Saylor v. State , 306 Neb. 147 ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    08/28/2020 08:08 AM CDT
    - 147 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    James Saylor, appellant,
    v. State of Nebraska
    et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed June 19, 2020.    No. S-18-794.
    1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm
    a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admit-
    ted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
    or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and
    that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    2. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
    judgment was granted and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences deducible from the evidence.
    3. Tort Claims Act: Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Appeal
    and Error. Where the relevant facts are undisputed, whether the notice
    requirements of the State Tort Claims Act or the Political Subdivisions
    Tort Claims Act have been satisfied is a question of law, on which
    an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower
    court’s ruling.
    4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
    an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.
    5. Administrative Law. Agency regulations that are properly adopted and
    filed with the Secretary of State have the effect of statutory law.
    6. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Notice. In cases under the
    Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, the substantial compliance doc-
    trine applies when deciding whether the content of a claim satisfies the
    presuit claim presentment requirements in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-905
    (Reissue 2012).
    7. ____: ____. Substantial compliance with the statutory provisions per-
    taining to a claim’s content supplies the requisite and sufficient notice
    - 148 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    to a political subdivision in accordance with the Political Subdivisions
    Tort Claims Act when the lack of compliance has caused no prejudice to
    the political subdivision.
    8.    Tort Claims Act: Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. Generally,
    provisions of the State Tort Claims Act should be construed in har-
    mony with similar provisions under the Political Subdivisions Tort
    Claims Act.
    9.    ____: ____. Under the State Tort Claims Act, when a question is raised
    about whether the content of a presuit tort claim complied with the man-
    ner in which the State Claims Board prescribed such claims to be filed,
    the substantial compliance doctrine may be applied, just as it is applied
    under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act.
    10.    ____: ____. Under both the State Tort Claims Act and the Political
    Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, application of the substantial compliance
    doctrine is limited to the content of a presuit claim. The doctrine of sub-
    stantial compliance does not apply when considering whether a presuit
    tort claim has complied with statutory timing requirements or whether it
    has been served on the recipient described in the statute.
    11.    Tort Claims Act: Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Notice.
    Under both the State Tort Claims Act and the Political Subdivisions
    Tort Claims Act, application of the doctrine of substantial compliance is
    confined to situations where the content of the tort claim nevertheless
    satisfies the primary purpose of the presuit notice requirements by noti-
    fying the state or political subdivision about possible tort liability for a
    recent act or omission so it may investigate and make a decision whether
    to pay or defend the claim.
    Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County:
    Robert R. Otte, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
    proceedings.
    Michael J. Wilson, of Berry Law Firm, for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, Scott R. Straus, and,
    on brief, David A. Lopez, Deputy Solicitor General, for appel-
    lee State of Nebraska.
    Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Funke, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    James Saylor, an inmate at the Nebraska Department of
    Correctional Services (DCS), appeals from an order dismissing
    - 149 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    his lawsuit under the Nebraska State Tort Claims Act (STCA), 1
    based on a finding that Saylor failed to comply with the pre-
    suit filing requirements of the STCA. 2 Because we find Saylor
    substantially complied with those requirements, we reverse,
    and remand for further proceedings.
    BACKGROUND
    Tort claims against the State are governed by the STCA. 3
    This case requires us to focus on the presuit administrative
    requirements of the STCA. Before suit can be commenced
    under the STCA, a claimant must present the claim in writing
    to the Risk Manager for the State Claims Board within 2 years
    after the claim accrued. 4 Pursuant to § 81-8,212, such claim
    “shall be filed with the Risk Manager in the manner prescribed
    by the State Claims Board.” Generally speaking, a claimant
    cannot file suit under the STCA until the Risk Manager or
    State Claims Board makes a final disposition of the claim. 5
    However, if no final disposition of a claim has been made after
    6 months, § 81-8,213 authorizes the claimant to withdraw the
    claim and commence an action under the STCA. 6
    We have described the presuit claim presentment require-
    ment in § 81-8,212 and the final disposition requirement in
    § 81-8,213 as procedural conditions precedent to commenc-
    ing a tort action against the State in district court, and not
    as jurisdictional prerequisites for the adjudication of a tort
    claim against the State. 7 Noncompliance with these procedural
    1
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,235 (Reissue 2014 & Cum. Supp.
    2018).
    2
    See § 81-8,212.
    3
    Komar v. State, 
    299 Neb. 301
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 610
    (2018).
    4
    See, § 81-8,227(1); Komar, supra note 3.
    5
    § 81-8,213; Komar, supra note 3.
    6
    Komar, supra note 3.
    7
    See Cole v. Isherwood, 
    264 Neb. 985
    , 
    653 N.W.2d 821
    (2002) (superseded
    by rule on other grounds as stated in Weeder v. Central Comm. College,
    
    269 Neb. 114
    , 
    691 N.W.2d 508
    (2005)).
