K. Steets v. Celebration Fireworks, Inc. (WCAB) ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kristina Steets, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Celebration Fireworks, Inc. (Workers’ :
Compensation Appeal Board), : No. 512 C.D. 2022
Respondent : Argued: March 8, 2023
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 8, 2023
Kristina Steets (Claimant) petitions this Court for review of the
Workers’ Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) April 26, 2022 order
affirming the WC Judge’s (WCJ) decision that granted her Claim Petition for WC
benefits (Claim Petition), but denied her Petition for Penalties (Penalty Petition) and
Petition to Review Compensation Benefits (Review Petition). Claimant presents one
issue for this Court’s review: whether specific loss1 benefits are payable following
an injured worker’s death resulting from a work injury. After review, this Court
affirms.
1
“A specific loss is either (1) the loss of a body part by amputation or (2) the permanent
loss of use of an injured body part for all practical intents and purposes.” Miller v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Wal-Mart), 44 A.3d 726, 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting Jacobi v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Wawa, Inc.), 942 A.2d 263, 264 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)).
On June 30, 2017, while working for Celebration Fireworks, Inc.
(Employer), an explosion occurred when Claimant inserted a fuse into a fireworks
display causing her traumatic injuries. On March 13, 2018, Employer filed a Notice
of Compensation Payable accepting liability for Claimant’s injuries, and paid
Claimant temporary total disability benefits.
Claimant filed the Claim and Review Petitions seeking to define the
nature and extent of her injuries, alleging therein that the loss of use injury was an
injury separate and apart from the brain injury. Employer opposed both Petitions.
After several hearings, by October 7, 2019 order, the WCJ granted the Claim and
Review Petitions and amended Claimant’s work injuries to include “multiple body
parts amputation, traumatic brain injury/anoxic encephalopathy with significant
cognitive impairment, septic shock, respiratory failure, dysphagia, quadriparesis,
bowel and bladder incontinence, and loss of use of both arms.” See Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 235a. Relevant here, the WCJ found that Claimant lost the use of
her arms for all practical intents and purposes, and that the impairment was
permanent. The WCJ declared that once Claimant’s total disability benefits ceased,
Claimant would be entitled to specific loss benefits under Section 306(c)(3) and (25)
of the WC Act (Act).2 Employer appealed to the Board. On October 8, 2020, the
Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision. See R.R. at 245a. On November 5, 2020,
Employer appealed to this Court.
On November 28, 2020, Claimant died as a result of complications from
bilateral pneumonia caused by her work-related respiratory deficiency. See R.R. at
85a. Employer ceased payment of total disability benefits upon Claimant’s death.
On May 24, 2021, this Court affirmed the Board’s October 8, 2020 order. See Kemps
2
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 513(c)(3), (25). Claimant’s “specific
loss benefits for both arms amounted to 840 weeks of compensation.” WCJ Dec. at 4 (Claimant’s
Br. Appendix A-13).
2
v. Steets (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 257 A.3d 1271 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Steets
I) (wherein this Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s
determination that Claimant lost the use of both her arms for all practical intents and
purposes, and Claimant was entitled to specific loss benefits after total disability
benefits ceased).
On March 31, 2021, Claimant’s estate (Estate)3 filed the Claim,
Review, and Penalty Petitions, seeking (1) payment of Claimant’s funeral expenses,
(2) payment of Claimant’s specific loss benefits, and (3) penalties based upon
Employer’s failure to pay the previously awarded specific loss benefits. On
December 15, 2021, the WCJ granted the Claim Petition - ordering Employer to pay
Claimant’s funeral expenses - and dismissed the Review and Penalty Petitions. The
Estate appealed to the Board, which, on April 26, 2022, affirmed the WCJ’s decision.
The Estate appealed to this Court.4
Initially,
“[t]he . . . Act is remedial legislation designed to
compensate claimants for earnings loss occasioned by
work-related injuries.”[5] Triangle B[ldg.] C[tr. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Linch)], 746 A.2d [1108,]
1111 [(Pa. 2000)]. The statute seeks “to provide
recompense commensurate with the damage from
3
Employer represents in its brief that the Estate was “raised by Claimant’s non-dependent
sister.” Employer Br. at 6.
