Michael Wayne Williams v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-21-00029-CR
Michael Wayne Williams, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF LAMPASAS COUNTY
NO. 21282, THE HONORABLE RANDALL J. HOYER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Michael Wayne Williams was charged with driving while intoxicated
(“DWI”), second offense. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 49.04(a), .09(a). Williams filed a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional and statutory
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution; Sections 9, 10, and 19 of Article I of the Texas Constitution; and Articles 38.22 and
38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, XIV; Tex.
Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10, 19; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 38.22, .23. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied Williams’s motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. In two
issues, Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion because
(1) his initial interaction with police was not consensual, and the detaining officer lacked
reasonable suspicion, and (2) “there was insufficient evidence presented that [Williams] was
operating a motor vehicle at the time of his arrest.” We will affirm the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
On the morning of September 26, 2019, Williams’s neighbor, Betty Cluck, called
911 and reported that Williams had “been drinking for the last week” and was “driving his
pickup,” for which she gave the license plate number HGF0197. 1 Cluck stated that Williams had
“just left the apartment” and might be headed to the Stripes or Shell gas station.
Lampasas Police Department (“LPD”) Officer John Bowman was on patrol when
dispatch provided him with the description of Williams’s vehicle 2 and advised him of a possibly
intoxicated driver. Officer Bowman testified that he located a vehicle “consistent with” the
description given by dispatch parked in the parking lot of the Shell station, “which is real[ly]
close to the intersection where the caller said [Williams] would be coming from.” He testified
that he pulled into the parking lot and positioned his squad car to block other vehicles from
entering. He also testified that he saw that Williams’s brake lights were activated and that, when
he approached Williams’s vehicle, he could smell “a strong odor commonly associated with the
consumption of alcohol[ic] beverage emitting from his person or clothing.” He observed that
Williams’s speech was slow and slurred and that Williams seemed “disoriented or confused.”
Video of the interaction taken from Officer Bowman’s dash-cam, which was
admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing, recorded Williams stating that his last drink
1 A recording of the 911 call was admitted into evidence at the hearing on Williams’s
motion to suppress.
2 At the suppression hearing, Officer Bowman testified that he thought he heard that the
license plate number was HGF0917 and that the vehicle was possibly a silver Ford pickup. The
truck is “[i]n reality . . . a gray Chevy.”
2
had been at 10 p.m. the night before. Williams explained that the smell of alcohol may have
come from his clothes, as he was wearing the same outfit. He stated that he had drunk “probably
a quarter” of a “[b]ig bottle” of vodka and “was just going back home.” When asked why he had
two black eyes, Williams responded that he had fallen at his house. During the questioning,
Officer Bowman stood next to the driver’s side door of Williams’s truck and addressed him
through its lowered window. Officer Bowman then directed Williams to step out of the vehicle,
opened the driver’s side door, and—with Williams’s consent—began administering standardized
field sobriety tests (“SFSTs”).
While Officer Bowman was questioning Williams, a second LPD officer,
Lieutenant Charles Montgomery, arrived to assist with the investigation. Officer Bowman
testified that before Lieutenant Montgomery arrived, Williams would have been able to reverse
his truck and leave by going around Officer Bowman’s squad car and exiting through the lot’s
unblocked driveway. He testified that although doing so would have been more difficult after
Lieutenant Montgomery’s arrival, by that time he “had already developed concern about
[Williams’s] level of intoxication.” On cross-examination, Officer Bowman clarified that had
Williams attempted to go “straight back” he would have hit Officer Bowman’s squad car, which
may have made him “a little nervous” about backing up. Lieutenant Montgomery testified that
there was enough room for Williams “to have backed out safely and exited the parking lot,”
including by “backing straight out.” When told that Officer Bowman had disagreed and asked
again if Williams would have had a problem backing up, Lieutenant Montgomery testified,
“Honestly, I don’t know.”
