Wisner v. Vandelay Investments , 300 Neb. 825 ( 2018 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    11/02/2018 01:12 AM CDT
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    WISNER v. VANDELAY INVESTMENTS
    Cite as 
    300 Neb. 825
    Robin J. Wisner, as Personal R epresentative of
    the Estate of Gladys P. Wisner, deceased,
    appellant, v. Vandelay Investments,
    L.L.C., a Nebraska limited liability
    company, et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed August 24, 2018.   No. S-16-451.
    1.	 Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties. Standing is a jurisdictional component
    of a party’s case because only a party who has standing may invoke the
    jurisdiction of a court.
    2.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. The question of jurisdiction is a ques-
    tion of law, upon which an appellate court reaches a conclusion indepen-
    dent of the trial court.
    3.	 Equity: Quiet Title. A quiet title action sounds in equity.
    4.	 Equity: Appeal and Error. On appeal from an equity action, an appel-
    late court tries factual questions de novo on the record and, as to ques-
    tions of both fact and law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent
    of the conclusion reached by the trial court, provided that where credible
    evidence is in conflict in a material issue of fact, the appellate court
    considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial judge heard
    and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather
    than another.
    5.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
    an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.
    6.	 Standing: Words and Phrases. Standing is the legal or equitable right,
    title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
    7.	 Jurisdiction: Standing. The requirement of standing is fundamental to
    a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and either a litigant or a court before
    which a case is pending can raise the question of standing at any time
    during the proceeding.
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    WISNER v. VANDELAY INVESTMENTS
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    300 Neb. 825
    8.	 Title: Deeds: Tax Sale: Standing. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1844 (Reissue
    2009) sets forth the conditions precedent to questioning title conveyed
    under a tax deed; to obtain standing to redeem property after the issu-
    ance of a tax deed, even if title under a tax deed is void or voidable, a
    party must satisfy these conditions precedent.
    9.	 Title: Deeds: Tax Sale: Public Officers and Employees. To comply
    with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1844 (Reissue 2009), a party only needs to
    show that it has tendered the tax payment to the treasurer, not that the
    taxes have actually been paid.
    10.	 Pleadings: Evidence: Words and Phrases. A judicial admission is a
    formal act done in the course of judicial proceedings which is a substi-
    tute for evidence, thereby waiving or dispensing with the production of
    evidence by conceding for the purpose of litigation that the proposition
    of fact alleged by the opponent is true.
    11.	 Jurisdiction. While parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction
    upon a judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent, nor may
    subject matter jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or
    conduct of the parties, such does not prevent a party from conclusively
    admitting the truth of an underlying fact required to establish subject
    matter jurisdiction by judicial admission.
    12.	 Pleadings: Evidence. Judicial admissions must be unequivocal, deliber-
    ate, and clear, and not the product of mistake or inadvertence.
    13.	 Pleadings: Intent. A judicial admission does not extend beyond the
    intendment of the admission as clearly disclosed by its context.
    14.	 Pleadings: Words and Phrases. Generally, an admission made in a
    pleading on which the trial is had is more than an ordinary admission; it
    is a judicial admission.
    15.	 Pleadings: Proof. It is an elementary rule of pleading that matters
    admitted by the pleadings need not be proved.
    16.	 Title: Deeds: Tax Sale: Taxes: Evidence. A showing pursuant to Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 77-1844 (Reissue 2009) of taxes paid must be made by the
    evidence and not by allegations in the pleadings alone.
    17.	 Real Estate: Taxes: Tax Sale: Words and Phrases. Under Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 77-1801 et seq. (Reissue 2009, Cum. Supp. 2016 & Supp. 2017),
    the term “redemption” refers to paying the amount shown on the cer-
    tificate and all subsequent taxes, along with the interest accrued thereon
    and any statutory fees.
    18.	 Pleadings: Evidence: Waiver. A party may waive its right to rely on
    an opponent’s admission by failing to object to the opponent’s offer of
    contrary evidence or introducing contrary evidence itself.
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    WISNER v. VANDELAY INVESTMENTS
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    300 Neb. 825
    19.	 Pleadings: Evidence: Parties. A party is bound to its admission absent
    the court’s relieving it, in exercise of the court’s judicial discretion, from
    that consequence.
    20.	 Appeal and Error. An argument not presented to or decided by the trial
    court is not appropriate for consideration on appeal.
    21.	 Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of
    statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
    should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the
    intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, har-
    monious, and sensible.
    22.	 Title: Deeds: Tax Sale: Standing: Public Officers and Employees:
    Case Disapproved. To satisfy the tax payment requirement in Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 77-1844 (Reissue 2009), a party must show the tender or
    payment of taxes due to the county treasurer; Hauxwell v. Henning, 
    291 Neb. 1
    , 
    863 N.W.2d 798
    (2015), is disapproved to the extent it can be
    read to authorize satisfying the standing requirement in § 77-1844 by
    tender or payment to the tax deed holder.
    23.	 Title: Deeds: Tax Sale: Statutes. The statutory prerequisites to defeat-
    ing title, in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1843 (Reissue 2009), apply only to
    those tax deeds made after substantial compliance with Neb. Rev.
    Stat. §§ 77-1831 to 77-1842 (Reissue 2009, Cum. Supp. 2016 &
    Supp. 2017).
    24.	 Title: Deeds: Tax Sale: Proof: Presumptions: Evidence. A county
    treasurer’s tax deed is presumptive evidence that the procedures required
    by law to make a good and valid tax sale and vest title in the purchaser
    were done. The presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted,
    but the burden is upon the party attacking the validity of such a deed
    to show by competent evidence some jurisdictional defect voiding
    the deed.
    25.	 Tax Sale: Service of Process. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1832 (Reissue
    2009), service need only be provided to the owner of record at the
    address where the property tax statement was mailed and may only be
    done by certified mail, return receipt requested.
    26.	 Statutes. A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute,
    and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as
    superfluous or meaningless.
    27.	 Tax Sale: Notice: Service of Process: Words and Phrases. Under Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 77-1834 (Cum. Supp. 2016), the phrase “diligent inquiry”
    requires the tax certificate holder to obtain the address where the prop-
    erty tax statement was mailed in order to send notice by certified mail
    before moving to service by publication.
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    28.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Generally, statutory language is to be
    given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not
    resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which
    are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
    29.	 Statutes. A statute can be considered ambiguous when a particular
    interpretation from the face of the statute could lead to an anomalous,
    unusual, or absurd result.
    30.	 ____. It is impermissible to follow a literal reading that engenders
    absurd consequences where there is an alternative interpretation that
    reasonably effects a statute’s purpose.
    31.	 Statutes: Intent. In the exposition of statutes, the reason and intention
    of the lawgiver will control the strict letter of the law when the latter
    would lead to palpable injustice or absurdity.
    32.	 Real Estate: Taxes: Tax Sale. The overall objective of the certificate
    method for delinquent taxes is the recovery of unpaid taxes on real
    property.
    33.	 Statutes: Courts: Words and Phrases. A term of art is a word or
    phrase having a specific, precise meaning in a given specialty apart from
    its general meaning in ordinary contexts. The Nebraska Supreme Court
    has ascribed the term of art meaning to statutory terms when necessi-
    tated by the statute’s context.
    34.	 Tax Sale: Notice: Service of Process: Words and Phrases. The word
    “found” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1834 (Cum. Supp. 2016) means “able to
    be served.”
    35.	 Tax Sale: Notice: Service of Process: Proof. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 77-1834 (Cum. Supp. 2016), a tax certificate holder may provide
    service by publication to an owner of record who was not able to be
    served by certified mail at the address where the property tax statement
    was mailed, upon proof of compliance with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1832
    (Reissue 2009) if the owner, in fact, lives at such address.
    36.	 Courts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Upon further review from
    a judgment of the Nebraska Court of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme
    Court will not reverse a judgment which it deems to be correct sim-
    ply because its reasoning differs from that employed by the Court
    of Appeals.
    37.	 Tax Sale: Notice: Proof. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1835 (Cum. Supp.
    2016), a proof of publication needs to state only that notice was pub-
    lished in the manner provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1834 (Cum. Supp.
    2016).
    38.	 Affidavits. In the absence of a sufficient showing to the contrary, the
    affidavit of the publisher that a newspaper was one of general circula-
    tion in the county must be held sufficient to establish the fact.
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    39.	 Tax Sale: Notice: Words and Phrases. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1834
    (Cum. Supp. 2016), the plain meaning of the word “in” shows that a
    newspaper only need be generally circulated within the county, not
    throughout the entire county.
    40.	 Courts: Appeal and Error. Upon reversing a decision of the Nebraska
    Court of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme Court may consider, as it
    deems appropriate, some or all of the assignments of error the Court of
    Appeals did not reach.
    41.	 Deeds: Tax Sale. In order to defeat a tax deed, a party must show
    that it satisfied the conditions precedent in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1843
    (Reissue 2009).
    42.	 Tax Sale: Mental Health: Time. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1827 (Reissue
    2009) extends the redemption period for a mental disorder only if the
    owner had a mental disorder at the time of the property’s sale.
    43.	 Statutes: Presumptions: Legislature: Intent. In interpreting a statute,
    a court is guided by the presumption that the Legislature intended a
    sensible rather than absurd result in enacting the statute.
    44.	 Tax Sale: Mental Health: Words and Phrases. A person with a “men-
    tal disorder” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1827 (Cum. Supp. 2016) is one
    who suffers from a condition of mental derangement which actually
    prevents the sufferer from understanding his or her legal rights or from
    instituting legal action, and a mental disorder within the meaning of
    § 77-1827 is an incapacity which disqualifies one from acting for the
    protection of one’s rights.
    45.	 Equity. Equity strives to do justice; it is not a rigid concept, but, instead,
    is determined on a case-by-case basis according to concepts of justice
    and fairness.
    Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, Moore,
    Chief Judge, and Inbody and R iedmann, Judges, on appeal
    thereto from the District Court for Lincoln County, R ichard
    A. Birch, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed, and
    cause remanded with directions.
