People v. Deleon , 2020 IL 124744 ( 2020 )

2020 IL 124744
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 124744)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
MIGUEL DELEON, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 24, 2020.
JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Kilbride, Karmeier, Theis, Neville,
and Michael J. Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 At issue in this case is whether section 112a-11.5 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5 (West 2018)), which permits the
issuance of a protective order in a crime involving domestic violence, a sexual
offense, or stalking, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to defendant. The
circuit court of Cook County held the statute unconstitutional, as violative of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. V, XIV) and of article I, section 2, and article I, section 10, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10). The circuit court also held that the
statute shifted the burden to defendant, in conflict with the Civil No Contact Order
Act (740 ILCS 22/204, 215.5 (West 2018)). We now reverse the circuit court’s
judgment.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant Miguel Deleon was charged by indictment with four counts of
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018)). The
conditions of defendant’s bond release included a prohibition against contacting the
victim or visiting her home, school, or workplace. Pursuant to section 112A-11.5
of the Code (725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5 (West 2018)), the State’s Attorney filed a
petition for a plenary civil no-contact order mandating defendant refrain from
contacting the victim, harassing or stalking her, and entering her place of
employment. Defense counsel filed a memorandum opposing the no-contact order,
asserting that section 112A-11.5 was unconstitutional.
¶4 At a hearing in March 2019, the circuit court orally pronounced that section
112A-11.5 was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied, although an
evidentiary hearing was never held nor evidence proffered by counsel as to the
section’s unconstitutionality as applied to defendant. The court found that the
statute allows the State to make a prima facie case for the issuance of a protective
order by producing the indictment without requiring the alleged victim to testify
and be subject to cross-examination, in violation of due process. The court also
found the statute’s requirement that the defendant present evidence of a meritorious
defense to rebut the prima facie evidence violative of defendant’s constitutional
protections against self-incrimination (id. § 112A-11.5(a)(1)). Additionally, the
court found that the statute improperly shifts the burden of persuasion to the
defendant. The State appealed directly to this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). We allowed the Illinois Coalition Against
Sexual Assault to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
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¶5 ANALYSIS
¶6 All statutes are presumed to be constitutionally valid. People v. Hollins, 2012
IL 112754, ¶ 13. It is the court’s duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds
the statute’s constitutionality, if such a construction is reasonably possible. Id. The
constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. This
court has previously advised circuit courts that “ ‘cases should be decided on
nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible,’ ” reaching constitutional grounds
only if necessary to decide the case. Vasquez Gonzalez v. Union Health Service,
Inc., 2018 IL 123025, ¶ 19 (quoting In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006)).
¶7 The due process clause protects fundamental justice and fairness. People v.
Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 472 (2002). Procedural due process claims challenge the
constitutionality of procedures used to deprive a person of their life, liberty, or
property. People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15. The fundamental requirements
of due process are notice of the procedure and the opportunity to present any
objection or rebuttal. Id.
¶8 What due process consists of, however, is a flexible concept, as “not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Therefore, what procedures due
process requires depends upon “ ‘the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action’ ” in each particular situation. Id. (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
¶9 At issue here is the constitutionality of section 112A-11.5 of the Code, which
allows for a protective order to be issued in conjunction with a criminal prosecution
and provides:
“(a) Except as provided in subsection (a-5) of this Section, the court shall
grant the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie
evidence that a crime involving domestic violence, a sexual offense, or a crime
involving stalking has been committed. The following shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the crime:
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(1) an information, complaint, indictment, or delinquency petition,
charging a crime of domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking or
charging an attempt to commit a crime of domestic violence, a sexual
offense, or stalking;
(2) an adjudication of delinquency, a finding of guilt based upon a plea,
or a finding of guilt after a trial for a crime of domestic battery, a sexual
crime, or stalking or an attempt to commit a crime of domestic violence, a
sexual offense, or stalking;
(3) any dispositional order issued under Section 5-710 of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987, the imposition of supervision, conditional discharge,
probation, periodic imprisonment, parole, aftercare release, or mandatory
supervised release for a crime of domestic violence, a sexual offense, or
stalking or an attempt to commit a crime of domestic violence, a sexual
offense, or stalking, or imprisonment in conjunction with a bond forfeiture
warrant; or
(4) the entry of a protective order in a separate civil case brought by the
petitioner against the respondent.