    - 150 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    conditions precedent is considered an affirmative defense to
    be raised by the State. 8 We apply the same rules to the presuit
    claim presentment and final disposition procedures under the
    Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). 9 Under both
    the STCA and the PSTCA, the primary purpose of the presuit
    claim presentment procedures is the same: to notify the state
    or political subdivision about possible tort liability for a recent
    act or omission, to provide an opportunity to investigate the
    allegedly tortious conduct, and to enable the state or politi-
    cal subdivision to make a decision whether to pay or defend
    the claim. 10
    Saylor Files Tort Claims
    With Risk Manager
    Between June 12, 2016, and February 23, 2017, Saylor filed
    16 separate tort claims with the Risk Manager. 11 Pursuant to
    § 81-8,212 of the STCA, these claims had to “be filed with the
    Risk Manager in the manner prescribed by the State Claims
    Board.” Saylor filed all 16 of his claims using the standard
    form provided by the Risk Manager. Each claim form con-
    tained 18 fields requesting information regarding the claim.
    Some fields were marked with an asterisk indicating it was
    a “required” field. Further, each form contained a blank area
    with the following instructions:
    Provide detailed itemization of all known facts/
    circumstances/damages leading to your claim. Identify
    all property, places, and people involved. Include names,
    8
    Id. 9
         Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-901 to 13-928 (Reissue 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
    See, e.g., Geddes v. York County, 
    273 Neb. 271
    , 
    729 N.W.2d 661
    (2007);
    Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 
    266 Neb. 750
    , 
    669 N.W.2d 63
    (2003);
    Jessen v. Malhotra, 
    266 Neb. 393
    , 
    665 N.W.2d 586
    (2003); Millman v.
    County of Butler, 
    235 Neb. 915
    , 
    458 N.W.2d 207
    (1990) (superseded by
    rule on other grounds as stated in Weeder, supra note 7).
    10
    See, Cole, supra note 7; Chicago Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No. 71, 
    227 Neb. 355
    , 
    417 N.W.2d 757
    (1988).
    11
    See § 81-8,212.
    - 151 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    addresses and phone numbers of witnesses, if any. The
    information provided herein, along with the findings
    of the investigating agency, will form the basis of
    any decision.
    In this section, most of Saylor’s claim forms described
    instances in which he claimed the actions of DCS or its
    employees either denied him timely medical care, aggravated
    his existing post-traumatic stress disorder, or deprived him
    of the use of devices that eased his pain. In a few claim
    forms, Saylor alleged DCS staff deprived him of the use of
    certain legal materials in his possession or interfered with
    his ability to meet with his attorney. Saylor generally stated
    that all these things caused him physical and emotional pain
    and suffering.
    On each form, Saylor provided information in all required
    fields. One of the required fields, field No. 9, was titled “Total
    Amount of Claim.” When completing field No. 9 on each
    claim form, Saylor wrote “[t]o be proven” without specifying
    a dollar amount.
    The Risk Manager, in a series of letters, acknowledged
    receiving all of Saylor’s claims. Those letters notified Saylor
    of the claim numbers assigned to his claims and advised it
    may take up to 6 months to receive final disposition. None
    of the letters indicated the claim forms were incomplete, and
    there is no evidence that additional information was requested
    from Saylor during the Risk Manager’s investigation. The
    parties generally agree the Risk Manager denied Saylor’s
    tort claims in a series of letters dated June 15, 2017. Those
    denial letters indicated that upon investigating the claims, “it
    was determined that there is no evidence of staff misconduct
    or negligence.”
    Complaint and Motion for
    Summary Judgment
    On June 16, 2017, Saylor filed a complaint in district
    court against the State of Nebraska, DCS, and 10 unnamed
    DCS employees (the State). He thereafter filed an amended
    - 152 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    complaint, styled as 16 separate causes of action, each one
    premised on a tort claim previously submitted to and denied
    by the Risk Manager. The State moved to dismiss the amended
    complaint for failure to state a claim. 12 The parties stipulated
    to the receipt of evidence and agreed the motion should be
    treated as one for summary judgment. 13
    The State’s sole argument for summary judgment was
    that Saylor failed to satisfy the claim presentment provi-
    sions of § 81-8,212 with respect to his claimed damages.
    The State asserted, summarized, that § 81-8,212 requires all
    tort claims to be filed “in the manner prescribed by the State
    Claims Board” and that regulations adopted by the State
    Claims Board 14 require all claims to “contain all information
    called for” on the claim form. 15 The State argued that Saylor’s
    claims did not “contain all information called for” on the form
    because he did not specify a dollar amount in field No. 9. In
    remarks to the court, the State suggested there were other pos-
    sible deficiencies in Saylor’s tort claims, but in the interest of
    time, it had elected to seek dismissal only on the basis that no
    dollar amount was specified in field No. 9. The district court
    limited its analysis accordingly.