    David W. Pederson, of Pederson & Troshynski, for appellant.
    Robert S. Lannin and Chris S. Schmidt, of Baylor,
    Evnen, Curtiss, Grimit & Witt, L.L.P., for appellee Vandelay
    Investments, L.L.C.
    Heavican,        C.J.,    Miller-Lerman,           Cassel,      Stacy,      and
    Funke, JJ.
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    WISNER v. VANDELAY INVESTMENTS
    Cite as 
    300 Neb. 825
    Funke, J.
    Robin J. Wisner, personal representative of the estate of
    Gladys P. Wisner, deceased, appealed from a district court
    judgment that quieted title to certain property in favor of
    Vandelay Investments, L.L.C. (Vandelay), and dismissed his
    complaint—which requested that the court set aside Vandelay’s
    tax deed and permit him to exercise a right of redemption.
    The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
    decision and remanded the cause after finding Vandelay had
    failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements before
    applying for the tax deed, which failure rendered Vandelay’s
    deed void.
    On further review, we conclude that (1) Robin had standing
    to question Vandelay’s tax deed, (2) Vandelay complied with
    the statutory notice requirements before applying for the tax
    deed, and (3) Robin failed to prove that the extension to the
    statutory redemption period for an owner with a mental disor-
    der applied. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of
    Appeals and remand the cause with directions that the Court of
    Appeals affirm the judgment of the district court.
    I. BACKGROUND
    1. Statutory Framework
    This case involves the purchase of real property due to
    delinquent real estate taxes.1 The purchaser of any real prop-
    erty sold by the county treasurer for taxes is entitled to a
    certificate in writing, commonly known as a tax certificate or
    tax sale certificate.2 This certificate represents a transfer of the
    state’s lien on the property to the purchaser and describes the
    property, the amount paid by the purchaser, and the date that
    the purchaser will be entitled to a deed.3 Tax certificates can
    1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1801 et seq. (Reissue 2009, Cum. Supp. 2016 &
    Supp. 2017) and § 77-1901 et seq. (Reissue 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
    2
    § 77-1818.
    3
    Coffin v. Old Line Life Ins. Co., 
    138 Neb. 857
    , 
    295 N.W. 884
    (1941);
    § 77-1818; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-203 (Reissue 2009).
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    be assigned by endorsement, and the assignee steps into the
    shoes of the purchaser.4
    A property owner may redeem his or her property by paying
    the county treasurer the amount shown on the certificate and
    all subsequent taxes, along with the interest accrued thereon
    and any statutory costs.5 If the property is not redeemed
    within 3 years, however, the tax certificate holder may pursue
    either one of two options: (1) apply for a deed of convey-
    ance for the property, commonly known as a tax deed, with
    the county treasurer 6 or (2) proceed in district court to fore-
    closure on its lien and compel the sale of the property.7 Tax
    sale certificates and the sale of tax certificates are governed
    by chapter 77, article 18, of the Nebraska Revised Statutes,
    and the foreclosure of tax certificates is governed by chapter
    77, article 19, of the Nebraska Revised Statutes for all tax
    sale certificates sold and issued between January 1, 2010, and
    December 31, 2017.8
    Vandelay elected to pursue the tax deed method. Under
    this method, the holder of the tax certificate has a 6-month
    period, commencing 3 years from the date of the sale of the
    property, to apply for a tax deed from the county treasurer.9
    Upon a county treasurer’s delivery of the tax deed to the tax
    certificate holder, a property owner loses the ability to redeem
    the property through the county treasurer.10 If the certificate
    holder waits longer than 3 years 6 months from the sale to
    apply for a tax deed, the certificate ceases to be valid and the
    lien of taxes for which the property was sold is discharged.11
    4
    § 77-1822.
    5
    §§ 77-1824 and 77-1830.
    6
    § 77-1837. See, generally, § 77-1801 et seq.
    7
    § 77-1902. See, generally, § 77-1901 et seq.
    8
    § 77-1837.01.
    9
    § 77-1837.
    10
    § 77-1824.
    11
    § 77-1856.
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    However, at least 3 months before applying for the tax deed,
    the holder of the tax certificate must serve the record owner
    and encumbrancers of record with sufficient notice that appli-
    cation for a tax deed will be made.12
    After a tax deed has been issued, the owner of the prop-
    erty may recover the property by proving the tax deed issued
    to the tax certificate holder is either void or voidable. A tax
    deed is void if the tax certificate holder did not substantially
    comply with the notice requirements.13 A tax deed is voidable
    if the property owner has a right to redeem the property and
    has exercised such right.14 While a property owner’s ability to
    redeem property typically ends upon the delivery of a tax deed,
    an owner with a mental disorder at the time of the property’s
    sale may redeem the property within 5 years from the date of
    the sale.15
    Here, Robin claims that Vandelay did not sufficiently com-
    ply with the notice requirements to obtain the tax deed. He
    further contends that he has a right to redemption under this
    extended redemption period due to the mental disorder of
    Gladys, the record owner of the property.
    2. Issuance of Tax Deed to Vandelay
    The real estate involved in this action consists of 480 acres,
    containing irrigated cropland, rangeland, and a homestead; is
    located about 9 miles southeast of North Platte, Nebraska; and
    has the following legal description: “The North Half (N1⁄2) and
    the North Half of the South Half (N1⁄2S1⁄2) of Section Twenty-
    Nine (29), Township Thirteen (13) North, Range Twenty-Nine
    (29) West of the 6th P.M., in Lincoln County, Nebraska.”
    Gladys and her husband moved onto the property in 1949
    and inherited it upon the passing of Gladys’ father in 1971.
    12
    § 77-1831 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
    13
    Ottaco Acceptance, Inc. v. Larkin, 
    273 Neb. 765
    , 
    733 N.W.2d 539
    (2007).
    See §§ 77-1842 and 77-1843.
    14
    § 77-1843.
    15
    § 77-1827.
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    WISNER v. VANDELAY INVESTMENTS
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    300 Neb. 825
    They had two sons, Robin and Roger Wisner, and two daugh-
    ters. After Gladys’ husband died in 2007, Roger primarily
    cared for Gladys and handled her affairs until his own death in
    2009. Robin then assisted Gladys in moving from the home-
    stead to a retirement community and arranged for her bills to
    be paid from her trust by a bank’s trust department.
    Robin testified he assumed the trust department was paying
    the real estate taxes, because he thought Roger had probably
    paid them from the trust previously. While Robin stated that
    he had access to semiannual records from the trust, he testi-
    fied that he did not typically check them closely or at all and
    that he never saw that the real estate taxes were being paid
    from it.
    In 2010, the real estate taxes on the property became delin-
    quent. In March 2011, the Lincoln County treasurer sold a tax
    sale certificate on the property to Acron Business Services,
    Inc. In February 2014, Vandelay purchased the tax sale cer-
    tificate from Acron Business Services. Randy James, one
    of Vandelay’s owners, obtained the address where Gladys
    received her property tax statements, which was that of the
    retirement community. In March 2014, Vandelay sent notice
    of its intent to apply for a tax deed to Gladys at that address
    by certified mail with a return receipt requested, which was
    returned as “unclaimed.”
    Despite the return of the certified mailing, James believed
    he had Gladys’ actual address because it was not returned as
    sent to a vacant address or not deliverable as addressed. In
    addition, James had found a newspaper article, dated June 11,
    2011, indicating that Gladys, in fact, lived at the retirement
    community.
    Vandelay then published notice of its intent to apply for a
    tax deed in the Sutherland Courier-Times newspaper (Courier-
    Times) for 3 consecutive weeks. Evidence was presented that
    the Courier-Times covers events affecting Lincoln County,
    Nebraska, and residents in Sutherland, Hershey, and Paxton,
    Nebraska, and that approximately 1,300 weekly editions are
    sent to subscribers and distributed to racks in those three
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    communities. In ZIP codes covering North Platte, there are
    about 100 Courier-Times subscribers but no distribution racks.
    Vandelay also sent a copy of the publicized notice to Gladys’
    address by first-class mail, which was not returned.
    In August 2014, Vandelay applied for a tax deed. Included
    with its application were a copy of the certified mail return
    receipt, a proof of publication in the Courier-Times, and an
    affidavit from James attesting that he had complied with the
    service requirements. The proof of publication attested that
    the Courier-Times is a legal newspaper in general circulation
    that is published in Sutherland and that the attached notice was
    published for 3 consecutive weeks, dates specified. The county
    treasurer delivered a tax deed to the property to Vandelay in
    September 2014.
    Through the relevant period, the property was under lease,
    but the lease was not recorded. Shortly after the tax deed was
    filed, however, the lessee informed Robin that a deed had been
    issued in Vandelay’s favor. Robin, as the holder of a power of
    attorney for Gladys, attempted to redeem the tax sale certificate
    with Vandelay, which Vandelay rejected.
    3. District Court Proceedings
    Gladys, by and through Robin, filed a complaint against
    Vandelay, requesting to have Vandelay’s tax deed voided, have
    her deed redeemed pursuant to the mental disorder extension,
    and title quieted in her name. Vandelay filed a counterclaim
    seeking to quiet title in its favor. Robin was substituted as the
    party plaintiff after Gladys’ death.
    The court ruled Vandelay had complied with the statu-
    tory requirements for notice and publication. It reasoned
    that “[i]f Gladys could not be served after compliance by
    [Vandelay] with [§] 77-1832, she was therefore not found for
    service within the meaning of [§] 77-1834.” The court also
    found the publication in the Courier-Times complied with the
    statutory requirement. Further, the court ruled Robin failed to
    prove Gladys had a mental disorder, and it rejected Robin’s
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    equity argument. Thus, the court dismissed Robin’s complaint
    with prejudice and quieted title in favor of Vandelay.
    Robin filed a timely appeal.
    4. Court of A ppeals Proceedings
    Before the Court of Appeals, Robin assigned, restated, that
    the district court erred in (1) finding Vandelay complied with
    the statutory notice and publication requirements for obtain-
    ing a treasurer’s tax deed, (2) finding Robin failed to prove
    Gladys suffered from a mental disorder, and (3) failing to use
    its equitable authority to remedy the situation.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision
    and remanded the cause for further proceedings after hold-
    ing that Gladys was entitled to redeem the property because
    Vandelay had not served Gladys with notice.16 It reasoned that
    Vandelay’s notice by certified mail was insufficient because it
    was returned as “‘unclaimed.’”17 Further, the Court of Appeals
    stated that notice by publication could not be relied on because
    Vandelay knew Gladys’ address, so she had been “found.”18
    The Court of Appeals did not reach Robin’s second and third
    assignments of error.
    Vandelay filed a timely petition for further review, which
    this court granted.
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Vandelay assigns, reordered and restated, that the Court of
    Appeals erred in (1) not determining Robin lacks standing
    to challenge the tax deed, under § 77-1844; (2) interpreting
    § 77-1834 not to permit service by publication in this case; (3)
    not interpreting the term “found” as the equivalent of being
    “served”; (4) voiding Vandelay’s tax deed and determining
    Gladys was entitled to redeem the property; and (5) failing to
    16
    See Wisner v. Vandelay Investments, No. A-16-451, 
    2017 WL 2399492
          (Neb. App. May 30, 2017) (selected for posting to court website).
    17
    