4
“[This Court’s] review determines whether there has been a violation of constitutional
rights, whether errors of law have been committed, whether [B]oard procedures were violated, or
whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Bryn Mawr
Landscaping Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cruz-Tenorio), 219 A.3d 1244, 1252 n.5 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2019). When an “appeal requires [this Court] to interpret statutory provisions[,] . . . it
presents a pure question of law over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of
review is plenary.” City of Phila. Fire Dep’t v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sladek), 195 A.3d
197, 207 (Pa. 2018) (italics added).
5
In Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, the General Assembly defined the term injury as “an
injury to an employe, . . . arising in the course of his employment and related thereto, and . . . death
resulting from such injury and its resultant effects, and occurring within [300] weeks after the
injury.” 77 P.S. § 411(1).
3
accidental injury, as a fair exchange for relinquishing
every other right of action against the employer.” Rudy v.
McCloskey Co., . . . 35 A.2d 250, 253 ([Pa.] 1944) . . . .
City of Erie v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Annunziata), 838 A.2d 598, 602 (Pa.
2003). Under the Act, an employer is liable for WC benefits where a claimant
“establish[es]: (1) [s]he was injured while in the course of employment, and (2) the
injury resulted in a loss of earning power.” Bryn Mawr Landscaping Co. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cruz-Tenorio), 219 A.3d 1244, 1252-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
Under Section 306(a)(1) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 511(1), “[w]here an employee is totally
disabled, meaning that the injury results in a total loss of earning power for a period
of time, . . . she is entitled to receive [total disability] benefits until the disability
ceases.” City of Erie, 838 A.2d at 602-03 (footnote omitted).
Section 306(c) of the Act also provides a schedule to compensate
injured employees for permanent losses. See 77 P.S. § 513. Because “specific loss
benefits are recognized as compensation ‘for the loss of use of designated bodily
members rather than for general loss of earning power,’” they “are payable without
regard to whether the permanent injury has actually caused a wage loss.” Allegheny
Power Serv. Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cockroft), 954 A.2d 692, 702
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 389 A.2d 42,
43 (Pa. 1978)).
Moreover,
[i]t is well established that in matters involving specific
loss claims, a claimant who sustains an injury that is
compensable under Section 306(c) of the Act . . . (relative
to specific loss calculations), is not [also] entitled to
compensation beyond that specified in that section[,] even
though [she/]he may be totally disabled by the injury.
Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Easterling), 113 A.3d
909, 914 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Sharon Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
4
Bd. (Frantz), 790 A.2d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)). This occurs because
“[i]njuries, including those that result in a loss of earning power, that normally flow
from the specific loss injuries are considered compensated under specific loss
benefits.” Lindemuth v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Strishock Coal Co.), 134 A.3d
111, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
However, “[a]n exception to the general rule provides that a claimant
may also receive benefits for injuries that are separate and distinct from those that
flow from the specific loss injury.” Steets I, 257 A.3d at 1277. Thus, where, as here,
“if a claimant suffers an injury that is separate and apart from a specific loss of a
body part that results in a loss of earning power, a claimant may receive
compensation under Section 306(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 511[] (related to total
disability) . . . , in addition to benefits for the specific loss of a body part.”6
Lindemuth, 134 A.3d at 121. In such case, Section 306(d) of the Act declares that
“the number of weeks for which compensation is specified for the [specific loss]
shall begin at the end of the period of temporary total disability which results from
the other separate injuries[.]” 77 P.S. § 513(d); see also Coker v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Duquesne Light Co.), 856 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (Where a
single work-related incident has caused multiple, separate and distinct injuries,
payment of specific loss benefits does not begin until after the claimant’s receipt of
total disability payments ends.).
