Galindo v. Valley View Ass'n , 399 P.3d 796 ( 2017 )

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA78
Court of Appeals No. 16CA1005
Garfield County District Court No. 13CV30316
Honorable John F. Neiley, Judge
Erika Galindo, individually and as parent, guardian, and next friend of Ariana
Guadalupe Galindo, a minor child; and Jose Galindo, individually and as
parent, guardian, and next friend of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, a minor child,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Valley View Association, d/b/a/ Valley View Hospital,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL DISMISSED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Graham and Welling, JJ., concur
Announced June 1, 2017
Law Office of Stan Epshtein, Stan Epshtein, John Bellinger, Denver, Colorado,
for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Jaudon & Avery LLP, David H. Yun, Jared R. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee
The Law Office of Natalie L. Decker, LLC, Natalie L. Decker, Littleton, Colorado;
Michael J. Norton, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado
Family Action
¶1 Plaintiffs, Erika and Jose Galindo, are the parents of Ariana
Guadalupe Galindo, who died in utero. They have brought claims
against Valley View Association, doing business as Valley View
Hospital (the hospital), seeking damages on behalf of themselves
and Ariana’s estate. They allege that medical personnel at the
hospital acted negligently in diagnosing and treating Mrs. Galindo
when she went to the hospital showing signs of a ruptured
placenta. They further assert that as a result of that negligence,
Ariana died and they were injured.
¶2 The district court dismissed the claims plaintiffs assert based
on Ariana’s death and sua sponte certified its order as final under
C.R.C.P. 54(b). Because we conclude that the district court erred in
ruling that there was no just reason to delay an appeal of its order,
we dismiss the appeal.
I. Additional Background
¶3 Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts causes of action against the
hospital for negligence on behalf of Mr. Galindo, Mrs. Galindo, and
Ariana (or her estate); negligent infliction of emotional distress on
behalf of Mrs. Galindo; loss of consortium on behalf of Mr. Galindo;
and wrongful death on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Galindo. It also
1
asserts that damages can be awarded for Ariana’s pre-death
injuries under the survival statute, section 13-20-101, C.R.S.
2016.1
¶4 Shortly before trial, the district court ordered the parties to
brief the issue whether an unborn fetus (who was not subsequently
born alive) is a “person” within the meaning of the wrongful death
and survival statutes. (The wrongful death statute, section 13-21-
202, C.R.S. 2016, and the survival statute apply in the event of the
“death of a person.”)2
1 A wrongful death claim based on negligence in causing the death
of another may be brought by certain statutorily identified
individuals to recover damages those individuals incurred as a
result of the other’s death. §§ 13-21-201 to -204, C.R.S. 2016. In
contrast, the survival statute, section 13-20-101, C.R.S. 2016,
allows an action on behalf of a deceased person’s estate for
damages that person incurred prior to death; it provides that a
cause of action that accrued prior to death is not extinguished upon
the person’s death. See Espinoza v. O’Dell, 633 P.2d 455, 462-66
(Colo. 1981) (explaining how the wrongful death and survival
statutes operate); Gonzales v. Mascarenas, 190 P.3d 826, 828-29
(Colo. App. 2008) (same).
2 The hospital never raised the issue of whether Ariana was a
“person” within the meaning of the wrongful death and survival
statutes. Though we don’t approve of the court’s decision to raise
the issue on its own, the case is nevertheless before us.
2
¶5 The court postponed the trial. After considering the parties’
briefs, the court ruled that Ariana was not a “person” within the
meaning of the statutes, and it dismissed the wrongful death claim
and the negligence claim brought on behalf of Ariana’s estate.3 At
the end of the order, the court wrote: “There being no just reason
for delay, final judgment is hereby entered in favor of [the hospital]
and against the Plaintiffs on both claims pursuant to C.R.C.P.
54(b).” The court didn’t explain why there was no just reason for
delay.
¶6 Plaintiffs appealed the order. After the appeal was fully
briefed, the clerk assigned the case to this division. The division
then ordered the parties to brief the issue whether the district court
had properly certified the order as final under Rule 54(b), directing
them specifically to explain why there was no just reason to delay
an appeal until the entire case has been resolved, and, even more
3 The court said it was dismissing the wrongful death and survival
statute claims. But, as discussed, the survival statute does not
create an independent cause of action; rather, it provides that a
person’s death does not preclude an action by that person’s estate if
that person could have brought an action had she survived. § 13-
20-101(1). The effect of the court’s order, therefore, was to dismiss
the wrongful death claim and the negligence claim that plaintiffs
have asserted on Ariana’s behalf (or on behalf of her estate).
3
specifically, to explain what hardship or injustice would result to
any party if the appeal is not allowed to proceed. See Allison v.