    Id. at *4.
    18
    
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    acknowledge Vandelay’s sending of a copy of the publication
    notice by first-class mail to Gladys’ address of record, which
    copy was not returned, as accomplishing service.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] Standing is a jurisdictional component of a party’s case
    because only a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdic-
    tion of a court.19 The question of jurisdiction is a question of
    law, upon which an appellate court reaches a conclusion inde-
    pendent of the trial court.20
    [3,4] A quiet title action sounds in equity.21 On appeal from
    an equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions de
    novo on the record and, as to questions of both fact and law,
    is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the conclu-
    sion reached by the trial court, provided that where credible
    evidence is in conflict in a material issue of fact, the appellate
    court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial
    judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one ver-
    sion of the facts rather than another.22
    [5] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.23
    IV. ANALYSIS
    1. Robin H as Standing to Challenge
    Vandelay’s Tax Deed
    Vandelay contends Robin lacks standing to challenge its
    tax deed. It argues Robin did not satisfy a condition precedent
    19
    Applied Underwriters v. S.E.B. Servs. of New York, 
    297 Neb. 246
    , 
    898 N.W.2d 366
    (2017).
    20
    J.S. v. Grand Island Public Schools, 
    297 Neb. 347
    , 
    899 N.W.2d 893
          (2017).
    21
    Royal v. McKee, 
    298 Neb. 560
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 51
    (2017).
    22
    
    Id. 23 J.S.,
    supra note 20.
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    to questioning the validity of its tax deed, under § 77-1844,
    because he failed to offer any evidence that he either paid
    or tendered payment of the taxes due on the property to the
    county treasurer. Vandelay further argues that its response to
    Robin’s allegation in his pleading—that he tendered payment
    to the county treasurer—cannot be considered a judicial admis-
    sion regarding tender to the county treasurer because its state-
    ment was not unequivocal, clear, or deliberate.
    Robin argues Vandelay’s answer was a judicial admission,
    which acted as a substitute for such evidence by conclusively
    admitting the fact’s truth in this case. He also argues ten-
    dering payment to Vandelay satisfied condition precedent of
    § 77-1844, citing Hauxwell v. Henning.24
    (a) Statutory Requirements to Obtain
    Standing to Challenge Tax Deed
    [6,7] Standing is the legal or equitable right, title, or inter-
    est in the subject matter of the controversy.25 The requirement
    of standing is fundamental to a court’s exercise of jurisdic-
    tion, and either a litigant or a court before which a case is
    pending can raise the question of standing at any time dur-
    ing the proceeding.26 A party invoking a court’s or tribunal’s
    jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements
    of standing.27
    [8,9] To obtain standing to redeem property after the issu-
    ance of a tax deed, even if title under a tax deed is void or
    voidable, a party must satisfy the requirements of § 77-1844.28
    Section 77-1844 sets forth the conditions precedent to ques-
    tioning title conveyed under a tax deed.29 Under § 77-1844,
    24
    Hauxwell v. Henning, 
    291 Neb. 1
    , 
    863 N.W.2d 798
    (2015).
    25
    Landrum v. City of Omaha Planning Bd., 
    297 Neb. 165
    , 
    899 N.W.2d 598
          (2017).
    26
    
    Id. 27 Applied
    Underwriters, supra note 19.
    28
    See, Hauxwell, supra note 24; Ottaco Acceptance, Inc., supra note 13.
    29
    Ottaco Acceptance, Inc., supra note 13.
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    a party must prove the person under whom he or she claims
    title (1) had title to the property at the time of the tax sale
    and (2) paid all taxes due upon the property. To comply with
    § 77-1844, a party only needs to show that it has tendered the
    tax payment to the treasurer, not that the taxes have actually
    been paid.30 Payment or tender thereof may be made before or
    during the trial, or before final judgment.31
    (b) Vandelay’s Answer Constituted Judicial
    Admission That Robin Tendered Payment
    of Taxes Due to County Treasurer
    [10,11] A judicial admission is a formal act done in the
    course of judicial proceedings which is a substitute for evi-
    dence, thereby waiving or dispensing with the production
    of evidence by conceding for the purpose of litigation that
    the proposition of fact alleged by the opponent is true.32
    While parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon
    a judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent, nor may
    subject matter jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel,
    consent, or conduct of the parties,33 such does not prevent a
    party from conclusively admitting the truth of an underlying
    fact required to establish subject matter jurisdiction by judi-
    cial admission.
    This distinction is illustrated by J.S. v. Grand Island Public
    Schools,34 where we held the district court lacked subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction because the appellant did not serve the appellee
    with a copy of the petition after the appellee waived such serv­
    ice. Here, contrariwise, the allegation is that Vandelay admitted
    the taxes had actually been tendered to the county treasurer, a
    condition precedent for standing.
    30
    Hauxwell, supra note 24.
    31
    Ottaco Acceptance, Inc., supra note 13.
    32
    
    Id. 33 J.S.,
    supra note 20.
    34
    
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    [12,13] Judicial admissions must be unequivocal, deliberate,
    and clear, and not the product of mistake or inadvertence.35 A
    judicial admission does not extend beyond the intendment of
    the admission as clearly disclosed by its context.36
    (i) Admission in Pleading May Serve as
    Sufficient Evidence to Satisfy Standing
    Requirement in § 77-1844
    [14,15] We begin by addressing Vandelay’s argument that an
    admission in its answer could not satisfy the standing require-
    ment. Generally, an admission made in a pleading on which the
    trial is had is more than an ordinary admission; it is a judicial
    admission.37 It is an elementary rule of pleading that matters
    admitted by the pleadings need not be proved.38 Despite these
    propositions, Vandelay points to Hauxwell, where we stated
    that for the purposes of § 77-1844, “[t]he showing of taxes
    paid must be made by the evidence and not by the plead-
    ings alone.”39
    Our proposition in Hauxwell originated in the modifica-
    tion of our opinion on rehearing of Cornell v. Maverick Loan
    & Trust Co.,40 which affirmed our opinion with an explana-
    tion that we had not referenced the predecessor statute to
    § 77-1844 because the taxes were clearly not shown to have
    been paid. While we stated in our opinion on rehearing that
    the pleadings alone were insufficient to provide such proof,
    our discussion of the facts in our initial decision reveals that
    the plaintiff had alleged tender of payment in its complaint
    but does not state the fact was admitted by the defendant.
    35
    In re Estate of Radford, 
    297 Neb. 748
    , 
    901 N.W.2d 261
    (2017).
    36
    Lewison v. Renner, 
    298 Neb. 654
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 540
    (2018).
    37
    
    Id. 38 Id.
    39
    Hauxwell, supra note 
    24, 291 Neb. at 6
    , 863 N.W.2d at 802.
    40
    Cornell v. Maverick Loan & Trust Co., 
    95 Neb. 9
    , 
    144 N.W. 1074
    (1914),
    modified on denial of rehearing 
    95 Neb. 842
    , 
    147 N.W. 697
    .
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    Thus, we do not find a conflict between our statement in
    Cornell and our propositions of law concerning admissions
    in pleadings.
    [16] Nevertheless, as a matter of clarity, we amend our
    proposition from Cornell as follows: The showing pursuant to
    § 77-1844 of taxes paid must be made by the evidence and not
    by allegations in the pleadings alone.
    (ii) Vandelay Admitted Robin Tendered
    Redemption to County Treasurer
    Regarding Robin’s efforts to pay the taxes due on the
    property, paragraph 16 of the complaint alleges, “[Robin]
    presented the redemption to [Vandelay] and to the Lincoln
    County Treasurer within forty-five (45) days of [Vandelay’s]
    Application for Tax Deed, but the County Treasurer declined to
    accept the redemption for filing”; Vandelay’s answer “[a]dmits
    that Lincoln County Treasurer declined to accept [Robin’s]
    redemption, but denies the remaining allegations of para-
    graph 16.”
    Vandelay asserts that Robin’s allegation should be read as
    two separate allegations: (1) Robin presented redemption to
    Vandelay and the county treasurer and (2) the county treasurer
    declined to accept Robin’s redemption. It argues its answer
    admitted only the second allegation and denied the first alle-
    gation. It argues that reading its answer to admit that Robin
    tendered payment to the county treasurer would give no effect
    to its denial.
    We disagree with Vandelay’s interpretation. Vandelay’s
    admission that the county treasurer declined to accept Robin’s
    redemption necessarily admits Robin tendered redemption to
    the county treasurer; redemption cannot be denied if it was
    never offered. Despite Vandelay’s contention, this interpreta-
    tion gives effect to its general denial because the allegation that
    Robin tendered payment to Vandelay is completely separate
    from the allegation concerning the county treasurer.
    [17] Further, we find that this admission is clear regarding
    the tender of all of the taxes due on the property. As stated
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    above, redemption under § 77-1801 et seq. refers to paying
    the amount shown on the certificate and all subsequent taxes,
    along with the interest accrued thereon and any statutory fees.41
    Thus, Vandelay’s response conclusively admitted Robin ten-
    dered payment of all taxes due on the property to the county
    treasurer and acted as a substitute for evidence of such, dis-
    pensing with Robin’s need to produce such evidence for the
    purpose of this case.
    [18] Vandelay’s additional arguments that its admission was
    an inadvertency and that Robin waived its judicial admission
    are unavailing. In Robison v. Madsen,42 we recognized that a
    party may waive its right to rely on an opponent’s admission
    by failing to object to the opponent’s offer of contrary evidence
    or introducing contrary evidence itself.43 Robin’s testimony
    that he tendered payment to Vandelay and that the taxes were
    unpaid at the time of trial was not contrary to the judicial
    admission concerning Robin’s tender of payment to the county
    treasurer. Accordingly, Robin did not offer contrary evidence
    waiving Vandelay’s admission.
    [19,20] Further, a party is bound to its admission absent the
    court’s relieving it, in exercise of the court’s judicial discre-
    tion, from that consequence.44 The requirements of § 77-1844
    are clearly stated in the statute and well established in our case
    law. If Vandelay had not intended to admit that Robin tendered
    payment to the county treasurer, it should have raised the
    issue in the district court, where it could have requested to be
    relieved of the consequence of its admission. An argument not
    presented to or decided by the trial court is not appropriate for
    consideration on appeal.45 Therefore, Vandelay cannot argue
    41
    §§ 77-1824 and 77-1830.
    42
    Robison v. Madsen, 
    246 Neb. 22
    , 
    516 N.W.2d 594
    (1994).
    43
    
