Com. v. Black, A. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S51037-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,               :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :             PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                 :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    ANTOINE MAURICE BLACK,                      :
    :
    Appellant                :            No. 367 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order entered on January 22, 2014
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,
    Criminal Division, No. CP-22-CR-0003493-2010
    BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                      FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2014
    Antoine Maurice Black (“Black”), pro se, appeals from the Order
    denying his first Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
    Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
    The PCRA court summarized the history relevant to the instant appeal
    as follows:
    On June 15, 2010, [Black] was stopped for a traffic
    violation. His information and that of his passenger were run
    and [Black] was taken into custody on an unrelated matter,
    along with his passenger. As per standard procedure and at the
    direction of [Harrisburg Police] Officer [Michael] McCormick
    [“Officer McCormick”], the police informed [Black] that his
    vehicle was going to be towed[,] since it was parked too close to
    the stop sign.
    The officers requested his keys, to which [Black] refused.
    The officers explained that it was standard police procedure to
    conduct an inventory search of towed vehicles as the vehicle’s
    1
    42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-S51037-14
    are taken to Don’s Towing Lot and anything of value over five
    dollars is inventoried. Prior to towing and searching the vehicle
    and while on the scene, Officer McCormick called his supervisor
    for approval to conduct said inventory search. [His supervisor]
    looked through the computer system to try and find a phone
    number for Ms. Patricia Louise Darty (hereinafter “Ms. Darty”),
    the owner of the car per its registration, but was unable to locate
    one. Ms. Darty testified that she is [Black’s] cousin. The vehicle
    [that Black] was driving on June 15, 2010, is in Ms. Darty’s
    name, i.e., the title, tags, and insurance. However, Ms. Darty
    testified that it is not her vehicle and that [Black] drives it. Ms.
    Darty put the vehicle in her name because [Black] told her [that]
    he could not have it in his name. Ms. Darty has driven the
    vehicle approximately three (3) times before. Ms. Darty does
    not know the current location of the vehicle.
    [Police] Officer [Matthew] Haflett [“Officer Haflett”]
    conducted a search of the trunk of the vehicle…. When he
    arrived at the right side of the trunk, he noticed a CD changer
    that was bolted to the side of the vehicle. There was about a
    three (3) inch space between the side of the trunk and the CD
    changer wherein Officer Haflett observed a baby sock with pink
    glassine plastic baggies protruding from the top…. Specifically,
    there were twenty-eight (28) pink baggies and one (1)
    blue/purple baggie with a dolphin emblem. Based upon his
    training and experience, Officer Haflett suspected the baggies
    contained crack cocaine. As a result, he field tested the contents
    of the baggies[,] which resulted positive for crack cocaine.
    Thereafter, the drugs were sent to the Pennsylvania State Police
    Lab for testing. The lab report indicated that the drugs were
    tested and confirmed to be over five (5) grams of crack
    cocaine….
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/13/14, at 3-4.   Black was transported to the police
    station. Id. at 5. During a strip search of Black conducted upon his arrival
    at the station, officers discovered a blue/purple baggie with a dolphin
    emblem. Id. The baggie matched the baggies found in the baby sock found
    in the vehicle. Id. That baggie contained 0.18 grams of crack cocaine. Id.
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    Black was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled
    substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving without a license,
    driving while operating privileges are suspended or revoked, and the
    summary offense of turning movements and required signals.2 Represented
    by the public defender’s office, Black filed a pre-trial suppression Motion,
    which the suppression court denied.
    A jury convicted Black of the above-described charges.   On January
    17, 2013, the trial court sentenced Black to an aggregate prison term of
    three to six years, followed by one year of probation.        The trial court
    credited Black with the time he served in jail from December 4, 2012 to
    January 16, 2013.      After sentencing, Black requested leave to represent
    himself during his direct appeal.   After a hearing, Black was permitted to
    proceed pro se. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Black’s judgment of
    sentence, after which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of
    appeal.     Commonwealth v. Black, 
    91 A.3d 1286
     (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 
    2013 Pa. LEXIS 2027
    .
