Term. of Par. Rights to P.G.D.W., Appeal of S.A.B ( 2023 )


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  • J-A04006-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: TERM. OF PAR. RIGHTS TO             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    P.G.D.W., A MINOR                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
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    :
    APPEAL OF: S.A.B., MOTHER                  :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1127 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the Decree Entered July 11, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Orphans’ Court at No.: 2022-0055a
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED: MARCH 27, 2023
    S.A.B. a/k/a S.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the July 11, 2022 decree
    entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas (“orphans’ court”),
    granting the petition of the York County Office of Children, Youth & Families
    (“CYF” or “the Agency”) and terminating involuntarily her parental rights to
    her minor daughter, P.G.D.W. a/k/a P.W. (“Child”), born in May 2019,
    pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and
    (b).1 After careful review, we vacate the decree and remand.
    ____________________________________________
    1 By the same decree, the court additionally terminated the parental rights of
    Child’s father, S.V.W. (“Father”). Father did not file a separate appeal.
    Further, counsel for Father, representing that Father is now deceased, filed a
    petition on February 13, 2023, requesting that Father be removed as a party
    from the instant appeal and that counsel be excused from oral argument.
    Counsel’s request is dismissed as moot. See In the Interest of D.R.-W.,
    
    227 A.3d 905
    , 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in
    ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force
    or effect.”) (citation omitted).
    J-A04006-23
    The family has been involved with CYF since 2017, prior to Child’s birth.
    N.T., 7/11/22, at 65, 89. CYF obtained emergency protective custody of Child
    on January 29, 2021, following Mother’s arrest and incarceration on driving
    under the influence and other charges, and placed Child with foster mother, a
    pre-adoptive resource, where she has since remained. Id. at 90, 94, 114-15;
    Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 2/11/21, at 1-2.2           Mother was
    incarcerated until February 26, 2021. N.T., 7/11/22, at 68, 70-71, 90, 117.
    She was then re-incarcerated from March 25, 2021, to July 14, 2021.3 Id. at
    68, 70-71, 91, 119.
    The court adjudicated Child dependent on February 11, 2021, and
    established a placement goal of return to parent or guardian.          Order of
    Adjudication and Disposition, 2/11/21, at 2-3.       Thereafter, CYF instituted
    objectives aimed at reunification, which were communicated to Mother. CYF
    Exhibit 6; N.T., 7/11/22, at 66. As testified by CYF caseworker, Elyse Nangle,
    Mother was required to address mental health, substance abuse, and housing,
    which remained consistent throughout the case. N.T., 7/11/22, at 66-67; see
    also CYF Exhibits 6-8.
    ____________________________________________
    2 We observe that counsel for CYF requested that the court incorporate the
    dependency record, which the court granted without objection. N.T., 6/2/22,
    at 9. As such, Child’s dependency record was included as part of the certified
    record.
    3Mother was released to a human trafficking shelter and then moved to a
    halfway house. Following that, she resided in a hotel, where she remained
    until just prior to the July 11, 2022 hearing. N.T., 7/11/22, at 67-71, 120,
    123-25.
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    Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court found
    Mother to be in minimal or no compliance with the permanency plan and
    minimal or no progression toward alleviating the circumstances necessitating
    placement.     As a result, on January 11, 2022, the court changed Child’s
    permanency goal to adoption.
    Thereafter, on March 8, 2022, CYF filed a petition for the termination of
    parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).
    Mother filed a motion to dismiss the termination petition on April 25, 2022,
    alleging that the petition failed to strictly comply with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b).
    As such, she asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition.
    Motion to Dismiss Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights,
    4/25/22, at ¶¶ 7-9. The court denied Mother’s motion the following day, on
    April 26, 2022.
