Danny Loyd Hayes, II v. State ( 2021 )


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  •                                        NO. 12-20-00222-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    DANNY LOYD HAYES, II,                                  §       APPEAL FROM THE 7TH
    APPELLANT
    V.                                                     §       JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEE                                               §       SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant appeals his conviction for theft. In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the
    trial court erred in assessing certain fees in the bill of costs. We modify and affirm as modified.
    BACKGROUND
    In September 2019, Appellant was charged by indictment with the state jail felony theft
    of property under $2,500, enhanced by two prior misdemeanor theft convictions. 1 Pursuant to a
    plea agreement, Appellant pleaded “guilty” in exchange for three years deferred adjudication
    community supervision.
    In April 2020, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, alleging that Appellant violated
    certain terms of his community supervision. At the hearing, Appellant pleaded “true” to all of
    the State’s allegations. Following the hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion to
    adjudicate, revoked Appellant’s community supervision, and adjudicated Appellant guilty of
    theft. The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at fifteen months confinement. This
    appeal followed.
    1
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(D) (West 2019).
    COURT COSTS
    In his sole issue, Appellant urges the trial court improperly assessed certain court costs in
    the judgment. First, Appellant argues the trial court erred in assessing a “time payment” fee
    previously authorized by Section 133.103 of the Texas Local Government Code. 2 Although the
    State acknowledges that it conceded error on this issue in previous appeals, it has reconsidered
    its position on the “time payment” fee and no longer concedes error. Second, Appellant further
    argues that he was erroneously charged a “specialty court” fee. The State concedes this error.
    Time Payment Fee
    Several courts, including this one, have held subsections (b) and (d) of Section 133.03
    unconstitutional. See, e.g., Irvin v. State, No. 12-19-00347-CR, 
    2020 WL 5406276
    , at *7 (Tex.
    App—Tyler Sept. 9, 2020, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ovalle v. State,
    
