State v. John Davis ( 2023 )

June 13, 2023 Supreme Court
No. 2021-337-C.A.
(P1/99-4291A)
State :
v. :
John Davis. :
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Supreme Court
No. 2021-337-C.A.
(P1/99-4291A)
State :
v. :
John Davis. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendant, John Davis, appeals
from a Superior Court order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The
defendant argues that the ten-year nonparolable sentence he received under
G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21 is in contravention of the plain language of the statute. This
case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to
appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily
decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing
the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be
decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we
affirm the order of the Superior Court.
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I
Facts and Travel
In October 2001, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of assault with
a dangerous weapon in a dwelling house.1 For the first count, defendant was
sentenced to forty years with twenty-five years to serve and fifteen years suspended,
with probation. For the second count, he received a ten-year suspended sentence
with ten years of probation, to be served consecutively to the first sentence. In
addition, and at issue in this appeal, defendant received a ten-year nonparolable
sentence enhancement as a habitual offender pursuant to § 12-19-21, which was to
be served consecutively to the first sentence.
On March 26, 2021, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 The
defendant did not dispute that he was properly deemed a “habitual criminal”; instead,
he argued that the ten-year nonparolable habitual offender sentence enhancement
was illegal because “there is no provision in the habitual criminal statute which
allows for a wholly non-parolable sentence.” The state submitted a response to
1
This Court affirmed defendant’s convictions in State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642 (R.I.
2005).
2
The defendant initially appeared pro se to challenge his sentence, but he was
ultimately represented by court-appointed counsel at the hearing on the motion
before the trial justice and is represented by the public defender’s office before this
Court.
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defendant’s motion suggesting that the trial justice deny defendant’s motion based
upon this Court’s holding in State v. Paiva, 200 A.3d 665 (R.I. 2019).
On November 5, 2021, the trial justice heard defendant’s motion. At the
hearing, defendant argued that the language in § 12-19-21(b) requires the trial justice
to identify a time period “before which [defendant is] not eligible for parole and after
which he would be eligible for parole.” The state asserted that defendant’s
interpretation of the statute essentially requires the trial justice to set a date that
defendant be eligible for parole, which requirement this Court expressly rejected in
Paiva.
The trial justice then rendered a bench decision denying defendant’s motion,
stating, “I’m satisfied that I have acted within the authority vested in me by the
legislature under the habitual statute, on the plain language of it. I’m satisfied that
the Paiva case is controlling, and I deny the motion.” That same day, an order
denying defendant’s motion was entered, and defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal.
II
Standard of Review
“This Court follows a ‘strong policy against interfering with a trial justice’s
discretion in sentencing matters.’” State v. Mattatall, 219 A.3d 1288, 1292-93 (R.I.
2019) (quoting State v. Barkmeyer, 32 A.3d 950, 952 (R.I. 2011)). “Therefore, this
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Court’s ‘review of a trial justice’s decision on a Rule 35 motion is extremely
limited.’” Id. at 1293 (quoting Barkmeyer, 219 A.3d at 952).
Nevertheless, the disposition of the issue presented on appeal requires us to
construe a certain subsection of the habitual offender statute, § 12-19-21(b). “This
Court reviews [such] questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo.”
State v. Wray, 101 A.3d 884, 886 (R.I. 2014) (quoting National Refrigeration, Inc.
v. Capital Properties, Inc., 88 A.3d 1150, 1156 (R.I. 2014)).
III
Discussion
On appeal, defendant argues that the entirety of his ten-year habitual offender
sentence “is an illegal sentence and the trial justice’s denial of the Rule 35 motion
must be reversed.” He argues that his ten-year nonparolable habitual offender
sentence is illegal because § 12-19-21(b) “requires that a defendant be eligible for
parole during some portion of their habitual offender sentence.” The particular
statutory language to which defendant directs this Court’s attention provides:
“If it appears by a preponderance of the evidence
presented that the defendant is a habitual criminal under
this section, he or she shall be sentenced by the court to an
additional consecutive term of imprisonment not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years; and provided further,
that the court shall order the defendant to serve a
minimum number of years of the sentence before he or she
becomes eligible for parole.” Section 12-19-21(b)
(emphasis added).
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According to defendant, “[i]f the legislature had intended that an entire habitual
offender sentence could be non-parolable, it would not have included the language[,]
‘before he or she becomes eligible for parole.’” (Quoting § 12-19-21(b).)
In addressing defendant’s argument, “we are guided by the following
important axiom: ‘It is a fundamental principle that, when the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give
the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Paiva, 200 A.3d at 667(quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)). “[I]n abiding by the plain
meaning rule, we remain mindful of the corollary principle that we ‘will not construe
a statute to reach an absurd result.’” State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 1032 n.5 (R.I.
2005) (quoting Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I. 1996)). As we have
stated before, the plain-meaning approach “is not the equivalent of myopic
literalism, and it is entirely proper for us to look to the sense and meaning fairly
deducible from the context.” Wray, 101 A.3d at 886-87 (quoting National
Refrigeration, Inc., 88 A.3d at 1156).
We have previously stated that the statutory clause at issue “is clear and
unambiguous” and that nothing in the statutory language requires a sentencing
justice to announce a specific eligibility date. Paiva, 200 A.3d at 667. Furthermore,
§ 12-19-21(b) does not require that a defendant be eligible for parole at all during
the habitual offender sentence. See State v. Tejeda, 171 A.3d 983, 1002-03 (R.I.
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2017) (affirming a twenty-five-year nonparolable habitual offender sentence, the
maximum sentence under § 12-19-21(b)). Rather, the statutory language simply
requires that a defendant who is deemed to be a habitual criminal be ordered to serve
an additional period of nonparolable incarceration. See § 12-19-21(b); see also G.L.
1956 § 13-8-9(a) (excluding individuals serving habitual offender sentences from
being subject to the parole board’s vote to grant parole). The statute does not
preclude the sentencing justice from ordering the entire sentence to be served,
provided that the habitual offender sentence does not exceed twenty-five years.
Section 12-19-21(b).
The defendant’s contrary reading of the statute is mistaken. The defendant
abscises the phrase “before he or she becomes eligible for parole[,]” from the rest of
the habitual offender statute, and in doing so, he asks this Court to constrain a
sentencing justice’s discretion to craft an adequate sentence to “deter and punish
* * * persistent violators who have not responded to the restraining influence of
conviction and punishment.” Tejeda, 171 A.3d at 1002 (quoting State v. Burke, 811
A.2d 1158, 1168 (R.I. 2002)); see § 12-19-21(b).
In the case at bar, the trial justice determined that ten nonparolable years to
serve was an adequate sentence to “deter and punish” the defendant’s habitual
criminal behavior. Tejeda, 171 A.3d at 1002 (quoting Burke, 811 A.2d at 1168). In
so doing, the trial justice correctly complied with the habitual offender statute, and,
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thus, we perceive no error on the part of the trial justice in denying the defendant’s
motion to correct his sentence.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The
record may be returned to that tribunal.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case State v. John Davis.
No. 2021-337-C.A.
Case Number
(P1/99-4291A)
Date Opinion Filed June 13, 2023
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Robert D. Krause
For Plaintiff:
Leslie M. Ocean
Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:
Michael G. Ewart
Rhode Island Public Defender
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)