(a-5) The respondent may rebut prima facie evidence of the crime under
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Section by presenting evidence of a
meritorious defense. The respondent shall file a written notice alleging a
meritorious defense which shall be verified and supported by affidavit. The
verified notice and affidavit shall set forth the evidence that will be presented
at a hearing. If the court finds that the evidence presented at the hearing
establishes a meritorious defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
may decide not to issue a protective order.
(b) The petitioner shall not be denied a protective order because the
petitioner or the respondent is a minor.
(c) The court, when determining whether or not to issue a protective order,
may not require physical injury on the person of the victim.
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(d) If the court issues a final protective order under this Section, the court
shall afford the petitioner and respondent an opportunity to be heard on the
remedies requested in the petition.” 725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5 (West 2018).
¶ 10 As stated, statutory enactments are presumed constitutional. To overcome that
presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish a constitutional
violation. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 200 (2009).
¶ 11 Under article 112A, the circuit court must grant a protective order if the court
finds prima facie evidence that the defendant committed “a crime involving
domestic violence, a sexual offense, or a crime involving stalking.” 725 ILCS
5/112A-11.5(a) (West 2018). For the statute’s purposes, prima facie evidence
includes the indictment charging defendant with a qualifying crime. Id. § 112A-
11.5(a)(1).
¶ 12 The State’s Attorney, or alternatively the victim, may petition for a protective
order at any time following the filing of the charge and issue of summons. Id.
§ 112A-5.5(a), (c). The defendant must receive at least 10 days’ notice prior to the
court’s consideration of the petition. Id. § 112A-5.5(f).
¶ 13 Medina v. California Due Process Analysis
¶ 14 The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that, in criminal proceedings,
“ ‘it is normally “within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which
its laws are carried out,” ’ ” generally declining to find a due process violation
unless the procedure in question “ ‘ “offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” ’ ”
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (quoting Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977), quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523
(1958)).
¶ 15 We first evaluate whether allowing the State to make a prima facie case for the
issuance on a protective order via indictment, without requiring the complaining
witness be subject to cross-examination, is a denial of due process. In Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the United States Supreme Court considered the
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constitutionality of Florida procedures allowing a person arrested without a warrant
and charged by information to be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending trial.
¶ 16 As Gerstein notes, the probable cause standard for arrest “represents a
necessary accommodation between the individual’s right to liberty and the State’s
duty to control crime.” Id. at 112. The Gerstein Court found that the fourth
amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Id. at 114. Standing alone, a
prosecutor’s assessment of probable cause does not meet due process requirements
and is thus insufficient to justify pretrial restraint of liberty. Id. at 117. However, a
determination of probable cause by a neutral and disinterested party could satisfy
constitutional protections. Id. at 114.
¶ 17 In determinations of probable cause, the Supreme Court held that the “adversary
safeguards,” including “confrontation [and] cross-examination [of witnesses],”
were “not essential for the probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment” “for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings.” Id.
at 119-20.
¶ 18 In Gerstein, the Supreme Court considered pretrial detainment furnished
through a charge by information. The Court found such confinement
constitutionally permissible where probable cause was properly established. In the
present case, defendant was charged by indictment, with a grand jury finding
probable cause prior to the petition for a protective order and attendant restraints
on liberty. “[A]n indictment ‘fair upon its face,’ and returned by a ‘properly
constituted grand jury,’ conclusively determines the existence of probable cause”
to believe the defendant perpetrated the offense alleged. Id. at 117 n.19 (quoting
Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932)).
¶ 19 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a grand jury
indictment “may do more than commence a criminal proceeding (with all the
economic, reputational, and personal harm that entails); the determination may also
serve the purpose of immediately depriving the accused of her freedom.” Kaley v.
United States, 571 U.S. 320, 329 (2014); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
129 (1997).
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¶ 20 A protective order, at issue in the present case, is unquestionably a less
restrictive constraint on liberty than the pretrial imprisonment contemplated in
Gerstein. As an indictment is constitutionally sufficient to sustain detainment, a
more extreme restriction on liberty, we likewise find it constitutionally sufficient
to be the basis of a protective order pursuant to section 112A-11.5.
¶ 21 There is no historic basis for concluding that due process precludes the use of
an indictment, alone, for restricting a defendant’s liberties prior to trial. In fact, the
indictment has always been sufficient to constrict liberties. The United States
Supreme Court, relying on the grand jury’s “historical role of protecting individuals
from unjust persecution,” has traditionally “let [that body’s] judgment substitute
for that of a neutral and detached magistrate.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117 n.19.