Williams agreed to undergo a horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test as part of
the SFSTs. Officer Bowman testified that he observed four of six clues indicating intoxication
3
during the test. Williams next agreed to attempt the walk-and-turn test, but Officer Bowman
testified that Williams was unable to stand as needed and that he refused any further testing.
Following his refusal, Williams was handcuffed and placed under arrest.
Williams testified that he had not been drinking on the morning of his arrest, that
Cluck could not have seen him drinking, and that he did not see her when he was driving. He
testified that although he had been drinking the night before, he felt that he was no longer
intoxicated because it was the next morning. Regarding the interaction in the Shell parking lot,
he testified that he did not feel free to leave when Officer Bowman approached, did not feel that
he could tell Officer Bowman that he did not wish to speak with him, and did not feel that
he could have backed up without hitting Officer Bowman. He also testified that when
Officer Bowman entered the lot, he had just gotten back into his truck and was preparing to back
out when he saw the squad car in his rearview mirror.
Following the suppression hearing, the trial court denied Williams’s motion and
entered the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law: 3
FINDINGS OF FACT
On September 26, 2019 around 8:25am, Betty Cluck, a neighbor of the
Defendant’s, witnessed Michael Williams driving away from his home and
reported it to 9-1-1.
Cluck . . . report[ed that] “Mike Williams has got in his pick-up” driving away
from his apartment. She provided his license plate being HGF0l97, vehicle
description and reported that “he’s been drinking for the last week” and told
dispatch that he would “go towards I guess Stripes or Shell to get coffee.” She
further reported that the Chief of Police advised her to call if she saw the
Defendant because “she’s alerted the police officers to pick him up.”
3 In response to multiple remands, the trial court twice entered supplementary findings
and conclusions. All relevant findings and conclusions are provided here.
4
About five minutes after Cluck called, Officer Bowman was given a license plate
number and vehicle description, being a silver Ford pickup truck, provided by
dispatch, and was told the driver was possibly intoxicated. Officer Bowman
located a grey Chevrolet pickup truck, with the license plate that Cluck provided
to dispatch that was relayed to the officers, parked at the Shell gas station. Two
of the license plate numbers in the officer’s report were inverted, and it is unclear
whether dispatch relayed incorrect numbers, the officer misheard the numbers, or
the officer made a typographical error in his report.
At the time Officer Bowman arrived, he was the only officer on scene.
Officer Bowman’s testimony that he positioned his vehicle in a way to keep
traffic from coming into the gas station is credible, based on his testimony and
review of the body camera footage and dash camera footage of both officers.
Because of the positioning of his vehicle, at the time Officer Bowman arrived, it
would have been possible for the Defendant to back up to the right of
Officer Bowman’s vehicle, and drive forward to the left to exit the station,
without hitting Officer Bowman’s vehicle. Officer Bowman did not see the
Defendant driving and therefore did not activate his lights or his siren when he
parked his vehicle.
As Officer Bowman arrived into the parking lot of the gas station, the Defendant’s
brake lights were clearly activated, indicating the vehicle was running and
being operated.
Officer Bowman observed Williams’s activated brake lights.
Officer Bowman approached the driver’s side window, which was already
lowered. He did not draw his service weapon, a [flashlight], or make any
commands. Officer Bowman’s testimony that at this point, the situation was only
a “welfare concern,” is credible, because when Officer Bowman began speaking
with the Defendant, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, he was speaking in a
friendly tone.
Neither officer testified as to whether they saw keys in the ignition.
Williams did not indicate to Officer Bowman that he did not wish to speak to him,
by words, action, or demeanor.
The defendant’s subjective belief that he could not back out when
Officer Bowman [pulled in] is credible, but objectively, based on the testimony of
the officers and review of the dash camera footage and body camera footage
provided by the officers[, t]he Defendant would have had to have first backed up
to the right of Officer Bowman’s vehicle, then drive[n] forward to the left to exit
the station.
