Com. v. Bryant, J. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S34001-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JULIAN BRYANT
    Appellant                     No. 1828 WDA 2012
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 29, 2012
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0010073-2011
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OTT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                                    FILED AUGUST 13, 2014
    Julian Bryant appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed October
    29, 2012, in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.                    Bryant was
    sentenced to a term of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment after a trial court,
    sitting without a jury, found him guilty of one count of attempted murder
    and two counts of aggravated assault.1          On appeal, Bryant challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of attempted murder.
    For the reasons below, we affirm.
    The    facts   underlying   Bryant’s   arrest    and   conviction    are   aptly
    summarized by the trial court as follows:
    On the afternoon of June 18, 2011, the defendant, Julian
    Bryant, fired six shots, wounding Kareem “Moose” Howard. The
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), and (a)(4), respectively.
    J-S34001-14
    victim, Mr. Howard, sustained three gunshot wounds to his
    buttocks, one to his arm, one to his hip, and one to his ear. The
    incident occurred at approximately 1:20 p.m. near the
    intersection of Frankstown Avenue and North Homewood in the
    City of Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
    [Bryant] had known Mr. Howard for approximately five
    years. The two were good friends. Mr. Howard referred to
    [Bryant] as “Juls” or “bro.” Mr. Howard was involved with
    [Bryant’s] sister, Lateesha Bryant, and is the father of two of her
    children.
    On the day of the incident, Mr. Howard testified that
    [Bryant] crossed the street to approach him and appeared
    “raged.” [Bryant] then opened fire on him at a distance of “not
    quite” 20 feet after Mr. Howard had pulled a gun on Ms. [Bryant]
    during a dispute over the custody of their children.
    Witness John Turner, the owner of a barbershop near the
    incident, heard a number of shots fired and then saw Mr.
    Howard, whom he knew, laying on the ground. Mr. Howard was
    shot four (4) times, falling to the ground, and in attempting to
    escape, was shot another two times while crawling away. Fired
    at point blank range, one shot came close to Mr. Howard’s head,
    breaking an earring that he was wearing and damaging the ear.
    While crawling away, Mr. Howard picked up a Smith and Wesson
    9mm semi-automatic pistol and returned fire in the direction of
    the fleeing [Bryant]. As a result of the incident, Mr. Howard was
    hospitalized for about eleven days, spending the first four in a
    coma. Among other injuries, he sustained a fractured pelvis,
    severe damage to the nerves of his right leg, and had to undergo
    three surgeries.
    While en route to the scene of the incident, Detective
    Robert Shaw testified that at approximately 2:24 p.m. he
    received a report that a man had been hospitalized with a
    gunshot wound to the leg.       The man in the hospital was
    [Bryant]; the 9mm bullet in his leg matched the Smith and
    Wesson pistol allegedly used by Mr. Howard upon returning fire.
    Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/2013, at 2-3 (footnote and record citations
    omitted).
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    Bryant was subsequently arrested and charged with one count each of
    attempted murder and persons not to possess firearms,2 and two counts of
    aggravated assault. He proceeded to a bench trial in June of 2012. On June
    12, 2012, the trial court granted a judgment of acquittal on the weapons
    offense, but returned a verdict of guilty on the remaining charges. Bryant
    was sentenced, on October 29, 2012, to a term of 20 to 40 years’
    imprisonment for the charge of attempted murder.                   The remaining
    aggravated assault convictions merged for sentencing purposes, and this
    timely appeal followed.3
    The sole issue Bryant raises on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting his conviction of attempted murder.          In particular, he
    contends the evidence failed to establish that he possessed a specific intent
    to kill Howard when he shot him six times. Rather, he argues, the evidence
    established that he only intended to scare Howard for “pulling a gun” on
    Bryant’s sister.    Bryant’s Brief at 15.      Indeed, he contends that “[i]f [he]
    ____________________________________________
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
    3
    On December 17, 2012, the trial court ordered Bryant to file a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    Thereafter, on January 2, 2013, Bryant’s counsel filed a petition for
    extension of time to file a Rule 1925(b) statement since the notes of
    testimony from his trial had not yet been transcribed. The trial court
    granted the petition, and, on June 12, 2013, Bryant filed a Rule 1925(b)
    statement. The trial court subsequently filed an opinion on December 2,
    2013.