    District Court Order
    The district court agreed with the State that by not specify-
    ing a dollar amount in field No. 9, Saylor had not filed his
    claim in the manner prescribed by the State Claims Board, and
    that therefore, he had not complied with § 81-8,212. The court
    expressly rejected Saylor’s assertion that the State waived its
    right to contest compliance with the claims procedure under
    § 81-8,212 by accepting his claim forms, sending him letters
    acknowledging receipt and assigning claims numbers, and then
    denying the claims on their merits.
    12
    See Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(6).
    13
    § 6-1112(b).
    14
    See § 81-8,221.
    15
    Neb. Admin. Code, State Claims Board, rule No. 12 (1975).
    - 153 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    The district court granted the State’s motion for summary
    judgment and dismissed Saylor’s amended complaint with
    prejudice. Saylor timely appealed, and we moved the case to
    our docket on our own motion.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Saylor assigns, restated, that the district court erred in grant-
    ing the State’s motion for summary judgment because (1)
    Saylor’s tort claim forms provided the requested information
    and substantially complied with the presuit requirements of the
    STCA and (2) the State waived any challenge to compliance
    with requested information on the tort claim forms.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant
    of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. 16 In reviewing a summary judgment, an appel-
    late court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    party against whom the judgment was granted and gives that
    party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
    the evidence. 17
    [3] Where the relevant facts are undisputed, whether the
    notice requirements of the STCA or the PSTCA have been sat-
    isfied is a question of law, on which an appellate court reaches
    a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. 18
    [4] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law,
    for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an
    16
    JB & Assocs. v. Nebraska Cancer Coalition, 
    303 Neb. 855
    , 
    932 N.W.2d 71
         (2019).
    17
    Id. 18
         Estate of McElwee v. Omaha Transit Auth., 
    266 Neb. 317
    , 
    664 N.W.2d 461
         (2003).
    - 154 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by
    the court below. 19
    ANALYSIS
    The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred
    in dismissing Saylor’s STCA action for failure to comply with
    the presuit claim presentment requirement of § 81-8,212. As
    stated, that statute requires, in relevant part, that “[a]ll tort
    claims shall be filed with the Risk Manager in the manner pre-
    scribed by the State Claims Board.” 20
    The State Claims Board has adopted rules and regulations
    that prescribe not only the manner of filing a tort claim, but
    also the form and content of such claims. Assuming without
    deciding that the statutory authority to prescribe the “manner”
    of filing tort claims with the Risk Manager includes prescrib-
    ing the form and content of such claims, we summarize, in
    the next section, the pertinent regulations adopted by the State
    Claims Board.
    [5] A certified copy of those regulations was received into
    evidence at the summary judgment hearing. It showed the
    regulations were adopted in 1975 and have not been amended
    since that time. It also showed the regulations have been signed
    and approved by the Governor and the Attorney General, as
    well as filed with the Secretary of State. We have held that
    agency regulations that are properly adopted and filed with the
    Secretary of State have the effect of statutory law. 21
    State Claims Board Rules
    and Regulations
    Regarding the manner of filing a tort claim, the regulations
    require it “shall be filed in triplicate with the Secretary of the
    Board, State Capitol Building, State House Station, Lincoln,
    19
    JB & Assocs., supra note 16.
    20
    § 81-8,212 (emphasis supplied).
    21
    Val-Pak of Omaha v. Department of Revenue, 
    249 Neb. 776
    , 
    545 N.W.2d 447
    (1996).
    - 155 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    Nebraska, 68509.” 22 Regarding the form of filing a tort claim,
    the regulations require that it “should be typewritten and upon
    a form provided by the Board, but claims printed by hand
    upon the Board’s form will be accepted if legible.” 23 And
    regarding the content of a tort claim, the regulations require
    that “[a]ll claims shall contain all information called for on
    the Board’s ‘Claim for Injury or Damage’ form, including
    the instructions printed on the back of the blue sheet of the
    form set, and also such other information as is pertinent to
    the claim.” 24
    Also received into evidence was a certified copy of a docu-
    ment titled “Standard Operating Procedures: How to File a
    Tort Claim Against the State of Nebraska.” According to the
    certificate, these operating procedures are available online
    and were created by the State’s risk management division of
    the Department of Administrative Services. Unlike properly
    adopted administrative regulations, an agency’s operating pro-
    cedures do not have the force and effect of law. 25
    As relevant to the issues on appeal, the Risk Manager’s
    operating procedures contain instructions regarding which
    form to use when filing a tort claim, how to complete the
    form, and how to file the form once completed. These instruc-
    tions differ from the State Claims Board’s regulations in
    several key respects. Specifically, the Risk Manager’s instruc-
    tions do not reference the “Claim for Injury or Damage”
    form required by the regulations, and instead, they direct
    that a “Tort & Miscellaneous Claim Form” be completed.
