Knapp v. Ruser , 297 Neb. 639 ( 2017 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    09/22/2017 09:13 AM CDT
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    KNAPP v. RUSER
    Cite as 
    297 Neb. 639
    Patricia A. K napp,         appellant, v. K evin Ruser,
    in his official capacity, and the         University
    of      Nebraska Board      of  R egents, appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed September 1, 2017.   No. S-16-785.
    1.	 Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will
    affirm a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and
    admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
    facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts
    and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    2.	 ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
    judgment was granted and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences deducible from the evidence.
    3.	 Motions for New Trial: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews
    a denial of a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend
    the judgment, for an abuse of discretion.
    4.	 Fair Employment Practices: Statutes: Federal Acts. The Nebraska
    Fair Employment Practice Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-1101 through
    48-1126 (Reissue 2010), is patterned after federal title VII of the Civil
    Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012), and therefore, it is appro-
    priate to look to federal court decisions construing Title VII for guidance
    with respect to the Nebraska act.
    5.	 Fair Employment Practices: Discrimination: Proof. A prima facie
    case of gender discrimination requires the plaintiff to prove that he or
    she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified to perform
    the job, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was treated
    differently from similarly situated persons of the opposite sex.
    6.	 ____: ____: ____. The test to determine whether employees are simi-
    larly situated to warrant a comparison to a plaintiff is a rigorous one and
    the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that there were individuals
    similarly situated in all relevant aspects to the plaintiff by a preponder-
    ance of the evidence.
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    7.	 Fair Employment Practices: Statutes: Federal Acts. Because Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 48-1221(1) (Reissue 2010) is patterned after the federal
    Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012), it is appropriate to look to
    federal court decisions construing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) for guidance with
    respect to § 48-1221(1).
    8.	 Claims: Fair Employment Practices: Discrimination: Wages: Proof.
    When bringing a claim of wage discrimination based on sex under Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 48-1221(1) (Reissue 2010), a plaintiff must first establish
    a prima facie case by showing by a preponderance of the evidence
    that (1) the plaintiff was paid less than a person of the opposite sex
    employed in the same establishment; (2) for equal work on jobs requir-
    ing equal skill, effort, and responsibility; (3) which were performed
    under similar working conditions. If a plaintiff establishes a prima
    facie case of wage discrimination based on sex, the burden then shifts
    to the defendant to prove one of the affirmative defenses set forth in
    § 48-1221(1).
    9.	 Fair Employment Practices: Proof. A plaintiff must establish a prima
    facie case of retaliation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1114 (Reissue 2010)
    by showing (1) he or she engaged in protected conduct, (2) he or she
    was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a
    causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action.
    10.	 ____: ____. To satisfy the adverse employment action requirement in
    a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
    would have found the challenged action materially adverse. This, in turn,
    requires a showing that the employment action might have dissuaded a
    reasonable worker from reporting the alleged unlawful practice. To meet
    this burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employment action
    was material, not trivial, and that it resulted in some concrete injury
    or harm.
    11.	 Claims: Fair Employment Practices: Public Policy: Damages. Under
    the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, an
    employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the moti-
    vation for the firing contravenes public policy. The public policy
    exception is restricted to cases when a clear mandate of public policy
    has been violated, and it should be limited to manageable and clear
    standards. In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy is
    violated, courts should inquire whether the employer’s conduct contra-
    venes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
    provision or scheme.
    Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County:
    Horacio J. Wheelock, Judge. Affirmed.
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    KNAPP v. RUSER
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    Brandon B. Hanson, of Hanson Law Offices, for appellant.
    John C. Wiltse, of University of Nebraska, and David R.
    Buntain, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather,
    L.L.P., for appellees.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, K elch,
    and Funke, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    I. NATURE OF CASE
    Patricia A. Knapp filed an action against Kevin Ruser, in his
    official capacity, and the Board of Regents of the University
    of Nebraska in which she asserted claims of discriminatory
    wage and employment practices based on her sex as well as
    claims of employment retaliation. Knapp’s claims arose from
    alleged occurrences while she was a supervising attorney for
    the civil clinical law program at the University of Nebraska
    College of Law. Knapp appeals the orders of the district
    court for Lancaster County in which the court sustained the
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment and overruled her
    motion to alter or amend the judgment. We affirm the district
    court’s orders.
    II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Knapp commenced this action with a complaint filed in
    the district court on July 11, 2014. In that complaint, Knapp
    set forth eight claims for relief, some based on state law and
    some based on federal law. In August, the defendants had
    the action removed to the U.S. District Court for the District
    of Nebraska. In November 2015, the federal court sustained
    the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and
    dismissed certain of Knapp’s claims, which were based on
    federal law, with prejudice. The federal court remanded the
    remaining claims, which were based on Nebraska state law,
    to the district court for Lancaster County for further proceed-
    ings. Knapp v. Ruser, 
    145 F. Supp. 3d 846
    (D. Neb. 2015).
    Upon remand to the state court, Knapp filed an amended
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    complaint which mirrored the operative amended complaint
    she had filed in the federal court. In the amended complaint,
    she set forth 10 claims for relief. The federal court had dis-
    missed the first through third, sixth, eighth, and tenth claims.
    Also, it remanded the fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth claims
    for further proceedings in the state court. Accordingly, our
    consideration on appeal is limited to the state district court’s
    disposition of four claims identified in the operative complaint
    as the fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth claims.
    1. Background/Facts
    Knapp, an attorney, began working in the civil clinic as a
    temporary half-time employee in the summer of 1999. At that
    time, the director of clinical programs was on a sabbatical,
    and Knapp was hired to cover the portion of his responsibili-
    ties that concerned the civil clinic. After the director returned
    from sabbatical and informed the college that he would be
    leaving at the end of the fall semester, Knapp was hired as a
    temporary half-time employee beginning in the spring 2000
    semester. The understanding was that she would cover the
    former director’s duties with respect to the civil clinic while
    the law school considered its long-term strategic plan for the
    clinical programs.