    On November 23, 2013, Black, pro se, timely filed his first PCRA
    Petition.   The PCRA court appointed Jennifer Tobias, Esquire (“Attorney
    Tobias”), to represent Black. On January 15, 2014, Attorney Tobias filed a
    Petition to withdraw from representation pursuant to Commonwealth v.
    Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550
    2
    35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501, 1543, 3334.
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    J-S51037-
    14 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). Thereafter, the PCRA court issued
    Notice of its intention to dismiss Black’s PCRA Petition and a Memorandum
    Opinion.   On January 22, 2014, the PCRA court denied Black’s Petition.
    Black timely filed a Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
    On appeal, Black presents the following claims for our review:
    (A). Whether PCRA counsel, [Attorney Tobias], gave ineffective
    assistance[] for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel, … for failing to raise ineffective assistan[ce] of
    suppression hearing counsel, … for failing to object to Officer
    McCormick’s testimony at the suppression hearing, and at trial
    concerning [Black’s] vehicle being a safety hazard[?]
    (B). Whether PCRA counsel, [Attorney Tobias], gave ineffective
    assistance[] for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel, … for failing to raise ineffective assistan[ce] of
    suppression hearing counsel, … for failing to raise a “weight
    claim” defense during pre-trial, trial and post-sentence, when
    [Black] asked them to raise this claim[?]
    (C). Whether PCRA counsel, [Attorney Tobias], gave ineffective
    assistance[] for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel, … for failing to raise ineffective assistan[ce] of
    suppression hearing counsel, … for failing to investigate [Black’s]
    actual innocence[?]
    (D). Whether PCRA counsel, [Attorney Tobias], gave ineffective
    assistance[] for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel, … for failing to raise ineffective assistan[ce] of
    suppression hearing counsel, … for citing the wrong case law[]
    and statute at [Black’s] suppression hearing, prejudicing [Black]
    in the process[?]
    (E). Whether PCRA counsel, [Attorney Tobias], gave ineffective
    assistance[] for failing to raise ineffective assistance of
    suppression hearing counsel, … for failing to argue [that] “trial
    court erred and abused its discretion[] by denying [Black’s]
    Motion to Suppress Evidence found in [Black’s] vehicle”; “[t]he
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    J-S51037-14
    police had no probable cause to tow[] and inventory search
    [Black’s] vehicle without a search warrant”[;] [and that] “[t]his
    constituted [] a ‘warrantless search[]’”[?]
    (F). Whether PCRA counsel, [Attorney Tobias], gave ineffective
    assistance[] for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel, … for failing to raise ineffective assistan[ce] of
    suppression hearing counsel, … for failing to argue[] “the plain
    view doctrine,” as a defense for [Black?]
    (G). Whether PCRA counsel, [Attorney Tobias], trial counsel, …
    and suppression hearing counsel, … completely abandon[ed]
    [Black] by not filing any motions [or] appeals, when [Black]
    asked them to do so, violating [Black’s] sixth [] Amendment
    right to effective assistance of counsel at [sic] at stages of the
    appeal process[?]
    Brief for Appellant at 5-7 (emphasis in original).
    An appellate court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a
    PCRA petition is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
    by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.     Commonwealth v.
    Kretchmar, 
    971 A.2d 1249
    , 1251 (Pa. Super. 2009).            The PCRA court’s
    findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in
    the certified record.   Commonwealth v. Treadwell, 
    911 A.2d 987
    , 989
    (Pa. Super. 2006).
    Black’s seven issues assert various claims of ineffective assistance of
    counsel. To be eligible for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) no
    reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or omission; and (3) there is a
    reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
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    J-S51037-14
    different absent such error. Commonwealth v. Steele, 
    961 A.2d 786
    , 796
    (Pa. 2008). With regard to the second, i.e., the “reasonable basis” prong,
    this Court will conclude that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a reasonable
    basis only if the appellant proves that “an alternative not chosen offered a
    potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.”