    592 S.W.3d 615
    , 618 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. filed); Simmons v. State, 
    590 S.W.3d 702
    , 712 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, pet. filed); Johnson v. State, 
    573 S.W.3d 328
    , 340 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. filed). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has
    recently held that the pendency of an appeal stops the clock for the purposes of the time payment
    fee. Dulin v. State, Nos. PD-0856-19, PD-0857-19, 
    2021 WL 1202400
    , at *4 (Tex. Crim. App.
    March 31, 2021).
    Here, the judgment adjudicating guilt reflects that the trial court assessed $256.50 in
    court costs. The judgment includes a document entitled “Order to Withdraw Funds,” which
    states that Appellant incurred “court costs, fees, fines and/or restitution in the amount of
    $256.50.” The bill of costs itemizes the court costs imposed, which total $276.50 with $256.50
    remaining. The bill of costs includes a $15.00 “time payment” fee and includes a paragraph
    stating that a $15.00 fee will be assessed if any part of the court costs is paid on or after the 31st
    2
    The Texas Legislature passed legislation, effective January 1, 2020, that transfers Texas Local
    Government Code, Section 133.103 to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 102.030 and revises the statute to
    provide that all of the fees collected under the section are “to be used for the purpose of improving the collection of
    outstanding court costs, fines, reimbursement fees, or restitution or improving the efficiency of the administration of
    justice in the county or municipality.” See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., S.B. 346, § 2.54, 2019 Tex. Sess.
    Law Serv. Ch. 1352. The changes apply only to a cost, fee, or fine assessed on a conviction for an offense
    committed on or after the effective date of the Act. Id. § 5.01. Because the offense in this case was committed before
    January 1, 2020, the former law applies. See Ovalle v. State, 
    592 S.W.3d 615
    , 617 n.1 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2020, pet.
    filed).
    2
    day after the judgment assessing the court costs is entered. 3 But see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
    ANN. § 133.103(c), redesignated as TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030 (West Supp.
    2020) (treasurer shall deposit ten percent of fees collected under this section in general fund of
    county or municipality for purpose of improving efficiency of administration of justice in county
    or municipality).
    Because the pendency of an appeal stops the clock for purposes of the time payment fee,
    the assessment of the fee in Appellant’s case is premature. Dulin, 
    2021 WL 1202400
    , at *4. As
    a result, the fee should be struck in its entirety, without prejudice to them being assessed later if,
    more than 30 days after the issuance of our mandate, Appellant has failed to completely pay any
    fine, court costs, or restitution that he owes. 4 
    Id.
     We sustain this portion of Appellant’s sole
    issue.
    Specialty Court Fee
    Appellant further urges that the trial court erred when it imposed the “specialty court” fee
    in its bill of costs. The State not only concedes that this fee was erroneously assessed but further
    states that the “Local Consolidated Fee on Conviction of Felony” as a whole should not have
    been assessed. We agree.
    The date of Appellant’s charged offense is March 6, 2019. The Local Consolidated Fee
    on Conviction of Felony only applies to defendants who are convicted of offenses committed on
    or after January 1, 2020. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 134.101 (West Supp. 2020). Section
    134.101 assesses an additional $105 fee for persons convicted of felonies. Id. § 134.101(a).
    That $105 fee is to be allocated to the following specific accounts and funds: the clerk of the
    court account, the county records management and preservation fund, the county jury fund, the
    courthouse security fund, the county and district court technology fund, and the county specialty
    court account. Id. § 134.101(b).
    3
    It appears the trial court improperly assessed the new $15.00 time payment fee instead of the $25.00
    payment fee applicable to Appellant’s case. See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., S.B. 346, §§ 2.54, 5.01, 2019
    Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 1352; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030 (West Supp. 2020).
    4
    The United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have recognized the
    desirability of avoiding the adjudication of constitutional issues when at all possible. Clinton v. Jones, 
    520 U.S. 681
    ,690, 
    117 S. Ct. 1636
    , 
    137 L. Ed. 2d 945
     (1997); Pena v. State, 
    191 S.W.3d 133
    , 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    Whether the time payment fee will be reimposed later is speculative at this point because Applicant could avoid the
    statutory conditions for imposing the fee by choosing to pay his monetary obligations on time. And there is an
    available statutory remedy to challenge the time payment fee, if it is ever imposed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
    ANN.; see also Dulin, 
    2021 WL 1202400
    , at *4 n.29.
    3
    The bill of costs in Appellant’s case includes the following costs as enumerated in
    Section 134.101: $40.00 Clerk of the Court, $4.00 County and District Court Technology Fund,
    $1.00 County Jury Fund, $25.00 County Records Management and Preservation, $25.00 County
    Specialty Court Account, and $10.00 Courthouse Security Fund. These total $105 in fees. Per
    the statute’s effective date, Appellant is not obligated to pay the Local Consolidated Fee on
    Conviction of Felony. Accordingly, we will modify the trial court’s judgment and Order to
    Withdraw Funds to delete these fees. See Sturdivant, 445 S.W.3d at 443; Ovalle, 592 S.W.3d at
    618. This portion of Appellant’s sole issue is sustained.
    DISPOSITION
    Having sustained Appellant’s sole issue, we modify the trial court’s judgment, along with
    its attached order to withdraw funds, to reflect that Appellant’s court costs are $136.50 by
    deleting the local consolidated fee on conviction of felony and by deleting the time payment fee,
    without prejudice to it being assessed later, if more than thirty days after the issuance of our
    mandate, Appellant fails to completely pay fine, court costs, or restitution he owes. We affirm
    the judgment as modified.
    BRIAN HOYLE
    Justice
    Opinion delivered April 14, 2021.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
    (DO NOT PUBLISH)
    4
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    JUDGMENT
    APRIL 14, 2021
    NO. 12-20-00222-CR
    DANNY LOYD HAYES, II,
    Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    Appeal from the 7th District Court
    of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-1328-19)
    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the briefs filed
    herein, and the same being considered, because it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of
    the court below should be modified and as modified, affirmed.
    It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
    of the court below be modified to reflect that Appellant’s court costs are $136.50 by deleting the
    local consolidated fee on conviction of felony and by deleting the time payment fee, without
    prejudice to it being assessed later, if more than thirty days after the issuance of our mandate,
    Appellant fails to completely pay fine, court costs, or restitution he owes.; in all other respects
    the judgment of the trial court is affirmed; and that this decision be certified to the court below
    for observance.
    Brian Hoyle, Justice.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-20-00222-CR

Filed Date: 4/14/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/19/2021