    Knapp’s half-time employment in the civil clinic ended
    in August 2004 after Ruser was named director of the clini-
    cal programs and the law school hired Richard Moberly to
    perform the duties Knapp had performed in the civil clinic.
    In 2006, the law school again hired Knapp as a half-time
    employee in the civil clinic after it determined that Moberly’s
    half-time status was not sufficient to meet student needs.
    While Knapp and Moberly split duties in the civil clinic,
    Moberly held a full-time position which included additional
    responsibilities such as teaching doctrinal classes, research,
    and community service.
    Knapp continued to work half-time in the civil clinic until
    August 2011, when Moberly became an associate dean of the
    law school and gave up his duties in the civil clinic. Knapp
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    and Ruser agreed that Knapp’s employment as supervising
    attorney in the civil clinic should go to full time. Knapp’s
    position was classified as that of “Temporary Lecturer” and
    was designated as a “‘Special Appointment.’” Knapp met
    with the dean of the law school to discuss her full-time sal-
    ary; the dean offered Knapp an annual salary of $80,000.
    After Knapp told the dean that the salary was low, the dean
    told Knapp that she would explore the possibility of increas-
    ing the salary by seeking a designation for the position as a
    “‘professor of practice.’” Knapp agreed to accept the salary
    for the upcoming academic year based on what she believed
    to be the dean’s “good-faith commitment” to find a way to
    increase her salary. When Knapp told Ruser the salary she
    had been offered, Ruser told her that the dean had “‘low-
    balled’” her.
    A year later, in August 2012, Ruser left a letter for Knapp
    setting forth proposed terms and conditions for her employ-
    ment in the upcoming academic year. The letter stated that
    her salary would again be $80,000. Prior to receiving the
    letter, Knapp had had no other communication with the law
    school’s administration regarding her salary for the upcom-
    ing year. The letter prompted Knapp to check the salaries of
    others working in the clinical programs. She learned from the
    University of Nebraska’s website that a male professor had
    been hired in March 2012 to teach a business transactions
    clinic at a salary of $106,000 per year. Knapp thereafter spoke
    with Ruser regarding her salary, and she told him that after
    seeing others’ salaries, she thought that the salary structure in
    the clinical programs was “skewed” and that the clinics had a
    “‘gender equity’ problem” that Ruser needed to address. Ruser
    responded that he was “‘baffled’” by Knapp’s allegations of
    discrimination and that the new male professor’s higher sal-
    ary was justified by the fact that his position was a tenure
    track position.
    Knapp alleged that the conversation became heated and
    that afterward, Ruser’s behavior and demeanor toward her
    changed. Knapp alleged that Ruser acted more hostile and
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    that he stopped adequately communicating with her. Knapp
    also observed that Ruser appeared to be neglecting his own
    duties in the clinic, including supervision of students and
    cases. After adopting a child in the spring semester, Ruser
    went to half time, and Knapp alleged that he “disengaged
    even further” from the clinic, with the result being that the
    clinic “was not fulfilling its ethical obligations to its clients
    or to its students.”
    In April 2013, Knapp learned that Ruser would be receiving
    a lifetime achievement award from the law school. Although
    other members of the clinic’s staff had known of the award
    for several weeks and had been invited to sit at Ruser’s table
    at the award ceremony, Ruser had not mentioned the award
    to Knapp. This incident prompted Knapp to conclude that her
    relationship with Ruser “was so badly damaged that it had
    become impossible for them to work together as law partners
    in a way that would meet their ethical obligations to their cli-
    ents and to their students.”
    Knapp decided to leave her job at the clinic, but a coworker
    encouraged her to speak with the dean about what was happen-
    ing in the clinic. Knapp met with the dean and informed her of
    several problems that she perceived in the clinic. Knapp told
    the dean that problems had existed for women in the clinical
    program since the early 1980’s, when Knapp was a student
    at the college. Knapp informed the dean of various concerns
    she had regarding Ruser’s management of the clinical pro-
    grams, focusing on “the environment created for women in
    the clinical programs over the years” by Ruser and his male
    associates. Knapp alleged that after listening to Knapp’s con-
    cerns, the dean “did not offer to help in any way but wished
    [Knapp] well.” Knapp’s employment in the clinic ended on
    May 31, 2013.
    2. Federal District Court’s
    Disposition of Claims
    The federal district court concluded that because of sover-
    eign immunity, it lacked jurisdiction to hear four of Knapp’s
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    claims: the fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth. Those four claims
    were based on state law, and the federal court found that the
    state statutory schemes underlying the claims were not “suf-
    ficiently explicit to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity to
    suit in federal court.” Knapp v. Ruser, 
    145 F. Supp. 3d 846
    , 855
    (D. Neb. 2015). The federal court therefore remanded the four
    claims for further proceedings in the state district court.
    The federal court determined that the six remaining claims—
    the first through third, sixth, eighth, and tenth—were asserted
    under federal law and that Congress had abrogated states’ sov-
    ereign immunity for those claims. The court stated that five of
    the claims arose under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (Title VII), and that the remain-
    ing claim arose under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
    (2012) (EPA). The federal district court considered the six
    claims. It found merit to the defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment and dismissed the six claims.
    The federal court stated that Knapp’s first claim was fash-
    ioned as a claim of disparate impact under Title VII. The court
    determined that Knapp’s disparate impact claim failed because
    she had not alleged any facially neutral employment policy
    that had a disparate impact on a protected class and instead
    had alleged a practice that was not facially neutral. The court
    characterized Knapp’s allegations as an allegation of dispar­
    ate treatment rather than disparate impact and concluded that
    Knapp had not pled a prima facie case for disparate impact.
    The court therefore dismissed Knapp’s first claim.
