State v. Malcolm , 2023 S.D. 6 ( 2023 )

#29644-a-MES
2023 S.D. 6IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
LEE TODD MALCOLM, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
CODINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE CARMEN MEANS
Judge
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SCOTT R. BRATLAND
Watertown, South Dakota Attorney for defendant and
appellant.
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
CHELSEA WENZEL
JENNY JORGENSON
Assistant Attorneys General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and
appellee.
****
ARGUED
OCTOBER 5, 2022
OPINION FILED 01/25/23
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SALTER, Justice
[¶1.] Lee Malcolm was convicted of nine counts of third-degree rape
involving J.C. in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(4). Malcolm’s defense theory was that
J.C. gave “advance consent” to the instances of sexual penetration before she passed
out and became incapable of giving contemporaneous consent. The circuit court
rejected the legal basis of the defense and, as a consequence, excluded evidence that
J.C. gave advance consent, including Malcolm’s testimony and evidence of the prior
sexual history between Malcolm and J.C. After the jury’s verdict, the court
sentenced him to 50 years in prison with fifteen years suspended.
[¶2.] Malcolm now appeals, challenging the court’s decision regarding the
advance consent theory and the corresponding exclusion of evidence. Malcolm also
argues the court’s jury instructions were inadequate and asks that we consider the
merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this direct appeal. We affirm
the circuit court and leave Malcolm’s ineffective assistance claims for further
development should he pursue a habeas corpus action.
Factual and Procedural Background
[¶3.] Following several intermittent periods of dating, Malcolm and J.C.
started living together in the summer of 2019. The two lived with Malcolm’s
mother in her Watertown home.
[¶4.] At around 4:30 p.m. on October 27, 2019, Malcolm and J.C. went to
Walmart to fill J.C.’s prescription of Baclofen, which is a muscle relaxer. Malcolm
stated that they purchased a six pack of beer and two single shots of vodka before
returning to their house. After consuming the alcohol, they drove to a Watertown
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bar where they drank more beer and liquor until approximately 1:00 a.m. the
following morning. Prior to returning home, J.C. drove them to a different
Watertown bar where they each drank several double-shot mixed drinks and
purchased four more double-shot mixed drinks to-go.
[¶5.] The pair finished their drinks in the backyard when they returned
home and then went to their upstairs bedroom where they engaged in sex. Malcolm
then ate a bowl of chili, smoked a cigarette, and fell asleep in their bed.
[¶6.] According to Malcolm, he was shortly thereafter awakened by a
panicked J.C. who was expressing displeasure with him for not paying “enough
attention to her.” Malcolm claims he tried to “reassure” her that she was all he
thought about, but J.C. started packing a bag and indicated that she was going to
leave the house. J.C. went outside for about fifteen minutes before coming back into
the house after she had “calmed down,” by Malcolm’s assessment. J.C. and Malcolm
then went back to their bedroom to lie in bed and watch television, and Malcolm fell
back to sleep.
[¶7.] Later, Malcolm claims he woke up after something struck him above
his left eye. He noticed J.C. was not in bed and discovered her face down on the
floor beside the bed bleeding from her head. Malcolm helped J.C. off the floor and
she went to the bathroom to attend to her wound. After J.C. bandaged the cut, they
both laid back down on the bed, and Malcolm resumed sleeping.
[¶8.] Allegedly still upset with Malcolm for not paying enough attention to
her, J.C. woke Malcolm up again. Malcolm later claimed that he asked J.C. what
she wanted him to do, and she replied, “I want you to make love to me.” Malcolm
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then left the bedroom to take a shower, apparently to prepare for a second sexual
encounter.
[¶9.] When he returned to the bedroom, Malcolm used a cell phone to take
several video recordings of himself performing sexual acts on an unresponsive J.C.