Therefore, article 112A’s issuance of a protective order when an indictment
establishes a prima facie case offends no traditional or fundamental principle of
justice.
¶ 22 Under the Medina standard, we thus find the issuance of a protective order
issued through the procedures detailed in section 112A-11.5 and based upon the
return of an indictment, even without giving defendant the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the victim, constitutionally permissible and in accord with due
process.
¶ 23 Mathews v. Eldridge Due Process Analysis
¶ 24 In addition to the Medina standard, the United States Supreme Court has
established a separate test to analyze potential due process violations in
deprivations of property. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court
considered whether the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires that a
recipient of Social Security disability payments be afforded an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of benefits. In finding that an
evidentiary proceeding was not required, the Court utilized a three-factor balancing
test to conclude that the administrative procedures at issue fully comported with
due process. Id.
¶ 25 While initially devised in Mathews’s administrative setting, the Supreme Court
has also applied the test to evaluate due process challenges in a criminal proceeding,
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albeit still in consideration of the deprivation of a property, as opposed to liberty,
interest. In Kaley, 571 U.S. 320, the defendants were charged by grand jury
indictment with a scheme to steal prescription medical devices and sell them for
profit. The defendants sought to apply the Mathews factors to their claim that, when
challenging the legality of the government’s pretrial asset seizure, they were
constitutionally entitled to contest a grand jury’s determination of probable cause.
Although admonishing that Medina, and not Mathews, provides the appropriate
framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules that apply to the
criminal process, the Kaley Court nonetheless additionally applied the Mathews
analysis to the claim and found that due process was not violated under either
standard. Id. at 334, 340.
¶ 26 Indeed, both the United States Supreme Court and this court have at times
previously either applied or considered applying the Mathews guidance in
evaluation of criminal justice procedures as well. See United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Cardona, 2013 IL 114076.
¶ 27 Per Mathews, when evaluating a procedural due process challenge, we should
consider (1) the government’s interest in the procedure, including the function
involved and the fiscal or administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedure would entail, (2) the private interest affected by the governmental action,
and finally (3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of said interest through the
procedures being contested and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
¶ 28 Mathews Factors
¶ 29 To begin the Mathews analysis, the government has a substantial interest in
protecting victims of sexual assault and related crimes from continued contact by
the accused pending trial. The issuance of a no-contact order may prevent the victim
from being subject to continued stalking, harassment, or intimidation. The
government also has a significant interest in minimizing the number of times the
alleged victim is subject to adversarial proceedings prior to trial. Victims of sexual
assault may already be physically and psychologically traumatized by the alleged
crimes. As the statute states, “[t]he purpose of this Article is to protect the safety of
victims *** and to minimize the trauma and inconvenience associated with
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attending separate and multiple civil court proceedings to obtain protective orders.”
725 ILCS 5/112A-1.5 (West 2018).
¶ 30 Requiring the victim to be subject to multiple pretrial “mini-trials” could
discourage continued cooperation from particularly reticent victims, undermining
the government’s ability to pursue justice for those wronged. At the very least, such
an adversarial proceeding could consume significant prosecutorial time and
resources.
¶ 31 On the other hand, the defendant also has a fundamental interest at stake: the
liberty to move about without restriction pending trial. One mitigating factor is the
limited number of locations the defendant is precluded from visiting under the no-
contact order. Pursuant to the no-contact order sought under section 112A-11.5,
defendant is prohibited only from contacting the victim, from “harassing or
stalking” her, and from entering her place of employment. Outside of these limited
mandates, defendant’s liberties remained unaffected throughout trial. While
defendant has a fundamental liberty interest in freedom of movement, when viewed
in the scope of his restrictions, he does not have a significant interest in associating
with his alleged victim.
¶ 32 Another important factor in assessing the impact of official action on private
interests is the “ ‘possible length of wrongful deprivation of . . . benefits.’ ”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975)).
Here, defendant is deprived of purely unrestricted movement only “until
disposition, withdrawal, or dismissal of the underlying charge.” 725 ILCS 5/112A-
20(b)(1) (West 2018). While the length of time from indictment to trial can vary
greatly, defendant retains a large degree of autonomy in determining this time
through his right to demand a speedy trial. Further, said deprivation of that interest
is wrongful only when unsupported by a finding of probable cause.