5
He advised the Defendant of the 9-1-1 call as a possible intoxicated driver.
Within seconds of his interaction with the Defendant, Officer Bowman suspected
that the Defendant was intoxicated because of the smell of alcohol coming from
him or “from his clothing inside the vehicle” and his speech was “slow and
slurred.” The defendant admitted to drinking one quarter of a bottle of vodka the
night before.
After this initial interaction occurred between Officer Bowman and the
Defendant, and after Officer Bowman suspected the Defendant was intoxicated,
Lieutenant Montgomery arrived at the gas station and parked to the left of
Officer Bowman’s vehicle. Lieutenant Montgomery’s testimony that before he
parked his vehicle the Defendant could have backed out and exited is credible.
However, once Lieutenant Montgomery parked next to Officer Bowman it was no
longer possible for the Defendant to exit his parking spot safely, without hitting
either Officer Bowman’s vehicle or Lieutenant Montgomery’s vehicle.
Officer Bowman continued speaking with the Defendant, who admitted he had
been drinking vodka the night before. He requested the Defendant to step out of
the vehicle and submit to Standard Field Sobriety Tests. The Defendant displayed
4 out of 6 clues on the HGN test, was unable to get into the starting position for
the walk and turn test, and then refused any further Standard Field Sobriety Tests.
The arrest of Michael Williams [for DWI] was made without a warrant, after
speaking with Williams and conducting field sobriety tests.
The Defendant consented to the taking of a breath specimen, but it was unable to
be taken. The Defendant then consented to the taking of a blood specimen, which
results exceeded .08.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The 9-1-1 call made by Betty Cluck was reliable, which led to an initial
interaction between the Defendant and Officer Bowman. A reasonable person in
the defendant’s position would have felt free to leave, up until the point that
Officer Bowman and Defendant began discussing possible intoxication.
[T]his Court finds that the initial interaction was consensual, and did not escalate
into a detention until further on. In the course of the consensual encounter,
Officer Bowman formed the suspicion that the Defendant was intoxicated, based
both on his own observations and the report of Defendant’s neighbor’s report to
dispatch. At the point that Officer Bowman began conversing with the Defendant
and suspected he was intoxicated, the interaction escalated to an investigatory
detention, which was justified based on the circumstances. The investigatory
detention did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation.
6
Following the initial consensual encounter, Officer Bowman lawfully detained the
Defendant based on the information he received through dispatch from the 9-1-1
caller, and his own observations that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle
and exhibiting signs of intoxication.
The evidence collected by officers was lawfully seized in the course of
their investigation.
Officer Bowman developed sufficient probable cause to lawfully arrest the
defendant for driving while intoxicated, following the initial consensual
encounter, and subsequent investigatory detention.
DISCUSSION
In two issues on appeal, Williams contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to suppress because (1) his initial interaction with
Officer Bowman was not a consensual encounter, and Officer Bowman lacked reasonable
suspicion to detain him, and (2) “there was insufficient evidence presented that [Williams] was
operating a motor vehicle at the time of his arrest.”
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); State v. Dixon,
206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the
sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Wiede v. State,
214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We therefore apply a bifurcated standard of
review, Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 189–90; Weems v. State, 493 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016), giving almost total deference to a trial court’s findings of historical fact and credibility
determinations that are supported by the record, but reviewing de novo questions of law and the
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trial court’s application of the law to facts that do not turn on credibility and demeanor, Furr
v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Cortez, 543 S.W.3d at 203–04. The same
deferential standard of review applies when a trial court’s findings are based on a video admitted
into evidence at a suppression hearing, and there is a factual dispute regarding its contents.
Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). However, “indisputable video
evidence” may be reviewed de novo, unless the trial court’s findings concern “whether a witness
actually saw what was depicted on a videotape.” State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013).
