State v. Helfrich , 107 N.E.3d 695 ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Helfrich, 2018-Ohio-638.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-17-30
v.
ROBERT C. HELFRICH, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-17-31
v.
ROBERT C. HELFRICH, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-17-32
v.
ROBERT C. HELFRICH, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Case No. 13-17-30, 13-17-31, 13-17-32
Appeals from Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court
Trial Court Nos. CRB 0200218 A, B, C, CRB 0200443, and CRB 0200444
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 20, 2018
APPEARANCES:
Dorothy L. Williams for Appellant
Charles R. Hall, Jr. for Appellee
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} This matter comes before us upon three consolidated appeals.
Defendant-Appellant, Robert C. Helfrich (“Helfrich”), appeals the judgments of the
Seneca County Tiffin Municipal Court denying his motion to seal the record of his
convictions. On appeal, Helfrich asserts that: 1) the trial court erred in making an
arbitrary ruling; 2) the trial court erred in ruling that Helfrich was not an eligible
offender for expungement; 3) the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the
need of society to maintain the record outweighs the benefit to Helfrich by sealing
the record; 4) the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Helfrich is not fully
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rehabilitated; and 5) the trial court erred by basing its decision on an error of law.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Factual Background
{¶2} On March 3, 2002, Helfrich was suspected for shoplifting cigarettes
from a Kroger grocery store located in Tiffin, Ohio. (Case Number 02CRB218,
Doc. No. 1).1 Helfrich was detained by local law enforcement officers after a brief
foot chase, and six packs of cigarettes were located on his person. (Id.).
{¶3} Helfrich was arrested for theft and taken to the police station for
questioning.2 (Id.). During Helfrich’s interrogation, the officer questioning
Helfrich noticed that Helfrich had the odor of alcohol on his breath. (Id.). Because
Helfrich was only nineteen (19) years old at the time of this arrest, the officer asked
Helfrich if he had been drinking. (Id.). Helfrich admitted that he had been drinking
beer at a local bar. (Id.). Helfrich also told the officer that he was at Tiffin
University just prior to being arrested for the shoplifting charge. (02CRB444, Doc.
No. 1).
{¶4} However, Helfrich had been expelled from Tiffin University on
February 5, 2002, and was informed by school officials that if he returned to school
property criminal charges for trespassing would be filed against him. (Id.). So, due
1
For clarity, because this appeal is from three separate court cases, references to the record will be identified
by the Municipal Court docket number and the individual document number.
2
Helfrich was advised of his Miranda rights before questioning commenced. (02CRB218, Doc. No. 1).
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to Helfrich’s admission that he was on Tiffin University’s property, the Tiffin police
department chose to investigate Helfrich’s presence on university property and
subsequently obtained evidence that Helfrich was, in fact, on Tiffin University’s
campus on March 3 and on March 6, 2002. (Id.; 02CRB443, Doc. No. 1).
Procedural Background
{¶5} On March 4, 2002, criminal charges were filed in the Tiffin Municipal
Court stemming from Helfrich’s shoplifting arrest. (02CRB218, Doc. No. 1).
Specifically, Helfrich was charged with: Underage Consumption, in violation of
R.C. 4301.632,3 a misdemeanor of the first degree, in case number 02CRB218A;
Theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the first degree, in case
number 02CRB218B; and Resisting Arrest, in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A), a
misdemeanor of the second degree, in case number 02CRB218C. (Id.). Helfrich
pled not guilty to all charges and the case was set for a jury trial. (02CRB218, Doc.
Nos. 4; 5). Thereafter, and on April 3, 2002, Helfrich appeared in the trial court and
changed his plea from “not guilty” to “no contest” to the Underage Consumption
and Theft charges. (02CRB218, Doc. No. 9). Because Helfrich entered “no
contest” pleas to the charges of Underage Consumption and Theft, the prosecutor
dismissed the Resisting Arrest charge. (Id.). Helfrich was found guilty by the trial
court of the Underage Consumption charge and was ordered to pay a fine of $150,
3
While R.C. 4301.632 has been repealed, it was the statute in effect at the time Helfrich was arrested in 2002.
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plus court costs. He also received a suspended jail sentence of thirty (30) days.
(Id.). Helfrich was also placed on probation for a period of one year. (Id.). The
trial court also found Helfrich guilty of the Theft charge and he was ordered to pay
a fine of $15 plus court costs. (Id.).