    The federal court next considered Knapp’s second, sixth,
    and eighth claims, which were fashioned as claims of dis-
    parate treatment and discrimination (the second and eighth
    claims, respectively) under Title VII and a claim of wage
    discrimination under the EPA (the sixth claim). The court
    set forth the requirements of a prima facie claim of disparate
    treatment or discrimination under Title VII and stated that a
    prima facie claim of wage discrimination under the EPA was
    sufficiently similar to examine the claims together. The court
    stated that in order to prevail on each of these claims, Knapp
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    needed to identify similarly situated males who were treated
    differently from her. Construing the facts in a light most favor-
    able to Knapp, the court determined that her claims failed
    because “she [had] not shown any similarly situated male
    comparators who were treated differently.” Knapp, 145 F.
    Supp. 3d at 858. The court stated that by Knapp’s own admis-
    sion, the males to whom she compared herself performed
    work or held duties that differed substantially from her own.
    Such duties included directing clinical programs, undertaking
    academic research, and performing community service, none
    of which were part of Knapp’s position, which focused solely
    on teaching.
    The federal court stated that although Knapp argued her
    Title VII claims as failure to promote and wage discrimina-
    tion, the evidence she presented was more consistent with
    a failure to hire. The court noted that Knapp compared her
    nontenured position to tenured positions held by male employ-
    ees, and the court stated that “the uncontroverted evidence
    [was] that Knapp could only become eligible for tenure if she
    were hired into a tenure-eligible position.” Knapp v. Ruser,
    
    145 F. Supp. 3d 846
    , 857 (D. Neb. 2015). The court consid-
    ered Knapp’s claims as failure-to-hire claims but determined
    that the claims still failed under such characterization. The
    court stated Knapp did not allege that she had applied for
    any tenure-eligible position or that anyone represented that
    her position would be eligible for tenure, and it stated that
    instead the uncontroverted evidence was that Knapp and the
    college mutually understood that her position was not eligible
    for tenure.
    The federal court determined that “[t]he uncontroverted
    evidence . . . demonstrates that Knapp held a position with
    substantially different duties from her male colleagues” and
    that “she never applied for a position similar to those they
    held.” 
    Id. at 859.
    The court concluded that Knapp “failed to
    allege facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that she
    suffered less favorable treatment than the Defendants gave to
    similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class.”
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    Id. The court 
    therefore dismissed Knapp’s second, sixth, and
    eighth claims.
    Knapp’s third claim was fashioned as a constructive dis-
    charge claim under Title VII. The federal court rejected the
    claim for two reasons. First, the court determined that Knapp
    had not alleged facts sufficient for a jury to conclude that a
    reasonable person would have found the conditions of employ-
    ment intolerable. The court noted that Ruser’s less frequent
    communication with Knapp, his personal slights against her,
    and his alleged disengagement from his own duties were not
    enough to create a cognizable constructive discharge claim.
    Second, the court determined that although Knapp had aired
    certain grievances with the dean, she did not give the law
    school an opportunity to correct the problems before she
    resigned, and that her complaints were focused on long-term
    problems in the clinic rather than her immediate problems with
    Ruser. The court dismissed Knapp’s third claim.
    For similar reasons, the court rejected Knapp’s tenth claim,
    which it characterized as an employment retaliation claim
    under Title VII. The court determined that “a reasonable jury
    could not conclude that Ruser’s alleged conduct constituted
    an adverse employment action.” 
    Knapp, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 861
    . The court stated that “Knapp acknowledge[d] that her
    strained relationship with Ruser did not interfere with her abil-
    ity to perform her duties” and that the evidence did not support
    her “assertion that Ruser’s alleged neglect of his own cases
    somehow affected her duties.” 
    Id. at 862.
    The court dismissed
    Knapp’s tenth claim.
    3. State Court’s Disposition
    of R emanded Claims
    Having dismissed the six claims that were based on federal
    law, the federal district court remanded Knapp’s fourth, fifth,
    seventh, and ninth claims, which were based on state law, to
    the state district court for further proceedings. On remand, the
    defendants moved for summary judgment on those claims. The
    state district court applied the familiar framework found in
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    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 1817
    , 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 668
    (1973), and after a hearing determined
    that Knapp’s evidence failed to show a prima facie case of dis-
    crimination. The state district court sustained the defendants’
    motion for summary judgment.
    In its order ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment, the district court began its analysis by noting that
    three of the four remanded claims arose under Nebraska stat-
    utes that were patterned on analogous federal laws. The court
    stated that in Knapp’s fourth claim, she asserted a discrimina-
    tory wage practice claim under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-1219
    through 48-1227.01 (Reissue 2010), which statutes the court
    characterized as the state equivalent of the federal EPA. The
    court stated that in her fifth and seventh claims, Knapp alleged
    violations of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, Neb.
    Rev. Stat. §§ 48-1101 through 48-1126 (Reissue 2010 & Cum.
    Supp. 2014) (NFEPA), which the court characterized as the
    state equivalent of federal Title VII. The court noted that this
    court has held that Nebraska antidiscrimination laws are to be
    interpreted in the same manner as their federal counterparts.
    The court cited Nebraska appellate court cases looking to fed-
    eral decisions construing Title VII for guidance to interpret the
    NFEPA. Extrapolating from the reasoning of those cases, the
    district court concluded it should apply a similar approach and
    looked to federal decisions construing the EPA for guidance
    regarding §§ 48-1219 through 48-1227.01.
    The court first considered Knapp’s fourth claim, regard-
    ing discriminatory wage practices, under §§ 48-1219 through
    48-1227.01. Using a rationale similar to that used by the
    federal court when it rejected Knapp’s sixth claim, for wage
    discrimination under the EPA, the court rejected this claim.
    The court indicated that the claim was specifically based on
    § 48-1221(1). The court determined that Knapp had failed to
    show any male employees who performed comparable work
    and that therefore, she could not establish a prima facie case
    of wage discrimination under § 48-1221(1). The court stated
    that the male professor who was hired in March 2012 had
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    duties that Knapp did not have, mainly related to the task
    of creating a new entrepreneurship clinic. This task required
    him to attend meetings with faculty and the dean and to per-
    form community outreach and academic research, as well
    as performing administrative tasks involved in establishing
    the new clinic. The court determined that three other men to
    whom Knapp compared herself were members of the college
    faculty who had administrative and other duties that Knapp
    did not have as a temporary member of the nontenured staff
    of the college. As a temporary lecturer, Knapp was assigned
    exclusively to teach students and did not have responsibilities
    to conduct academic research or perform community service.