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    899 A.2d 1060
    , 1064 (Pa. 2006) (citation
    omitted).     To establish the third prong, i.e., prejudice, the appellant must
    show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
    proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s action or inaction.
    Commonwealth v. Dennis, 
    950 A.2d 945
    , 954 (Pa. 2008).
    Black first claims that PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
    failing to claim that his suppression hearing counsel rendered ineffective
    assistance.    Brief for Appellant at 10.   Black asserts that his suppression
    hearing counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
    testimony of Officer McCormick that Black’s vehicle presented a safety
    hazard, which justified towing the vehicle. Id. at 12. According to Black,
    Officer McCormick’s suppression hearing testimony directly contradicted his
    testimony at the preliminary hearing. Id. At the preliminary hearing, Black
    asserts, Officer McCormick testified that Black’s car was not a safety hazard.
    Id.    Black contends that his suppression hearing counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance by failing to object to Officer McCormick’s testimony on
    this basis. Id. at 13.
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    J-S51037-14
    Our review of the record discloses that Black did not raise this claim in
    his pro se PCRA Petition.    To overcome this waiver, Black avers that his
    PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not raising this claim. The
    record, however, discloses no arguable merit to Black’s ineffectiveness
    claims.
    Black’s underlying ineffectiveness claim is premised upon his assertion
    that Officer McCormick’s suppression hearing testimony contradicted the
    testimony he presented at the preliminary hearing. However, the notes of
    testimony from the preliminary hearing are not included in the certified
    record. In his appellate brief, Black has attached an affidavit, dated March
    21, 2014, averring that Officer McCormick testified at the preliminary
    hearing that Black’s vehicle presented no safety hazard. This affidavit was
    not presented to the PCRA court and is not part of the certified record.
    “[D]ocuments which are not part of the certified record on appeal are
    considered to be non-existent.” Lundy v. Manchel, 
    865 A.2d 850
    , 855 (Pa.
    Super. 2004). “[T]hese deficiencies may not be remedied by inclusion in a
    brief.”   
    Id.
       Those items that do not appear of record do not exist for
    appellate purposes.    Stumpf v. Nye, 
    950 A.2d 1032
    , 1041 (Pa. Super.
    2008). Because Black did not raise this claim in his pro se PCRA Petition and
    the record includes no evidence supporting for his claim, Black has failed to
    establish arguable merit to his claim of ineffective assistance of suppression
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    J-S51037-14
    hearing counsel or PCRA counsel. Therefore, we cannot grant him relief on
    this claim.3
    Black next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
    by failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the verdict as against
    the weight of the evidence.   Brief for Appellant at 15.   In its Opinion, the
    PCRA court addressed this claim and concluded that it lacks merit.      PCRA
    Court Opinion, 3/13/14, at 8-9. We agree with the reasoning of the PCRA
    court, and affirm on this basis. See 
    id.
    In his third claim, Black argues that his PCRA counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance by failing to claim the ineffective assistance of prior
    counsel for not investigating his “actual innocence.”   Brief for Appellant at
    23.   In support, Black asserts that his claim has arguable merit because the
    evidence was not sufficient to sustain his verdict. Id. at 24. In this regard,
    Black asserts that “the lab results proved [that his] fingerprints or DNA
    wasn’t on the sandwich baggie,” and that police did not charge him related
    to contraband found during his strip search. Id.
    Our review of the record discloses that in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    Concise Statement, Black’s ineffectiveness claim did not address the
    sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, Black presented the following claim:
    3
    In his Affidavit of Probable Cause, which is part of the record, Officer
    McCormick averred that Black’s vehicle “was parked illegally at the
    intersection. It was parked directly next to a stop sign and more than 12”
    from the curb.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 6/15/10. Officer McCormick’s
    suppression hearing testimony was consistent with this statement. See
    N.T., 6/7/11, at 5.