    Id. (citing Collision
    Center Paint & Body v. Campbell, 
    773 S.W.2d 354
          (Tex. App. 1989); Jenni v. Gamel, 
    602 S.W.2d 696
    (Mo. App. 1980); and
    31A C.J.S. Evidence § 381 c. (1964)).
    44
    See Kipf v. Bitner, 
    150 Neb. 155
    , 
    33 N.W.2d 518
    (1948).
    45
    Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 
    299 Neb. 76
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 275
    (2018).
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    for the first time on appeal that it should not be bound by the
    plain meaning of its admission.
    The evidence presented at trial also clearly established that
    Gladys had title to the property at the time of its sale. Therefore,
    Robin proved that he had standing to question Vandelay’s tax
    deed, under § 77-1844.
    (c) Tender of Payment to Tax Deed Holder
    Is Not Sufficient to Obtain Standing
    Robin also argued that we held in Hauxwell that payment
    or tender of payment to a deed holder is sufficient to obtain
    standing, under § 77-1844.46 We address this argument to
    clarify our holding in Hauxwell.
    In Hauxwell, Selma B. Hauxwell filed a complaint seeking
    to quiet title by claim of adverse possession in certain proper-
    ties after Ryan R. Hanzlick and his wife acquired tax deeds to
    the same.47 We held that the district court erred by not dismiss-
    ing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to Hauxwell’s
    failure to establish standing, under § 77-1844.48 Robin cites
    our conclusion that “Hauxwell did not plead or demonstrate
    through evidence that payment of the past due taxes was ever
    made or tendered to the treasurer or to the Hanzlicks.”49
    Directly preceding this conclusion, however, we cited our
    longstanding proposition of law that to satisfy the tax payment
    requirement of § 77-1844, “the party needs only to show the
    tender of payment of taxes to the treasurer.”50 In concluding
    that there was also no payment or tender to the Hanzlicks, we
    provided no support or explanation for the implication that
    doing so would satisfy the standing requirements of § 77-1844
    and expanding our precedent.
    46
    Hauxwell, supra note 24.
    47
    
    Id. 48 Id.
    49
    See 
    id. at 7,
    863 N.W.2d at 802.
    50
    Id. at 
    6, 863 N.W.2d at 802
    (emphasis supplied).
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    When we adopted this longstanding proposition, it was
    based on our reasoning that when a plaintiff has tendered pay-
    ment to the county treasurer and such payment is refused, a
    “plaintiff could not do more” under the tax certificate statutes
    to satisfy the standing requirement.51 This reasoning itself nec-
    essarily rejects an argument that making payment to the tax
    deed holder would be an acceptable alternative.
    [21] Our statement in Hauxwell was also not supported by
    our tax certificate statutes.52 Components of a series or collec-
    tion of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari
    materia and should be conjunctively considered and construed
    to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different
    provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.53 Sections
    77-1844 and 77-1843 both provide statutory prerequisites for
    property owners to recover their property after the issuance of
    a tax deed.
    While § 77-1844 does not specify whom the taxes due on
    the property must be paid to, § 77-1843 requires the property
    to have been redeemed pursuant to various statutory sec-
    tions. Section 77-1843 explicitly references Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 77-1701(1) (Reissue 2009), which provides in part: “The
    county treasurer shall be ex officio county collector of all taxes
    levied within the county.” As we mentioned above, redemption,
    a term of art in § 77-1801 et seq., includes the payment of all
    property taxes due.
    [22] Thus, we hold that to satisfy the tax payment require-
    ment in § 77-1844, a party must show the tender or payment
    of taxes due to the county treasurer, and we disapprove of
    Hauxwell to the extent it can be read to authorize satisfying the
    standing requirement in § 77-1844 by tender or payment to the
    tax deed holder.54
    51
    Howell v. Jordan, 
    94 Neb. 264
    , 266, 
    143 N.W. 217
    , 218 (1913).
    52
    Hauxwell, supra note 24.
    53
    In re Trust of Shire, 
    299 Neb. 25
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 263
    (2018).
    54
    Hauxwell, supra note 24.
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    2. Vandelay Substantially Complied
    With Statutory Notice R equirements
    Before A pplying for Tax Deed
    Robin argues Vandelay’s tax deed is void because he pre-
    sented sufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presump-
    tion that the notice requirements were complied with before
    Vandelay applied for the tax deed. Specifically, he argues that
    Vandelay was not entitled to provide notice by publication
    and that Vandelay did not comply with the statutory publica-
    tion requirements.
    [23] Section 77-1843 provides the statutory prerequisites
    to defeating title “[i]n all controversies and suits involving
    the title to real property claimed and held under and by virtue
    of a deed made substantially by the treasurer in the manner
    provided by sections 77-1831 to 77-1842 . . . .”55 We have
    interpreted § 77-1843 to apply only to those tax deeds made
    after substantial compliance with the aforementioned sec-
    tions.56 Accordingly, we consider the validity of Vandelay’s
    tax deed.
    [24] A county treasurer’s tax deed is presumptive evidence
    that the procedures required by law to make a good and valid
    tax sale and vest title in the purchaser were done.57 A tax deed
    holder is entitled to receive a tax deed from the county treas­
    urer only after it “serves or causes to be served a notice,” con-
    taining specific information provided therein, at least 3 months
    before applying for the tax deed.58 Specifically, § 77-1842
    provides that a tax deed is presumptive evidence that “the
    notice had been served or due publication made as required
    in sections 77-1831 to 77-1835 before the time of redemption
    had expired.” The presumption is not conclusive and may be
    55
    See Ottaco Acceptance, Inc., supra note 13.
    56
    