    The Risk Manager’s instructions do not direct that the claim
    form be filed in triplicate with the secretary of the State
    22
    Neb. Admin Code, State Claims Board, rule No. 6 (1975).
    23
    Neb. Admin Code, State Claims Board, rule No. 7 (1975).
    24
    Rule No. 12, supra note 15.
    25
    See, e.g., Reed v. State, 
    272 Neb. 8
    , 
    717 N.W.2d 899
    (2006) (in contrast to
    agency regulations, agency manuals and guidelines lack force of law and
    do not warrant deference).
    - 156 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    Claims Board as required by the regulations, but instead,
    they direct that the form should be submitted electronically to
    “as.riskmanagement@nebraska.gov” or mailed to the “Office
    of Risk Management” at a specific post office box in Lincoln.
    The Risk Manager’s operating procedures also provide that
    “[o]nly fully completed and signed Tort Claim Forms will
    be accepted by the office of Risk Management.” It is undis-
    puted that all of Saylor’s tort claims were accepted by the
    Risk Manager and that all were presented using the “Tort &
    Miscellaneous Claim Form.”
    Arguments of Parties
    After Saylor commenced his tort action in district court, the
    State sought dismissal based on a single affirmative defense:
    that Saylor’s presuit tort claims were deficient because when
    he answered field No. 9, asking for the “Total Amount of
    Claim,” he did not provide a dollar amount, and instead stated
    “[t]o be proven.” The State contends that because the answer
    to field No. 9 did not reference a dollar amount, the forms
    did not “contain all information called for,” 26 and that thus,
    the claims were not filed “in the manner prescribed by the
    State Claims Board” as required by § 81-8,212. The State also
    asserts, as it did before the trial court, that the substantial com-
    pliance doctrine which this court has applied when reviewing
    the content of presuit claims under the PSTCA 27 should not
    be applied under the STCA. The State argues, summarized,
    that the substantial compliance doctrine is inconsistent with
    the principle that “requirements of the [STCA] must be fol-
    lowed strictly.” 28
    26
    Rule No. 12, supra note 15.
    27
    See, e.g., Jessen, supra note 9; West Omaha Inv. v. S.I.D. No. 48, 
    227 Neb. 785
    , 
    420 N.W.2d 291
    (1988); Chicago Lumber Co., supra note 10.
    28
    See Jill B. & Travis B. v. State, 
    297 Neb. 57
    , 69, 
    899 N.W.2d 241
    , 252
    (2017).
    - 157 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    Saylor contends that even though his answer to field No. 9
    was not stated in dollars, he nevertheless provided “all infor-
    mation called for” 29 on the standard form, and that he thus
    substantially complied with the provisions of § 81-8,212. He
    also argues it was impossible for him to strictly comply with
    the “manner prescribed by the State Claims Board” for fil-
    ing claims, pursuant to § 81-8,212, because the State Claims
    Board’s rules and regulations are outdated and inconsistent
    with the information and instructions on the only claim form
    currently made available for filing tort claims—the “Tort &
    Miscellaneous Claim Form.”
    Substantial Compliance Doctrine
    Under PSTCA
    [6] In cases under the PSTCA, we have long applied the
    substantial compliance doctrine when deciding whether the
    content of a claim satisfied the statutory presuit claim present-
    ment requirements. 30 Section 13-905 sets out the PSTCA’s pre-
    suit claim presentment requirements, and it is the counterpart
    to § 81-8,212 under the STCA.
    Section 13-905 requires that “[a]ll [tort] claims shall be in
    writing and shall set forth the time and place of the occur-
    rence giving rise to the claim and such other facts pertinent
    to the claim as are known to the claimant.” We pause here to
    observe that when the Legislature prescribed the content of
    presuit claims under the PSTCA, it identified some require-
    ments that are specific and objective (like the time and place
    of the occurrence) and some which are nonspecific and subjec-
    tive (like “other facts pertinent to the claim as are known to
    the claimant”). The challenge of determining compliance with
    similar presuit notice requirements that predated the PSTCA
    29
    Rule No. 12, supra note 15.
    30
    See, e.g., Jessen, supra note 9; West Omaha Inv., supra note 27; Chicago
    Lumber Co., supra note 10.
    - 158 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    led this court, more than a century ago, to adopt the substantial
    compliance doctrine.
    In City of Lincoln v. Pirner, 31 we applied the substantial
    compliance doctrine to a statute requiring that before a tort
    action could be commenced against the city, “‘it shall be nec-
    essary that the party file in the office of the city clerk, within
    three months from the time such right of action accrued, a
    statement giving full name and the time, place, nature, cir-
    cumstances and cause of the injury or damage complained
    of.’” In that case, the plaintiff’s written claim stated that he
    fell into a “coal-hole” in a city sidewalk, but it incorrectly
    identified the block number. 32 We rejected the city’s argument
    that this claim was deficient, reasoning that the presuit notice
    requirement “should be liberally construed by the courts” and
    that “if the description given and the inquiries suggested by it
    will enable the agents and servants of the city to find the place
    where the accident occurred, there is a substantial compliance
    with the law.” 33
    In Chicago Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No. 71, 34 we addressed
    whether a letter complied with the presuit claim presentment
    requirements of the PSTCA. At the time, those requirements
    were codified at Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-2404 (Reissue 1983) and
    provided, as § 13-905 does now, that a claim must “set forth
    the time and place of the occurrence giving rise to the claim
    and such other facts pertinent to the claim as are known to
    the claimant.”