    The court also noted that Knapp had never applied for a posi-
    tion offering the possibility of tenure. The court granted sum-
    mary judgment in favor of the defendants on Knapp’s fourth
    claim because she had not presented sufficient evidence of
    comparable individuals to make a prima facie inference of
    discriminatory wages under § 48-1221(1).
    The court next considered Knapp’s fifth claim, which it
    characterized as a claim of discrimination on the basis of
    sex under the NFEPA. The court determined that Knapp’s
    discrimination claim under the NFEPA failed for the same
    reason that her eighth claim, for discrimination under Title
    VII, had failed in the federal district court. The court noted
    that the NFEPA mirrors Title VII and that in order to establish
    a prima facie case for sex discrimination, a plaintiff needed
    to show, inter alia, that similarly situated males were treated
    differently. The court determined that Knapp had failed to
    identify any similarly situated males who were treated dif-
    ferently from her and that therefore, she had failed to show a
    prima facie case of discrimination under the NFEPA. The court
    also addressed Knapp’s argument that the defendants failed
    to hire her for ­better-paying positions with the opportunity
    for tenure. The court agreed with the federal district court’s
    analysis to the effect that this argument failed because Knapp
    had not presented any evidence that she had applied for any
    tenure-eligible positions. The court therefore granted summary
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    judgment in favor of the defendants on Knapp’s fifth claim, of
    discrimination under the NFEPA.
    The court characterized Knapp’s seventh claim as a claim
    of employment retaliation under the NFEPA. Knapp argued
    that Ruser had created a hostile work environment and had
    unreasonably interfered with her work performance after she
    complained to him regarding sex discrimination in the clinic.
    The court rejected Knapp’s retaliation claim under the NFEPA
    based on reasoning similar to that of the federal district court
    when it rejected Knapp’s tenth claim, of employment retali-
    ation under Title VII. The court determined that Knapp had
    failed to show that a reasonable person would have found the
    conditions of employment intolerable or that the defendants
    either intended to force her to resign or could have reason-
    ably foreseen that she would do so as a result of their actions.
    The court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the
    defendants on Knapp’s seventh claim, of employment retalia-
    tion under the NFEPA.
    Finally, the court characterized Knapp’s ninth claim as a
    public-policy-based claim of retaliation. Knapp alleged that
    the defendants had retaliated against her “for attempting to
    prevent ethical issues in a learning setting for future lawyers
    . . . in contravention of public policy.” Knapp argued that the
    civil clinic was a de facto law firm and that it was therefore
    subject to duties required of law firms in Nebraska. The dis-
    trict court cited Trosper v. Bag ’N Save, 
    273 Neb. 855
    , 
    734 N.W.2d 704
    (2007), and stated that this court has recognized
    a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine
    and that under the public policy exception, an employee may
    claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation
    for the firing contravenes public policy. The court rejected
    Knapp’s public policy retaliation claim for much the same
    reasons it rejected her claim of employment retaliation under
    the NFEPA. The court determined that Knapp had “failed to
    show how Ruser’s absence or refusal to communicate fol-
    lowing their heated conversation resulted in her discharge or
    demotion.” The court noted that certain of Knapp’s concerns
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    regarding Ruser’s management of the clinical programs “were
    longstanding” and that she did not express those concerns to
    anyone in the college prior to April 2013. The court further
    determined that “even after Ruser became withdrawn, [Knapp]
    was able to fulfill her ethical obligations and performance”
    in the clinic, and that there was “no evidence that Ruser’s
    work on his own cases could compel a reasonable person in
    [Knapp’s] position to resign.” The court granted summary
    judgment in favor of the defendants on Knapp’s ninth claim,
    of public policy retaliation.
    The district court concluded its order by stating that Knapp
    had “failed to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimi-
    nation, failure to promote because of sex, retaliation, and
    retaliation in violation of public policy.” The court therefore
    sustained the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with
    respect to Knapp’s fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth claims. The
    court overruled Knapp’s subsequent motion to alter or amend
    its judgment.
    Knapp appeals the district court’s orders sustaining the
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment and overruling her
    motion to alter or amend its judgment.
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Knapp generally claims that the district court erred when it
    sustained the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on her
    fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth claims and when it overruled
    her motion to alter or amend the judgment.
    Knapp specifically claims, restated, that the district court
    erred when it (1) analyzed her fifth claim as a claim of fail-
    ure to hire but failed to analyze it as a claim of impermis-
    sible classification under the NFEPA; (2) determined, with
    regard to her fifth claim, that she failed to show that there
    were similarly situated male employees who were treated
    differently; (3) determined, with regard to her fourth claim,
    regarding wage discrimination under § 48-1221(1), that she
    failed to show that there were male employees who performed
    comparable duties; and (4) determined that she failed, with
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    regard to both her seventh claim, of employment retaliation
    under the NFEPA, and her ninth claim, of public-policy-
    based retaliation, to show retaliatory or unreasonable conduct
    by Ruser.
    We note that Knapp also claims that the federal district court
    erred when it sustained the defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment with respect to her first through third, sixth, eighth
    and tenth claims. She requests that we reverse the federal dis-
    trict court’s order sustaining the defendants’ motion for sum-
    mary judgment on those claims. Under federal law, when a fed-
    eral district court grants summary judgment on certain claims
    and remands the remaining claims to a state court, the federal
    district court’s partial summary judgment becomes final as to
    the claims on which the federal district court granted summary
    judgment and the federal district court’s resolution of those
    claims is appealable to the federal circuit court. See Porter
    v. Williams, 
    436 F.3d 917
    (8th Cir. 2006). The federal district
    court’s order in Knapp v. Ruser, 
    145 F. Supp. 3d 846
    (D. Neb.