Generally,
[u]nder Section 307 of the Act, . . . when a claimant
receiving temporary total disability benefits dies from
work-related causes, her death creates an independent
right for [widowers, and/or] surviving
children[/dependents] to claim survivors’ benefits. The
Act prescribes the computation and recipients of the
6
“[T]otal or partial disability ends at the death of the worker.” City of Scranton v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Rideski), 638 A.2d 944, 946 (Pa. 1994).
5
survivors’ benefits, which are obtainable by filing a fatal
claim petition . . . . [See] 77 P.S. § 561[.][7]
Kinzler, Tr. for Kinzler v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ass’n for Vascular Access),
245 A.3d 389, 398 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (citation omitted). Section 307(7) of the Act
adds that when an employee without dependents dies as a result of his/her work
injury, the employer shall pay up to $7,000.00 in reasonable burial expenses. See
77 P.S. § 561(7).8
7
“A surviv[or’s] [] right to compensation is a separate cause of action and is not dependent
upon [a] decedent[] having received [WC].” Antonucci v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (U.S.
Steel Corp.), 576 A.2d 401, 403 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990); see also Kujawa v. Latrobe Brewing Co.,
312 A.2d 411 (Pa. 1973). This Court has observed: “In contrast to Section 3[07] of the Act, . . .
which states plainly that fatal claim compensation benefits are to be paid to [categories of survivors
set forth in the statute],” Kinzler, Tr. for Kinzler v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ass’n for Vascular
Access), 245 A.3d 389, 399 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021),
under Section 306(g) of the Act, . . . when a claimant dies of a cause
not related to her work injury, any specific loss benefits to which
she was already entitled, but which she did not collect, are heritable.
77 P.S. § 541; Est[.] of Harris [v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Sunoco, Inc.)], 845 A.2d [239,] 244 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)]. [A]
claimant’s death from non-work-related causes does not convert or
alter the character of pending specific loss benefits into funds
receivable by the surviving recipient in the survivor’s own right.
[(Quotation marks omitted).] . . . Thus, such compensation is
expressly not paid to the survivors in their own rights.
Id. (emphasis in original). Here, the Estate has not established any independent or derivative right
to Claimant’s WC benefits.
8
Specifically, Section 307 of the Act states, in pertinent part:
In case of death, compensation shall be computed on the following
basis, and distributed to the following persons:
....
(7) Whether or not there be dependents as aforesaid, the reasonable
expense of burial, not exceeding seven thousand dollars
($7,000[.00]), which shall be paid by the employer or insurer
directly to the undertaker (without deduction of any amounts
theretofore paid for compensation or for medical expenses).
77 P.S. § 561.
6
“The survivability of specific loss benefits is treated separately in the
Act.” Est. of Harris v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sunoco, Inc.), 845 A.2d 239,
243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Section 306(g) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
Should the employe die from some other cause than the
injury, payments of compensation to which the
deceased would have been entitled to under [S]ection
306(c)(1) to (25) [of the Act] shall be paid to . . . persons
who at the time of the death of the deceased were
dependents . . . :
....
(7) If there be no dependents eligible to receive
payments under this section[,] then the payments shall be
made to the estate of the deceased but in an amount not
exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided in
this [A]ct . . . .
77 P.S. § 541 (emphasis added).
In addition, Section 410 of the Act states, in pertinent part: “In case any
claimant shall die before the final adjudication of his[/her] claim, the amount of
compensation due such claimant to the date of death shall be paid to the dependents
entitled to compensation, or, if there be no dependents, then to the estate of the
decedent.” 77 P.S. § 751. In Estate of Harris, this Court expressly ruled that
“[Section 410 of the Act] does not provide an independent or supporting basis for a
specific loss award . . . .” Id. at 243 (quoting Endres v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal
Bd. (City of Phila.), 677 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (emphasis added)).
The Endres Court explained:
Section 306(d) of the Act sets forth a schedule for
collecting total disability benefits and specific loss
benefits and provides that the payment of specific loss
benefits is to commence at the end of the temporary total
disability. Therefore, Section 306(d) [of the Act] merely
sets forth the timetable for when specific loss payments
are to begin. Section 410 of the Act is a general provision
7
which states that benefits due to a claimant who dies
before final adjudication of his or her claim are payable to
the claimant’s estate or dependents. This statutory
provision does not provide an independent or
supporting basis for a specific loss award . . . .
