In Re the Estate of Wittman , 305 Mont. 290 ( 2001 )


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    No. 00-370
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2001 MT 109
    IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
    AMY WITTMAN,
    Deceased.
    APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Yellowstone,
    The Honorable Susan P. Watters, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Bruce O. Bekkedahl, West, Patten, Bekkedahl & Green, Billings, Montana; Patricia D.
    Peterman, Billings, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Elizabeth Honaker, Honaker Law Firm, Billings, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: March 1, 2001
    Decided: June 28, 2001
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
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    Justice Patricia Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1 Appellant, James Wittman (James) appeals from the order of the Thirteenth Judicial
    District Court, Yellowstone County, admitting the last will and testament of his mother
    Amy Wittman to probate, after finding that she had testamentary capacity and was not
    unduly influenced when she executed her will in September of 1997. We affirm.
    ¶2 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court's finding of no undue
    influence is supported by substantial credible evidence, and is not clearly erroneous.
    Factual and Procedural History
    ¶3 Amy Wittman died on July 16, 1999, at the age of 95. She had thirteen children, with
    nine of them surviving her. From 1953 to 1997 she made four different wills. The final
    two, made in 1994 and 1997, are at issue in this proceeding. Amy's son James argues that
    the 1994 will, and not the 1997 will, should have been admitted to probate. The 1994 will
    left Amy's entire estate to James, so long as he survived her. In the event he predeceased
    her, the 1994 will dictated the estate would go to the remaining children in equal shares.
    The 1997 will, however, divided the estate equally among the children.
    ¶4 James had lived with Amy for most of his life, ultimately moving out in 1998, after a
    series of disagreements with his mother and siblings. Amy suffered from a series of
    illnesses toward the end of her life, including two strokes. The first was in 1995 and the
    second in 1997. The state of Amy's health varied during this period, alternating between
    deterioration and improvement. It ultimately became clear that full time care was
    necessary, and several of Amy's daughters assumed care for her starting in July of 1997.
    ¶5 After having some disagreements with James, several of the children spoke with Amy
    concerning James' handling of Amy's finances. It appears that while he was living in her
    home, James may have been neglecting to pay certain bills for her home, and may also
    have been spending money from Amy's Social Security and VA checks for his personal
    use. Finally, at least in part at the urging of her children, Amy decided to make a new will.
    The children therefore contacted attorney Ingrid Gustafson, who met with Amy regarding
    the new will, and then prepared a revised will. The fourth and final will, made in
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    September of 1997, divided the estate equally among the children, with shares left to
    certain grandchildren as lineal descendants of the deceased children.
    ¶6 Ms. Gustafson testified that Amy read her previous will and indicated she wanted to
    make a new one. Amy and Gustafson met alone to discuss the making of the new will.
    Gustafson testified that she questioned Amy carefully to determine that Amy understood
    what she was doing. She spoke with her about a variety of issues, including the division of
    her estate. According to Gustafson, Amy was alert, understood the significance of
    changing her will, and understood that the new will would divide her estate among her
    children equally. Although several of her children brought Amy to the attorney's office,
    none of them were in the room when Amy and her attorney discussed the provisions of
    Amy's new will.
    ¶7 James brought this proceeding in District Court, petitioning for formal probate of the
    will dated May 24, 1994. David K. Wittman, the respondent, opposed the probate of the
    1994 will on the grounds that a valid later will was executed by Amy. He requested that
    the District Court probate the 1997 will. James contested the 1997 will on the grounds that
    Amy Wittman lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced. Following a
    hearing, the District Court concluded that the decedent had testamentary capacity and was
    under no undue influence when executing her 1997 will. The District Court ruled that the
    1997 will was entitled to probate and that David Wittman was a suitable person to be
    personal representative.
    ¶8 James does not appeal from the court's finding that Amy had testamentary capacity, but
    does appeal from the court's finding that there were no specific acts of undue influence
    exercised over Amy by his siblings.
    Standard of Review
    ¶9 On appeal, this Court will uphold findings of fact in an equitable case unless they are
    clearly erroneous. Matter of E.P. (1990), 
    241 Mont. 316
    , 319, 
    787 P.2d 322
    , 325. Rule 52
    (a), M.R.Civ.P. We first inquire into whether the findings are supported by substantial