    Id. 57 SID
    No. 424 v. Tristar Mgmt., 
    288 Neb. 425
    , 
    850 N.W.2d 745
    (2014). See
    § 77-1842.
    58
    § 77-1831.
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    rebutted, but the burden is upon the party attacking the validity
    of such a deed to show by competent evidence some jurisdic-
    tional defect voiding the deed.59
    As to proper notice under the tax deed method, § 77-1832,
    in relevant part, provides: “Service of the notice provided by
    section 77-1831 shall be made by certified mail, return receipt
    requested, upon the person in whose name the title to the real
    property appears of record to the address where the property
    tax statement was mailed . . . .”
    This section, however, has been the subject of signifi-
    cant revision since the turn of the century. The 2009 version
    resulted from a 2003 amendment to the following language:
    “Service of the notice provided by section 77-1831 shall be
    made on every person in actual possession or occupancy of the
    real property [and] upon the person in whose name the title to
    the real property appears of record . . . .”60
    Further, the language of § 77-1832 (Supp. 2017), currently
    in effect, provides:
    (1) Service of the notice provided by section 77-1831
    shall be made by:
    (a) Personal, residence, certified mail, or designated
    delivery service as described in section 25-505.01 upon
    every person in actual possession or occupancy of the
    real property who qualifies as an owner-occupant under
    section 77-1824.01; or
    (b) Certified mail service as described in section
    25-505.01 upon:
    (i) The person in whose name the title to the real prop-
    erty appears of record who does not qualify as an owner-
    occupant under section 77-1824.01. The notice shall be
    sent to the name and address to which the property tax
    statement was mailed[.]
    59
    Ottaco Acceptance, Inc. v. Huntzinger, 
    268 Neb. 258
    , 
    682 N.W.2d 232
          (2004). See § 77-1842.
    60
    § 77-1832 (Reissue 1996). See 2003 Neb. Laws, L.B. 319.
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    [25] In summary, direct service under the recent versions of
    § 77-1832 was provided for as follows: Before 2003, service
    was required both (1) on every person in actual possession
    or occupancy of the real property and (2) upon the person in
    whose name the title to the real property appears of record,
    and service was not limited to certified mail; under § 77-1832
    (Reissue 2009), service need only be provided to the owner
    of record at the address where the property tax statement was
    mailed and may only be done by certified mail, return receipt
    requested; for tax certificates issued in 2018, service must be
    (1) made upon every owner-occupant by the methods autho-
    rized in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-505.01 (Reissue 2016) and (2)
    provided to the owner of record, if not an owner-occupant, at
    the address where the property tax statement was mailed by
    certified mail.
    Besides § 77-1832, the only other section that provides for
    effectuating the service required by § 77-1831 is § 77-1834.
    Section 77-1834, in relevant part, has consistently provided:
    If the person in whose name the title to the real prop-
    erty appears of record in the office of the register of
    deeds in the county . . . cannot, upon diligent inquiry,
    be found, then such purchaser or his or her assignee
    shall publish the notice in some newspaper published
    in the county and having a general circulation in the
    county . . . .
    There is no dispute that Vandelay sent notice to Gladys by
    certified mail, return receipt requested, and that it was returned
    as “‘unclaimed’” after three attempted deliveries.61 Because
    Vandelay was unable to serve Gladys in compliance with
    § 77-1832, it could comply with § 77-1831 only by causing
    Gladys to be served under § 77-1834. Accordingly, we consider
    Robin’s arguments that Vandelay was not entitled to provide
    service under § 77-1834 and that the service it did provide
    was deficient.
    61
    Wisner v. Vandelay Investments, supra note 16, 
    2017 WL 2399492
    at *4.
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    (a) Vandelay Was Entitled to Serve Gladys
    by Publication After It Was Unable to
    Serve Her Notice by Certified Mail
    Robin argues we should interpret “found” consistently with
    its plain meaning of a person’s whereabouts’ being actually
    known, as the Court of Appeals held. Under this interpreta-
    tion, he argues that Vandelay could not serve Gladys by pub-
    lication because it actually knew her address and that instead,
    its only course of action was to resend notice by certified mail
    or initiate foreclosure proceedings. Robin also contends pub-
    lication was not available because Vandelay did not conduct
    a “diligent inquiry” by publishing notice after sending only
    one certified mailing and taking no other actions to provide
    Gladys notice.62
    Vandelay contends that because § 77-1801 et seq. allows
    service only by certified mail and publication, we should con-
    strue the statutes harmoniously by interpreting someone to be
    “‘found’” only when he or she has been “[actually] ‘served’”
    by certified mail, not when his or her address of record simply
    becomes “‘known.’” It also argues that its efforts were diligent
    because it sent the notice of publication to Gladys by first-class
    mail, which was not returned.
    (i) “Diligent Inquiry” Under § 77-1834
    Requires Party to Request Address Where
    Property Tax Statements Are Sent
    From County Treasurer
    We begin by considering the meaning of “diligent inquiry,”
    under § 77-1834. This phrase is not defined in the statutes, and
    we have not previously interpreted its meaning. Robin argues
    we should interpret the phrase consistently with “reasonable
    diligence,” from Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-517.02 (Reissue 2016).
    Section 25-517.02 provides: “Upon motion and showing
    by affidavit that service cannot be made with reasonable dili-
    gence by any other method provided by statute, the court may
    62
    Brief for appellant on petition for further review at 20.
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    permit service to be made . . . (2) by publication . . . .” In
    In re Interest of A.W.,63 we described a “reasonably diligent”
    search as
    not requir[ing] the use of all possible or conceivable
    means of discovery, but [a]s such an inquiry as a reason-
    ably prudent person would make in view of the circum-
    stances [that] must extend to those places where informa-
    tion is likely to be obtained and to those persons who, in
    the ordinary course of events, would be likely to receive
    news of or from the absent person.
    While the phrases are not identical, the context of both
    concerns the effort required to determine the location of an
    individual for the purpose of providing service. As mentioned
    above, components of a series or collection of statutes per-
    taining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
    should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine
    the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are
    consistent, harmonious, and sensible.64 Based on the similar
    subject matter, an argument could be made to interpret these
    phrases to have a similar meaning. However, these phrases
    are not components of a series of statutes. Instead, the context
    of the statutes for service under § 77-1831 is quite unique in
    its limitation.
    As mentioned above, § 77-1832 (Reissue 2009) authorizes a
    tax certificate holder to serve the owner of record only at the
    address where the property tax statement was mailed. Unlike
    the pre-2003 amended statute—which allowed for an owner
    of record to be served by mail at any address—the limitation
    on service to the address where the property tax statement was
    mailed remains in effect under the current statutory scheme. As
    a result, a party’s efforts to discover the actual location of an
    owner of record are fruitless because the tax certificate holder
    has no authority to serve him or her at that location.
    63
    In Interest of A.W., 
    224 Neb. 764
    , 766, 
    401 N.W.2d 477
    , 479 (1987).
    64
    In re Trust of Shire, supra note 53.
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    [26,27] Nevertheless, a court must attempt to give effect to
    all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause,
    or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless.65
    In this case, the Legislature has rendered the phrase “diligent
    inquiry” largely superfluous through its 2003 amendment to
    § 77-1834, but we give the phrase effect by acknowledging that
    it is still incumbent upon the tax certificate holder to obtain the
    address where the property tax statement was mailed in order
    to send notice by certified mail before moving to service by
    publication. Vandelay took this action, and the statutes do not
    require it to do any more.
    The parties’ arguments surrounding “diligent inquiry,” how-
    ever, do not concern the efforts required under § 77-1834 to
    locate the address of the owner of record. It is undisputed
    that Vandelay did, in fact, discover Gladys’ actual address.
    Instead, the parties’ argument, essentially, requests us to read
    all of the prerequisites to notice by publication, contained in
    § 25-517.02, into § 77-1834, under the guise of interpreting
    “diligent inquiry.” This we cannot do. A court will not read
    into a statute a meaning that is not there.66 While subjecting a
    tax certificate holder to the same prerequisites for service by
    publication as are required in § 25-517.02 might be a prudent
    decision for the Legislature to make, it is solely within the
    Legislature’s purview to do so. Therefore, the parties’ argu-
    ments concerning whether Vandelay took sufficient steps above
    those required in § 77-1832 are irrelevant.
    (ii) Owner of Record Is “Found” Only if
    He or She Is “Able to Be Served,”
    Under § 77-1834
    We next consider whether Vandelay was entitled to serve
    Gladys notice by publication after it was unable to serve her by
    certified mail, despite having actual knowledge of her location.
    65
    Woodmen of the World v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 
    299 Neb. 43
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 1
    (2018).
    66
    State v. Gill, 
    297 Neb. 852
    , 
    901 N.W.2d 679
    (2017).
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    Whether Vandelay was able to serve Gladys by publication
    depends on our interpretation of the term “found.”
    [28-30] Generally, statutory language is to be given its plain
    and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort
    to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words
    which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.67 However, “‘[a]
    statute can . . . be considered ambiguous when a particular
    interpretation from the face of a statute could lead to an anom-
    alous, unusual or absurd result.’”68 For “‘[i]t is impermissible
    to follow a literal reading that engenders absurd consequences
    where there is an alternative interpretation that reasonably
    effects the statute’s purpose.’”69
    [31] In the exposition of statutes, the reason and intention of
    the lawgiver will control the strict letter of the law when the
    latter would lead to palpable injustice or absurdity.70 As men-
    tioned above, components of a series or collection of statutes
    pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
    should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine
    the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are
    consistent, harmonious, and sensible.71
    The definition of “found,” as the past tense of “find,” is “I.
    To come upon by chance or in the course of events. . . . II. To
    discover or attain by search or effort.”72 Consistently with this
    plain meaning, the Court of Appeals interpreted “found” to
    mean Vandelay actually knew Gladys’ address. The implication
    of ascribing this plain meaning to the term, however, would to a
    67
    Becher v. Becher, 
    299 Neb. 206
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 12
    (2018).
    
    68 U.S. v
    . E.T.H., 
    833 F.3d 931
    , 938 (8th Cir. 2016), quoting Breedlove
    v. Earthgrains Baking Companies, Inc., 
    140 F.3d 797
    (8th Cir. 1998).
    Accord, e.g., Dean v. State, 
    288 Neb. 530
    , 
    849 N.W.2d 138
    (2014).
    
    69 U.S. v
    . E.T.H., supra note 
    68, 833 F.3d at 938
    , quoting Ashley, Drew &
    Northern Ry. v. United Transp. U., 
    625 F.2d 1357
    (8th Cir. 1980).
    70
    Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 
    283 Neb. 868
    , 
    813 N.W.2d 467
    (2012).
    71
    In re Trust of Shire, supra note 53.
    72
    “Find,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/view/
    Entry/70348 (last visited Aug. 3, 2018).
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    large extent obviate the utility of the tax deed statutes. It would,
    based on the narrow service procedure in § 77-1832, preclude
    the holder of a tax certificate from obtaining a tax deed if an
    owner of record either refuses to accept a certified mailing of
    the notice to the address where the property tax statement was
    sent or lives at any other address and can be found there.
    [32] We have stated that the overall objective of the cer-
    tificate method for delinquent taxes is the recovery of unpaid
    taxes on real property.73 As explained above, the Legislature
    created two separate methods for a tax certificate holder to
    elect to pursue to recover the taxes he or she paid on behalf of
    the deficient owner. Neither of these policies supports a con-
    struction of the tax deed statutes rewarding an owner, already
    deficient in paying taxes, by allowing him or her to force the
    initiation of judicial foreclosure proceedings simply by avoid-
    ing the notice, which the tax deed method was designed to
    provide the owner regarding his or her rights.74 Therefore, we
    reject the plain meaning of “found.”
    [33] Vandelay, contrariwise, argues that we should interpret
    “found” to mean “‘able to be served.’”75 While this defini-
    tion is not supported by any plain or ordinary meaning of the
    word, it does find support in the context of civil procedure as
    a legal term of art. “A ‘term of art’ is a word or phrase having
    a specific, precise meaning in a given specialty apart from its
    general meaning in ordinary contexts.”76 We have ascribed the
    term of art meaning to statutory terms when necessitated by the
    statute’s context.77
    73
    SID No. 424, supra note 57.
    74
    