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    PCRA Counsel … gave ineffective assistance for failing to raise
    the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, … for failing to raise
    the ineffective assistance of Suppression Hearing counsel, … for
    failing to investigate [Black’s] actual innocence….
    Concise Statement, ¶ 3.       Because Black’s Concise Statement raised a
    boilerplate and vague claim, the PCRA court concluded that the claim was
    waived and denied relief. PCRA Court Opinion, 3/13/14, at 9. We agree,
    and affirm on this basis. See id.
    Black next claims that his suppression counsel rendered ineffective
    assistance by citing “the wrong caselaw and statute” at his suppression
    hearing.   Brief for Appellant at 28.      Black argues that his suppression
    counsel referred to Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, section 9, rather than
    section 8, as the provision applicable to illegal searches and seizure. Id. at
    29. Black claims that his PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
    not raising this claim. Id. at 28.
    In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed this claim and concluded that
    it lacks merit. PCRA Court Opinion, 3/13/14, at 9-11. We agree with the
    PCRA court’s determination that suppression counsel did not render
    ineffective assistance by stating the wrong section number.        Id. at 10.
    Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s Opinion with regard
    to this claim.4 See id. at 9-11.
    4
    We do not adopt the PCRA court’s speculation as to suppression hearing
    counsel’s motivation for failing to correct his error.
    -9-
    J-S51037-14
    In his fifth claim, Black asserts that his trial counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the suppression court’s denial of
    Black’s suppression Motion. Brief for Appellant at 30. Black asserts that the
    Commonwealth failed to prove that he constructively possessed the
    controlled substances found in the vehicle; the police officers failed to follow
    a uniform policy on inventory searches; and there were no exigent
    circumstances permitting a search of the vehicle without a warrant. Id. at
    33-42.
    In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, Black was required to plead and
    prove that “the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or
    waived.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). “[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner
    could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary
    review, on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction proceeding.” Id.
    § 9544(b).
    Our review of the record discloses that Black did not raise this claim in
    his pro se direct appeal. Because this claim could have been raised on direct
    appeal and Black failed to do so, Black’s claim is not cognizable under the
    PCRA. Black’s PCRA counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise
    a claim that is without merit. See Commonwealth v. Fears, 
    86 A.3d 795
    ,
    804 (Pa. 2014) (stating that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing
    to raise a claim that lacks merit). Accordingly, we cannot grant Black relief
    on this claim.
    - 10 -
    J-S51037-14
    In his sixth claim, Black argues that his suppression counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance by failing to argue the “plain view” doctrine as a
    defense.     Brief for Appellant at 44.    Black asserts that his PCRA counsel
    rendered ineffective assistance by not raising this claim before the PCRA
    court. 
    Id.
    Our review discloses that during his pro se direct appeal, Black did not
    challenge the legality of the vehicle search and the applicability of the plain
    view doctrine. Because Black could have raised this issue on direct appeal,
    and failed to do so, he was not eligible for relief under the PCRA. See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). Black’s PCRA counsel cannot be deemed ineffective
    for failing to raise a claim that is without merit. See Fears, 86 A.3d at 804.
    Accordingly, we cannot grant Black relief on this claim.
    In his seventh claim, Black argues that all prior counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance “by not filing any motions [or] appeals, when [Black]
    asked them to do so, violating [Black’s] Sixth (6th) Amendment right to
    effective assistance of counsel, at all stages of the proceedings.” Brief for
    Appellant at 57 (emphasis omitted). In support, Black argues that his PCRA
    counsel refused to file an amended PCRA petition.       Id. at 58.   Black also
    claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Id.
    In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed this claim and concluded that
    it lacks merit. PCRA Court Opinion, 3/13/14, at 12. We agree, and affirm
    based upon the reasons stated in the PCRA court’s Opinion. See id.
    - 11 -
    J-S51037-14
    Order affirmed.
    Ott, J., joins the memorandum.
    Bowes, J., files a concurring statement.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/18/2014
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Document Info

Docket Number: 367 MDA 2014

Filed Date: 11/18/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021