    2015), as a final judgment as to those claims upon which the
    federal court granted summary judgment, is appealable to a
    federal circuit court, and we do not review the federal district
    court’s resolution of those claims.
    IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1,2] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant
    of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 
    296 Neb. 726
    ,
    
    895 N.W.2d 692
    (2017). In reviewing a summary judgment, an
    appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the party against whom the judgment was granted and gives
    that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible
    from the evidence. 
    Id. [3] An
    appellate court reviews a denial of a motion for new
    trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment, for
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    an abuse of discretion. Cisneros v. Graham, 
    294 Neb. 83
    , 
    881 N.W.2d 878
    (2016).
    V. ANALYSIS
    Knapp generally claims that the district court erred when
    it sustained the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
    her fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth claims generally for the
    reason that Knapp’s evidence failed to show a prima facie case
    of discrimination, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 1817
    , 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 668
    (1973), and when
    it overruled her motion to alter or amend the judgment. She
    also assigns specific errors, each of which relates to one or
    more of the claims. We will review the district court’s ruling
    as to each claim and Knapp’s specific arguments as to each
    claim in turn.
    1. Fifth Claim: Discrimination
    Under the NFEPA
    Knapp’s fifth claim was based on the NFEPA. The district
    court analyzed Knapp’s fifth claim as a claim of discrimi-
    nation based on sex under the NFEPA; the court specifi-
    cally addressed Knapp’s arguments that it characterized as a
    ­failure-to-hire claim. On appeal, Knapp makes two main argu-
    ments with regard to her fifth claim: (1) that the district court
    erred when it failed to analyze the fifth claim as a claim of
    improper classification under the NFEPA and (2) that the
    court erred when it determined that she had failed to show
    similarly situated male employees who were treated differ-
    ently. Knapp claims that because of these errors, the district
    court erred when it sustained the defendants’ motion for sum-
    mary judgment on her fifth claim and that the court abused
    its discretion when it overruled her motion to alter or amend
    the judgment in order to consider the fifth claim as a claim of
    improper classification.
    [4] We note first that we have stated that the NFEPA is pat-
    terned after federal Title VII and that it is appropriate to look
    to federal court decisions construing Title VII for guidance
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    with respect to the NFEPA. See Hartley v. Metropolitan
    Util. Dist., 
    294 Neb. 870
    , 
    885 N.W.2d 675
    (2016). Like the
    plaintiff’s claim in Hartley, Knapp’s fifth claim is a claim of
    disparate treatment, that is, “a claim based on an employer’s
    treating some people less favorably than others because of
    their race, color, religion, sex, or other protected character-
    
    istics.” 294 Neb. at 891
    , 885 N.W.2d at 692-93. In Hartley,
    we looked to federal case law applying Title VII, specifically
    McDonnell Douglas 
    Corp., supra
    , to provide a framework
    for a discrimination claim under the NFEPA. We noted in
    Hartley that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. framework is not
    the exclusive method of proving disparate treatment, but in
    this case, as in Hartley, the district court used that frame-
    work and the parties do not dispute that it was the appropri-
    ate approach.
    The first step under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. frame-
    work is that “first the plaintiff has the burden of proving a
    prima facie case of discrimination.” 
    Hartley, 294 Neb. at 893
    , 885 N.W.2d at 693. In Hartley, the plaintiff set forth a
    failure-to-promote claim, and therefore, we stated that a prima
    facie case of discrimination in that case consisted of “demon-
    strating (1) the employee is a member of a protected group,
    (2) the employee was qualified and applied for a promotion
    to an available position, (3) the employee was rejected, and
    (4) a similarly situated employee, not part of the protected
    group, was promoted instead.” 294 Neb. at 
    893, 885 N.W.2d at 693
    .
    [5,6] We note, however, that courts typically modify the
    formulation of a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
    tion based on the specific type of discrimination claimed in a
    specific case. Although the requirements set forth in Hartley
    focused on a claim of failure to promote, the Nebraska Court
    of Appeals in Helvering v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 13 Neb.
    App. 818, 
    703 N.W.2d 134
    (2005), set forth a more univer-
    sal formulation of the required showing for a prima facie
    case of gender discrimination. The Court of Appeals stated
    that a “prima facie case of gender discrimination requires
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    the plaintiff to prove that he or she (1) is a member of a
    protected class, (2) was qualified to perform the job, (3) suf-
    fered an adverse employment action, and (4) was treated dif-
    ferently from similarly situated persons of the opposite sex.”
    
    Helvering, 13 Neb. Ct. App. at 842
    , 703 N.W.2d at 154 (citing
    Riggs v. County of Banner, 
    159 F. Supp. 2d 1158
    (D. Neb.
    2001) (considering Title VII claim of discrimination based
    on sex)). The Court of Appeals further stated that the test to
    determine whether employees are similarly situated to war-
    rant a comparison to a plaintiff is a rigorous one and that the
    plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that there were indi-
    viduals similarly situated in all relevant aspects to the plaintiff
    by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Helvering, supra
    (citing
    E.E.O.C. v. Kohler Co., 
    335 F.3d 766
    (8th Cir. 2003) (consid-
    ering Title VII retaliation claim based on race)).
    (a) Classification
    Knapp claims that the district court erred because it failed
    to analyze her fifth claim as a claim of improper classification
    under the NFEPA. She raises this argument in connection with
    her claims of error with respect to the court’s grant of summary
    judgment and its overruling of her motion to alter or amend
    the judgment.
    Knapp’s fifth claim was based on § 48-1104, which is part
    of the NFEPA and which provides as follows:
    It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
    employer:
    (1) To fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or to harass
    any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
    individual with respect to compensation, terms, condi-
    tions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
    vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, disability, marital sta-
    tus, or national origin; or
    (2) To limit, advertise, solicit, segregate, or classify
    employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
    deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
    otherwise adversely affect such individual’s status as an
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    employee, because of such individual’s race, color, reli-
    gion, sex, disability, marital status, or national origin.