Throughout these videotaped sexual acts, J.C. frequently snored and did not open
her eyes, speak any words, or change her positioning, aside from occasional groans
and movements that a physician later described as involuntary responses to
stimuli. The video recordings reveal that Malcolm inserted foreign objects into
J.C.’s vagina and anus. Malcolm also sexually penetrated J.C.’s mouth, vagina, and
anus with his fingers, his fist, and his penis.
[¶10.] Malcolm ended this series of sex acts with J.C. after approximately two
hours and then went back to sleep. He eventually woke up later in the afternoon
and noticed J.C. was cold to the touch and unresponsive. Malcolm called 911 for
emergency assistance, prompting a quick response by police officers and emergency
medical technicians who arrived and treated J.C. Unfortunately, efforts to revive
J.C. were not successful, and she passed away later that day at a local hospital.
[¶11.] As part of their investigation of J.C.’s death, police officers obtained a
search warrant, which they executed at Malcolm’s home that same day. During the
investigation, an empty pill bottle bearing a Baclofen label was recovered, which,
Malcolm reported, had contained the Baclofen they had picked up at Walmart the
previous day. Toxicology testing, ordered as part of an autopsy, ultimately revealed
J.C. died of a fatal combination of Baclofen and Hydroxyzine toxicity, an apparent
overdose for which police officers determined Malcolm was not responsible.
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[¶12.] However, the investigation into J.C.’s death took on a new dimension
after officers discovered and reviewed the self-recorded videos of Malcolm
performing acts of sexual penetration upon a seemingly unconscious J.C. Malcolm
was arrested on October 31, 2019, and charged with third-degree rape. The case
was dismissed on November 15, 2019, and recharged on January 13, 2020.
[¶13.] On that date, a Codington County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Malcolm with five counts of third-degree rape under alternative theories:
1) J.C. was either incapable of consenting to the sexual penetration by virtue of
physical or mental incapacity; or 2) she was incapable of consenting “because of any
intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent or hypnosis[.]” SDCL 22-22-1(3), (4). The
State later obtained a superseding indictment alleging nine counts of third-degree
rape under the same alternate theories. Malcolm pled not guilty and was
represented by appointed counsel.
[¶14.] Shortly before trial, the State moved in limine to exclude evidence of
prior sexual activity between Malcolm and J.C. The State argued that the
disclosure deadline under the rape shield statute set out in SDCL 19-19-412 (Rule
412) had passed without an effort by Malcolm to seek admission of prior sexual
conduct evidence involving J.C. The State also contended that any such evidence
would be inadmissible, in any event, under both Rule 412 and the more general
relevancy provisions of SDCL 19-19-403 (Rule 403).
[¶15.] During a hearing conducted five days before trial, the prosecutor
stated she had filed the motion in limine based upon the belief that Malcolm
intended to offer specific instances of his prior sexual conduct with J.C. in an
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attempt to present a consent defense. Notwithstanding Malcolm’s noncompliance
with the notice requirements of Rule 412, 1 the prosecutor explained that “[t]he
State preemptively filed the motion to quash such evidence.” See SDCL 19-19-
412(c)(1)(A), (B) (requiring a party seeking to offer evidence of specific instances of a
victim’s sexual behavior to “[f]ile a motion that specifically describes the evidence
. . . at least 14 days before trial unless the court, for good cause, sets a different
time”).
[¶16.] The circuit court acknowledged the State’s argument and observed
that the defense had not “give[n] me what I need to know to decide this issue.” In
response to the court’s direct question asking “who are your [Rule 412] witnesses
and what are they testifying to[,]” defense counsel expressed uncertainty but
indicated “there are going to be witnesses.” Defense counsel asked the court to
“reserve ruling” on the State’s motion in limine, arguing that “the seriousness of the
allegations” justified invoking the good cause provision of Rule 412(c)(1)(B)’s notice
requirement. But the court was unable to find a basis for good cause to excuse the
14-day notice provision of Rule 412 and stated:
The idea that [the defense] do[es]n’t have to give notice to the
State as required by statute in a serious case is not an argument
the [c]ourt is going to entertain . . . . As you sit here today, 5
days before trial, you’re not able to tell me who your witnesses
are and what they are going to say. I can’t conduct a meaningful
hearing and I am not going to give you free reign [sic] to walk in
1. In addition to the recorded videos depicting the acts of sexual penetration
Malcolm performed on J.C. while she was unresponsive on October 28, the
record suggests that police officers also recovered videos of Malcolm and J.C.