¶ 33 Ultimately, the conditions of the no-contact order were relatively limited and
largely identical to the restraints imposed as conditions of defendant’s pretrial bond
release. Hence, not only would defendant be subject to these conditions absent
section 112A-11.5, but the conditions are undeniably less restrictive than the
pretrial confinement an indictment and accompanying arrest warrant can also
constitutionally enable as stated above.
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¶ 34 The remaining prong of the Mathews test—the probable value, if any, of a
judicial hearing allowing defendant to confront and cross-examine the complaining
witness—is critical “when the governmental and private interests both have
weight.” Kaley, 571 U.S. at 338. Although we conclude that the governmental
interests here have vastly more weight than the implicated interests of defendant,
we will nevertheless assess this factor as well. While “confrontation and cross-
examination might *** enhance the reliability of probable cause determinations in
some cases,” in most instances “their value would be too slight to justify holding,
as a matter of constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards
designed for trial must also be employed” at less critical stages in the prosecution
like the granting of a no-contact order. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121-22. While the
criminal justice system relies on such adversarial safeguards when the question is
whether a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, an adversarial process as
suggested by defendant at this stage is far less useful.
¶ 35 Application of the Mathews test to the present case only confirms what we have
already concluded through Medina. Under either Medina or Mathews, we again
find the statute’s potential issuance of a protective order, absent an opportunity for
the defendant to confront the complaining witness, is in compliance with due
process requirements.
¶ 36 Defendant’s Opportunity to Rebut the Prima Facie Case
¶ 37 We next decide whether the statute’s requirement that a defendant present a
meritorious defense to rebut the indictment and prevent the protective order violates
a defendant’s right against self-incrimination. Under article I, section 10, of our
state constitution, which is substantially similar to the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution, “[n]o person shall be compelled in a criminal case to
give evidence against himself.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10.
¶ 38 The privilege against self-incrimination applies in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, where there is a reasonable expectation that a person would subject
himself to criminal contempt proceedings by making any compelled statements.
Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d at 467.
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¶ 39 To be clear, at no point in the proceedings outlined by section 112A-11.5 is a
defendant required to present any evidence of a meritorious defense. Instead, after
the indictment establishes the prima facie showing for issuance of a no-contact
order, the defendant may permissively rebut that showing if he so chooses. There
is no legal compulsion for defendant to rebut the prima facie evidence, thereby
alleviating self-incrimination concerns.
¶ 40 In Lindsey, this court held that a probationer could be compelled to testify at a
probation revocation hearing, finding that the defendant’s fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination was not violated because his testimony impacted only his
probationary status and did not realistically expose him to further proceedings. Id.
at 468. The instant case is distinguishable from Lindsey in that defendant does face
further criminal proceedings following any proffered testimony to rebut the
prima facie evidence. Thus, unlike Lindsey, defendant cannot be compelled to
testify.
¶ 41 There may be concerns that the defendant does not actually have a free choice
whether to present a meritorious defense or to remain silent, as the issuance of the
protective order is at stake. If a defendant testifies, he risks his testimony being used
in the underlying charge of sexual assault. If he remains silent, he risks the issuance
of the order. The United States Supreme Court has previously addressed extraneous
forces creating “indirect compulsion” to abandon one’s protections against self-
incrimination.
¶ 42 In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the witness was forced to
choose between the exercise of one constitutional right at the expense of another.
The defendant testified in a hearing on his motion to suppress, and that testimony
was used against him at trial. The Supreme Court held that such practice was
unconstitutional. The defendant “was obliged either to give up what he believed
*** to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 394. To be clear, the
present case does not involve compelled testimony. As we have discussed, the
issuance of a protective order on the basis of an indictment pursuant to section
112A-11.5 does not violate fourteenth amendment due process. Further, the
potential risk of temporarily being unable to contact the victim, harass or stalk the
victim, or enter her place of employment, as proscribed by the no-contact order,
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does not rise to the level of “an undeniable tension” between the exercise of two
fundamental rights that Simmons recognized, should defendant choose to remain
silent. Id. Therefore, we find that the statute does not implicate compelled
testimony, directly or indirectly. For this reason, the outlined procedures in question
do not violate the right against self-incrimination.