    Id. 75 Supplemental
    brief for appellee on petition for further review at 27.
    76
    82 C.J.S. Statutes § 418 at 537 (2009).
    77
    In re Estate of Young, No. A-96-423, 
    1997 WL 426191
    (Neb. App. July
    1, 1997) (not designated for permanent publication), citing In re Estate of
    Hannan, 
    246 Neb. 828
    , 
    523 N.W.2d 672
    (1994). See, also, e.g., Spady v.
    Spady, 
    284 Neb. 885
    , 
    824 N.W.2d 366
    (2012); ATS Mobile Telephone, Inc.
    v. General Communications Co., Inc., 
    204 Neb. 141
    , 
    282 N.W.2d 16
    (1979).
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    In fact, we long ascribed such a meaning to the word
    “found” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-408 (Reissue 1985), which
    has since been repealed.78 Section 25-408, in relevant part,
    provided: “An action . . . against a nonresident of this state or
    a foreign corporation may be brought in any county . . . where
    said defendant may be found . . . .” Regarding foreign corpora-
    tions, we had held that “[a] defendant ‘may be found’ in any
    county in which proper service can be had upon its agent.”79
    Further, in other states, courts have also determined “found”
    to mean “‘found for legal service’” in the context of civil
    procedure.80 These states’ venue statutes state the following:
    “When the defendant is a resident of the state, either in the
    county within which the defendant resides, or in the county
    within which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be
    found.”81 The Nevada Supreme Court interpreted “found,” in
    this context, as follows:
    It is clear from the statute that the word “found” is used
    in contradistinction to the word “reside.” The action then
    may be instituted by a resident of the state in a court of
    a county, regardless of the residence of the defendant,
    if it is alleged that he can be found within the county
    where suit is instituted and is actually served with proc­
    ess therein.82
    This term of art definition of “found” also provides a
    harmonious construction to the tax deed statutes by giving
    effect to the dichotomy created by §§ 77-1832 and 77-1834
    to accomplish the service requirement of § 77-1831. Under
    this construction, a tax certificate holder must attempt to serve
    78
    See 1986 Neb. Laws, L.B. 529, § 58.
    79
    Mittelstadt v. Rouzer, 
    213 Neb. 178
    , 181, 
    328 N.W.2d 467
    , 469 (1982),
    quoting Juckett v. Brennaman, 
    99 Neb. 755
    , 
    157 N.W. 925
    (1916).
    80
    Shields v. Shields, 
    115 Mont. 146
    , 155, 
    139 P.2d 528
    , 530 (1943). Accord
    State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Manners, 
    161 S.W.3d 373
    (Mo. 2005).
    81
    See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 508.010(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2018). Accord
    Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-11 (2013).
    82
    Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 
    36 Nev. 494
    , 500-501, 
    137 P. 824
    , 826 (1913).
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    the owner of record under the requirements of § 77-1832,
    but, if such service is impossible or unsuccessful, then the tax
    certificate holder may provide service by publication. Such
    an interpretation gives effect to the statutory requirements
    while retaining the overall viability of the tax deed statutes as
    a whole.
    [34,35] Therefore, we hold that the word “found” in
    § 77-1834 means “able to be served.” Accordingly, we hold
    that § 77-1834 authorizes a tax certificate holder to provide
    service by publication to an owner of record who was not able
    to be served by certified mail at the address where the prop-
    erty tax statement was mailed, upon proof of compliance with
    § 77-1832 if the owner, in fact, lives at such address.
    In this case, Vandelay obtained the address where Gladys
    received the property tax statements for the property. It then
    sent notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, which
    notice was returned as “unclaimed” after three failed attempts
    at delivery. Vandelay submitted this into evidence along with
    an affidavit of its efforts to comply with § 77-1832, as
    required by § 77-1833 (Cum. Supp. 2012). This constituted
    complete compliance with the requirements of § 77-1832,
    and because Gladys was not able to be served in this manner,
    Vandelay appropriately proceeded with service by publica-
    tion. Therefore, we find the Court of Appeals’ determination
    that Vandelay was not entitled to serve Gladys by publica-
    tion erroneous.
    [36] Before we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision,
    however, we consider Robin’s alternative argument before the
    Court of Appeals that the tax deed was void because Vandelay
    failed to comply with the publication requirements, which the
    Court of Appeals did not reach. Upon further review from
    a judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme
    Court will not reverse a judgment which it deems to be correct
    simply because its reasoning differs from that employed by the
    Court of Appeals.83
    83
    In re Estate of Clinger, 
    292 Neb. 237
    , 
    872 N.W.2d 37
    (2015).
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    (b) Vandelay Complied With Publication
    Requirements of § 77-1834
    Robin argues Vandelay’s proof of publication did not com-
    ply with § 77-1835 because it did not say the Courier-Times
    newspaper was in general circulation in the county and because
    he offered evidence the Courier-Times was not, in fact, in cir-
    culation throughout Lincoln County. Further, Robin contends
    Vandelay did not comply with § 77-1834 because there was
    another Lincoln County newspaper Gladys was more likely
    to see.
    As mentioned above, § 77-1834, in relevant part, provides
    that “the purchaser or his or her assignee shall publish the
    notice in some newspaper published in the county and having a
    general circulation in the county.” Section 77-1835, in relevant
    part, states:
    Proof of publication shall be made by filing in the county
    treasurer’s office the affidavit of the publisher, manager,
    or other employee of such newspaper, that to his or her
    personal knowledge, the notice was published for the time
    and in the manner provided in this section, setting out
    a copy of the notice and the date upon which the same
    was published.
    [37] There is no requirement in the preceding sections
    that specific language must appear in a proof of publica-
    tion. Instead, the proof of publication needs to state only that
    notice was published in the manner provided in § 77-1834.
    In addition, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-523 (Reissue 2016) defines
    a “legal newspaper” for the publication of legal and other
    official notice as one which has a “bona fide circulation of at
    least three hundred paid subscriptions weekly, and shall have
    been published within the county for fifty-two successive
    weeks prior to the publication of such notice, and be printed,
    either in whole or in part, in an office maintained at the place
    of publication.”
    The proof of publication sufficiently stated that the Courier-
    Times is a legal newspaper having a bona fide circulation of at
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    least 300 paid weekly subscriptions and that it had been pub-
    lished within the county for 52 consecutive weeks prior to the
    publication of such notice.
    [38] Robin also failed to produce sufficient evidence the
    Courier-Times was not, in fact, in general circulation in Lincoln
    County. In the absence of a sufficient showing to the contrary,
    the affidavit of the publisher that a newspaper was one of gen-
    eral circulation in the county must be held sufficient to estab-
    lish the fact.84
    [39] Robin submitted evidence that the Courier-Times had
    only 1,300 weekly subscriptions among three villages within
    Lincoln County. However, absent anything to the contrary,
    statutory language is to be given its plain meaning, and a court
    will not look beyond the statute or interpret it when the mean-
    ing of its words is plain, direct, and unambiguous.85 The plain
    meaning of the word “in,” in § 77-1834, shows that the news-
    paper only needed to be generally circulated within Lincoln
    County, not throughout the entire county, as Robin argues.
    Robin’s evidence does not constitute sufficient evidence that
    the Courier-Times was not a legal newspaper in general circu-
    lation in Lincoln County.
    Robin also produced evidence another newspaper published
    in Lincoln County had greater circulation throughout the
    county and, specifically, in the ZIP code where Gladys and the
    property were located. He argues that Vandelay did not satisfy
    the publication requirement by not publishing the notice in
    this newspaper, by reading some type of good faith require-
    ment into § 77-1834. However, § 77-1834 does not require
    publication in the newspaper of greatest circulation in the
    county, and we will not impose such a requirement. As men-
    tioned above, a court will not read into a statute a meaning
    that is not there.86
    84
    See Bourke v. Somers, 3 Neb. (Unoff.) 761, 
    92 N.W. 990
    (1902).
    85
    In re Trust of Shire, supra note 53.
    86
    State v. Gill, supra note 66.
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    Nevertheless, Robin directs us to State, ex rel. Elliott, v.
    Holliday,87 where in 1892, we stated: “Legal advertisements
    should not be inserted in an obscure paper where the prob-
    abilities are that they will be seen by but few, where there is a
    paper of general circulation in the county, because the object of
    the law will be in part at least defeated.” In Holliday, we were
    considering a sheriff’s refusal to publish mortgage foreclosure
    sale notices in any newspaper except the one published by his
    political party, which newspaper was alleged to have been “‘of
    such small circulation as in effect to utterly defeat the object
    of the law.’”88 We do not foreclose the possibility that there is
    some threshold requirement for the circulation of a newspaper
    to satisfy the requirements of § 77-1834, but Holliday is inap-
    plicable here, where, as we stated above, Robin has not pre-
    sented sufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presump-
    tion that § 77-1834 was complied with.
    Because we conclude Robin did not overcome the presump-
    tion Vandelay complied with the statutory notice requirements
    to show Vandelay’s tax deed is void, we must reverse the deci-
    sion of the Court of Appeals.
    [40] Upon reversing a decision of the Court of Appeals,
    we may consider, as we deem appropriate, some or all of the
    assignments of error the Court of Appeals did not reach.89
    Because the Court of Appeals determined that Vandelay’s tax
    deed was void, it did not consider whether Gladys had a
    mental disorder entitling Robin to redeem the property under
    the expanded statutory period or whether equity requires the
    protection of Robin’s interests. The district court fully decided
    these issues, and the meaning of “mental disorder,” under
    § 77-1827, is a matter of first impression. Thus, we elect to
    consider these assignments of error.
    87
    State, ex rel. Elliott, v. Holliday, 
    35 Neb. 327
    , 333, 
    53 N.W. 142
    , 144
    (1892).
    88
    