We review a trial court’s application of search and seizure law to the facts de
novo. State v. Ford, 537 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521,
525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 291 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (distinguishing fact findings from “legal rulings on ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘probable
cause’” because such rulings are “legal conclusions subject to de novo review”). We view the
record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590, and will
overturn its determination only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or “outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement,” Cortez, 543 S.W.3d at 203. We will uphold the ruling if it is correct on any
theory of law applicable to the case, Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190; Weems, 493 S.W.3d at 577, even
if the trial judge made the ruling for a wrong reason, State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014).
Nature of Initial Encounter
In his first issue, Williams contends that his initial interaction with
Officer Bowman constituted an investigatory detention for which Officer Bowman lacked
8
reasonable suspicion. Williams argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the interaction
was a consensual encounter.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by
government officials. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010). Not every encounter between a civilian and a police officer implicates the
Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). There are three distinct types
of police-citizen interactions: (1) consensual encounters that do not implicate the Fourth
Amendment; (2) investigative detentions that are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope
and duration, which must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and
(3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures, which are constitutional only if
supported by probable cause. Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 877; Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 667
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
A consensual encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because the
citizen is free to terminate the encounter at any time. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411; Crain
v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (so long as
citizen feels that he is free to disregard officer and go about his business, officer may approach
and ask questions without implicating Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983) (highlighting that in consensual encounters, individuals “may decline to listen to the
questions at all and may go on [their] way”). “Law enforcement is free to stop and question a
fellow citizen; no justification is required for an officer to request information from a citizen.”
Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411. These types of encounters do not require any justification on the
officer’s part; an officer may initiate a consensual encounter without any indicia of criminal
activity. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980); State v. Castleberry,
9
332 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201
(2002) (even when police officer lacks suspicion of criminal activity he may, among other
things, pose questions to suspect so long as he does not induce suspect’s cooperation by
coercive means).
There is no bright-line rule for determining when a consensual encounter becomes
a seizure. Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 877; Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 667; Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411; see
State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“Each citizen-police
encounter must be factually evaluated on its own terms; there are no per se rules.”). The “crucial
test” is “whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to
ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437; accord Hunter
v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“[T]he dispositive question is whether
the officers conveyed a message to appellant that compliance with their requests was required.”).
In other words, a person is “seized” when an officer, “by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). “The test is necessarily imprecise, because
it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to
focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation.” Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 243–44.
What constitutes a sufficient restraint on liberty “will vary, not only with the
particular conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.” Id. at 244.
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure include “the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of
the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s
10
request might be compelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 244(observing that “[t]he question of when an encounter between police officers and a person in a
car constitutes a ‘seizure’ depends on specific facts as to the manner of the encounter, the degree
of authority displayed, and all other circumstances surrounding the incident”). Furthermore, the
test is objective; it does not rely on the subjective belief of the detainee or the police. Furr,
499 S.W.3d at 878; Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668. Whether the facts surrounding the interaction
between an officer and a citizen constitute a consensual encounter or a Fourth Amendment
detention is subject to de novo review. Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 877; Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184,
192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
With regard to an individual in a parked car, a detention occurs when the person
“complies with a police order to roll down the window, open the door, or get out of the car.”
Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (citing Ebarb v. State,
598 S.W.2d 842, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (on reh’g)); cf. Ashton v. State,
931 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (finding there was no
detention when officer approached car parked in public place and asked driver to roll down her
window); Harper v. State, 217 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.)
(concluding interaction in which officer asked defendant to step out of his vehicle was
consensual encounter). A detention does not occur, however, if the officer “merely approaches a
parked vehicle and knocks on the window.” Martin, 104 S.W.3d at 301 (citing Merideth v. State,
603 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)); see Stewart v. State, 603 S.W.2d 861,
862 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (finding no seizure where police shined spotlights into
van parked on dead-end street, saw four people inside, and approached van on foot, upon which
driver opened door and exited).