engaging in sexual acts at earlier points in time, apparently when both were
fully conscious. These video recordings, however, are not included in the
record.
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Monday morning on jury selection and say oh, by the way, we
found witness A, B and C that we want to now get in. You need
to exercise your due diligence to track down these witnesses.
[¶17.] The circuit court granted the State’s motion in limine, but the court did
not categorically foreclose any further effort to offer evidence of specific instances of
J.C.’s sexual behavior. Instead, the court indicated that defense counsel could
“bring this up again and I imagine we’re going to be having hearings on this, but
quite frankly what you’ve told me today . . . is not persuasive as to why I should find
good cause for you and your client not to comply with the statute.”
[¶18.] During his opening statement at trial, Malcolm’s counsel referenced
the idea that J.C. had consented in advance of her incapacity, characterizing the
practice as “pass out sex.” However, efforts to introduce evidence to develop this
advance consent theory during the trial were unsuccessful. For instance, in his
defense case, Malcolm sought to introduce evidence of J.C.’s sexual behavior from
four witnesses, none of whom were the subject of a properly noticed Rule 412
motion. The four witnesses all testified during an offer of proof outside of the jury’s
presence. Each offered testimony about sexual conduct between Malcolm and
J.C.—some of which concerned prior instances of sexual conduct between the two
and some related to conversations in which J.C. had purportedly endorsed the idea
of “pass-out sex” in connection with the events of October 27–28.
[¶19.] After hearing the proffered testimony, the circuit court denied
admission, relying upon three principal grounds: 1) hearsay, based upon the fact the
testimony related to J.C.’s out of court statements; 2) a lack of notice under Rule
412; and 3) the court’s view that “advance consent” was not a valid defense to third-
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degree rape. As to the last of these bases, the court indicated its legal research on
the advance consent theory led it to conclude that Malcolm’s asserted defense was
not valid:
Essentially the defendant as I understood it from your opening
statement . . . was going to testify or you were going to attempt
to present evidence on an issue wherein you say the victim in
this matter said I intend to pass out and when I pass out I give
you consent to have sex with me. Essentially when I become
incapable of giving consent I give you consent to do what you
want to do . . . . Based upon my research[,] . . . I don’t find that
to be a valid issue in this case. The idea of consent to the
[c]ourt’s mind has to go with it the ability to revoke consent, so
the idea that you can give consent and then become incapable of
giving consent . . . , I don’t think that is a valid legal princip[le].
****
And so . . . I am intending not to allow the defense to introduce
any notion of in quotations pass out sex. I think pass out sex is
by definition rape in the third degree[.]
[¶20.] Malcolm testified in his own defense and described the sequence of
events from the time on October 27 when he and J.C. had filled her prescription at
Walmart through the point at which Malcolm woke up to find J.C. unresponsive in
the afternoon on October 28 and called 911. As Malcolm was preparing to describe
his second, fateful sexual encounter with J.C. on the morning of October 28, he
testified that J.C. had told him to “make love” to her before he went downstairs to
shower. This comment prompted an objection, which the circuit court sustained
based upon its previous ruling. And Malcolm, for his part, did not further describe,
before the jury or through an offer of proof, anything that would suggest J.C.
consented in advance to the acts of sexual penetration Malcolm ultimately
performed on J.C. while she was unresponsive.