Section 306(g) [of the Act] relates directly to the receipt
of specific loss benefits and is, therefore, a more
particular provision.[FN]2 Enacted by the 1972
amendments . . . , Section 306(g) [of the Act] specifically
addresses the receipt of specific loss benefits by an injured
employee’s dependents if the injured employee dies from
causes unrelated to the work injury. Further, this Court
held in Burns International Security Services, Inc. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Crist), . . . 469
A.2d 336 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1984), that specific loss benefits
are payable to survivors pursuant to Section 306(g) of the
Act where the decedent’s death is from a cause other than
the work injury.[9]
[FN]2
Section 1933 of the Statutory Construction
Act of 1972 [(SCA]), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933, provides
that when there is a conflict between general and
special provisions of a statute, “the special
provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as
an exception to the general provision, unless the
general provision shall be enacted later and it shall
be the manifest intention of the General Assembly
that such general provision shall prevail.”
Endres, 677 A.2d at 903 (emphasis added; citation omitted). In addition, because
the WCJ in the instant case adjudicated Claimant’s total disability and specific loss
9
See also City of Scranton (wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the
claimant’s death terminated his total disability, making his specific loss benefits payable, and,
since specific loss payments could not be made directly to him, they were payable to his surviving
spouse pursuant to Sections 306(c) and 306(g) of the Act). City of Scranton is distinguishable
from the instant fact pattern in that the claimant had a survivor with a statutory right to his specific
loss benefits, and the claimant’s death was unrelated to his work injuries and, thus, fell squarely
under Section 306(g) of the Act.
8
claims before Claimant died, Section 410 of the Act, by its express terms, does not
control.10
In Estate of Harris, this Court held that the holding in Endres was
firmly grounded in precedent “stand[ing] for the legal conclusion that Section
306(g) of the Act governs the payment of specific loss benefits and that such
benefits may be paid only where death of the employee is from a cause other
than the work injury.” Id. at 244 (emphasis added). The Estate of Harris Court
further declared:
Under the statutory construction principle expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, we must find that because the
General Assembly conditioned payment of specific loss
benefits on a death by cause other than the work injury
that it intended to exclude the alternative, i.e., death by
the work injury. There is a sound reason for this canon
of construction; without it, the Act would have been twice
as long because its drafters would have been required to
couple every declarative sentence with its obverse.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Estate of Harris Court summarized:
Where a claimant is awarded specific loss [benefits]
and dies without a dependent, the specific loss benefit
is to be made “to the estate of the deceased but in an
amount not exceeding reasonable funeral
expenses . . . .” Section 306(g) of the Act, 77 P.S. §
541(7) (emphasis added). [The c]laimant died without
dependents. Accordingly, [the e]mployer’s obligation to
pay specific loss benefits, had they been awarded prior
to [the claimant’s] death, would have been satisfied by
the payment it has already made to the [e]state for
10
The Majority agrees with the Dissent that Section 410 of the Act might apply if Claimant
had died before her specific loss claim was adjudicated, and if this Court had not ruled that Section
306(g) of the Act more specifically applies over Section 410 of the Act. However, Claimant’s
specific loss claim was adjudicated before she died, and the Endres Court did rule that Section
306(g) of the Act more specifically applies over Section 410 of the Act. See Endres; see also Est.
of Harris.
9
reasonable funeral expenses. Accordingly, there is
nothing further to be gained by making a specific loss
benefit award to the [e]state.
The [e]state would have this Court create a new category
of claim, i.e., payment of specific loss benefits to an estate
. . . where death is caused by the work-related injury and
not by another cause. [Such] claim has no grounding in
the language of the Act and is at odds with case law
precedent. The General Assembly has spoken, and we
are so bound.
Id. at 244-45 (bold emphasis added).