    The claim letter at issue did not reference a particular time
    or place, but it complained that the plaintiff had provided the
    school district with building materials and supplies in connec-
    tion with a recent project to renovate a specific school. The
    31
    City of Lincoln v. Pirner, 
    59 Neb. 634
    , 639-40, 
    81 N.W. 846
    , 847 (1900)
    (quoting Comp. Stat. ch. 13a, § 36 (1899)).
    32
    Pirner, supra note 31, 59 Neb. at 
    637, 81 N.W. at 846
    .
    33
    Id. at 640, 81
    N.W. at 847.
    34
    Chicago Lumber Co., supra note 10.
    - 159 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    letter cited to statutes requiring the school district to obtain
    a construction bond from the contractor. The letter further
    stated that the district had failed to obtain such a bond in
    connection with the particular renovation project and that the
    plaintiff had suffered damages as a result.
    [7] On appeal, the school district claimed this presuit
    notice was insufficient under the PSTCA because it did not
    state with precision the time and location of the occurrence
    giving rise to the claim. 35 We disagreed, reasoning that the
    language of § 23-2404 did not require a claimant to “state the
    indicated information, circumstances, or facts with the full-
    ness or precision required in a pleading.” 36 We explained “the
    notice requirements for a claim filed pursuant to the [PSTCA]
    are [to be] liberally construed so that one with a meritorious
    claim may not be denied relief as the result of some techni-
    cal noncompliance with the formal prescriptions of the act.” 37
    And we said that “substantial compliance with the statutory
    provisions pertaining to a claim’s content supplies the requi-
    site and sufficient notice to a political subdivision in accord­
    ance with [the PSTCA], when the lack of compliance has
    caused no prejudice to the political subdivision.” 38 Because
    the claim letter identified the contractor to whom the plaintiff
    had delivered the supplies and identified the particular school
    renovation project at issue, we found the content of the claim
    substantially complied with the time and place requirements
    under the PSTCA.
    In West Omaha Inv. v. S.I.D. No. 48, 39 we again addressed
    whether the content of a letter complied with the presuit pre-
    sentment requirements of the PSTCA. In a letter to the political
    35
    Id. 36
    
    Id. at 368, 417 
    N.W.2d at 765.
    37
    Id. at 
    369, 417 N.W.2d at 766
    .
    38
    Id. (emphasis supplied). 39
         West Omaha Inv., supra note 27.
    - 160 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    subdivision, the plaintiff claimed fire damage to specific prop-
    erty on a specific date and alleged that a contributing cause of
    the fire damage was the defendant’s negligence in failing to
    furnish water with which to extinguish the fire. The political
    subdivision argued this claim was insufficient because it did
    not specify a dollar amount of damage. We held the contents
    of the letter were sufficient, noting in part that the statutory
    language did not “mandate that the claim contain the amount
    of damages or loss.” 40 We also reasoned that the letter substan-
    tially complied with the statute because it set forth the date,
    location, and circumstances of the event giving rise to the
    claim and alleged that property loss had occurred as a result of
    the political subdivision’s negligence.
    As these cases illustrate, we have long applied the sub-
    stantial compliance doctrine when the question presented
    was whether the content of a presuit tort claim satisfied the
    statute and supplied the political subdivision with sufficient
    notice to enable it to accomplish the primary goals of the
    presuit claim presentment requirements under the PSTCA
    and similar statutes. 41 But as other cases illustrate, we have
    declined to apply the substantial compliance doctrine when the
    question presented did not involve compliance with content-
    based requirements.
    We have refused to apply the substantial compliance doc-
    trine when the presuit claim was not filed with the statutorily
    authorized recipient, 42 reasoning that notice to the wrong
    recipient may deprive a political subdivision of the opportunity
    40
    Id., 227
    Neb. at 
    790, 420 N.W.2d at 295
    . Compare Jessen, supra note 9
    (holding presuit presentment requirements of PSTCA not substantially met
    because claim did not make any demand).
    41
    Accord, Loontjer v. Robinson, 
    266 Neb. 902
    , 914, 
    670 N.W.2d 301
    , 310
    (2003) (Hendry, C.J., concurring) (“‘[s]ubstantial compliance with a statute
    is not shown unless it is made to appear that the purpose of the statute is
    shown to have been served. What constitutes substantial compliance with
    a statute is a matter depending on the facts of each particular case’”).