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[¶21.] The jury convicted Malcolm on nine counts of rape in the third degree,
opting for the alternate theory of criminal liability set out in SDCL 22-22-1(4),
which prohibits sexually penetrating any person “incapable of giving consent
because of any intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent . . . .” The circuit court
sentenced Malcolm to a total of 50 years in prison with fifteen years suspended. 2
[¶22.] Malcolm appeals raising several issues for our review that we restate
as follows:
1. Whether the circuit court erred by determining that
Malcolm’s theory that J.C. gave “advance consent” to the
instances of sexual penetration for which he was charged
was not a legally valid defense that could be supported by
evidence and argument.
2. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by ruling
that evidence of specific instances of J.C.’s sexual
behavior was inadmissible under Rule 412.
3. Whether the circuit court committed plain error by not
providing the jury with an instruction further defining the
intoxication element of third-degree rape under SDCL 22-
22-1(4).
4. Whether the circuit court committed plain error by
admitting video evidence of the charged offenses without
first viewing the videos.
5. Whether exceptional circumstances justify review of
Malcolm’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct
appeal.
2. The circuit court imposed a 20-year sentence on count 1 and a 15-year
sentence on count 2, to be served consecutively. The court suspended the 15-
year sentences on the remaining counts which were concurrent to each other
and consecutive to the sentences for counts 1 and 2.
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Analysis and Decision
Advance Consent
[¶23.] At the heart of Malcolm’s broad argument that the circuit court
erroneously refused him the opportunity to “tell his story” lies the premise that his
advance consent theory was a valid defense. If it was not, Malcolm cannot prevail
on his principal claim that the court unjustifiably restricted his defense in this
regard. If, on the other hand, we were to hold that the court erred in its
determination, Malcolm’s arguments about the exclusion of evidence would merit
further consideration. We view the efficacy of Malcolm’s advance consent defense
theory as a legal question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.
State v. Bowers, 2018 S.D. 50, ¶ 16, 915 N.W.2d 161, 166.
[¶24.] The text of SDCL 22-22-1(4) defines third-degree rape as “an act of
sexual penetration accomplished with any person under . . . the following
circumstances: . . . the victim is incapable of giving consent because of any
intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent. . . .” As a matter of statutory
interpretation, the plain and unambiguous text of SDCL 22-22-1(4) makes it a crime
to perform “an act of sexual penetration” upon a person “under circumstances” in
which the person “is incapable of giving consent[.]” (Emphasis added.) Under this
uncomplicated reading of the statute, the act of sexual penetration and the inability
to give consent must be contemporaneous, meaning a person is guilty of third-
degree rape if at the time the person accomplishes an act of sexual penetration, the
victim is incapable of giving consent.
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[¶25.] Here, Malcolm’s formulation of “advance consent” skews the concept of
consent into an unrecognizable misnomer under which a victim’s inability to provide
contemporaneous consent at the time of sexual penetration becomes irrelevant.
Malcolm’s advance consent theory is, as the name suggests, founded upon his view
that although J.C. was not able to consent during the acts of sexual penetration at
issue, she instead “consented” at an earlier time. Indeed, the other term used by
Malcolm in this case—pass-out sex—can only be understood to mean that J.C. was
incapable of consenting when Malcolm was sexually penetrating her.
[¶26.] Apart from the fact that the text of SDCL 22-22-1 forecloses Malcolm’s
argument, accepting Malcolm’s advance consent theory would create a rule under
which victims who initially express consent to an act of sexual penetration are
irrevocably bound by it later during the actual act, even if they have subsequently
lost the ability to consent. The stark results of such a determination are easy to
imagine. For example, a victim could express consent to sexual penetration in
general terms, lose consciousness, and be unable to withdraw consent to further
sexual penetration or to object to specific types of sexual penetration that were not
originally contemplated.
[¶27.] For this reason, we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the
ability to consent must necessarily contemplate the concomitant ability to withdraw
consent at any point during a sexual encounter. We reached a similar conclusion in
State v. Jones, where we affirmed the circuit court’s decision to refuse a jury
instruction that would have told jurors that no rape occurs if a victim withdraws
consent after penetration. 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1994).