Thus, based on Section 306(g) of the Act and applicable precedent,
when an employee dies due to a work injury while collecting total disability benefits
and before specific loss benefits are payable, the only specific loss payments due are
reasonable (up to $7,000.00) funeral expenses to be paid to the funeral home. This
does not offend the Act’s “humanitarian objective . . . to benefit the injured worker.”
Burgess v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Patterson-UTI Drilling Co. LLC), 231 A.3d
42, 46 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (quoting Whitfield v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tenet
Health Sys. Hahnemann LLC), 188 A.3d 599, 616 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)).
Here, Claimant was receiving total disability benefits, and was awarded
specific loss benefits that would commence after her total disability ceased. See
Steets I. Claimant’s work-related injuries caused her death. She had no dependents
with rights to either her total disability or specific loss benefits when she died. Under
such circumstances, Employer’s only statutory obligation was to pay $7,000.00 in
funeral expenses to the funeral home, which it did.
Accordingly, the WCJ properly granted the Claim Petition and
dismissed the Review and Penalty Petitions, concluding:
4. Section 306(g) of the [Act] provides that specific loss
benefits can be paid to the same category of dependent
persons listed in [Section] 307 of the Act, but only where
10
“the [e]mployee [should] die from some other cause than
the injury . . . [.]” 77 P.S. [§] 541.
5. There is nothing in the Act that requires an [e]mployer
to pay specific loss benefits in a case where the injured
worker died as a result of the work injury that caused the
specific loss. Claimant’s [c]ounsel has argued that the
right to the specific loss benefit became vested when it was
awarded by [the WCJ in Steets I] and that the vested right
passed from Claimant to her estate. Claimant’s [c]ounsel
has attempted to distinguish this case from other cases
because, in this case, the specific loss benefits were
awarded prior to Claimant’s death. There is nothing in the
language of the Act or in the case law interpreting the Act
that supports this view. Furthermore, even if this
argument w[as] accepted, there is nothing in the statutory
scheme of [WC] that would require the payment of these
benefits to anyone except dependents. Since it is
undisputed that [] Claimant had no dependents,
[Employer] is not obligated to pay the specific loss
benefits.
6. Since [Employer] did not dispute its obligation to pay
the funeral benefits, and since the [E]state has not shown
a violation of the Act on the part of [Employer], the
Penalty Petition must be dismissed.
WCJ Dec. at 4 (Claimant’s Br. Appendix A-13).
Notwithstanding, the Estate argues that specific loss benefits should be
payable following an injured worker’s death that resulted from the work injury.
Specifically, the Estate asserts that since the practical effect of Estate of Harris is
“to . . . provide greater benefits to workers who die from non-work-related causes
than those whose injuries ultimately cause their death[,]” which is inconsistent with
the Act and its humanitarian purposes and the principles of statutory construction,
this Court should clarify Estate of Harris, and apply its holding only to situations in
which an injured worker dies from a cause other than a work-related injury, while
still permitting the estates of injured workers who die as a result of their work-related
injuries to receive previously awarded specific loss benefits. Employer Br. at 9.
11
While this case is certainly tragic, the instant appeal is not the vehicle
for this Court to revisit or reinterpret Estate of Harris. The Estate has failed to
identify any legal basis consistent with the Act’s express language for this Court to
do so.11 Estate of Harris is precedential. “Stare decisis ‘maintains that for purposes
of certainty and stability in the law, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same.’” Bold v. Dep’t
of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 285 A.3d 970, 979 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 966-67
(Pa. 2006)). The circumstances presented to this Court in Estate of Harris are nearly
identical to those now before the Court. Harris sustained work-related injuries for
which the employer paid her total disability benefits until her death due to her work-
related injuries. Because Harris died without statutory dependents, the estate paid
her funeral expenses.12 The Estate of Harris Court thoroughly examined Endres,
Burns International, and City of Scranton v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal
Board (Rideski), 638 A.2d 944 (Pa. 1994), in reaching its decision, which was
consistent with this Court’s interpretations of Sections 306(c)-(d), 306(g) and 307 of
the Act, and upheld the WCJ’s decision that the estate was only entitled to statutory
11
Section 1921(a) of the SCA provides that “[t]he object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every
statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
Section 1921(b) of the SCA states: “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1921(b).