    42
    See, e.g., Estate of McElwee, supra note 18; Willis v. City of Lincoln, 
    232 Neb. 533
    , 
    441 N.W.2d 846
    (1989).
    - 161 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    to investigate and settle claims and thus must be given to a
    person or entity specified in the statute. 43 Similarly, we have
    refused to apply the substantial compliance doctrine to presuit
    claims that did not comply with the statutory time limits under
    the PSTCA, reasoning that, unlike the general requirements
    regulating the content of presuit claims, the time limits are
    specific and can be determined with precision. 44 And finally,
    we have refused to apply the substantial compliance doctrine
    when the content of the purported claim was so indefinite or
    contingent in nature it could not fairly be characterized as pre-
    senting a tort claim at all. 45
    Substantial Compliance
    Doctrine and STCA
    [8] We have not yet had occasion to consider the propriety
    of applying the substantial compliance doctrine to the content
    of a presuit claim under the STCA. Generally, provisions of the
    STCA should be construed in harmony with similar provisions
    under the PSTCA. 46 We have expressly recognized the simi-
    larity of the presuit content claim presentment requirements
    under § 81-8,212 of the STCA and § 13-905 of the PSTCA, 47
    and as discussed already, we have consistently applied the
    substantial compliance doctrine to the content of such claims
    under the PSTCA.
    The State concedes the substantial compliance doctrine has
    been applied for decades to similar presuit claims under the
    43
    Willis, supra note 42.
    44
    See, Big Crow, supra note 9; Schoemaker v. Metro. Utilities Dist., 
    245 Neb. 967
    , 
    515 N.W.2d 675
    (1994).
    45
    See, e.g., Jessen, supra note 9 (letter to physician accusing malpractice
    but not making any demand is not written tort claim under § 13-905);
    Peterson v. Gering Irr. Dist., 
    219 Neb. 281
    , 
    363 N.W.2d 145
    (1985) (letter
    to irrigation district that made no actual demand but merely alerted district
    to possible claim for damages that may occur is not claim).
    46
    Cole, supra note 7.
    47
    See
    id. - 162 -
                 Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    PSTCA, but it asks us to find the doctrine is incompatible
    with the STCA. As support for this argument, the State relies
    exclusively on the principle, articulated in Jill B. & Travis B.
    v. State, 48 that “because the State has given only conditional
    consent to be sued and there is no absolute waiver of immu-
    nity by the State, requirements of the [STCA] must be fol-
    lowed strictly.” The State argues this principle is incompatible
    with the doctrine of substantial compliance.
    We agree that strictly following the requirements of the
    STCA, and any statute that purports to waive the sovereign
    immunity of the state or a political subdivision, 49 is a foun-
    dational principle in our sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
    But as we explain, we are not persuaded that this principle
    is offended by applying the substantial compliance doctrine
    to the content of presuit claims under either the PSTCA or
    the STCA.
    The principle from Jill B. & Travis B. on which the State
    relies was not being applied to the content of presuit claims.
    Instead, in Jill B & Travis B., we were considering the
    applicability of exceptions to the State’s waiver of sovereign
    immunity for tort claims arising out of misrepresentation and
    deceit. 50 In that context, we emphasized the importance of
    strictly construing statutes that are in derogation of sovereign
    immunity. 51
    The presuit claim procedures under the PSTCA and the
    STCA are not statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity,
    but, rather, they are administrative in nature, intended to give
    the government notice of a recent tort claim so it can investi-
    gate and, if appropriate, resolve the claim before suit is com-
    menced. 52 Unlike statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity,
    48
    Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 
    28, 297 Neb. at 69
    , 899 N.W.2d at 251-52.
    49
    Rutledge v. City of Kimball, 
    304 Neb. 593
    , 
    935 N.W.2d 746
    (2019).
    50
    See § 81-8,219(4).
    51
    Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 28.
    52
    See, e.g., Cole, supra note 7; Chicago Lumber Co., supra note 10.
    - 163 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    the presuit claim procedures do not identify the particular tort
    claims for which the State has conditionally waived its sov-
    ereign immunity and consented to suit, 53 nor do they identify
    the tort claims the State has exempted from that waiver. 54
    Instead, the presuit claim presentment requirements are proce-
    dural conditions precedent to commencing a tort action against
    the government in district court; they are not jurisdictional. 55
    We see no incompatibility between our precedent that rules
    of strict construction must be applied to statutes in derogation
    of sovereign immunity and our precedent that the doctrine of
    substantial compliance may be applied to statutes governing
    the content of presuit notice requirements. 56 Indeed, given how
    some of the content requirements are described in the statutes
    and regulations, it is difficult to imagine how strict compliance
    could be utilized by courts if we were to require it.