    The court held hearings on June 2, 2022, and July 11, 2022.4 Mother
    was present and represented by counsel. Child, who was three years old at
    the time, was represented by legal counsel as well as a guardian ad litem
    (“GAL”).5    On June 2, 2022, CYF presented the testimony of Abbie Fulton,
    family   advocate,     Catholic    Charities;    Robert   Gordon,   M.Ed.,   licensed
    ____________________________________________
    4 Aside from a continued termination hearing as to Child, the July 11, 2022
    hearing also served as a permanency review hearing with respect to Child and
    her half-sibling, I.B., who is not a subject of the instant appeal. N.T., 7/11/22,
    at 3.
    5 Both legal counsel and the GAL argued in favor of termination of Mother’s
    parental rights. N.T., 7/11/22, at 148-50. The GAL and CYF additionally filed
    a joint appellee brief in support of the decree.
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    psychologist, who conducted an evaluation of Mother, dated November 30,
    2021, and was accepted as an expert in parenting capacity examinations
    without objection; and Christianne Brennan, family therapist, Catholic
    Charities. On July 11, 2022, CYF presented the testimony of Elyse Nangle,
    CYF caseworker; Jill Egbert, D & A Program Supervisor, Family United
    Network; Carla Arp, therapist, Pressley Ridge; and Katlyn Gumpper, parent
    advocate, PA Child TIFFSS (Trauma Intensive Family Focused Support
    Services) Program.    Mother presented the testimony of J.G., Child’s foster
    mother. She additionally testified on her own behalf.
    By decree dated and entered July 11, 2022, the court terminated
    Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),
    and (b).   Thereafter, on August 9, 2022, Mother, through counsel, filed a
    timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained
    of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
    On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
    [1.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in finding the Petition for Involuntary Termination of
    Parental Rights, filed by [the Agency] satisfied strict compliance
    with the legal requirements of the Adoption Act where the Petition
    did not set forth specific facts and therefore, lacked jurisdiction to
    hear said petition?
    [2.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in taking judicial notice of records of another case
    (over objection) and incorporating the record from the related
    dependency proceedings (over objection) wherein evidence and
    documents contained within said record were admitted under a
    separate and distinct body of law (the Juvenile Act), contained
    documents admitted into evidence under a lower standard of
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    proof, were not properly authenticated, and consisted of hearsay
    within hearsay with no exceptions presented?
    [3.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in admitting (over objection) hearsay evidence in
    the form of a threat of harm evaluation without applicable
    exception, without proper authentication, and without providing
    Mother, the subject of said evaluation, the opportunity to cross
    examine the individual who authored the report, thereby violating
    the Rules of Evidence and denying Mother her right to due
    process?
    [4.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
    proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother’s conduct
    evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to
    her child or has refused to perform parental duties pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?
    [5.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
    proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother’s repeated
    and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the
    child to be without essential care, control, or subsistence
    necessary for their physical or mental well-being, and the
    conditions and causes cannot or will not be remedied by Mother
    pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?
    [6.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
    proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions
    which led to the removal and placement of the child continued to
    exist and Mother failed to remedy those conditions within a
    reasonable time pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?
    [7.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
    proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions
    which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
    exist, and termination of parental rights would best serve the
    needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
    2511(a)(8)?
    [8.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
    proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of
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    Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
    of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(b)?
    Mother’s Brief at 5-8 (suggested answers omitted).
    With her first issue, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred in
    denying Mother’s motion to dismiss the Agency’s termination petition for
    failure to strictly comply with the Adoption Act (“Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-
    2910.     Mother asserts that the subject petition did not strictly comply with
    the Act in that it failed to set forth the factual basis for termination as required
    by Section 2512(b)(1).6 As such, she contends the court lacked jurisdiction
    to hear the petition. Mother’s Brief at 34-37.
    ____________________________________________
    6   The petition provided in part:
    13. Set forth the ground(s) for involuntary termination of parental
    rights, including the specific subsection(s) of 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §]
    2511, which establish(es) the legal basis for the requested
    termination(s): 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and
    [(b)].
    Regarding the mother and father:
    The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six (6)
    months immediately preceding the filing of the Petition either has
    evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing a parental claim to a
    child or has refused to perform parental duties.