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[¶28.] We are not alone in our view that the ability to consent to sex includes
the ability to withdraw consent as an integral component. For example, a
California intermediate appellate court rejected a defendant’s advance consent
theory very similar to the one Malcolm makes here:
While a woman may expressly or impliedly consent to conscious
sexual intercourse in advance, she remains free to withdraw
that consent, and ordinarily has the ability to do so since she is
conscious. Even if a woman expressly or impliedly indicates in
advance that she is willing to engage in unconscious sexual
intercourse, a man who thereafter has sexual intercourse with
her while she is unconscious necessarily deprives her of the
opportunity to indicate her lack of consent. The inherent risk
that a man may misinterpret a woman’s prior statements or
conduct weighs strongly against recognizing “advance consent”
as a defense to rape of an unconscious person since the woman’s
lack of consciousness absolutely precludes her from making her
lack of consent known at the time of the act.
People v. Dancy, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
[¶29.] Similarly, a Virginia court of appeals recently held,
[C]onsent to engage in sexual acts must be ongoing and capable
of being withdrawn at any time. To hold that a person can give
prior consent to sexual activity taking place when they are
asleep would deny that person the ability to withdraw that
consent.
Conley v. Commonwealth, 871 S.E.2d 640, 650 (Va. Ct. App. 2022).
[¶30.] Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature intended “incapable of
giving consent” in SDCL 22-22-1(4) to be oriented to the time of the act of sexual
penetration and to contemplate the corresponding ability to withdraw consent at
any time. To hold otherwise would institute an untenable rule licensing irrevocable
consent to sexual penetration, a concept we emphatically reject. For this reason,
the circuit court’s decision to refuse the admission of Malcolm’s four witnesses who
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testified during the offer of proof and the court’s decision to sustain the State’s
objection to Malcolm’s testimony that J.C. told him to “make love” to her are
affirmed. 3
Rule 412 and Allegations Regarding Prior Sexual History
[¶31.] Malcolm’s additional claim that the circuit court abused its discretion
when it “refused to allow . . . any evidence . . . [that] he and JC had a longstanding
and intimate relationship . . .” directly implicates Rule 412. We review evidentiary
rulings under our abuse of discretion standard. State v. Shelton, 2021 S.D. 22, ¶ 16,
958 N.W.2d 721, 727.
[¶32.] Rule 412 provides that evidence is inadmissible if “offered to prove that
a victim engaged in other sexual behavior . . . [or] a victim’s sexual predisposition.”
SDCL 19-19-412(a). This general prohibition is subject to certain narrow
exceptions, see SDCL 19-19-412(b), but Malcolm does not argue that any of the
statutory exceptions apply to the evidence of J.C.’s prior sexual conduct. 4 Instead,
now represented on appeal by a different attorney, Malcolm’s Rule 412 arguments
3. There was no offer of proof from Malcolm himself as to what J.C. told him
regarding advance consent. Malcolm’s mother, Debra Tobin, testified during
an offer of proof that she overheard J.C. say “something about I might be
passed out or sleeping when you get back [from a shower], so you can just
record it like we do so we can watch it she said.” Stacy Thennis, who is a
friend and former girlfriend of Malcolm’s, testified during her offer of proof
that J.C. had told her on October 27 that she and Malcolm planned to “get
drunk” and then “have pass out sex.”
4. The only proof in the record of J.C.’s prior sexual conduct comes from portions
of the testimony provided by the four witnesses who testified during
Malcolm’s offer of proof. For example, Malcolm’s sister, Amanda First in
Trouble, testified that J.C. once related that she and Malcolm never deprive
each other of sexual intercourse. Another witness, Sarah Waldner, testified
that she and J.C. spoke to each other about their sexual interests.