Engel, 2017 COA 43, ¶ 1 (to show that there is no just reason for
delay, it must appear that “a party would experience some hardship
or injustice through delay that could be alleviated only by an
immediate appeal”). Having considered the parties’ supplemental
briefs and the record, we conclude that the district court’s
conclusory ruling that there is no just reason for delay is
unsupported by the record or law.
II. The Requirements of Rule 54(b)
¶7 Rule 54(b) creates an exception to the rule that an appellate
court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments.
Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1125, 1126 (Colo.
1982). But that exception is quite limited, and it must be
construed consistently with the historical policy against allowing
piecemeal appeals. Allison, ¶ 31.
¶8 A court correctly certifies a ruling as final under the rule only
if (1) it is on an entire claim for relief; (2) it ultimately disposes of
the claim; and (3) the court determines expressly that there is no
just reason to delay an appeal on the ruling. Lytle v. Kite, 728 P.2d
4
 305, 308 (Colo. 1986); Harding Glass, 640 P.2d at 1125; Allison,
¶ 24.
¶9 In this case, we assume that the ruling satisfies the first two
parts of this test.4 We focus on part three.
III. Standard of Review — No Just Reason for Delay
¶ 10 Ordinarily, we review a district court’s determination that
there is no just reason for delay for an abuse of discretion. Lytle,
728 P.2d at 308, 309; Allison, ¶ 25. We do so because determining
whether there is no just reason for delay requires considering
interests of judicial administration and equitable factors, see
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980); Lytle,
728 P.2d at 309, and “the district court is ‘most likely to be familiar
with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay.’” Allison,
4 But this assumption is questionable. We don’t just look at the
labels in a party’s pleading. Claims are separate “when more than
one recovery is possible and when a judgment on one claim would
not bar a judgment on the other claims.” Richmond Am. Homes of
Colo., Inc. v. Steel Floors, LLC, 187 P.3d 1199, 1203 (Colo. App.
2008). The negligence claim and the wrongful death claim are
premised on the same alleged negligence. So if the fact finder
determines that the hospital employees were not negligent, and
finds against Mrs. Galindo on that basis, that would seem to bar
any claim based on Ariana’s death or on behalf of Ariana’s estate.
See Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 109 P.3d
604, 608 (Colo. 2005) (claim preclusion); Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox
& O’Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 84-85 (Colo. 1999) (issue preclusion).
5
¶ 25 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437
(1956)).5
¶ 11 Our deference to the district court’s determination therefore
depends on whether we know the court’s reasons, so it’s important
that the court not merely parrot the language of the rule (“no just
reason for delay”), but clearly explain its reasoning. Still, we do not
say that a court’s failure to do that is some sort of jurisdictional
defect. It isn’t. But unless the court explains its reasoning, or the
reasons are otherwise obvious from the record, “any deference we
5 Relevant considerations include
(1)the relationship between the adjudicated
and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility
that the need for review might or might not be
mooted by future developments in the district
court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing
court might be obliged to consider the same
issue a second time; (4) the presence or
absence of a claim or counterclaim which
could result in set-off against the judgment
sought to be made final; [and] (5)
miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic
and solvency considerations, shortening the
time of trial, frivolity of competing claims,
expense, and the like.
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir.
1975) (footnotes omitted), abrogation on other grounds recognized by
Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 221 (3d Cir. 2012); see
also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
6
might otherwise accord the 54(b) certification decision will be
nullified.” Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162,
166 (11th Cir. 1997); accord, e.g., Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer
E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir. 1993); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Fore
River Ry. Co., 861 F.2d 322, 325-26 (1st Cir. 1988); Solomon v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 58, 61 (6th Cir. 1986); see also 10
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 54.23[2], at 54-
68 to 54-69 (3d ed. 2015); 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller
& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2659, at 140-44
(4th ed. 2014).6
¶ 12 In this case, the district court didn’t give any explanation as to
why it was certifying the ruling, much less any explanation as to
why there was no just reason for delay. The record doesn’t
otherwise reveal some obvious explanation.7 Thus, we will carefully
6 We consider persuasive case law applying the federal counterpart
to C.R.C.P. 54(b) because the federal rule and the state rule are
virtually identical. Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123,
1126 n.5 (Colo. 1981); Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43, ¶ 25 n.3.
7 Sometimes the reasons may be obvious based on how claims are
pleaded. And oftentimes the reasons for finding that there is no
just reason for delay may be set forth in a party’s motion requesting
certification, and an appellate court can assume that the district
court relied on those reasons. See Clos v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 597
7
scrutinize the district court’s decision without according it
deference.
IV. Analysis — No Just Reason for Delay
¶ 13 The hospital concedes that the district court improperly
certified the ruling. It gleans from the court’s ruling and the court’s
decision to stay the proceedings pending this appeal that the court
sought to avoid multiple trials, and it recognizes that Allison holds
that that reason is “plainly insufficient to justify certification
because the same could be said about any case involving multiple
claims or parties as to which a dispositive ruling is entered on one
claim, or as to one party, before trial.” Allison, ¶ 40.