    The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal
    of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
    care, control, or subsistence necessary for the child’s physical or
    mental well-being and the conditions or causes of the incapacity,
    abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
    parent.
    The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
    Court or under a voluntary agreement with the Agency for a period
    of at least six (6) months, the conditions which led to the removal
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    The orphans’ court found the Agency’s restatement of the statutory
    language to be sufficient factual averments. While noting that “more specific
    detail would be helpful,” the orphans’ court found this met strict compliance.
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 16-17.
    Mother’s issue involves the interpretation and application of a statute, a
    question of law.     G.A.P. v. J.M.W., 
    194 A.3d 614
    , 616 (Pa. Super. 2018)
    (citation omitted). Our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review
    is plenary to determine whether the court committed an error of law. Id.;
    see also In re Adoption of K.M.D., 
    261 A.3d 1055
    , 1059 (Pa. Super. 2021)
    (interpreting notice requirements of the Act and the Rules of Orphans’ Court
    Procedure). This Court has stated:
    When interpreting a statute, this [C]ourt is constrained by the
    rules of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (the “Act”). 1
    Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 1501-1991. The Act makes clear that the goal in
    interpreting any statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention
    of the General Assembly while construing the statute in a manner
    ____________________________________________
    or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
    will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
    time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent
    are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal
    or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and
    termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
    welfare of the child.
    The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
    court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months
    or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
    continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best
    serve the needs and welfare of the child.
    Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 3/8/22, at ¶ 13.
    -7-
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    that gives effect to all its provisions. See 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(a).
    The Act provides: “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and
    free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
    under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(b).
    Moreover, it is well settled that “the best indication of the General
    Assembly’s intent may be found in a statute’s plain language.”
    Cagey v. Commonwealth, 
    179 A.3d 458
    , 462 (Pa. 2018). . . .
    G.A.P., 
    194 A.3d at 616-617
    ; see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1924 (“The title and
    preamble of a statute may be considered in the construction thereof.”).
    It is well-settled that “[a] petitioner’s strict compliance with the
    requirements of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101–2910, is a
    prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction to hear a petition to terminate parental
    rights.”   In re Adoption of J.F.D., 
    782 A.2d 564
    , 565 (Pa. Super. 2001)
    (citation omitted); see also In re E.M.I., 
    57 A.3d 1278
    , 1284-85 (Pa. Super.
    2012). In K.M.D., we explained the rationale for strict compliance of the Act,
    as follows.
    [W]e are unwilling to allow the termination of parental rights
    “without strict compliance with the procedures set forth by the
    Legislature. . . .” [In re A.N.P., 
    155 A.3d 55
    , 66, 68 (Pa. Super.
    2017)] ([citing] In re Adoption of K.G.M., 
    845 A.2d 861
    , 865
    (Pa. Super. 2004)) (further citation omitted) (emphasis added).
    Strict compliance is warranted in termination matters because of
    the gravity of such cases. Given the “complete and irrevocable”
    nature of the decision, our Supreme Court has explained that
    “termination of parental rights is one of the most serious and
    severe steps a court can take[.]” In re Adoption of M.R.D.,
    [
    145 A.3d 1117
    , 1129 (Pa. 2016)] (citation omitted). . . .
    K.M.D., 261 A.3d at 1059-60.
    As to the contents of a petition for involuntary termination, Section
    2512(b) provides:
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    § 2512. Petition for involuntary termination.
    ...
    (b) Contents.--The following apply:
    (1) The petition shall set forth specifically those
    grounds and facts alleged as the basis for
    terminating parental rights.
    (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the petition
    filed under this section shall also contain an averment
    that the petitioner will assume custody of the child
    until such time as the child is adopted.
    (3) If the petitioner is a parent and section 2514
    (relating to special provisions when child conceived as
    a result of rape or incest) applies, or if the petitioner
    is an agency, the petitioner shall not be required to
    aver that an adoption is presently contemplated nor
    that a person with a present intention to adopt exists.
    ...