    evidence. Interstate Production Credit v. DeSaye (1991), 
    250 Mont. 320
    , 323, 
    820 P.2d 1285
    , 1287. The evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
    and the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to the testimony are the responsibility
    of the trial court. Interstate Production Credit, 250 Mont. at 324, 820 P.2d at 1287. Our
    standard of review of questions of law is whether the district court's interpretation of the
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    law is correct. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc. (1995), 
    271 Mont. 459
    ,
    469, 
    898 P.2d 680
    , 686.
    Discussion
    ¶10 Whether the District Court's finding of no undue influence was supported by
    substantial, credible evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
    ¶11 James argues that the District Court's findings were not supported by substantial,
    credible evidence. Among other things, he argues that the District Court should have
    weighed testimony by Amy's physician more heavily than it did, and that the District
    Court should not have relied so strongly on the testimony of the attorney who drafted
    Amy's will. He further argues that the District Court did not make sufficient findings on
    the elements of undue influence. We disagree.
    ¶12 As the contestant of the will, James had the burden of establishing that undue
    influence was exerted over Amy in the making of the will. Section 72-3-310, MCA,
    provides:
    In contested cases, petitioners who seek to establish intestacy have the burden of
    establishing prima facie proof of death, venue, and heirship. Proponents of a will
    have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execution in all cases and,
    if they are also petitioners, prima facie proof of death and venue. Contestants of a
    will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity, undue
    influence, fraud, duress, mistake, or revocation. Parties have the ultimate burden of
    persuasion as to matters with respect to which they have the initial burden of proof.
    ¶13 In Montana, undue influence is defined by statute. Section 28-2-407, MCA, provides
    that undue influence is:
    (1) the use by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another who holds a real or
    apparent authority over him of such confidence or authority for the purpose of
    obtaining an unfair advantage over him; (2) taking an unfair advantage of another's
    weakness of mind; or (3) taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of
    another's necessities or distress.
    In determining whether undue influence has occurred in the making of a will, the statutory
    requirements must control. In re the Estate of Bradshaw, 
    2001 MT 92
    , ¶ 16, ___ Mont.
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    ___, ¶16, ___ P.3d ___, ¶ 16. In addition, the court may consider the following five
    criteria: (1) the existence of a confidential relationship between the person alleged to be
    exerting undue influence and the testator; (2) the testator's physical condition as it affects
    her ability to withstand undue influence; (3) the testator's mental condition as it affects her
    ability to withstand undue influence; (4) the unnaturalness of the disposition which would
    show an unbalanced mind or a mind easily susceptible to undue influence; and (5) the
    demands and importunities that may have affected the testator, taking into consideration
    the time, place, and surrounding circumstances. Estate of Maricich (1965), 
    145 Mont. 146
    ,
    161, 
    400 P.2d 873
    , 881, Cameron v. Cameron (1978), 
    179 Mont. 219
    , 229, 
    587 P.2d 939
    ,
    945. While the court may consider these five criteria in determining the existence of undue
    influence, all five criteria need not be present. Estate of Bradshaw, ¶ 16.
    ¶14 Undue influence is never presumed and must be proven like any other fact. Estate of
    Lein (1994), 
    270 Mont. 295
    , 304, 
    892 P.2d 530
    , 535 (overruled, in part, on other grounds).
    Moreover, we have held that the mere opportunity to exercise influence on the testator is
    not sufficient to prove undue influence and invalidate a will. Dybvik v. Dybvik (1982), 
    201 Mont. 389
    , 397, 
    654 P.2d 989
    , 993.
    ¶15 We turn now to the five criteria set forth in Cameron, 179 Mont. at 229, 587 P.2d at
    945. Examining the facts before us, the first criterion of the existence of a confidential
    relationship has been met. There was clearly a confidential relationship between Amy
    Wittman and the children who discussed with Amy the option of her changing her will.
    Amy was being cared for by her children and saw them on a daily basis. Especially during
    her periods of illness, she required extensive care which was provided by them.
    ¶16 In evaluating the second and third criteria, we look at the mental and physical
    condition of the testator to determine if either might affect her ability to withstand
    influence. It is clear that Amy's physical condition was compromised later in life. She
    became ill in 1989, and suffered a stroke in June of 1995 and a second stroke in October
    of 1997. Her physical condition and her dependence on others for everyday tasks might
    well have made her susceptible to the influence of those caring for her.
    ¶17 Following her stroke in 1995, Amy was treated by Dr. John Byorth. Dr. Byorth