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    wanted to kill Howard when he was standing directly over him, he could
    have easily done so.” Id.
    Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-
    settled:
    A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presents a
    question of law. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    560 Pa. 308
    , 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751 (2000). We must determine “whether the
    evidence is sufficient to prove every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Hughes, 
    521 Pa. 423
    , 
    555 A.2d 1264
    , 1267 (1989). We “must view evidence
    in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
    winner, and accept as true all evidence and all reasonable
    inferences therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact finder
    properly could have based its verdict.” 
    Id.
    Our Supreme Court has instructed:
    [T]he facts and circumstances established by the
    Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
    be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
    weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
    probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
    circumstances. Moreover, in applying the above test, the
    entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
    received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while
    passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
    the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
    of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 
    594 Pa. 176
    , 
    934 A.2d 1233
    ,
    1236 n. 2 (2007).
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    65 A.3d 939
    , 943 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    Here, Bryant challenges only his conviction of attempted murder.
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    Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, “[a] person commits
    an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does
    any act which constitutes a substantial step towards the
    commission of the crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). If a person
    takes a substantial step toward the commission of a killing, with
    the specific intent in mind to commit such an act, he may be
    convicted of attempted murder. Commonwealth v. Dale, 
    836 A.2d 150
    , 152 (Pa.Super.2003) (citation omitted); 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    §§ 901, 2502. The substantial step test broadens the scope of
    attempt liability by concentrating on the acts the defendant has
    done and does not any longer focus on the acts remaining to be
    done     before   the   actual   commission    of   the   crime.”
    Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 
    273 Pa.Super. 586
    , 
    417 A.2d 1203
    , 1205 (1980). The Commonwealth may establish the
    mens rea required for first-degree murder, specific intent to kill,
    solely from circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Schoff,
    
    911 A.2d 147
    , 160 (Pa.Super.2006).
    In re R.D., 
    44 A.3d 657
    , 678 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 
    56 A.3d 398
    (Pa. 2012). Moreover, “[s]pecific intent to kill may be inferred from the use
    of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth
    v. Uderra, 
    706 A.2d 334
    , 338 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 
    526 U.S. 1070
    (1999).
    Here, Bryant acknowledges that a specific intent to kill may be inferred
    when a defendant shoots a victim in a vital part of his body.       He argues,
    however, that the inference is not mandatory,4 and, under the particular
    ____________________________________________
    4
    See Commonwealth v. Hill, 
    511 A.2d 171
    , 178 (Pa. Super. 1986)
    (stating that “[w]hen evidence is introduced to overcome or rebut this
    presumption, the question of defendant’s intent becomes one for the triers
    of fact … [who may] consider the presumption along with all other credible
    evidence presented on the issue of intent.”).
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    J-S34001-14
    facts of this case, “should not be available.” Bryant’s Brief at 14. Indeed,
    Bryant contends the evidence established that his intent was simply to
    “scare Howard and warn him … [to stop] threatening Mr. Bryant’s sister [].”
    Id. at 15. Further, he claims:
    The shots to the buttocks, leg, and arm [were] all to non-vital
    parts of Howard’s body. The one shot that was deflected by
    Howard’s earring was in the pavement next to Howard. If Mr.
    Bryant wanted to kill Howard when he was standing directly over
    him, he could have easily done so. Instead, his bullet was fired
    into the pavement next to the victim’s head.
    Id. at 15.
    However, Bryant’s analysis of the evidence views the facts in a light
    most favorable to him, and not to the verdict winner, as is required in a
    sufficiency of the evidence claim. See Thomas, 
    supra.
     Here, the evidence
    established that Bryant fired four shots at Howard, from less than 20 feet
    away, and, after Howard collapsed on the ground, fired two more shots, one
    of which was near Howard’s head and damaged his ear.           See N.T., 6/11-
    12/2012, at 26-27, 38-40. Indeed, as the trial court observed in its opinion:
    “That the [v]ictim was not killed by the six shots, singularly or in tandem of
    one another, is simply good fortune.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/2013, at 5.
    Therefore, while an inference of Bryant’s specific intent to kill was not
    required, it was permissible and reasonable under the facts of this case.
    Accordingly, Bryant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    J-S34001-14
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/13/2014
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