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b) (emphasis added).7
    Significantly, in J.F.D., emphasizing strict compliance with the Adoption
    Act, we concluded that the Act compels a termination petition to contain
    certain allegations as a prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction to hear the
    petition. In re Adoption of J.F.D., 
    782 A.2d at 565-67
    . This Court affirmed
    an order dismissing the termination petition filed on child’s behalf by counsel
    for failure to comply with the prior version of Section 2512(b). 8 Specifically,
    ____________________________________________
    7   The current version of Section 2512 became effective December 28, 2020.
    8   The version of Section 2512(b) in effect at the time provided:
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    the petition failed to include averments that the petitioner will assume custody
    of the child until such time as the child is adopted and that an adoption is
    contemplated. 
    Id.
     In so concluding, this Court found that “[i]n the petition,
    Appellant included the facts alleged as the basis for the termination. However,
    Attorney Jackson, as petitioner, did not aver that he will assume custody of
    J.F.D. until such time as she is adopted.” 
    Id. at 567
    .
    By contrast, in E.M.I., recognizing that the requirements of Section
    2512(b) had been met,9 we stated,
    In the present case, Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s
    parental rights to Child, alleging the grounds and facts which form
    the basis for terminating Father’s parental rights, S.S. would like
    to adopt Child, and Mother agrees to assume and continue to
    assume custody of Child until such time as Child is adopted.
    Therefore, Mother’s petition fulfilled the minimal requirements to
    invoke the court’s jurisdiction over the petition.
    In re E.M.I., 
    57 A.3d at 1287
     (citations omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    § 2512. Petition for involuntary termination
    ...
    (b) Contents.--The petition shall set forth specifically those
    grounds and facts alleged as the basis for terminating parental
    rights. The petition filed under this section shall also contain an
    averment that the petitioner will assume custody of the child until
    such time as the child is adopted. If the petitioner is an agency it
    shall not be required to aver that an adoption is presently
    contemplated nor that a person with a present intention to adopt
    exists.
    ...
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b).
    9   Again, we were dealing with the prior version of Section 2512.
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    Instantly, we are constrained to conclude that the orphans’ court erred
    as a matter of law in failing to dismiss the Agency’s termination petition. As
    the subject petition failed to strictly comply with Section 2512(b)(1) of the Act
    to allege even minimal facts to support the petition, the court lacked
    jurisdiction to hear the petition.
    Section 2512(b)(1) provides that the petition shall set forth specifically
    those grounds and facts alleged as the basis for terminating parental rights.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b)(1) (emphasis added).10 As such, the plain language
    of the statute necessitates the pleading of facts.     Here, while the Agency
    stated the alleged grounds for termination within its petition, it neglected to
    further set forth any facts supporting the requested termination and merely
    ____________________________________________
    10The Orphans’ Court Rules in effect at the time of the filing of the subject
    petition provided similarly. Former Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rule 15.4,
    provided, in relevant part:
    15.4. Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
    (a) Petition. A petition for involuntary termination of parental
    rights under Sections 311 and 312 of the Adoption Act shall
    include the following allegations:
    ...
    (6) facts constituting grounds for the involuntary termination
    under Section 311 of the Adoption Act, and a reference to the
    applicable subsection or subsections;
    ...
    Former Pa.O.C.R. 15.4(a)(6) (emphasis added). We note that the Orphans’
    Court Rules on this topic were amended in 2022 and effective July 1, 2022.
    See Pa.O.C.R. 15.10(a)(9), (10).
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    parroted the statutory language as to the grounds for termination.       See
    Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 3/8/22, at ¶ 13. As a
    result, the subject petition failed to “fulfill[] the minimal requirements to
    invoke the court’s jurisdiction over the petition.” In re E.M.I., 
    57 A.3d at 1287
    .
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decree and remand to the
    orphans’ court for entry of an order dismissing the Agency’s petition for
    involuntary termination of parental rights filed on March 8, 2022.11
    Decree vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 03/27/2023
    ____________________________________________
    11As Mother’s first issue is dispositive, we do not address the remainder of
    Mother’s issues.
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