11
Here, Officer Bowman testified that he parked his squad car in such a way as to
block one entrance to the Shell station parking lot, and the trial court found his explanation
credible. Neither the car’s siren nor its overhead lights were activated. Although
Officer Bowman parked his car behind Williams’s truck, the trial court found that “at the time
Officer Bowman arrived, it would have been possible for [Williams] to back up to the right of
Officer Bowman’s vehicle, and drive forward to the left to exit the station, without hitting
Officer Bowman’s vehicle.” To the extent that testimony contradicting the trial court’s finding
was offered at the suppression hearing, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact and
credibility determinations and find them supported by the record. See Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 877.
During their initial interaction, Officer Bowman approached the driver’s side of
Williams’s truck and spoke to him through the window, which was already lowered. See
Stewart, 603 S.W.2d at 862 (finding that officer’s approaching vehicle “interfered with no one’s
freedom of movement and caused minimal inconvenience and loss of time”). Officer Bowman
spoke to Williams in a friendly tone and did not draw his service weapon, wield a flashlight, or
make any commands. Moreover, Williams does not assert that Officer Bowman physically
touched him, ordered him to remove the keys from the truck’s ignition, or utilized the squad
car’s spotlight or loudspeaker. Prior to Williams’s formal arrest, Officer Bowman never told
Williams that he was not free to leave, and Williams never attempted to do so.
Williams emphasizes that he testified that he did not feel free to leave, that
Officer Bowman testified that he “[c]ould see someone being a little nervous about backing up in
that situation,” and that Lieutenant Montgomery testified that he could “see where someone
would come to [the] conclusion” that he or she could not leave. However, the subjective beliefs
of both the officers and Williams are irrelevant to our inquiry. See Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 878;
12
Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668. From this record, we conclude that the initial interaction between
Williams and Officer Bowman—including Officer Bowman’s smelling the odor of an alcoholic
beverage; observing Williams’s slurred speech, confusion, and disorientation; and learning that
Williams had drunk a quarter of a “big” bottle of vodka the night before—was a consensual
encounter for which Officer Bowman did not need reasonable suspicion. We therefore overrule
Williams’s first issue.
Probable Cause
In his second issue, Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to suppress because there was “insufficient evidence presented” that he was
“operating a motor vehicle at the time of his arrest.” Specifically, he argues that “[w]ith no
evidence presented as to the operation of the vehicle, it was error for the Judge to find that there
was probable cause to believe that [Williams] committed the offense of Driving
While Intoxicated.” 4
“Probable cause is a fluid concept that cannot be readily reduced to a neat set of
legal rules.” Ford, 537 S.W.3d at 23; accord Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009); see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily,
4 We construe Williams’s second issue as asserting that officers lacked probable cause
for his warrantless arrest. To the extent that he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
proving an element of the charged offense, he may not do so when appealing the denial of a
motion to suppress. See Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[T]he
statutes authorizing pre-trial proceedings do not contemplate a ‘mini-trial’ on the sufficiency of
the evidence to support an element of the offense.”); Gonzalez v. State, 501 S.W.3d 283, 286
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.) (“A suppression hearing is for the limited
purpose of addressing preliminary matters, not the merits of the case itself, and it may not be
used to decide the sufficiency of the evidence to support an element of the offense.”).
13
or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
232 (1983)). “Although the concept evades precise definition, it involves ‘a reasonable ground
for belief of guilt’ that is ‘particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.’”
Ford, 537 S.W.3d at 23 (quoting Baldwin, 278 S.W.3d at 371); see Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371. “It
is a greater level of suspicion than ‘reasonable suspicion’ but falls far short of a preponderance of
the evidence standard.” Ford, 537 S.W.3d at 23–24; accord Baldwin, 278 S.W.3d at 371.
“[I]t is clear that ‘only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is
the standard of probable cause.’” Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).
Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists if, at the time the arrest is made, the
facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that the arrested
person had committed or was committing an offense. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 412; Amador
v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964);
State v. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d 621, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). “The test for probable cause is
an objective one, unrelated to the subjective beliefs of the arresting officer, and it requires a
consideration of the totality of the circumstances facing the arresting officer.” Amador,
275 S.W.3d at 878 (citing Beck, 379 U.S. at 97; Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371).
According to Cluck’s 911 call, Williams had been “drinking for the last week”
and was driving his truck to a gas station. Cluck’s account bore sufficient indicia of reliability to
constitute “reasonably trustworthy information” for purposes of a probable cause determination.
See Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 412; see also Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 399–400
(2014) (noting that use of 911 is “indicator of veracity” and that contemporaneous reports are
14
“especially reliable”); Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(observing that “the degree of reliability significantly improves” when informant provides
self-identifying information); State v. Nelson, 228 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no
pet.) (explaining that “[u]nsolicited information regarding a crime in progress provided by a
citizen who has no relationship with the police and who makes herself accountable by providing
contact information is inherently reliable”).
Approximately six minutes after the 911 call, Officer Bowman located Williams’s
truck in the parking lot of the Shell station identified by Cluck as one of Williams’s possible
destinations. See Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting
requirement of “temporal link” between intoxication and driving for DWI conviction). The
license plate number was the same as that provided by Cluck, and Bowman testified that the
truck was discovered “real close to the intersection where [Cluck] said [Williams] would be
coming from.”
On Officer Bowman’s dash-cam video, the truck’s brake lights were illuminated
as Officer Bowman pulled into the lot, and he can be heard telling Williams, “I saw that the
vehicle brake lights were on and activated, so the vehicle was on when I pulled up.”
Officer Bowman noted in his DWI case report 5 that Williams, the truck’s “sole occupant, was
sitting in the [d]river seat with the keys in the ignition.” Because Officer Bowman encountered
Williams alone in the Shell station parking lot shortly after Cluck reported that Williams was
driving to a gas station, he could have reasonable inferred that Williams had driven to the Shell
station. See Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“[B]ecause
[defendant] was the only person found in the area, a factfinder could have also reasonably
5 The case report was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing.
15
inferred that [defendant] drove his vehicle to the location at which he was found after drinking to
intoxication.”); Kirsch v. State, 366 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.)
(“[T]here were no businesses or houses near the intersection, and [defendant] was in a lane of a
public highway. The jury was free to draw reasonable inferences from the totality of these facts
that [defendant] had driven the motorcycle to that place, and thus had operated the motorcycle
while intoxicated.”); see also Dornbusch v. State, 262 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2008, no pet.) (“[A] parking lot at a public place is not legally different than a roadway for
purposes of a DWI arrest or conviction.”).
Officer Bowman testified that “as soon as [he] made contact with [] Williams,” he
could smell a strong odor of alcohol coming from inside the truck, that Williams’s speech was
slow and slurred, and that Williams seemed disoriented or confused. On the dash-cam video,
Williams stated that he had drunk a quarter of a “big” bottle of vodka the night before and was
still wearing the same outfit, which he explained was possibly the reason for the alcoholic odor.
Williams also stated that he was “just going back home.” When asked why he had two black
eyes, Williams responded that he had fallen down at his house.
Williams consented to undergo SFSTs, and Officer Bowman testified that he
observed four of six possible clues indicating intoxication during the HGN test. Although
Williams also agreed to attempt the walk-and-turn test, Officer Bowman testified that Williams
was unable to stand as needed and refused to undergo further testing. On the video, Williams
stumbled while trying to stand heel-to-toe on a yellow stripe in the Shell parking lot. Following
his refusal to attempt additional tests, Williams was handcuffed and placed under arrest by
Officer Bowman. From this record, we find that the facts and circumstances known to
Officer Bowman were sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that Williams had driven
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while intoxicated. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 412; Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 878. Consequently,
there was probable cause for Williams’s arrest.
We therefore overrule Williams’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Williams’s issues, we affirm the order of the trial court
denying his motion to suppress.
__________________________________________
Edward Smith, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: January 27, 2023
Do Not Publish
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