¶ 14 Plaintiffs, however, try to justify the court’s certification in four
ways.
¶ 15 First, they argue that unlike the situation in Harding Glass,
the claims the court dismissed in this case are “entire stand-alone
F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Huggins v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In some
cases, a sufficient reason for Rule 54(b) certification may be evident
from the record, even though the court did not explain its
reasoning.”); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d
740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (failure to give reasons may not be a
problem where the court’s reasoning is discernable from other parts
of the record). But in this case, no party moved for certification.
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claims.” But that goes mainly to the first two parts of the Rule
54(b) certification test, not the issue whether there is no just reason
for delay.8
¶ 16 Second, and similarly, plaintiffs argue that this case is not like
Allison, where the court had dismissed one counterclaim while
various claims and counterclaims remained pending. That’s true,
but the difference is merely one of degree, not kind. That this case
involves dismissal of a greater percentage of claims says nothing
about whether there is no just reason for delay, or even more
specifically about whether any party will suffer hardship or injustice
unless this appeal proceeds.
¶ 17 Third, plaintiffs assert that this appeal involves “an issue of
first impression” that we “will inevitably have to address.” Many
cases, however, involve issues of first impression. Plaintiffs haven’t
cited any authority for the proposition that the presence of such an
issue justifies Rule 54(b) certification, and we haven’t found any.
See Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1336 (deeming that reason
8As discussed in footnote 4 above, it is not at all clear that the
dismissed claims are truly “stand-alone claims.”
9
insufficient and dismissing the appeal).9 And as for whether we will
“inevitably” have to address the issue, again the same could be said
about issues in most any multiple-claim or multiple-party case.
¶ 18 Moreover, the assumption that we will have to decide the
“person” issue at some point in this case may prove incorrect. If a
fact finder determines that the hospital wasn’t negligent, and that
finding is affirmed on appeal, that would be an independent basis
for affirming the judgment on the wrongful death claim and the
negligence claim brought on behalf of Ariana’s estate pursuant to
the survival statute. Because all of the claims are premised on
exactly the same allegations of negligence, the doctrines of claim
and issue preclusion would thus bar relitigation of the matter of the
hospital’s negligence, even if we decided the “person” issue
differently. See Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth.,
109 P.3d 604, 608 (Colo. 2005) (claim preclusion); Bebo Constr. Co.
v. Mattox & O’Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 84-85 (Colo. 1999) (issue
9 That the case involves a matter of first impression is relevant to
whether the ruling would be appropriate for an interlocutory appeal
under C.A.R. 4.2. See C.A.R. 4.2(b)(2); Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v.
Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 n.4 (4th Cir. 1993) (so reasoning
in light of the federal statutory counterpart to C.A.R. 4.2).
10
preclusion).10 In any event, the fact that we may be called on to
decide the issue at some point doesn’t mean that any party will
suffer hardship or injustice if we don’t decide it now.
¶ 19 Fourth, plaintiffs assert in purely conclusory fashion that
dismissing the appeal will be “harmful to the parties” and “the
justice system as a whole.” We don’t see how. Requiring all issues
in the case to be resolved before an appeal in no way hinders any
party’s access to justice. Rather, it promotes such access in a more
efficient fashion.
¶ 20 The district court’s ruling is inappropriate for certification
under Rule 54(b) for the added reason that the adjudicated and
unadjudicated claims are closely interrelated. See Curtiss-Wright,
446 U.S. at 10 (a court should consider “the interrelationship of the
claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be
reviewed only as single units”); Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 167; Braswell
Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1337; Consol. Rail Corp., 861 F.2d at 326;
Solomon, 782 F.2d at 62; see also 10 Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 54.23[1][a]; 10 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2659, at 108-10.
The operative facts of all of the claims are the same. Mr. and Mrs.
10 Also, the parties could settle the case.
11
Galindo remain parties to the unadjudicated claims. See Consol.
Rail Corp., 861 F.2d at 326 (“Application of Rule 54(b) is particularly
inappropriate ‘when the contestants on appeal remain,
simultaneously, contestants below.’” (quoting Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts
Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1988))). And, as discussed, the key
issue common to all the claims is whether the hospital was
negligent. So while the dismissed claims may be separate from the
other claims asserted by Mr. and Mrs. Galindo individually, all the
claims are so closely interrelated that allowing piecemeal appeals
would be counterproductive. Cf. Clark v. Baka, 593 F.3d 712 (8th
Cir. 2010) (in action seeking damages for injuries caused to child
during birth at hospital, district court improperly certified judgment
in favor of one defendant, a hospital management company, where
claims against the remaining health care providers arose out of the
same facts).
V. Conclusion
¶ 21 The appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE GRAHAM and JUDGE WELLING concur.
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