    testified at trial that following this stroke, Amy's health was compromised and that she
    could have been subject to undue influence. However, it appears from the record that
    Byorth hadn't seen Amy for some time when she made her 1997 will, and that her health
    had, in the interim, improved dramatically. Furthermore, it does not appear from the
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    medical records that Byorth ever made any evaluation of Amy's mental status. On the
    other hand, the District Court found significance in Amy's attorney's uncontroverted
    testimony that when the will was executed, Amy was mentally alert and oriented, that she
    understood the nature of her property, and that she understood the impact of the change in
    the disposition of her estate.
    ¶18 The fourth element to be considered is the unnaturalness of the disposition. James
    argues that the change in the will was unnatural because he had lived in the family home
    for 55 years and was disabled, and the 1997 will deprived him of most of his interest in
    that home. It is clear that Amy and James cared for each other and depended on each other
    for many years. Moreover, in both the 1989 and the 1994 wills, Amy demonstrated her
    intent to leave her estate entirely to James.
    ¶19 The findings of fact indicate that the three children who helped take care of Amy after
    she became ill, discovered and told Amy that James had used Amy's Social Security and
    VA checks for his personal use, especially in local bars; had failed to pay some utilities;
    and had failed to pay her real estate taxes for three years. The District Court also found
    that when shown the past due notices, bank account statements reflecting overdrafts,
    canceled checks to bars, and the real estate tax bills in arrears, Amy became hurt and
    upset. Under these circumstances, the change in disposition makes sense. Furthermore,
    absent unusual circumstances, it would be surprising for any court to find a will dividing
    an estate equally among the decedent's children unnatural.
    ¶20 The fifth element concerns the demands and importunities that may have affected the
    testator, taking into consideration the time, place, and surrounding circumstances. James
    argues that his siblings were unhappy with him because of their belief he was misusing his
    mother's money, and that they decided the will had to be changed, and arranged for a
    lawyer to handle the arrangements. Thus, he concludes, they encouraged her to make the
    change in her testamentary disposition.
    ¶21 At most, James has shown that his siblings had the opportunity to exercise undue
    influence. However, the opportunity to exercise undue influence on the testator is not
    sufficient to prove undue influence and invalidate a will. Rather, the opportunity to
    exercise undue influence is to be considered and correlated with the alleged acts of
    influence to determine if the acts amount to undue influence. Estate of Lien, 270 Mont. at
    304, 892 P.2d at 535. This Court has previously stated:
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    Mere general influence in the affairs of life or method of living at the time of the
    execution of a will by a testator is not proof of undue influence in the contemplation
    of our statute, and, in order to establish it as a fact, it must be shown by proof that it
    was exercised upon the mind of the testator directly to procure the execution of the
    will. Mere suspicion that undue influence may have or could have been brought to
    bear is not sufficient. It is never presumed, and must be proven like any other fact.
    (Citation omitted).
    Here, while James may have suspected that undue influence was brought to bear on his
    mother by his siblings, the District Court found no overt proof of it.
    ¶22 James makes the assertion that the District Court mis-weighed the evidence, and urges
    this Court to re-weigh the evidence in his favor. We will not do so. Where there are
    conflicts in the evidence, it is the trial court's responsibility, and not this Court's, to weigh
    that evidence. In making a determination whether undue influence was exercised in a case
    where the credibility of witnesses is of prime importance, the determination of the weight
    to be given to the testimony is the primary function of the trial judge. Cameron, 179 Mont.
    at 228-29, 587 P.2d at 945.
    ¶23 The District Court found that there were no specific incidences of undue influence
    exerted over Amy Wittman in the making of her 1997 will. Having reviewed the record,
    we find substantial evidence to support this finding, and conclude that the District Court
    did not err in this regard. There being no specific incidences of undue influence, and the
    District Court having found that Amy had the requisite testamentary capacity to make the
    1997 will, there is no basis for invalidating it. The judgment of the District Court is
    therefore affirmed.
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    We Concur:
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
    /S/ JIM REGNIER
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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Document Info

Docket Number: 00-370

Citation Numbers: 2001 MT 109, 305 Mont. 290

Judges: Cotter, Gray, Leaphart, Regnier, Trieweiler

Filed Date: 6/28/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023