    Knapp maintains that the district court analyzed her fifth
    claim as a claim under only § 48-1104(1), which makes
    it an unlawful employment practice to, inter alia, “fail or
    refuse to hire . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any
    individual with respect to compensation . . . because of such
    individual’s . . . sex.” She contends that the court should have
    also analyzed the claim as a claim under § 48-1104(2), which
    makes it an unlawful employment practice to, inter alia, “clas-
    sify employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
    deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
    wise adversely affect such individual’s status as an employee,
    because of such individual’s . . . sex.”
    In support of her contention that the court analyzed the
    claim only under subsection (1) and not under subsection (2),
    Knapp focuses on the portion of the district court’s summary
    judgment analysis in which it considered the failure-to-hire
    aspects of the fifth claim. However, in addition to consider-
    ing the claim specifically as a failure-to-hire claim, the district
    court also analyzed the claim as a more generalized claim of
    discrimination utilizing the framework of McDonnell Douglas
    Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 1817
    , 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 668
    (1973). Knapp contends that she showed a prima facie case of
    improper classification under that framework, and she does not
    offer an alternative approach.
    Although Knapp used “classification” language in her com-
    plaint, and we acknowledge that the district court did not
    specifically refer to her fifth claim as one of improper “clas-
    sification,” this is of no legal consequence. We believe that a
    claim of improper classification under § 48-1104(2) is subject
    to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. framework and that in such
    a case, the “adverse employment action” is an improper clas-
    sification, which must be demonstrated by evidence of prima
    facie discrimination. In this case, the district court used the
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. framework and determined that
    Knapp had failed to show that there were similarly situated
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    male employees who were treated differently. As a con-
    sequence of this determination, the court effectively deter-
    mined that Knapp had failed to show similarly situated male
    employees who were classified differently than she was and
    that therefore, she failed to show a prima facie case of dis-
    crimination resulting from an improper classification under
    § 48-1104(2).
    (b) Similarly Situated
    Knapp further argues that the court erred when it determined
    with respect to her fifth claim that she failed to show simi-
    larly situated male employees who were treated differently.
    As noted above, this finding was dispositive of the improper
    classification aspects of Knapp’s claim as well as the other
    aspects of the claim. Knapp argues that she presented evidence
    of similarly situated males because she presented evidence that
    male employees were moved from nontenure positions into
    tenure track positions with higher pay.
    The district court determined that Knapp failed to show
    similarly situated males because the males to whom she com-
    pared herself had duties that were different from or in addition
    to the duties that she performed. Because Knapp did not show
    the existence of males who were similarly situated, she could
    not show that males were treated differently. Any differences
    in compensation or classification could be explained by the
    differences in duties.
    Knapp argues that the men were treated differently because
    they moved on to tenure track positions. But when the men
    moved on to such positions, they took on additional duties
    and therefore were no longer similarly situated. Therefore,
    to the extent that Knapp compares herself to male employees
    who moved on to tenure track positions while she did not, her
    argument is no longer that she was treated differently from
    similarly situated male employees. Instead, her argument is
    more properly characterized as a failure to promote or a fail-
    ure to hire claim because she is arguing the male employees
    were able to move into tenure positions while she was not.
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    The district court analyzed Knapp’s fifth claim as a failure to
    hire claim, and the court determined that the claim failed as
    such because Knapp did not show that she had attempted to
    obtain a tenure track position and therefore could not show that
    the defendants refused to hire her for or promote her to such
    a position.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Knapp,
    we find she did not present evidence of similarly situated males,
    and therefore, she was unable to show under § 48-1104(1) that
    they were treated differently, whether such different treatment
    was with respect to compensation, classification, or hiring for
    or promotion to tenure track positions.
    We conclude that with respect to Knapp’s fifth claim under
    § 48-1104(1) and (2), the district court did not err when it
    reached the determinations noted above and sustained the
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment and overruled
    Knapp’s subsequent motion to alter or amend challenging such
    determinations.
    2. Fourth Claim: Discriminatory
    Wage Practices Based on Sex
    Knapp’s fourth claim was a claim of wage discrimination
    based on sex under §§ 48-1219 through 48-1227.01. The
    district court determined that Knapp had failed to identify a
    male employee with comparable duties and therefore had not
    shown that a male employee performing the same duties was
    paid more. Knapp claims that the district court erred when it
    determined that she failed to show male employees who had
    comparable duties.
    [7] As an initial matter, we note that the specific statute
    that underlies Knapp’s fourth claim is § 48-1221(1), which
    provides:
    No employer shall discriminate between employees in the
    same establishment on the basis of sex, by paying wages
    to any employee in such establishment at a wage rate less
    than the rate at which the employer pays any employee
    of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work
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    on jobs which require equal skill, effort and responsibil-
    ity under similar working conditions. Wage differentials
    are not within this prohibition where such payments are
    made pursuant to: (a) An established seniority system; (b)
    a merit increase system; or (c) a system which measures
    earning by quantity or quality of production or any factor
    other than sex.
    Knapp’s sixth claim, which was dismissed by the federal dis-
    trict court, was a claim of wage discrimination under the fed-
    eral EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), which provides:
    No employer having employees subject to any provisions
    of this section shall discriminate, within any establish-
    ment in which such employees are employed, between
    employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
    employees in such establishment at a rate less than the
    rate at which he pays wages to employees of the oppo-
    site sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the
    performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
    responsibility, and which are performed under similar
    working conditions, except where such payment is made
    pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;
    (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
    quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any
    other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer
    who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of
    this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the
    provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of
    any employee.
    The state and federal statutes are similar, and the Nebraska stat-
    ute appears to be patterned after the federal statute. Therefore,
    similarly to our holding in Hartley v. Metropolitan Util. Dist.,
    
    294 Neb. 870
    , 
    885 N.W.2d 675
    (2016), noted above with
    regard to the NFEPA and Title VII, we hold that because
    § 48-1221(1) is patterned after the federal EPA, 29 U.S.C.