12
The Majority disagrees with the Dissent that Estate of Harris “is readily distinguishable
from the instant matter” and does not apply here. Steets v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., __ A.3d
__ (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 512 C.D. 2022, filed May 8, 2023), slip op. at 4 (Ceisler, J., dissenting). The
Estate of Harris Court expressly considered what would have happened if specific loss benefits
had been awarded to Harris before she died, and declared that because “[the c]laimant died [due
to her work-related injuries] without dependents[,] . . . [the e]mployer’s obligation to pay specific
loss benefits, had they been awarded prior to Harris’ death, would have been satisfied by the
payment it has already made to the [e]state for reasonable funeral expenses.” Est. of Harris, 845
A.2d at 245.
12
funeral expenses. Thus, Estate of Harris is not distinguishable on its facts or the
law.
This Court acknowledges that “[w]hile stare decisis serves invaluable
and salutary principles, it is not an inexorable command to be followed blindly when
such adherence leads to perpetuating error.” Stilp, 905 A.2d at 967. However, Estate
of Harris does not perpetuate any error. Legal scholars have observed:
The Act is to be “liberally construed, with borderline
interpretations resolved in favor of the injured employe.”
[Turner, 389 A.2d at 47.] . . . [I]t may seem at first blush
that an outcome that results in less compensation to a
worker who dies from a work-related injury than to a
worker who dies from some other cause would be contrary
to a “liberal” construction of the Act.
However, . . . the language of the Act yields a clear
result[,] and, although [Estate of] Harris may be a case of
first impression, it is resolvable with respect to the
language of the Act. Moreover, the outcome in [Estate of]
Harris does not run afoul of the remedial purpose of the
Act.
Th[e Estate of Harris C]ourt’s application of [S]ection
306(g) [of the Act] closely tracks the language of the
statute. Given the facts, it was difficult for the [e]state
[therein] to formulate an intellectually coherent way to
surmount the [] requirements of [S]ection 306(g) [of the
Act]. Accordingly, [Estate of] Harris was really decided
on the facts and did not present a difficult case of statutory
interpretation. Therefore, [Estate of] Harris did not
present a “borderline interpretation [] [to be] resolved in
favor of the injured employee.”
Moreover, the outcome in [Estate of] Harris did not
infringe on the remedial purpose of the Act. The provision
for the survival of the specific loss election for dependents
in [S]ection 306(g) [of the Act] is intended to protect
dependents where an injured worker dies of a cause other
than the work-related injury.
The survival provision in [S]ection 306(g) [of the Act] is
augmented by a death benefit for dependents in cases
13
where the injured worker dies of a work-related injury.
Therefore, whether the worker dies of the work-related
injury or some other cause, a benefit or advantage is
preserved for the statutory dependents. Accordingly, at
least with respect to dependents, the [Estate of] Harris
decision does not fail to achieve the remedial purpose of
the Act.
. . . . [T]he Act’s more generous treatment of dependents
is not irrational and may reflect an effort to balance the
cost of the [WC] program with the protection of those
most vulnerable to the harm occasioned by work-related
injuries. Moreover, should it be necessary or desirable to
harmonize the treatment of dependents and non-
dependents under the Act, the legislature would be in the
best position to do so because it is the more politically
accountable branch.
Yen T. Lucas, Est. of Harris v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sunoco, Inc. &
Esis/Signa): Survival of Specific Loss Claims, 15 Widener L.J. 519, 528-30 (2006)
(footnotes omitted).
The General Assembly stated its intention in Section 306(g) of the Act,
and, despite this Court’s rulings in Endres (in 1996) and Estate of Harris (in 2004),
to date, the General Assembly has not taken steps to change its effect.