{¶6} On May 2, 2002, two additional and separate criminal cases were filed
against Helfrich in the Tiffin Municipal Court. (02CRB443, Doc. No. 1;
02CRB444, Doc. No. 1). These charges stemmed from Helfrich’s trespasses on
Tiffin University’s property on March 3rd and March 6th, 2002. (Id.). Helfrich was
charged in each case with Criminal Trespass, in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A),
misdemeanors of the fourth degree. (Id.). Helfrich entered a plea of “not guilty” to
the Criminal Trespass charge in case number 02CRB443 on May 16, 2002.
(02CRB443, Doc. No. 4). On June 6, 2002, Helfrich entered a plea of “not guilty”
to the Criminal Trespass charge in case number 02CRB444. (02CRB444, Doc. No.
5).
{¶7} However, on August 1, 2002, Helfrich changed his pleas of “not guilty”
to “no contest” in both trespassing cases in the trial court. (02CRB443, Doc. No.
12; 02CRB444, Doc. No. 10). As a result, Helfrich was found guilty by the trial
court in both cases and sentenced to a fine of $150, and ordered to pay court costs
in Case No. 02CRB443. (02CRB443, Doc. No. 12; 02CRB444, Doc. No. 10). The
trial court also ordered Helfrich to serve thirty (30) days in jail, consecutive to any
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other misdemeanor jail time, with such jail term being conditionally suspended.
(Id.). In case number 02CRB444, Helfrich was ordered to pay court costs, and
sentenced to serve thirty (30) days in jail, consecutive to any other misdemeanor jail
time, with such sentence also being suspended. (02CRB444, Doc. No. 10).
{¶8} Approximately fifteen (15) years later, on June 9, 2017, Helfrich filed
a motion in the trial court to seal the records of his convictions in all of his Tiffin
Municipal Court cases. (02CRB218, Doc. No. 11; 02CRB443, Doc. No. 14;
02CRB444, Doc. No. 12). On July 6, 2017, the State of Ohio (Appellee herein)
filed its objection to Helfrich’s request. (02CRB218, Doc. No. 13; 02CRB443, Doc.
No. 16, 02CRB444, Doc. No. 14). Specifically, the State of Ohio argued that
Helfrich was not an “eligible offender” under R.C. 2953.32, which therefore
precluded the sealing of his convictions. (Id.).
{¶9} A hearing on Helfrich’s motions to seal was held in the Tiffin Municipal
Court on July 10, 2017, and on the September 11, 2017 the trial court denied
Helfrich’s motions, ruling that: “[b]ased upon review of said case the Court finds
that the Defendant does not qualify pursuant to ORC. [sic] and therefore said motion
is DENIED.” (02CRB218, Doc. No. 12; 02CRB443, Doc. No. 15; 02CRB444, Doc.
No. 13).
{¶10} On October 11, 2017, Helfrich filed an appeal from the Tiffin
Municipal Court’s denial of his motion to seal his record. (02CRB218, Doc. No.
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16; 02CRB443, Doc. No. 19; 02CRB444, Doc. No. 18). On appeal, Helfrich asserts
the following assignments of error for review:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING A RULING THAT
APPEARS TO BE ARBITRARY WITH NO STATED
FOUNDATION FOR SAME.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPARENTLY RULING
THAT APPELLANT IS NOT AN ELIGIBLE OFFENDER.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
APPARENTLY RULING THAT SOME UNDISCLOSED NEED
OF SOCIETY TO MAINTAIN THE RECORD AS PUBLIC
[SIC] OUTWEIGHS THE BENEFIT TO APPELLANT OF
SEALING THE RECORD.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
APPARENTLY RULING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT FULLY
REHABILITATED.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING BASED ON AN
ERROR OF LAW: NAMELY THAT THE SEALING OF
RECORDS IS CHANGING HISTORY.
{¶11} For ease of analysis, we choose to address Helfrich’s assignments of
error out of order.
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Appellant’s Second Assignment of Error
{¶12} In his second assignment of error, Helfrich asserts that the trial court
erred by ruling that he was not an eligible offender to have his records sealed.
Specifically, Helfrich argues that the trial court’s determination that Helfrich “does
not qualify pursuant to ORC” suggests that Helfrich is not an eligible offender to
have his records sealed, and such ruling was an error of law. For the reasons that
follow, we disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶13} “The sealing of records of conviction, like expungement, is an act of
grace created by the state, and so is a privilege, not a right.” State v. Tauch, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-327, 2013-Ohio-5796, ¶ 7 citing State v. Dominy, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-124, 2013-Ohio-3744, ¶ 5. As such, sealing should only
be granted when all the requirements for eligibility are met. Id. “If an applicant is
not an eligible offender, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant the application.”