    § 206(d), it is appropriate to look to federal court decisions
    construing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) for guidance with respect to
    § 48-1221(1).
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    The district court in this case looked to federal court deci-
    sions construing the federal EPA when it analyzed Knapp’s
    fourth claim. The court cited Price v. Northern States Power
    Co., 
    664 F.3d 1186
    , 1191 (8th Cir. 2011), in which the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that when
    bringing a claim of pay discrimination on the basis of sex
    pursuant to the federal EPA, “[a] plaintiff must first establish
    a prima facie case that women were paid less than men in
    the same establishment for equal work requiring equal skill,
    effort, and responsibility and performed under similar work-
    ing conditions” and that “[i]f a plaintiff establishes a prima
    facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove
    one of [the] statutory affirmative defenses.” We note that in
    Hunt v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 
    282 F.3d 1021
    (8th Cir.
    2002), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit formulated
    the prima facie case under the EPA as follows: To establish an
    equal pay claim, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of
    the evidence that (1) she was paid less than a male employed
    in the same establishment; (2) for equal work on jobs requir-
    ing equal skill, effort, and responsibility; (3) which were per-
    formed under similar working conditions.
    [8] We believe that the framework applicable to a federal
    EPA claim is also the proper framework to be applied to a
    claim under § 48-1221(1) for wage discrimination based on
    sex. Therefore, when bringing a claim of wage discrimina-
    tion based on sex under § 48-1221(1), a plaintiff must first
    establish a prima facie case by showing by a preponderance
    of the evidence that (1) the plaintiff was paid less than a per-
    son of the opposite sex employed in the same establishment;
    (2) for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and
    responsibility; (3) which were performed under similar work-
    ing conditions. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
    wage discrimination based on sex, the burden then shifts to the
    defendant to prove one of the affirmative defenses set forth in
    § 48-1221(1).
    Using this general framework to analyze Knapp’s fourth
    claim, the district court concluded that Knapp had not
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    established a prima facie case of wage discrimination, because
    she had not shown that the male employees to whom she com-
    pared herself were performing comparable duties. The court
    determined that “[a]lthough all faculty named by Knapp as
    comparators also taught in the clinics as part of their posi-
    tions, the totality of their duties were [sic] not substantially
    equal.” The court noted that while their positions shared cer-
    tain duties that Knapp performed, each of the male employees
    had additional responsibilities including some combination of
    classroom teaching, research, and service to the faculty, admin-
    istration, and community.
    In terms of the requirements of a prima facie case of wage
    discrimination based on sex set forth above, we read the dis-
    trict court’s determinations as a ruling that Knapp failed to
    show a male employee who was doing “equal work on jobs
    requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility.” See Hunt v.
    Nebraska Public Power Dist., 
    282 F.3d 1021
    , 1029 (8th Cir.
    2002). Specifically, the court determined that the male employ-
    ees to whom Knapp compared herself performed work that
    required additional responsibilities.
    In this regard, we note that the Eighth Circuit Court of
    Appeals in Hunt explained the required showing of “equal
    work” by stating that the jobs need not be identical to be
    considered “‘equal’” under the EPA and they need only
    be substantially 
    equal. 282 F.3d at 1029
    . The court further
    stated that neither job classifications nor titles are disposi-
    tive for determining whether jobs are equal for purposes of
    the EPA and that determining whether two jobs are substan-
    tially equal requires a practical judgment on the basis of all
    the facts and circumstances of a particular case, including
    factors such as level of experience, training, education, abil-
    ity, effort, and responsibility. 
    Hunt, supra
    . The court further
    stated that two jobs could require insubstantial or minor
    differences in the degree or amount of skill, or effort, or
    responsibility and still be substantially equal. 
    Id. We find
    these standards to be sound, and we adopt them and apply
    them to this case.
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    With these considerations in mind, we determine that
    Knapp’s evidence did not show that the male employees to
    whom she compared herself were doing “equal work . . .
    requiring equal . . . responsibility.” See 
    Hunt, 282 F.3d at 1029
    .
    The evidence showed that the male employees had additional
    responsibilities that were not insubstantial or minor differences
    from the work Knapp was doing. We conclude therefore that
    the district court did not err when it sustained the defendants’
    motion for summary judgment on Knapp’s fourth claim; nor
    did the court abuse its discretion when it overruled Knapp’s
    motion to alter or amend such judgment.
    3. Seventh Claim: R etaliation
    Under the NFEPA
    Knapp’s seventh claim was a claim of retaliation under the
    NFEPA. Knapp claims on appeal that the district court erred
    in its determination that she had failed to show that a reason-
    able person would have found the conditions of employment
    intolerable or that the defendants either intended to force her
    to resign or could have reasonably foreseen that she would do
    so as a result of their actions.
    [9] A claim of retaliation under the NFEPA is based on
    § 48-1114, which provides in relevant part that “[i]t shall be
    an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
    nate against any of his or her employees . . . because he or she
    . . . has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
    practice by the [NFEPA].” The Nebraska Court of Appeals in
    Helvering v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 
    13 Neb. Ct. App. 818
    , 
    703 N.W.2d 134
    (2005), noted that the framework for a claim of
    retaliation under the NFEPA is the framework of McDonnell
    Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 1817
    , 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 668
    (1973), used for other unlawful employment
    practice claims under the NFEPA as set forth above in con-
    nection with our analysis of Knapp’s fifth claim. The Court
    of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit set forth the formulation
    of a prima facie case in a retaliation claim as being that a
    plaintiff must establish such case by showing (1) he or she
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    engaged in protected conduct, (2) he or she was subjected to
    an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal con-
    nection between the protected conduct and the adverse action.
    See Wood v. SatCom Marketing, LLC, 
    705 F.3d 823
    (8th Cir.