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focus upon his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for, in his
view, failing to understand and comply with Rule 412’s requirements for notice. 5
[¶33.] Notwithstanding this noncompliance, we make two additional
observations. First, the circuit court was keenly aware of Rule 412’s provisions and
stated its willingness to consider, or reconsider, the issue of J.C.’s prior sexual
conduct if there was a basis to determine the existence of good cause and excuse the
14-day notice requirement. Second, the court did not completely bar all testimony
from the four offer-of-proof witnesses. Instead, the court carefully considered
different aspects of the witnesses’ testimony and offered its assessment as to
discrete portions. For instance, Malcolm’s mother stated that J.C. came downstairs
at some point that morning to find a bandage for the cut on her head, and the court
determined this testimony could be relevant to establishing a timeline for the
sequence of events.
[¶34.] Under the circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court followed
the procedural requirements of Rule 412 and did not abuse its discretion. The
circuit court’s ruling could also be sustained based upon the court’s determination
that the evidence lacked relevance and constituted hearsay, neither of which
Malcolm challenges on appeal. Accordingly, the decision to exclude evidence of
J.C.’s sexual conduct was within the range of permissible choices available to the
circuit court.
5. We address Malcolm’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim below.
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Intoxication Instruction
[¶35.] Malcolm argues that the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the
jury on a definition of intoxication and by not instructing the jury to take into
account the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether J.C. was
intoxicated. Because Malcolm did not propose the jury instructions he now argues
should have been included or object to the jury instructions at trial, we review his
argument for plain error. See State v. Thomas, 2011 S.D. 15, ¶ 20, 796 N.W.2d 706,
713 (holding that review is limited to plain error where a defendant did not
preserve his claim by proposing a jury instruction).
[¶36.] In order “[t]o establish plain error, an appellant must show (1) error,
(2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and only then may this Court
exercise its discretion to notice the error if, (4) it seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. McMillen, 2019 S.D.
40, ¶ 13, 931 N.W.2d 725, 729–30 (quoting State v. Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 27, 889
N.W.2d 404, 412). The defendant “bears the burden of showing the error was
prejudicial.” Id. (quoting State v. Beck, 2010 S.D. 52, ¶ 10, 785 N.W.2d 288, 293).
[¶37.] We have held that “[a] circuit court should instruct the jury on issues
that are ‘supported by competent evidence in the record[.]’” City of Rapid City v.
Big Sky, LLC, 2018 S.D. 45, ¶ 21, 914 N.W.2d 541, 547 (quoting Johnson v.
Armfield, 2003 S.D. 134, ¶ 7, 672 N.W.2d 478, 481). Malcolm’s argument that the
circuit court should have instructed the jury to consider the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating whether J.C. was intoxicated does little to convince us
any error was committed, much less plain error.
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[¶38.] Indeed, there does not appear to be any evidentiary dispute that J.C.
was intoxicated at the time of the charged offenses. Compounding Malcolm’s highly
incriminating cell phone recordings plainly showing J.C.’s unresponsive state
during the charged acts and the corresponding expert testimony that the degree of
consciousness she displayed in the videos was akin to her being “asleep,” the jury
also viewed body camera footage of Malcolm telling police officers J.C. was “really
fucked up” after their night of drinking. Under the circumstances, we conclude the
circuit court did not erroneously fail to act on its own and give the instructions
Malcolm now feels were necessary. 6
Graphic Videos of the Charged Conduct
[¶39.] Malcolm also failed to preserve his appellate claim that the circuit
court erred by admitting the graphic video recordings of the charged offenses
without first conducting a Rule 403 balancing test and without first viewing the
evidence. There was no objection to the admission of this evidence at trial and no
request for the court to view the video recordings before determining their
admissibility. 7 “Where an issue has not been preserved by objection at trial, our
6. Malcolm makes no claim that would satisfy the remaining elements of the
plain error test—namely, that the error alleged was plainly contrary to
controlling law, affected his substantial rights, and seriously affected the
integrity of the judicial system. See State v. Fischer, 2016 S.D. 1, ¶ 16, 873
N.W.2d 681, 688 (determining that the circuit court did not commit plain
error where the party failed to show how the alleged error prejudiced the
party).
