarah K into its own
    KIMZEY V. YELP!                         11
    “advertisement” or “promotion” on Google and featured a
    unique star-rating system as the mantlepiece of its creation.
    As this case illustrates, it is not difficult to allege in a
    complaint that a publisher of information engaged in creation
    by transformation. Here, for instance, Kimzey alleged that
    Yelp designed and created its signature star-rating system,
    and thereby served as “author” of the one-star rating given by
    Sarah K. Kimzey also alleged that Yelp “republishe[d]” the
    statements on Google as “newly developed advertisements,”
    and in that fashion became the actual author of that iteration
    of the content. These characterizations have superficial
    appeal, but they extend the concept of an “information
    content provider” too far and would render the CDA’s
    immunity provisions meaningless.
    The CDA defines “information content provider” as “any
    person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
    creation or development of information provided through the
    Internet or any other interactive computer service.”
    47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). The meanings of the words “creation”
    and “development” are hardly self evident in the online
    world, and our cases have struggled with determining their
    scope. See, e.g., 
    Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1171
    (clarifying the language used in Carafano because it was
    “unduly broad” and recognizing that a website could be a
    developer of content where it encouraged users to provide
    illegal content); 
    Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124
    (holding that a
    dating site could not “be considered an ‘information content
    provider’ under the [CDA] because no profile has any content
    until a user actively creates it”); Batzel v. Smith, 
    333 F.3d 1018
    , 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that “development of
    information” requires “something more substantial than
    merely editing portions of an e-mail and selecting material for
    publication”). These cases establish that a website may lose
    12                        KIMZEY V. YELP!
    immunity under the CDA by making a material contribution
    to the creation or development of content.4
    It is clear here, however, that neither of the allegedly
    creative actions taken by Yelp falls within our interpretation
    of the terms “creation” or “development” of information.
    Even were we convinced that a one-star rating could be
    understood as defamatory—a premise we do not embrace, see
    Aviation Charter, Inc. v. Aviation Research Grp./US,
    
    416 F.3d 864
    , 870–72 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding ratings
    inactionable opinion statements), abrogated on other grounds
    by Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., 
    773 F.3d 58
    (8th Cir. 2014)—the rating system does “absolutely nothing
    to enhance the defamatory sting of the message” beyond the
    words offered by the user. 
    Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1172
    .
    Our foundation is Carafano, where we held that the mere
    fact that an interactive computer service “classifies user
    characteristics . . . and collects responses to . . . questions . . .
    does not transform [it] into a developer of the underlying
    
    misinformation.” 339 F.3d at 1124
    (internal quotation marks
    4
    Our sister circuits have generally adopted Roommates.Com’s
    “material contribution” to activity test and have consistently drawn the
    line at the “crucial distinction between, on the one hand, taking actions
    (traditional to publishers) that are necessary to the display of unwelcome
    and actionable content and, on the other hand, responsibility for what
    makes the displayed content illegal or actionable.” Jones v. Dirty World
    Entm’t Recordings LLC, 
    755 F.3d 398
    , 413–14 (6th Cir. 2014); see also
    Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 
    591 F.3d 250
    ,
    257–58 (4th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Roommates.Com on the basis that
    the content that the website solicited from users was not itself unlawful);
    
    Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197
    –201 (denying immunity where a website
    intentionally made illegal purchases of confidential consumer
    information).
    KIMZEY V. YELP!                        13
    omitted). Carafano cited Gentry v. eBay, Inc., a case from
    the California Court of Appeal, in which the court examined
    the eBay rating system that displayed user feedback through
    both a star symbol and a color code. 
    See 339 F.3d at 1124
    (citing 
    121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703
    (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). Apropos
    of Yelp’s star rating, the eBay rating system was “simply a
    representation of the amount of such positive information
    received by other users of eBay’s web site” and was thus
    protected by § 230. 
    Gentry, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 717
    ; see also
    Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., Nos. C-10-1321 EMC, C-10-2351 EMC,
    
    2011 WL 5079526
    , *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (applying
    Gentry’s logic to Yelp and concluding that “[s]ince the
    aggregate rating . . . is likewise based on user-generated data,
    the Court finds that aspect of Gentry persuasive”), affirmed
    on other grounds by Levitt, 
    765 F.3d 1123
    .
    We fail to see how Yelp’s rating system, which is based
    on rating inputs from third parties and which reduces this
    information into a single, aggregate metric is anything other
    than user-generated data. Indeed, the star-rating system is
    best characterized as the kind of “neutral tool[]” operating on
    “voluntary inputs” that we determined did not amount to
    content development or creation in 
    Roommates.Com. 521 F.3d at 1172
    ; see also Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 
    753 F.3d 1354
    , 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a “website does not
    create or develop content when it merely provides a neutral
    means by which third parties can post information of their
    own independent choosing online”).
    Nor do Kimzey’s arguments that Yelp can be held liable
    for “republishing” the same content as advertisements or
    14                        KIMZEY V. YELP!
    promotions on Google survive close scrutiny.5 To the extent
    Kimzey’s complaint aims at alleged downstream distribution
    of the starred review, § 230’s immunity defeats the claim.
    Nothing in the text of the CDA indicates that immunity turns
    on how many times an interactive computer service publishes
    “information provided by another information content
    provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Just as Yelp is immune
    from liability under the CDA for posting user-generated
    content on its own website, Yelp is not liable for
    disseminating the same content in essentially the same format
    to a search engine, as this action does not change the origin
    of the third-party content. See Ascentive, LLC v. Op. Corp.,
    
    842 F. Supp. 2d 450
    , 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[Search engine
    optimization and] use of plaintiffs’ marks to make
    [defendant’s ] pages appear higher in search engine results
    list . . . do not render [defendant] an information content
    provider.”). Simply put, proliferation and dissemination of
    content does not equal creation or development of content.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    It is unclear whether the republication on Google that Kimzey
    alleges amounts to anything more than the passive indexing of Yelp
    reviews by Google for the purpose of populating its search engine results.
    If this is what Kimzey means, then the claims fail because he pled no
    plausible theory of liability for Yelp stemming from Google’s actions.
    Tipping to Kimzey’s favor in construing his claim, we assume that
    Kimzey alleges Yelp proactively posted advertisements or promotional
    links on Google.