    2013). The same formulation applies to set forth a prima facie
    case of retaliation under § 48-1114.
    Knapp’s claim of retaliation under the NFEPA was that
    she had engaged in a protected activity when she opposed
    practices by Ruser that she alleged amounted to discrimina-
    tion based on sex. The district court determined that the claim
    failed because Knapp had not shown that she “‘suffered an
    adverse employment decision.’” Knapp did not allege that the
    law school had terminated her employment because she had
    complained to Ruser or to the dean; instead, she argued that
    after she complained to Ruser, he created an environment that
    drove her to leave her employment. The district court deter-
    mined that Knapp’s evidence on summary judgment regard-
    ing Ruser’s behavior did not rise to the level of an adverse
    employment action.
    [10] To satisfy the “adverse employment action” require-
    ment in a retaliation claim, see 
    Helvering, 13 Neb. Ct. App. at 842
    , 703 N.W.2d at 154, a plaintiff must show that “a rea-
    sonable employee would have found the challenged action
    materially adverse,” see Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White,
    
    548 U.S. 53
    , 68, 
    126 S. Ct. 2405
    , 
    165 L. Ed. 2d 345
    (2006).
    This, in turn, requires a showing that the employment action
    “‘might have “dissuaded . . .”’” a reasonable worker from
    reporting the alleged unlawful practice. 
    Id. To meet
    this bur-
    den, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employment action
    was material, not trivial, and that it resulted in some concrete
    “‘injury or harm.’” AuBuchon v. Geithner, 
    743 F.3d 638
    , 644
    (8th Cir. 2014). In this regard, it has been noted that report-
    ing discriminatory behavior “‘cannot immunize that employee
    from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take
    place at work and that all employees experience.’” 
    Id. (quoting White,
    supra).
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    Viewing Knapp’s evidence in the light most favorable to her
    and applying the standards set forth above, we determine that
    Knapp did not show the sort of “adverse employment action”
    necessary to support a claim of retaliation under § 48-1114
    of the NFEPA. Ruser’s alleged change in attitude and the
    behaviors he displayed after Knapp raised concerns regard-
    ing gender discrimination are more properly characterized as
    “petty slights” and “minor annoyances” than as the sort of
    actions a reasonable employee would have found to be materi-
    ally adverse and that would have resulted in some concrete
    injury or harm. We therefore conclude that the district court
    did not err when it sustained the defendants’ motion for sum-
    mary judgment as to Knapp’s seventh claim nor did the court
    abuse its discretion when it overruled Knapp’s motion to alter
    or amend such judgment.
    4. Ninth Claim: Public Policy R etaliation
    Finally, Knapp’s ninth claim was a claim of retaliation based
    on public policy considerations. Similar to its disposition of
    the seventh claim, the district court rejected this claim on the
    basis that Knapp’s evidence did not show material retaliatory
    conduct. Knapp claims on appeal that the district court erred
    in this determination because, she argues, she and Ruser were
    “de facto law partners” and because ethical concerns relating
    to law firms give rise to a public policy claim and require that
    a different standard be used to determine whether there was
    retaliation. Brief for appellant at 33.
    [11] Knapp argues that her ninth claim is cognizable as a
    “tort-based claim for retaliation when it violates public policy,”
    
    id. at 31,
    and she cites Trosper v. Bag ’N Save, 
    273 Neb. 855
    ,
    
    734 N.W.2d 704
    (2007), as support for this theory. In Trosper,
    we recognized that generally, an employer may terminate the
    employment of an at-will employee at any time, but we rec-
    ognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment
    doctrine. We described the exception as follows:
    Under the public policy exception, we will allow an
    employee to claim damages for wrongful discharge when
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    the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.
    The public policy exception is restricted to cases when
    a clear mandate of public policy has been violated, and
    it should be limited to manageable and clear standards.
    In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy
    is violated, courts should inquire whether the employer’s
    conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitu-
    tional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme.
    
    Trosper, 273 Neb. at 857-58
    , 734 N.W.2d at 707. The specific
    exception noted in Trosper originated in Jackson v. Morris
    Communications Corp., 
    265 Neb. 423
    , 
    657 N.W.2d 634
    (2003),
    where we recognized a public policy exception to the at-will
    employment doctrine and allowed an action for retaliatory
    discharge when an employee has been discharged for filing
    a workers’ compensation claim. Trosper extended Jackson to
    include a claim for retaliatory demotion for filing a workers’
    compensation claim.
    Knapp argues that a public policy exception should be rec-
    ognized to allow her ninth claim and that the public policy
    supporting her claim consists of ethical considerations gov-
    erning the legal profession and law firms as expressed in the
    Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct. She contends that
    the defend­ants retaliated against her because she raised ethical
    concerns regarding Ruser’s conduct at the civil clinic.
    Whether or not a public policy exception related to such
    ethical concerns should be recognized, we note that in cases
    like Trosper, the public policy exception is fashioned as an
    exception to the at-will employment doctrine. As such, the
    exception has been limited to claims of retaliatory discharge
    and, as extended in Trosper, claims of retaliatory demotion.
    Knapp’s evidence does not show that the defendants either dis-
    charged or demoted her after she raised ethical concerns; nor
    does it show a constructive discharge or some other adverse
    employment action that falls short of a discharge or demo-
    tion. As we noted in connection with Knapp’s seventh claim
    for retaliation under the NFEPA, Knapp has not shown any
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    adverse employment action that was material and that resulted
    in some concrete injury or harm.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Knapp,
    we determine she has not shown employment-related retali-
    ation that would give rise to a claim based on public policy.
    Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err when
    it sustained the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
    on Knapp’s ninth claim; nor did the court abuse its discre-
    tion when it overruled Knapp’s motion to alter or amend
    such judgment.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the district court did not err when it sus-
    tained the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with
    respect to Knapp’s fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth claims and
    that it did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Knapp’s
    subsequent motion to alter or amend its judgment. We there-
    fore affirm the district court’s orders.
    A ffirmed.
    Stacy, J., not participating.