    Id. at 331,
    53 N.W. at 143.
    89
    Burns v. Burns, 
    293 Neb. 633
    , 
    879 N.W.2d 375
    (2016).
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    3. Robin Failed to Prove He Was Entitled to
    Extended R edemption Period in § 77-1827
    Robin argues that he was entitled to redeem the property
    because Gladys suffered from a mental disorder that extended
    the statutory redemption period and because Vandelay admitted
    that Robin had tendered redemption to the county treasurer. He
    argues that the district court erred in not finding Gladys had
    a mental disorder by relying on Vandelay’s expert, who never
    examined Gladys and only selectively reviewed her medical
    records, over her long-term physician.
    Vandelay argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove
    Gladys had a mental disorder affecting her ability to make
    legal decisions and that we should defer to the lower court’s
    factual finding that Vandelay’s expert was more credible than
    Gladys’ physician, whose testimony was not supported by his
    own medical records.
    [41] In order to defeat a tax deed, a party must show that
    it satisfied the conditions precedent in § 77-1843. One of
    the options to satisfy § 77-1843 includes proving that (1)
    the property has been redeemed from the sale and (2) such
    redemption was had or made for the use and benefit of persons
    having the right of redemption under the laws of this state.
    As discussed above, Vandelay admitted that Robin tendered
    redemption to the county treasurer, which is sufficient to sat-
    isfy that condition.
    Though we are aware that in 2013, the Legislature revised
    § 77-1827 to replace the term “mental retardation” with the
    term “intellectual disability,” for purposes of this matter we
    quote from the version of the statute in place during the rel-
    evant period of this controversy. The 2009 version states: “The
    real property of persons with mental retardation or a mental
    disorder so sold, or any interest they may have in real property
    sold for taxes, may be redeemed at any time within five years
    after such sale.” 90 There is no contention that Gladys suffered
    90
    § 77-1827 (Reissue 2009).
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    from the first condition, so we consider only whether she suf-
    fered from the second condition.
    [42,43] The language of the statute indicates that the
    extended redemption period for a mental disorder exists if the
    owner had a mental disorder at the time of the property’s sale.
    Contrariwise, interpreting the statute to extend the redemp-
    tion period for an individual who only later develops a men-
    tal disorder within the 5-year period provided therein would
    be absurd because such an individual could not reobtain the
    right to redeem the property after a tax deed had been val-
    idly issued. In interpreting a statute, a court is guided by the
    presumption that the Legislature intended a sensible rather
    than absurd result in enacting the statute.91 Accordingly, we
    restrict our analysis to whether Gladys had a mental disorder
    in March 2011.
    At trial, each party called an expert witness concerning
    Gladys’ mental state. The witnesses agreed that a mental disor-
    der is, as characterized by Vandelay’s expert, “marked primar-
    ily by sufficient disorganization of personality, mind and emo-
    tions to seriously impair the normal psychological functioning
    of the individual.”
    Robin called Dr. Ronald Asher, who provided Gladys’ medi-
    cal care beginning in at least 2006. He stated that an MRI
    record in his 2006 records indicated Gladys had vascular dis-
    ease in her brain, which causes small strokes. He described
    Gladys’ mental functioning as starting at a normal level in
    2006 but slowly deteriorating until the time of her death,
    when she was mostly bedridden. Asher explained that Gladys’
    deterioration was a “step-wise progression,” where she would
    suffer a small stroke impairing her mental status for 7 to 10
    days before she recovered to a level slightly worse than before
    the stroke.
    Asher opined Gladys had a mental disorder and dementia
    from at least 2009 until her death, but he could not deter-
    mine exactly when she developed the mental disorder. He
    91
    Burns v. Burns, 
    296 Neb. 184
    , 
    892 N.W.2d 135
    (2017).
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    explained she was unable to understand complicated issues,
    make appropriate judgments, or manage financial matters—
    beyond writing checks and simple cash management. While
    Asher never performed any psychological testing or prescribed
    Gladys dementia medication, he explained she had never suf-
    fered any behavioral issues warranting intervention. Finally, he
    acknowledged his notes from June 2012, “I thought [her] men-
    tal status was good,” and May 2015, “mental status reassur­
    ing,” but explained the notes were relative to her status during
    that period.
    Robin and one of his sisters provided anecdotal testimony
    about Gladys’ false memories and lack of reasoning, which
    were consistent with the symptoms of a mental disorder as
    described by the experts. Robin also testified that Gladys’
    mental condition gradually declined but that the most sig-
    nificant change occurred after she was hospitalized for a fall in
    December 2013.
    Regarding Gladys’ ability to handle her affairs, Robin and
    his sister stated that Gladys tended to keep all documents
    and mail she received and that they found records from doc-
    tor appointments, letters from Social Security, various bills,
    junk mail, and a handicapped parking pass Gladys claimed to
    have thrown away, but no property tax statements. Robin also
    stated Gladys asked him about her bills frequently after 2009 to
    make sure they were being paid. Robin testified he confirmed
    with the retirement community staff that Gladys continued to
    receive her mail throughout her time living there.
    Dr. John Goldner, a neurologist, testified for Vandelay
    after conducting a comprehensive review of Gladys’ medical
    records. Specifically, he relied on Asher’s notes, the absence of
    psychological testing and prescriptions treating dementia, and
    the daily notes from the retirement community—describing
    Gladys as alert, orientated, and able to make her needs known
    and make her own decisions, through 2013. Goldner testified
    that Asher’s notes indicated that in April 2013, Gladys suffered
    from decreased memory, and that then in December 2013,
    Gladys moved from a residential unit to the assisted living
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    unit at the retirement community because she required a higher
    level of care. He testified that at Gladys’ age, it was possible
    that her functioning could be deficient enough to be consid-
    ered a mental disorder on certain days, but that she appeared
    to generally be able to function within normal limits for her
    advanced age, which is not de facto a mental disorder. He tes-
    tified Gladys’ functioning could not be classified as a mental
    disorder before mid-2014, at which point her mental capacity
    was inconclusive.
    The court determined that Asher’s records did not support
    his conclusions that Gladys had a mental disorder. It con-
    cluded Robin failed to prove Gladys had a mental disorder,
    relying on Goldner’s testimony that Gladys did not suffer from
    a mental disorder any time before mid-2014, the evidence
    that any mental decline she was experiencing was not out of
    line with other individuals her age, and the fact that she was
    never tested for a mental condition or placed on medication
    for dementia.
    We have not previously interpreted the term “mental disor-
    der” in the context of § 77-1827 (Cum. Supp. 2016). We have,
    however, interpreted that same phrase in the context of statu-
    tory limitations on certain actions. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213
    (Reissue 2016), in relevant part, provides:
    [I]f a person entitled to bring any action [under listed
    statutes] for the recovery of the title or possession of
    lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure
    of mortgages thereon, is, at the time the cause of action
    accrued . . . a person with a mental disorder . . . every
    such person shall be entitled to bring such action within
    the respective times . . . after such disability is removed.
    [44] In Maycock v. Hoody,92 we adopted the definition of
    “mental disorder” employed by the Court of Appeals, reason-
    ing it was consistent with our interpretation of a previous ver-
    sion of the statute.93 We stated:
    92
    Maycock v. Hoody, 
    281 Neb. 767
    , 
    799 N.W.2d 322
    (2011).
    93
    See Sacchi v. Blodig, 
    215 Neb. 817
    , 
    341 N.W.2d 326
    (1983).
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    [A] person with a mental disorder under § 25-213 is “one
    who suffers from a condition of mental derangement
    which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding
    his or her legal rights or from instituting legal action[,]”
    and . . . a mental disorder within the meaning of § 25-213
    is “an incapacity which disqualifies one from acting for
    the protection of one’s rights.”94
    Because both § 77-1827 and § 25-213 relate to extending
    the time required to exercise a legal right for an individual suf-
    fering from a mental disorder, we interpret the meaning of the
    term “mental disorder” consistently among them.
    While we review factual issues de novo on the record, we
    give deference to the fact that the trial court observed the tes-
    timony of the experts and Wisner family members. The court
    determined that Goldner’s testimony was more credible than
    Asher’s and the Wisners’ because of the contradiction with
    Asher’s records and lack of anyone requesting psychological
    testing for Gladys.
    The definition of a mental disorder provided by the experts
    appears to be broader than the standard required by the stat-
    ute. Accordingly, Goldner’s opinion that Gladys did not suffer
    from any mental disorder before mid-2014 strongly supports
    not finding Gladys to have had a mental disorder in March
    2011, while Asher’s contrary opinion did not contain a precise
    conclusion regarding her ability to understand and protect her
    legal rights.
    Both Asher and Robin described Gladys’ mental condi-
    tion as a slow decline. Asher could not pinpoint when Gladys
    developed a mental disorder but concluded it was in at least
    2009 despite a general consensus that her greatest decline in
    functioning occurred in December 2013. While Asher stated
    that Gladys had a decreased ability to make judgments and
    understand complex issues since 2009, Robin stated that she
    remained vigilant regarding her financial obligations, and
    94
    Maycock, supra note 
    92, 281 Neb. at 776
    , 799 N.W.2d at 329, quoting
    Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 
    1 Neb. Ct. App. 1141
    , 
    510 N.W.2d 550
    (1993).
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    the June 2011 newspaper article indicated that typically, she
    was still functioning near her normal capacity—engaging in
    weekly card games with friends and reading. Finally, Asher’s
    note from June 2012 does not provide any support for his
    conclusion that she had a mental disorder, even if it was only
    describing her relative status.
    Based on the district court’s credibility determination and
    our independent review of the evidence, we conclude Robin
    failed to prove Gladys suffered from a mental disorder in
    March 2011. Therefore, her right to redeem the property
    expired when the county treasurer delivered the tax deed
    to Vandelay.
    4. Equities of Case Do Not Favor Robin
    Robin argues the equities of this situation warrant this
    court’s permitting him to redeem the property, even if the law
    does not. He argues the undisputed evidence is that Gladys
    was a 95-year-old widow in a retirement community with no
    local family and at least some diminished mental capacity.
    Conversely, he argues Vandelay chose to pursue the less ardu-
    ous process for a tax deed and did only the bare minimum
    required by the tax deed statutes, in bad faith to deprive Gladys
    of her property at a significant windfall.
    The parties dispute whether we may provide an equitable
    remedy at all when the situation is governed by a comprehen-
    sive, rigid statutory structure. We need not decide this issue,
    because even assuming, without deciding, that we could craft
    some type of relief for Robin, his characterization of the equi-
    ties of the situation strongly distorts the reality of this case.
    [45] Equity strives to do justice; it is not a rigid concept,
    but, instead, is determined on a case-by-case basis according
    to concepts of justice and fairness.95 But “‘equity follows the
    law to the extent of obeying it and conforming to its gen-
    eral rules and policies whether contained in common law or
    95
    Floral Lawns Memorial Gardens Assn. v. Becker, 
    284 Neb. 532
    , 
    822 N.W.2d 692
    (2012).
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    statute.’” 96 This maxim is strictly applicable whenever the
    rights of the parties are clearly defined and established by
    law.97 Also, equitable remedies are generally not available
    where there exists an adequate remedy at law.98
    When Roger died in 2009, Robin took responsibility over
    managing Gladys’ affairs. He passed this responsibility to
    the trust department of a bank but, apparently, overlooked
    the property taxes due on the property. Further, his own tes-
    timony provided that he did not monitor Gladys’ finances,
    despite her persistent concern about her bills’ being paid.
    Additionally, while Gladys was stated to have retained all
    of her mail, even junk mail, she apparently disposed of her
    repeated notices by Lincoln County and Vandelay regarding
    her property tax deficiency.
    Steps could have been taken to ensure that Gladys’ affairs
    were being addressed. When Gladys moved to the retirement
    community in 2009, her address of record was changed with
    the relevant agencies. Robin, as the holder of Gladys’ power of
    attorney, could have directed that all of Gladys’ mail be sent
    to him. He could have had the lease on the property recorded
    with the register of deeds to allow additional notices to be
    sent to the tenant. He could have paid the real estate taxes or
    authorized the trust department to pay the real estate taxes. He
    could have sought to have her mental capacity tested, and if
    Gladys was found to be impaired by reason of disability, he
    could have sought a conservatorship for her. However, Robin
    failed to take any one of the steps to ensure the real estate
    taxes were paid.
    Despite the harsh result in this matter, the Legislature has
    established strict rules for the payment of real estate taxes and
    ramifications for the failure to pay those taxes. Vandelay com-
    plied with those statutory requirements to obtain a tax deed on
    validly purchased tax certificates. Despite Robin’s arguments
    96
    Jeffrey B. v. Amy L., 
    283 Neb. 940
    , 949, 
    814 N.W.2d 737
    , 745 (2012).
    97
    
