Damonte Bonds v. State , 503 S.W.3d 622 ( 2016 )


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  • Motion for Rehearing Granted; Affirmed; Opinion of August 16, 2016
    Withdrawn, and Substitute Opinion filed October 25, 2016.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-15-00688-CR
    DAMONTE BONDS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 337th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1436427
    1
    SUBSTITUTE OPINION
    Appellant Damonte Bonds raises two court-costs issues in this appeal from
    his aggravated-robbery conviction. He asserts that (1) he was not provided a bill of
    court costs as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.001 and
    (2) assessing court costs under Texas Local Government Code section 133.102 is a
    1
    The court grants appellant’s motion for rehearing to reconsider the court’s preservation-of-error
    analysis on appellant’s second issue. We withdraw the opinion issued on August 16, 2016, and
    issue this substitute opinion.
    taking that violates the Texas Constitution and United States Constitution. We
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant pleaded “guilty” to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and
    was convicted of that offense. The trial court sentenced him to seven years’
    confinement. Assessed court costs amounted to $259.00, including $13.06 to fund
    rehabilitation services. Appellant now challenges the assessment of these court
    costs.
    BILL OF COSTS
    In his first issue, appellant asserts that he was not provided a bill of costs as
    required by Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.001. Appellant requests that
    we enjoin the Texas Department of Criminal Justice from taking money out of his
    inmate account until he is provided a bill of costs.
    In 2015, the Legislature amended Code of Criminal Procedure article
    103.001, entitled “Costs Payable,” effective June 19, 2015, to read:
    (b) In a court other than a justice or municipal court, a cost is not
    payable by the person charged with the cost until a written bill
    containing the items of cost is:
    (1) produced;
    (2) signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer who is
    entitled to receive payment for the cost; and
    (3) provided to the person charged with the cost.
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.001 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). To
    resolve appellant’s first issue, we must determine if appellant was provided with a
    bill of costs within the meaning of this statute.
    Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review de
    novo. See Williams v. State, 
    253 S.W.3d 673
    , 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When
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    interpreting statutory language, we focus on the “collective intent or purpose of the
    legislators who enacted the legislation.” Boykin v. State, 
    818 S.W.2d 782
    , 785
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). To determine the collective intent of the Legislature, we
    look first to the literal text. 
    Id. The statutory
    language provides the best means to
    determine “the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment.” 
    Id. We construe
    an unambiguous statute according to its plain meaning, unless such a
    construction would produce an absurd result. Clinton v. State, 
    354 S.W.3d 795
    ,
    800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing 
    Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785
    –86).
    Appellant asserts that the costs assessed against him are not payable because
    he was not provided with a written bill containing the items of costs, as required by
    article 103.001. Because the Code of Criminal Procedure does not define
    “provided,” the word is “to be taken and understood in [its] usual acceptation in
    common language.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 3.01 (West, Westlaw through
    2015 R.S.). The verb “provide” means “make available for use; supply.” NEW
    OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1406 (3rd ed. 2010). The word, as commonly
    used, means that if one is to be “provided” with something, one must have that
    thing supplied to him or at least made available to him. See 
    id. Appellant states
    in his appellate brief that “[a]n accompanying bill of costs,
    dated August 10, 2015, lists court costs as $259.00,” and he cites page 65 of the
    clerk’s record to support this statement.        Appellant’s statement shows that
    appellant has seen “a written bill containing the items of cost.” See Tex. Crim.
    Proc. Code Ann. § art. 103.001. Article 103.001 does not identify a particular
    actor who must provide the bill of costs but specifies that a cost is not payable until
    a written bill containing the items of cost is provided. Because appellant has seen
    and examined the bill of costs, we conclude that the bill of costs was supplied to
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    appellant or at least made available to him. Thus, appellant has been provided with
    a written bill containing the items of cost. See 
    id. Inasmuch as
    our record reflects that the bill of costs has been provided to
    appellant, we find no merit in his first issue. Without deciding whether the relief
    appellant seeks is proper, we overrule appellant’s first issue.
    CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
    In his second issue, appellant asserts Local Government Code section
    133.102 violates the Texas Constitution and United States Constitution by
    authorizing the trial court to collect $133.00 as court costs, $13.06 of which is used
    for comprehensive rehabilitation.          See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 133.102
    (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Appellant argues that using court costs to
    fund rehabilitation efforts violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
    the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution
    because his private property was taken for public use without just compensation.
    See U.S. Const. amend. V; Tex. Const. art. I, § 17.
    Appellant did not voice these objections in the trial court and raises them for
    the first time on appeal. A divided panel of this court has determined that the
    Court of Criminal Appeals’s precedent in London v. State, 
    490 S.W.3d 503
    (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2016), excused the requirement of error preservation for challenges to
    court costs that are not imposed in open court nor itemized in the court’s judgment.
    See Bowden v. State, — S.W.3d —,—, 
    2016 WL 6107625
    at *— (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2016, no pet. h.).2 In today’s case, the trial court did
    2
    One panel member concluded that defendants challenging court costs must object in the trial
    court because the Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that in most cases defendants have
    constructive notice of court costs and constructive notice provides a defendant with the
    knowledge necessary to trigger the defendant’s obligation to object to the costs in the trial court
    when the defendant has an opportunity to do so. See Bowden v. State, No. 14-14-00955-CR,
    4
    not impose the court costs in open court or itemize the costs in the judgment.
    Thus, under the Bowden precedent, notwithstanding appellant’s failure to preserve
    error in the trial court, we address the merits of appellant’s complaints. See 
    id. A panel
    majority in Bowden held that a trial court’s assessment of court
    costs does not effect a taking within the meaning of the United States or Texas
    Constitutions. See 
    id. Thus, under
    Bowden, appellant’s argument lacks merit.
    Because the assessment of court costs against appellant is not a taking within the
    meaning of the United States and Texas Constitutions, we overrule appellant’s
    second issue. See 
    id. CONCLUSION Contrary
    to appellant’s assertion in his first issue, appellant has been
    provided a bill of costs as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article
    103.001. The constitutional challenges appellant asserts in his second issue fail
    because the assessment of court costs against him did not effect a taking under the
    United States and Texas Constitutions.          Having overruled both of appellant’s
    issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/     Kem Thompson Frost
    Chief Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Wise.
    Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    
    2016 WL 6107625
    , at *— (Houston [14th Dist.]       Oct. 18, 2016, no pet. h.) (Frost, C.J.,
    dissenting).
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Document Info

Docket Number: 14-15-00688-CR

Citation Numbers: 503 S.W.3d 622

Filed Date: 10/25/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023