    Applying the substantial compliance doctrine to the general
    content provisions under the PSTCA was, in some respects, a
    practical necessity because there was no principled way for a
    court to determine whether a claimant had strictly complied
    with the general requirement in § 13-905 that a claim include
    “such other facts pertinent to the claim as are known to the
    claimant.” Similarly, under the STCA, we question how a court
    would go about determining whether a claimant has strictly
    complied with the State Claims Board’s regulation requiring
    that a claim include “such other information as is pertinent to
    the claim.” 57
    But as our cases make clear, our application of the substan-
    tial compliance doctrine has been limited to a claim’s content,
    53
    See, e.g., §§ 81-8,215 and 81-8,215.01.
    54
    See, e.g., § 81-8,219.
    55
    See Cole, supra note 7.
    56
    Accord Franklin v. City of Omaha, 
    230 Neb. 598
    , 
    432 N.W.2d 808
    (1988)
    (acknowledging some states apply strict construction to all presuit claim
    requirements under their tort claims acts, but Nebraska does not).
    57
    Rule No. 12, supra note 15.
    - 164 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    and the doctrine is not applied to all of the presuit notice
    requirements. We still apply rules of strict construction when
    considering whether a presuit tort claim has complied with
    statutory timing requirements 58 and whether it has been served
    on the recipient described in the statute. 59
    We therefore disagree with the State that applying the sub-
    stantial compliance doctrine when analyzing the content of
    presuit tort claims under the PSTCA and the STCA is incon-
    sistent with the well-settled principle that statutes in derogation
    of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed or with the
    principle that the “requirements of the [STCA] must be fol-
    lowed strictly.” 60
    [9-11] We hold that when a question is raised about whether
    the content of a presuit tort claim complied with the manner
    in which the State Claims Board prescribed such claims to
    be filed, the substantial compliance doctrine may be applied
    under the STCA, just as it is applied under the PSTCA. And,
    consistent with what we have done under the PSTCA, the
    doctrine is limited to the content of the presuit claim and does
    not apply when such a claim is not filed with the statutorily
    authorized recipient 61 or when it is not filed in compliance
    with the statutory time limits. 62 Furthermore, application of
    the doctrine of substantial compliance under both the PSTCA
    and the STCA is confined to situations where the content of
    the presuit claim nevertheless satisfied the primary purpose of
    the presuit notice requirements by notifying the state or politi-
    cal subdivision about possible tort liability for a recent act or
    58
    Big Crow, supra note 9; Schoemaker, supra note 44. See, also, State v.
    Saylor, 
    304 Neb. 779
    , 
    936 N.W.2d 924
    (2020) (strictly construing STCA
    statute of limitation provisions).
    59
    Estate of McElwee, supra note 18; Willis, supra note 42.
    60
    Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 28, 297 Neb. at 
    69, 899 N.W.2d at 252
    .
    61
    See, e.g., Estate of McElwee, supra note 18; Willis, supra note 42.
    62
    See, e.g., Big Crow, supra note 9; Schoemaker, supra note 44.
    - 165 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    omission so it may investigate and make a decision whether to
    pay or defend the claim. 63
    Having concluded the substantial compliance doctrine can
    apply to the content of claims under the STCA, we proceed
    to analyze whether Saylor’s claim was properly dismissed for
    failing to comply with the presuit presentment requirements
    under the STCA.
    Content of Saylor’s Claim Forms
    Substantially Complied
    As noted, the State argues that on all 16 of Saylor’s claim
    forms, his response to field No. 9 was insufficient in that it
    did not reference a dollar amount. Saylor responds that even
    though his answers were not stated in dollars, they neverthe-
    less contained “all information called for” 64 on the standard
    form, and thus, they substantially complied with the provisions
    of § 81-8,212. Saylor also contends that on the record in this
    case, he could not have strictly complied with all the require-
    ments of the State Claims Board.
    We agree with Saylor that, in this case, there was no
    way he could have strictly complied with the “manner pre-
    scribed by the State Claims Board” 65 for filing his tort claims.
    This is so for at least two reasons. First, the specific claim
    form required by the regulations—the Board’s form entitled
    “Claim for Injury or Damage”—is not the same form currently
    being used by the Risk Manager—the “Tort & Miscellaneous
    Claim Form.” Consequently, there was no way the content of
    Saylor’s claims could have strictly complied with the regula-
    tion’s requirement that it “contain all information called for
    on the Board’s ‘Claim for Injury or Damage’ form.” 66 Second,
    the requirement under the regulations that the completed
    63
    See, Cole, supra note 7; Chicago Lumber Co., supra note 10.
    64
    Rule No. 12, supra note 15.
    65
    § 81-8,212.
    66
    Rule No. 12, supra note 15.