    Id. 98 Jeffrey
    B. v. Amy L., supra note 96.
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    that it did the bare minimum required, Vandelay, in fact,
    researched where to find Gladys; sent Gladys, by certified mail
    to her correct address, notice that an application for a tax deed
    would be made; published notice of the application in a legal
    newspaper of general circulation in Lincoln County; and sent
    the notice of publication to Gladys by first-class mail. The last
    step of mailing the notice of the publication by first-class mail
    was not statutorily required and was made by Vandelay out of
    an abundance of caution to ensure Gladys was not deprived of
    the due process rights in her property.
    Hence, the equities of this situation do not favor Robin, and
    this assignment of error is without merit.
    V. CONCLUSION
    Despite Robin’s standing to challenge Vandelay’s tax deed,
    we conclude Robin failed to present sufficient evidence to
    either overcome the presumption Vandelay provided Gladys
    with sufficient service, as required to obtain a valid tax deed,
    or prove Gladys suffered from a mental disorder at the time
    of her property’s tax sale, extending her statutory redemption
    period. In addition, the tax certificate statutes enacted by the
    Legislature establish a specific process upon the failure to
    pay real estate taxes which does not take into consideration
    the amount of the delinquent tax compared to the value of
    the property. As a result, we determine the record in this case
    does not support providing Robin with a remedy he was not
    entitled to under the statutes. Therefore, we reverse the deci-
    sion of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause with direc-
    tions that the Court of Appeals affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    R eversed and remanded with directions.
    Wright and K elch, JJ., not participating.
    Cassel, J., dissenting in part.
    This court’s admittedly “harsh” result flows from the district
    court’s single failure, amidst an otherwise thorough and cor-
    rect analysis, to see the forest for the trees. The district court
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    rejected Gladys’ estate’s attempt to redeem the property based
    on an extended redemption period authorized where a taxpayer
    suffers from a “mental disorder.”1 The ultimate question here
    is not whether Vandelay is entitled to all of the taxes, fees,
    and costs that it paid, together with all of the interest imposed
    pursuant to a high statutory rate designed to encourage prompt
    payment of real estate taxes. Rather, the question is whether,
    despite a remedy expressly authorized by the Legislature’s
    “strict rules” in anticipation of this situation, Vandelay should
    reap a windfall at the expense of an extremely elderly tax-
    payer lacking the capacity to take action to protect her rights.
    Because I conclude that Gladys was entitled to the extended
    redemption period and that equity demands its implementation,
    I respectfully dissent.
    In all respects but one, the district court rendered an exten-
    sive, well-researched, and well-written judgment. On appeal,
    the Court of Appeals concentrated on the complicated tax
    deed method statutes and did not reach the essential issue. On
    further review, my colleagues have almost everything right. I
    agree with this court’s conclusions that Robin had standing to
    challenge the tax deed and that Vandelay substantially com-
    plied with the statutory notice requirements for a tax deed, and
    with all of this court’s reasoning leading to those conclusions.
    The court’s analysis regarding those matters is spot on. Only
    where the court turns to the statutory right of redemption do I
    part its company.
    This court acknowledges that both parties assert claims
    for quiet title, which sound in equity. As this court’s opinion
    admits, equity strives to do justice determined on a case-by-
    case basis according to concepts of justice and fairness. This
    court recites the correct standard of review—trying factual
    questions de novo on the record and, as to questions of both
    law and fact, reaching an independent conclusion from that of
    the district court.
    1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1827 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
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    Regarding whether Gladys suffered from a mental disorder
    during the pertinent timeframe, I assert that this court should
    give no weight to the district court’s observation of the two
    medical experts. Our standard of review does not demand def-
    erence to the district court in any respect. It is purely within
    this court’s discretion. Here, none is due, for two reasons.
    First, the testimony of Vandelay’s expert was presented by
    deposition. As to that physician, the district court was in no
    better position than this court to make credibility assessments.
    Second, where I believe the district court went wrong had little
    to do with its observations of Robin’s expert, who was Gladys’
    treating physician.
    I accept this court’s definition of “mental disorder,”2 which
    the district court also employed. Thus, a mental disorder in this
    context is “‘an incapacity which disqualifies one from acting
    for the protection of one’s rights.’”3
    Several facts set the stage, which is essential to an assess-
    ment of Gladys’ capacity to protect her rights. She went to live
    at a retirement community in 2009, the year she turned age
    93. She moved there after the deaths of her husband in 2007
    and her son Roger in 2009. The district court recognized that
    “Gladys was generally unfamiliar with financial matters and
    did not pay her own bills.” When she entered the facility, she
    initially lived in the residential section. By the time the tax
    sale certificates were sold in 2011, she was 94 years old. In
    late 2013, at age 97, she suffered a number of falls. Because
    she was no longer ambulatory, she was moved to the facility’s
    assisted living section. By March 2014, as she approached the
    age of 98, she was, as the district court found, suffering from
    numerous chronic medical issues and having difficulty with
    her memory, particularly in recalling names, and with compli-
    cated tasks.
    2
    § 77-1827.
    3
    Maycock v. Hoody, 
    281 Neb. 767
    , 776, 
    799 N.W.2d 322
    , 329 (2011).
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    Both the district court and this court relied on medical
    records kept for a significantly different purpose—to guide
    her caregivers at the facility. Her caregivers were not record-
    ing assessments of her understanding and ability to protect
    her rights in financial matters. They were concerned with her
    day-to-day well-being. Thus, it is no surprise that the records
    showed that “she was having no behavioral issues, was kind
    and easy to get along with, was oriented to time, person and
    place, was alert and cooperative, was capable of performing
    simple tasks, and displayed a fairly consistent pattern of nor-
    mal intellectual behavior.” Vandelay’s expert relied solely on
    these medical records. He never met or observed Gladys. His
    testimony provides no significant insight into Gladys’ capacity
    to protect her rights.
    In contrast, Gladys’ longtime physician testified to per-
    sonal observations and conclusions, over an extended period,
    directly bearing on Gladys’ incapacity which disqualified her
    from acting for the protection of her rights. He observed in
    2006 that she had episodes of confusion and disorientation.
    Those were typically associated with findings suggesting small
    strokes—where imaging studies showed evidence of “white
    matter changes,” that is, “ischemic injury.”
    When Gladys moved to the facility in 2009, her doctor
    observed that she was “not really able to make good judg-
    ments.” He explained, “You could ask her questions and she
    would give a good response, but if you asked detail, if you . . .
    asked her to make judgments, she really wasn’t able to do that
    very well.” He opined that “over time what you could see is
    that she became less capable.”
    From 2009 until the time of Gladys’ death, her doctor saw
    her about every 60 days. Her doctor recalled a “fairly steady
    but gradual deterioration in how well she did.” From his
    observations, he described a “step-wise decrease in her . . .
    functional capacity,” which he characterized as “more mental
    than physical.” He described her ability to do “simple things,”
    such as “describe that she needed to go to the bathroom, she
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    was hungry, she was tired.” But he opined that her ability to
    understand business or financial matters from 2009 on was
    “very limited.” He opined that her ability to organize infor-
    mation also was “very limited.” He opined that she suffered
    from a “disorganization of the mind” from 2009 forward.
    And he opined that her cognitive capacity from 2009 forward
    showed that her “ability to deal with anything that was beyond
    simple was not something that she could do.” With respect to
    her reasoning and memory, he opined that “anything that was
    . . . complicated would be beyond what she would be able to
    manage.” Ultimately, Gladys’ doctor opined that from 2009 to
    the time of her death, she suffered from a “mental disorder.”
    He characterized it as “multi-infarct dementia,” that is, “mul-
    tiple small strokes which . . . progressively knock out sections
    of brain.”
    The district court recognized that the question of whether
    by 2014 Gladys suffered from a mental disorder in the statu-
    tory sense was “more difficult.” It acknowledged that by the
    spring of 2014, there “had been a decline in Gladys’ cognitive
    and mental status.”
    But then the district court missed the forest, stating that the
    “evidence [did] not establish that her decline was out of the
    normal range for a person of her age.” (Emphasis supplied.)
    It defies reason and common sense to ignore the impact of
    extremely advanced age on mental ability. And coupled with
    the testimony of her doctor, supported by imaging showing
    repeated small strokes over a period of years, I cannot agree
    that Gladys had the capacity to act for the protection of her
    own rights in the payment of real estate taxes.
    Because I conclude that a de novo review supports the exis-
    tence of a “mental disorder” as contemplated by § 77-1827
    at the relevant time, I would modify the Court of Appeals’
    decision and direct that court to reverse the judgment of the
    district court and remand the cause with directions to quiet title
    in Gladys’ estate upon payment by the estate into court of all
    taxes, costs, and fees paid by Vandelay, together with statutory
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    interest (14 percent per annum) to the time of payment into
    court, to be disbursed to Vandelay in redemption of its tax deed
    and the underlying tax sale certificate.
    I reiterate that Vandelay is entitled to the full benefit of
    the payments required for redemption. But Gladys (and now,
    her estate) is no less entitled to justice. That was the exact
    purpose of the statutory extended redemption period. And the
    failure to implement that statute permits Vandelay to reap a
    windfall that borders on the obscene. Because I believe that
    the windfall is an unjust result contrary to statute, I respect-
    fully dissent.