It is a well[-]established principle of statutory
interpretation that [courts] “may not supply omissions in
the statute when it appears that the matter may have been
intentionally omitted.” Sivick v. State Ethics Comm[’]n,
238 A.3d 1250, 1264 (Pa. . . . 2020). It is not [the courts’]
role under our tripartite system of governance to
engage in judicial legislation and to rewrite a statute in
order to supply terms which are not present therein[.]
In re Nov. 3, 2020 Gen. Election, 240 A.3d 591, 611 (Pa. 2020) (emphasis added);
see also Lower Swatara Twp. v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 208 A.3d 521, 529 n.12 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting Bender v. Pa. Ins. Dep’t, 893 A.2d 161, 164 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2006) (“Th[is C]ourt may not rewrite a statute[.]”); Mercurio v. Allegheny Cnty.
Redevelopment Auth., 839 A.2d 1196, 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting Fischer v.
14
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 482 A.2d 1148, 1161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (“It is not within
the jurisdiction of this Court to rule on the wisdom of legislative enactments. ‘The
judiciary may not sit as a super legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations . . . .’”).
Based on the foregoing, the Board’s order is affirmed.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kristina Steets, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Celebration Fireworks, Inc. (Workers’ :
Compensation Appeal Board), : No. 512 C.D. 2022
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of May, 2023, the Workers’ Compensation
Appeal Board’s April 26, 2022 order is affirmed.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kristina Steets, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 512 C.D. 2022
:
Celebration Fireworks, Inc. :
(Workers’ Compensation :
Appeal Board), :
Respondent : Argued: March 8, 2023
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
DISSENTING OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: May 8, 2023
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority because I believe that Section 410 of
the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)1 authorizes the payment of specific loss
benefits following the work-related death of a claimant. Accordingly, I would
reverse the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) and direct
the payment of specific loss benefits to the estate of Kristina Steets (Steets).
Section 410 of the Act relevantly provides that, if a claimant dies before the
final adjudication of her claim, the amount of compensation due “to the date of death
shall be paid” to the claimant’s dependents or, in the absence of dependents, to the
claimant’s estate. 77 P.S. § 751 (emphasis added). The language in Section 410
does not condition the payment of compensation upon a specific cause of death. This
1
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 751.
Court reviewed Section 410 in White v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(Good Shepherd Rehabilitation Hospital), 666 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1995), in which a
claimant’s estate sought payment of total disability benefits owed at the time of her
death. A workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) denied the claim, reasoning that
Section 410 “applies only to specific loss claims and death claims.” Id. at 1129.
Although we affirmed the WCJ on other grounds,2 we agreed with the claimant’s
estate that “Section 410’s scheme of distribution applies to all claims regardless
of the nature of the loss[,]” including specific loss benefits, fatal claims, and total
disability benefits. Id. at 1130 (emphasis added).
Instantly, at the time Steets died, Celebration Fireworks, Inc.’s (Employer)
challenge to a WCJ’s award of specific loss benefits was pending before this Court.
Therefore, Steets died prior to a final adjudication of her claim for specific loss
benefits.3 Per Section 306(d) of the Act,4 specific loss benefits are not paid until a
claimant’s period of total disability has ended. Specific loss benefits are not intended
to compensate a claimant for loss of earning power; rather, such benefits are intended
to specifically compensate a claimant for the loss of use of a designated body part,
rather than for the general loss of earning power. Shaffer v. Workmen’s Comp
Appeal Bd. (Silver & Silver, Inc), 588 A.2d 1029, 1032-33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). The
relevant language in Section 410 only becomes operable following a claimant’s
2
This Court concluded that the claimant’s widower was not a “dependent” under the Act
and that the deceased claimant’s benefits should be paid to her estate. White, 666 A.2d at 1131.
3
In arguing that Section 410 does not apply in this matter, Employer suggests that a final
adjudication of Steets’ claim was rendered, because Employer accepted liability for her work
injury and it was paying her total disability benefits when she died. Such an argument lacks
credibility, given that Employer’s appeal of the WCJ’s award of specific loss benefits was pending
before this Court when Steets died.