Id. “[A]n order sealing the record of one who is not an eligible offender is void for
lack of jurisdiction and may be vacated at any time. Id. “[W]hether an applicant is
considered an eligible offender is an issue of law for a reviewing court to decide de
novo.” State v. Weiss, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-957, 2015-Ohio-3015, ¶ 5.
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Relevant Statutory Authority
{¶14} Under Ohio law, “‘two different statutes relate to the sealing of court
documents – R.C. 2953.32, for sealing of records after conviction, and R.C.
2953.52, for sealing after disposition other than conviction.’” In re Application for
the Sealing of the Records of A.H., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-555, 2016-Ohio-
5530, 60 N.E.3d 60, ¶ 11 quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons, 140
Ohio St.3d 7, 2014-Ohio-2354, 14 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 16. Because Helfrich only
petitioned the trial court to seal the record of his convictions, we will analyze this
assignment of error with guidance from the statutory language contained in R.C.
2953.32.
R.C. 2953.32 provides, in its relevant part:
(A)(1) Except as provided in section 2953.61 of the Revised Code, an
eligible offender may apply to the sentencing court if convicted in this
state, or to a court of common pleas if convicted in another state or in
a federal court, for the sealing of the record of the case that pertains
to the conviction. * * *
(B) Upon the filing of an application under this section, the court shall
set a date for a hearing and shall notify the prosecutor for the case of
the hearing on the application. The prosecutor may object to the
granting of the application by filing an objection with the court prior
to the date set for the hearing. The prosecutor shall specify in the
objection the reasons for believing a denial of the application is
justified. The court shall direct its regular probation officer, a state
probation officer, or the department of probation of the county in
which the applicant resides to make inquiries and written reports as
the court requires concerning the applicant. The probation officer or
county department of probation that the court directs to make inquiries
concerning the applicant shall determine whether or not the applicant
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was fingerprinted at the time of arrest or under section 109.60 of the
Revised Code. If the applicant was so fingerprinted, the probation
officer or county department of probation shall include with the
written report a record of the applicant's fingerprints. If the applicant
was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of division (A)(2) or
(B) of section 2919.21 of the Revised Code, the probation officer or
county department of probation that the court directed to make
inquiries concerning the applicant shall contact the child support
enforcement agency enforcing the applicant's obligations under the
child support order to inquire about the offender's compliance with
the child support order.
(C)(1) The court shall do each of the following:
(a) Determine whether the applicant is an eligible offender or
whether the forfeiture of bail was agreed to by the applicant and the
prosecutor in the case. If the applicant applies as an eligible offender
pursuant to division (A)(1) of this section and has two or three
convictions that result from the same indictment, information, or
complaint, from the same plea of guilty, or from the same official
proceeding, and result from related criminal acts that were committed
within a three-month period but do not result from the same act or
from offenses committed at the same time, in making its
determination under this division, the court initially shall determine
whether it is not in the public interest for the two or three convictions
to be counted as one conviction. If the court determines that it is not
in the public interest for the two or three convictions to be counted as
one conviction, the court shall determine that the applicant is not an
eligible offender; if the court does not make that determination, the
court shall determine that the offender is an eligible offender.
(b) Determine whether criminal proceedings are pending against the
applicant;
(c) If the applicant is an eligible offender who applies pursuant to
division (A)(1) of this section, determine whether the applicant has
been rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court;
(d) If the prosecutor has filed an objection in accordance with
division (B) of this section, consider the reasons against granting the
application specified by the prosecutor in the objection;
(e) Weigh the interests of the applicant in having the records
pertaining to the applicant's conviction or bail forfeiture sealed against
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the legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those
records. * * *
(Emphasis added). R.C. 2953.32.
{¶15} To determine whether Helfrich is an “eligible offender,” pursuant to
R.C. 2953.32, we look to the definition of “eligible offender” set forth in R.C.
2953.31(A), which, in its pertinent part, provides:
“Eligible offender” means anyone who has been convicted of an
offense in this state or any other jurisdiction and who has not more
than one felony conviction, not more than two misdemeanor
convictions, or not more than one felony conviction and one
misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other jurisdiction. When
two or more convictions result from or are connected with the same
act or result from offenses committed at the same time, they shall be
counted as one conviction. When two or three convictions result from
the same indictment, information, or complaint, from the same plea of
guilty, or from the same official proceeding, and result from related
criminal acts that were committed within a three-month period but do
not result from the same act or from offenses committed at the same
time, they shall be counted as one conviction, provided that a court
may decide as provided in division (C)(1)(a) of section 2953.32 of the
Revised Code that it is not in the public interest for the two or three
convictions to be counted as one conviction. * * *4
(Emphasis added). R.C. 2953.31(A).