7. Malcolm’s effort to support his argument by citing the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision in United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372 (3d Cir.
2012), is misplaced. In Cunningham, the three-judge panel held that the
district court had abused its discretion by not viewing video recordings of
(continued . . .)
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review is limited to whether the trial court committed plain error.” State v. Wilson,
2020 S.D. 41, ¶ 17, 947 N.W.2d 131, 136 (quoting Thomas, 2011 S.D. 15, ¶ 20, 796
N.W.2d at 713).
[¶40.] Applying the principles of plain error review discussed above, we are
unaware of any controlling rule which would require the circuit court to view the
evidence and sua sponte balance its probative force against the potential for unfair
prejudice under Rule 403. Malcolm, for his part, has not argued otherwise or
sustained his burden to establish the requirements of the plain error test, and our
review is therefore at an end.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
[¶41.] “[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, we will not address an ineffective
assistance claim on direct appeal.” State v. Vortherms, 2020 S.D. 67, ¶ 30, 952
N.W.2d 113, 120–21 (quoting State v. Golliher-Weyer, 2016 S.D. 10, ¶ 8, 875 N.W.2d
28, 31). “The rule is a practical one, necessitated by the fact that ‘the record on
direct appeal typically does not afford a basis to review the performance of trial
counsel.’” State v. Alvarez, 2022 S.D. 66, ¶ 34, 982 N.W.2d 12, 20 (quoting
Vortherms, 2020 S.D. 67, ¶ 30, 952 N.W.2d at 120; see also Thomas, 2011 S.D. 15,
¶ 23, 796 N.W.2d at 714 (“The reason is to allow attorneys charged with
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(. . . continued)
child pornography before allowing their admission at the defendant’s trial on
federal child pornography charges. However, the issue was carefully
preserved through the defendant’s pretrial motion in limine and pretrial
litigation that was focused upon the defendant’s detailed descriptions of the
video clips, his acknowledgement that they contained child pornography, and
his claims of unfair prejudice. This distinction alone renders Cunningham
inapposite, and we need not consider further whether the decision possesses
any persuasive value.
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ineffectiveness to explain or defend their actions and strategies, and thus a more
complete picture of what occurred is available for review.” (cleaned up)).
[¶42.] “[O]nly when trial counsel was ‘so ineffective and counsel’s
representation so casual as to represent a manifest usurpation of the defendant’s
constitutional rights’” will we attempt to resolve his claim on direct appeal.
Thomas, 2011 S.D. 15, ¶ 23, 796 N.W.2d at 714 (quoting State v. Arabie, 2003 S.D.
57, ¶ 20, 663 N.W.2d 250, 256). “Where this standard is not met, the better course
is to consider a defendant’s Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim within
the context of a habeas corpus action where the parties may develop the factual
record.” Alvarez, 2022 S.D. 66, ¶ 35, 982 N.W.2d at 20 (citing Vortherms, 2020 S.D.
67, ¶ 30, 952 N.W.2d at 120).
[¶43.] Malcolm attributes several errors to his trial counsel that, he claims,
entitle him to relief in this direct appeal. Among them are assertions that trial
counsel only filed one pretrial motion, failed to file a Rule 412 motion, sent an
unprepared associate to argue at the motion in limine hearing, did not object to
video evidence on foundation and relevance grounds, did not file a motion regarding
prior bad acts, and did not obtain a toxicologist expert witness. However, we cannot
determine under the current record that defense counsel’s performance was so
patently ineffective under the standard set out above so as to support review of
Malcolm’s claims now. We, therefore, decline to address Malcolm’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct review.
[¶44.] We affirm.
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[¶45.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, DEVANEY, and MYREN,
Justices, concur.
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