4
77 P.S. § 513.
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death and, unlike Section 306(g). As noted herein, Section 410 does not distinguish
between a work-related death or one that is wholly unrelated to the work injury.
Therefore, under Section 410, if a claimant dies prior to final adjudication of a claim,
whatever the cause, the claimant’s dependents or estate “shall be paid” the amount
of compensation due “to the date of death[,]” regardless of the nature of the loss. 77
P.S. § 751; White, 666 A.2d at 1130.
A review of Section 306(g)’s legislative history supports my conclusion that
the General Assembly did not intend to prevent the payment of specific loss benefits
to the dependents or estate of a claimant whose death was caused by the work injury.
Section 306(g) of the Act was amended by the Act of March 29, 1972, P.L. 159, No.
12 (Act 12). Prior to Act 12’s enactment, Section 306(g) provided that, “[s]hould
the claimant die from some other cause than the injury, the liability for compensation
shall cease.” See Petitioner’s Post-Argument Submission, Ex. B.5 Act 12 revised
Section 306(g) to include the current language, which permits the payment of
compensation “to which the deceased would have been entitled” to the deceased
claimant’s dependents. 77 P.S. § 541. Critically, while Act 12 effectuated minor
amendments to Section 410, it made no changes to the language relevant in the
instant appeal. Therefore, prior to the enactment of Act 12 and the revisions to
Section 306(g), the Act contained no language to suggest that specific loss benefits
did not survive the work-related death of a claimant.
“The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a);
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1167–68 (2009). The plain language of
5
See also Senate Bill 1048, Session of 1971, Printer’s No. 1631.
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=HTM&sessYr=1971
&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=1048&pn=1631 (last visited May 5, 2023).
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a statute generally provides the best indicator of legislative intent. Id. at 1166. A
change in the language of a statute ordinarily indicates a change in legislative intent.
Masland v. Bachman, 374 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1977). Presumably, if the General
Assembly intended that the revisions to Section 306(g) would effectuate a change to
the application of Section 410, it would have included language to that effect.
Nothing in Act 12 suggests such an intent, given that the relevant portion of Section
410 was left untouched. Thus, the changes to Section 306(g) wrought by the passage
of Act 12 indicates a legislative intent to provide for the survivability of specific loss
benefits, without regard to the claimant’s cause of death, and not an intent to revoke
the survivability of specific loss benefits from the dependents or estate of a claimant
whose work injury resulted in death.
Moreover, the case upon which the majority relies, Estate of Harris v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Sunoco, Inc.), 845 A.2d 239 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2004), is readily distinguishable from the instant matter. Unlike Steets, the claimant
in Estate of Harris, Rosalie Harris (Harris), had not been awarded specific loss
benefits at the time she died, nor had she filed a claim petition seeking specific loss
benefits. This Court recognized that, if Harris had died before her final total
disability payment was made, her employer would be required to make the payment
by operation of Section 410. Further, although we acknowledged that the
“dependent of a deceased employee” could elect to receive specific loss benefits in
lieu of total disability, we rejected the argument that Harris’ estate should be
permitted to make such an election on her behalf. Id. at 243. We noted that Section
410 of the Act generally provides for the payment of benefits owed to a claimant
who dies prior to the final adjudication of his or her claim. Id. Section 410 does
not, however, “provide an independent or supporting basis for a specific loss
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award[.]” Id. at 243 (emphasis in original) (quoting Endres v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeal Bd. (City of Philadelphia), 677 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)).6 In
effect, because Harris was not awarded specific loss benefits prior to her death, the
issue of whether previously-awarded specific loss benefits could survive the work-
related death of a claimant was not before this Court.
For the reasons outlined above, I respectfully dissent.
__________________________________
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
President Judge Cohn Jubelirer joins in this dissent.
6
Endres involved circumstances similar to those in Estate of Harris, in that the decedent
in Endres was not awarded specific loss benefits prior to his death and, therefore, specific loss
benefits were not “due” at that time.
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