{¶16} Before a trial court exercises discretion in determining whether the
statutory criteria permits sealing a record of conviction, the applicant must “first
cross the threshold of statutory eligibility,” pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(a). State
4
The remaining section of R.C. 2953.31(A) addresses minor misdemeanor convictions that do not count as
convictions affecting eligibility under this section. However, since Helfrich has no minor misdemeanor
convictions, we omit that statutory language from this opinion for the purposes of judicial economy.
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v. V.M.D., 148 Ohio St.3d 450, 2016-Ohio-8090, 71 N.E.3d 274, ¶ 13 quoting State
v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639, 1996-Ohio-440, 665 N.E.2d 669.
Accordingly, a trial court must first determine whether an applicant is an eligible
offender, pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(C)(1). Id. at ¶ 14.
Analysis
{¶17} Initially, we note that Helfrich and the State of Ohio refer to “first
offender”5 and “eligible offender” interchangeably in their arguments. However,
the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that “‘the statutory law in effect at the time
of the filing of a R.C. 2953.32 application to seal a record of a conviction is
controlling.’” Id. at ¶ 6 quoting State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-
4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172, paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, while some appellate
courts may have used “first offender” and “eligible offender” interchangeably, we
must apply the controlling law in effect at the time Helfrich filed his application to
seal his records. Accordingly, we will analyze Helfrich’s argument to determine
whether he is an “eligible offender” under R.C. 2953.31(A). See generally, Dominy,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-124, 2013-Ohio-3744, ¶ 5.
5
A prior version of R.C. 2953.31, in effect until September 27, 2012, discussed the sealing of records for
“first offenders.” However, on September 28, 2012, the Ohio legislature revised R.C. 2953.31(A), changing
the legal standard from “first offender” to “eligible offender.” See, Dominy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-
124, 2013-Ohio-3744, ¶ 5.
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{¶18} Helfrich argues that because he committed his four misdemeanor
charges during a three-day span, all four (misdemeanor convictions) are connected
by the same act or resulted from offenses committed at the same time, and therefore,
should be counted as only one misdemeanor conviction. We find such interpretation
of R.C. 2953.31(A) misplaced.
{¶19} In determining whether Helfrich’s convictions are to be counted as one
conviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.31(A), we must review the language of the statute
and apply the rules of statutory construction to analyze the relevant portions of the
eligible offender definition. See generally, Tauch, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-
327, 2013-Ohio-5796, ¶¶ 8-11.
When two or more convictions result from or are connected with the
same act * * * they shall be counted as one conviction.
{¶20} In analyzing this initial portion of R.C. 2953.31(A), we note that “the
‘same act’ plainly refers to the ‘same conduct.’” State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d
81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 988 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 16. Helfrich argues that his four
convictions resulted from or were connected with one act: living with his “frat
brothers” for two weeks after he was dismissed from Tiffin University. Our review
of the record reveals that his four misdemeanor convictions did not result from or
were not connected to living with his frat brothers. When arrested for shoplifting
on March 3, 2002, Helfrich admitted to trespassing on Tiffin University’s property;
stealing cigarettes from Kroger’s; and drinking alcohol while under the legal
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drinking age of twenty-one (21), all on that same date. These acts ultimately
resulted in three convictions in two separate criminal proceedings in the Tiffin
Municipal Court.
{¶21} Nevertheless, on March 6, 2002, Helfrich trespassed again on Tiffin
University’s campus after appearing in the trial court on March 4, 2002 for his
arraignment on the charges that stemmed from his March 3, 2002 arrest for
shoplifting. Helfrich’s trespass of March 6th resulted in a new criminal case and a
subsequent separate conviction against him in the Tiffin Municipal Court.
{¶22} In our review, Helfrich’s conduct on March 3rd was not connected to
his conduct of March 6th. We find that Helfrich’s convictions from trespassing on
the Tiffin University campus occurred on separates dates, and are unrelated to his
theft and underage drinking convictions. While Helfrich’s framing of his conduct
as being one continuous act of “frat life” is trying to be clever, we are not persuaded
by such characterization of the facts present in this case. Thus, we find this initial
portion of our “eligible offender” analysis inapplicable under the facts presented.
When two or more convictions result from or are connected * * * offenses
committed at the same time, they shall be counted as one conviction.