    - 166 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    claim form be filed in triplicate with the secretary of the State
    Claims Board is not the same filing method as is required under
    either § 81-8,212 (which requires filing the claim “with the
    Risk Manager”) or under the Risk Manager’s standard operat-
    ing procedures (which asks that the form be either emailed or
    mailed to the Risk Manager). Consequently, although Saylor
    filed his claims with the statutorily authorized recipient, there
    was no way he could have strictly complied with the statutory
    requirement that he do so “in the manner prescribed by the
    State Claims Board.” 67 The State’s briefing ignored the dis-
    parity between the Board’s adopted regulations and the Risk
    Manager’s standard operating procedures, but we agree with
    Saylor that, as a practical matter, this disparity prevents strict
    compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirements
    concerning the manner of filing a tort claim.
    The question then is whether the content of Saylor’s
    tort claims substantially complied with the requirements of
    § 81-8,212 and its related regulations prescribing the manner
    of filing such claims. We conclude that as to the challenged
    content, Saylor’s tort claims did substantially comply with the
    requirements of § 81-8,212 and afforded the State sufficient
    notice to satisfy the purpose of the presuit claim presentment
    requirement. 68
    The State challenges the sufficiency of Saylor’s responses
    to only field No. 9 on the claim forms, which asks for the
    “Total Amount of Claim.” The State insists that the term
    “Amount” in this context necessarily requires the answer to
    be stated in terms of a dollar amount. But the claim form
    does not specify that a dollar amount must be provided,
    and the regulation governing the content of claims does not
    require that a dollar amount be provided. And to the extent
    the instructions in the Risk Manager’s operating procedures
    can fairly be understood to indicate that “Total Amount of
    67
    § 81-8,212.
    68
    See Cole, supra note 7.
    - 167 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    Claim” should be stated in terms of dollars, those instructions
    do not have the force and effect of law. On this record, we
    find Saylor’s answer stating “[t]o be proven” substantially
    complied with the question asked in field No. 9.
    That is particularly so where, as here, the tort claims were
    seeking general damages. The State’s singular focus on the
    answer to field No. 9 paints an incomplete picture of the
    State’s knowledge regarding the damages being sought, and it
    ignores altogether the additional information Saylor provided
    in the narrative sections of his claim forms, many of which
    stated that the various acts and omissions of the State caused
    him physical and emotional pain and suffering. So although
    it is true that Saylor did not, in either field No. 9 or in his
    narratives, place a specific dollar amount on his damages, his
    failure to do so is nevertheless consistent with the nature of
    his claims and the relief he sought.
    Saylor’s tort claims were premised on assertions that the
    State had denied him (1) timely and adequate medical care,
    (2) the use of his personal property, and (3) access to his
    attorney. His claims generally stated that this conduct caused
    him physical and emotional pain and suffering. In light of the
    nature of Saylor’s claims, his answer that the total amount of
    his claim was “[t]o be proven” was entirely consistent with
    how we treat allegations of general damages. 69 It would be an
    odd result if we were to demand more specificity regarding
    general damages in a presuit tort claim than is required in the
    complaint once litigation is commenced.
    Finally, we do not doubt the State’s assertion that know-
    ing the specific dollar amount of a tort claim can make “a
    significant difference in terms of how the claim is processed
    and at what level.” 70 But given the nature of his claims and the
    69
    See, e.g., Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1108(a) (“[i]f the recovery of money be
    demanded, the amount of special damages shall be stated but the amount
    of general damages shall not be stated . . .”).
    70
    Brief for appellee at 6.
    - 168 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 147
    damages he seeks, we cannot find that Saylor’s answer to field
    No. 9 caused the State any prejudice regarding its ability to
    investigate his claims or decide whether to settle them before
    litigation commenced. Indeed, the State’s frank admission
    during oral argument that it would have sufficed for Saylor to
    write any amount in field No. 9, even an “exorbitant” amount
    such as “$20 million,” belies its argument that a particular
    dollar amount was essential to the proper investigation and
    processing of his claims. Although the Risk Manager certainly
    has the prerogative to refuse to accept a tort claim form on the
    basis that it does not contain all of the information called for,
    that is not what happened here.
    On this record, we reject the State’s contention that Saylor’s
    presuit tort claims were deficient because they did not state
    a specific dollar amount being sought as damages and that
    therefore, they were not filed “in the manner prescribed by the
    State Claims Board” as required by § 81-8,212. We instead
    find, as a matter of law, that the content of Saylor’s presuit
    tort claims in regard to damages substantially complied with
    the presuit notice provisions of § 81-8,212.
    Given this disposition, we do not reach Saylor’s argument
    that the State waived his failure to comply with § 81-8,212 by
    accepting the forms when submitted.
    CONCLUSION
    Because the content of Saylor’s tort claims substantially
    complied with the requirements of § 81-8,212, the district
    court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
    State and dismissing his action. We therefore reverse the judg-
    ment in favor of the State and remand the matter for further
    proceedings.
    Reversed and remanded for
    further proceedings.
    Heavican, C.J., and Papik and Freudenberg, JJ., not
    participating.