¶ 43 Burden Shifting
¶ 44 The circuit court’s final rationale for invalidating section 112A-11.5 was that it
shifted the burden to defendant, in conflict with the Illinois Civil No Contact Order
Act’s requirement that the petitioner establish the allegations necessary to issue a
protective order (740 ILCS 22/204, 215.5 (West 2018)).
¶ 45 “Where two statutes are allegedly in conflict, a court has a duty to interpret the
statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes,
where such an interpretation is reasonably possible.” Barragan v. Casco Design
Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 435, 441-42 (2005). “In other words, before declaring two statutes
to be in conflict, ‘[w]e must presume that several statutes relating to the same
subject *** are governed by one spirit and a single policy, and that the legislature
intended the several statutes to be consistent and harmonious.” In re Jarquan B.,
2017 IL 121483, ¶ 34 (quoting Uldrych v. VHS of Illinois, Inc., 239 Ill. 2d 532, 540
(2011)).
¶ 46 Under the Civil No Contact Order Act, it is generally the petitioner’s burden to
establish qualifying acts by the respondent that justify the issuance of an order of
protection through testimony or affidavit. Meanwhile, as discussed, section 112A-
11.5(a) allows an indictment supported by probable cause to serve as the
prima facie evidence for a protective order.
¶ 47 The Illinois General Assembly has enacted several statutes allowing for
protective orders to be issued on behalf of victims of domestic violence and sexual
assault. See, e.g., Stalking No Contact Order Act (740 ILCS 21/1 et seq. (West
2018)); Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West
2018)); Civil No Contact Order Act (740 ILCS 22/101 et seq. (West 2018)); 725
ILCS 5/112A-11.5 (West 2018).
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¶ 48 Although the statutes may at times govern overlapping areas of coverage, or
even present differing parties shouldering the burden of persuasion, the overarching
legislative intent is clear. Through the enactment of a myriad of statutes, the
General Assembly has sought to provide comprehensive protection to those
affected by domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault.
¶ 49 For example, the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 allows for the issuance
of a civil order of protection for persons in a dangerous dating or familial
relationship (see 750 ILCS 60/201(a) (West 2018)), while the Civil No Contact
Order Act provides that protective orders are also available for victims of sexual
assault yet does not require a dating relationship between the petitioner and
respondent (see 740 ILCS 22/213 (West 2018)). The Civil No Contact Order Act
allows for a protective order based on a single unwarranted assault (see id.
§ 201(b)(1)), whereas the Stalking No Contact Order Act requires petitioner to
establish that respondent engaged in a course of conduct (see 740 ILCS 21/5 (West
2018)).
¶ 50 Here, section 112A-11.5 and the Illinois Civil No Contact Order Act are not in
unresolvable conflict, as article 112A applies only to proceedings in connection
with criminal prosecutions, while the Illinois Civil No Contact Order Act governs
civil proceedings in which the respondent has not been charged with a crime. The
legislative intent is made clear within the statute. “Rape is recognized as the most
underreported crime; estimates suggest that only one in seven rapes is reported to
authorities. Victims who do not report the crime still desire safety and protection
from future interactions with the offender. Some cases in which the rape is reported
are not prosecuted.” 740 ILCS 22/102 (West 2018). Clearly, the Civil No Contact
Order Act was enacted in contemplation of protection for victims who may have
failed to or been fearful of reporting the crime in a timely manner, or where the
State declines prosecution.
¶ 51 Conversely, article 112A places the authority with either the victim or the
prosecutor to petition for a no-contact order, specifically attendant to a criminal
prosecution. Probable cause has already been determined through indictment in
these proceedings; thus different burdens and procedures may appropriately be
required for the issuance of the protective order.
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¶ 52 As these two statutes operate in different proceedings, criminal and civil, we
decline to minimize the protections sought by the General Assembly for the vastly
varying scenarios confronted by victims of sexual assault. We give effect to both
statutes, as consistent with the legislative intent of providing wide coverage for
those seeking protective orders.
¶ 53 CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that section 112A-11.5 does not violate
due process by allowing the State to make a prima facie case for issuance of a
protective order by producing an indictment without requiring the complaining
witness be subject to confrontation and cross-examination. Neither does the statute
compel testimony or the presentation of evidence by the defendant in violation of
constitutional protections against self-incrimination. Finally, we do not find
impermissible burden shifting nor a conflict that renders the operation of either
section 112A-11.5 or the Civil No Contact Order Act untenable.
¶ 55 Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
¶ 56 Reversed and remanded.
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