{¶23} As previously discussed, Helfrich committed and was convicted of
three misdemeanor crimes stemming from his behavior on March 3, 2002. Helfrich
subsequently committed and was convicted of one misdemeanor crime stemming
from his actions on March 6, 2002. Thus, Helfrich’s crimes and acts were clearly
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separated by the span of three days. See generally, State v. Derugen, 110 Ohio
App.3d 408, 411, 674 N.E.2d 719 (3rd Dist. 1996) (Holding that convictions of drug
abuse, possessing criminal tools, theft, falsification, and obstructing official
business did not meet the statutory criteria contained within R.C. 2953.31 and R.C.
2953.32 as the offenses were separate and unrelated, even though some of the
offenses had been committed on the same date).
{¶24} Thus, in our analysis of this portion of the “eligible offender” statutory
language, Helfrich had, at a minimum, two separate misdemeanor convictions from
the Tiffin Municipal Court for purposes of the sealing statute. And, because
Helfrich testified (at his sealing of records hearing) that he had a criminal conviction
for possession of drug paraphernalia from the Portsmouth Municipal Court in 2003,
his three “consolidated” convictions made him ineligible for having his records
sealed under R.C. 2953.31 and R.C. 2953.32 by the trial court. (See 07/10/2017 Tr.
at 8).6
When two or three convictions result from * * *.
{¶25} Lastly, we look to the “eligible offender” statutory language contained
in R.C. 2953.31(A), addressing convictions resulting from acts that were committed
at the same time. In Helfrich’s argument, it is evident to us that he is attempting to
combine the requirements from this portion of the statute with the requirements of
6
Helfrich testified at his hearing on his motion to seal records that he had a criminal conviction for possession
of drug paraphernalia in the Portsmouth Municipal Court.
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the previous portion (that we addressed above) to support his contention that he only
had one conviction from the trial court. Such construction is not permissible,
because the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and, as a result, we
must apply the statute as written. State v. J.M., 148 Ohio St.3d 113, 2016-Ohio-
2803, 69 N.E.3d 642, ¶ 12 citing Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Nat. Resources, Ohio Div.
of Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 12; see also
Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929
N.E.2d 448, ¶ 20. Thus, because the statute clearly indicates that such criteria
contained in this portion of R.C. 2953.31(A) only applies to two or three
convictions, an offender having more than two or three convictions would not be
eligible for the exception criteria contained in this particular section of R.C.
2953.31(A).
{¶26} In the case before us, Helfrich came to the Tiffin Municipal Court
seeking to have four convictions sealed. Because the statutory language indicates
that only two or three convictions are subject to this portion of analysis under R.C.
2953.31(A), we find that Helfrich did not meet the statutory requirement for this set
of exceptions to apply. Thus, we agree with the trial court that Helfrich was not an
“eligible offender” for purposes of the sealing statute.
{¶27} Accordingly, because Helfrich was unable to establish himself as an
eligible offender (the first requirement of the sealing statute pursuant to R.C.
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2953.32(C)(1)), the trial court did not err in finding that Helfrich did not meet the
statutory requirements to have his records sealed.7
{¶28} Accordingly, we overrule Helfrich’s second assignment of error.
Appellant’s First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Assignments of Error
{¶29} As the trial court correctly held that Helfrich was not an “eligible
offender” pursuant to R.C. 2953.31 and R.C. 2953.32, it was without jurisdiction to
exercise discretion and rule on the merits of Helfrich’s motion. Thus, by finding
that Helfrich was not an “eligible offender” to have his record of convictions sealed,
Helfrich’s first, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are therefore rendered
moot.
{¶30} Having found no error prejudicial to Helfrich herein in the particulars
assigned and argued, we overrule Helfrich’s second assignment of error and moot
Helfrich’s first, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgments of the Tiffin Municipal Court.
Judgments Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and PRESTON, J., concur.
7
In ruling that the trial court did not err in finding Helfrich statutorily ineligible, we acknowledge that after
the trial court issued its ruling on Helfrich’s motion to seal his records, the Portsmouth Municipal Court
granted his motion to seal his convictions in that court. However, we note that the Portsmouth Municipal
Court judgment entry, as an attachment to a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment, is not properly
before us, as a motion to reconsider a final judgment is a nullity. See Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio
St.2d 378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus; Consol. Rail Corp. v. Forest Cartage Co.,
68 Ohio App.3d 333, 340, 588 N.E.2d 263 (8th Dist.1990). Additionally, even if we were able to consider
the motion and entry, we note that Portsmouth Municipal Court may have improperly analyzed Helfrich’s
request to seal his conviction under R.C. 2953.52, which only applies to sealing records other than
convictions. We accordingly disregard the motion for reconsideration and its attachments as not properly a
part of the record.
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