Zonts v. PGC , 416 P.3d 360 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                   This opinion is subject to revision before final
    publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
    2017 UT 71
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    JACOB ZONTS 1,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    PLEASANT GROVE CITY,
    Respondent.
    No. 20170651
    Filed October 10, 2017
    On Petition for Extraordinary Relief
    Jacob Zonts, Dean Hale, Karl Khuni, Nathan Stoker, Blaine Thatcher,
    and Wendy Morgan, Pleasant Grove, pro se petitioners
    Christine M. Petersen, Pleasant Grove, for respondent
    PER CURIAM:
    ¶ 1 A group of sponsors prepared an initiative and obtained
    sufficient signatures to have that initiative placed on the November
    2017 ballot for the Pleasant Grove City municipal election. The Utah
    County Clerk verified the signatures, and the Pleasant Grove City
    Attorney prepared a proposed ballot title. The sponsors submitted
    comments, and the City Attorney prepared the final ballot title.
    ¶ 2 Dissatisfied with certain aspects of the final ballot title, one of
    the sponsors, Mr. Jacob Zonts, then filed a petition pursuant to
    section 20A-7-508(6)(a) of the Utah Code, which we dismissed for
    failure to comply with the requirement that a petition under that
    provision be brought by at least three sponsors. Mr. Zonts and five
    other sponsors then filed this petition, and we asked the parties for
    supplemental briefing on
    the question of whether Petitioners have met the
    requirements of rule 19 of the Rules of Appellate
    Procedure, including, but not limited to, subparts (b)(4)
    _____________________________________________________________
    1 Other parties to this second petition are: Dean Hale, Karl Kuhni,
    Nathan Stoker, Blaine Thatcher, and Wendy Morgan.
    ZONTS v. PLEASANT GROVE CITY
    Per Curiam
    and (b)(5), pertaining to whether Petitioners possessed
    a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the form of
    filing a petition with the district court at the time they
    received notice from the City Attorney of the final
    ballot title, and in light of this Court’s decisions in
    Anderson v. Provo City, 
    2016 UT 50
    , 
    387 P.3d 1014
    , and
    Brown v. Cox, 
    2017 UT 3
    , 
    387 P.3d 1040
    .
    ¶ 3 On August 30, 2017, we issued a summary order denying the
    petition and indicated this opinion would follow. At the outset, we
    note that section 20A-7-508(6)(a) states “the decision of the local
    attorney may be appealed by a petition to the Supreme Court.” But
    the only means by which such a decision properly may be
    challenged is by a petition for extraordinary relief under rule 65B of
    the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the event a petition in the
    district court does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate
    remedy, under rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Thus, the use of the term “appeal” in the statute could be misleading
    insofar as a prospective challenger of the local attorney’s decision
    views it as implying an entitlement to an appeal of right invoked
    under rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. And
    the statute also could be misleading insofar as it is read to imply that
    this court is the only forum in which a petition for extraordinary
    relief may be sought. Rule 19 expressly requires that a petition
    explain why the petitioners could not have filed a petition in the
    district court. See UTAH R. APP. P. 19(b)(5); Anderson v. Provo City,
    
    2016 UT 50
    , ¶ 3, 
    387 P.3d 1014
    . As we have previously explained,
    rule 19’s requirement to demonstrate why a petition could not be
    filed in the district court “is more than an exercise in ensuring [the
    petitioner] incant[s] magic words.” Brown, 
    2017 UT 3
    , ¶ 28. “When
    an appellate court considers a petition for extraordinary relief
    without any record generated by prior litigation or other official
    proceedings, it ordinarily may grant relief only if that relief is based
    on allegations properly supported by affidavit or other reliable
    documentation.” Gricius v. Cox, 
    2015 UT 86
    , ¶ 5, 
    365 P.3d 1198
    . And,
    in that regard, we have noted our reluctance “to arrive at a legal
    ruling that is dependent on the resolution of disputed facts” because
    we do “not conduct evidentiary hearings (except in those rare
    circumstances in which reference to a special master is deemed
    appropriate).” Carpenter v. Riverton City, 
    2004 UT 68
    , ¶ 4, 
    103 P.3d 127
    .
    ¶ 4 We ordered supplemental briefing to provide the petitioners
    an opportunity to explain why they could not have filed their
    2
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 71
    Per Curiam
    petition in district court. They failed to meet their burden of
    persuading us that they could not have asked the district court to
    review their contentions in the first instance. We emphasize, as we
    have in the past, that district courts are better equipped to resolve
    factual questions and that starting in the district court allows parties
    to create the record that enables this court to conduct a more
    meaningful review. We can understand the petitioners' perception
    that a district court proceeding will only slow their path to our court,
    but we trust our district courts to appropriately expedite these
    petitions in a fashion that contemplates, and allows time for,
    appellate review before ballots are printed. This is the framework the
    Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure establish. And we insist that
    parties comply with these Rules not because the issues they raise are
    not important, but because they are. Adherence to the Rules
    promotes better and more efficient resolution of disputes and a
    party, like the petitioners here, needs to convince us to depart from
    them. The petitioners here did not.
    ¶ 5 The petitioners failed to satisfy their burden under rule 19 of
    demonstrating they possessed no plain, speedy, and adequate
    remedy other than the filing of a petition directly with this court. The
    petition itself assumed that filing directly with this court was the
    appropriate remedy without any discussion of the possibility of
    filing in the district court. And the petitioners’ supplemental brief
    continued to rely on that assumption. Its only references to the
    possibility of filing in the district court were a speculative
    assumption that “Pleasant Grove could have held the decision up in
    the courts,” and a citation to this court’s statement in that “many
    ballot disputes will present tight timelines that will make it either
    impractical or inappropriate to file in the district court,” followed by
    an assertion that the petition in this case involved one of those
    disputes. Anderson, 
    2016 UT 50
    , ¶ 4. The supplemental brief
    provided no further discussion or elucidation of any practical
    obstacles to filing in the district court immediately after the decision
    of the City Attorney, followed by an expedited appeal. 2
    _____________________________________________________________
    2 We do not mean to imply that the necessary showing of the
    absence of a remedy via a filing in the district court either could or
    could not have been made in this case. Without a specific
    explanation from the petitioners as to why the filing of a petition in
    the district court followed by an appeal could not afford a plain,
    speedy, and adequate remedy, we are in no position to make that
    judgment. But we do note that the parties in some election cases
    (continued . . .)
    3
    ZONTS v. PLEASANT GROVE CITY
    Per Curiam
    ¶ 6 Additionally, we found persuasive the respondent’s
    supplemental responsive argument that petitioners had raised
    various grounds for modification of the ballot title that were
    predicated on factual assumptions that were not adequately
    supported by affidavit and that were disputed by Pleasant Grove’s
    response to the prior petition. 3 And the petitioners failed to address
    the obstacles to review that were presented by those factual disputes.
    (continued . . .)
    appear to have failed to appreciate the importance of timely
    initiation of proceedings in the proper forum and of anticipating the
    practical requirements of meeting the timeline for an ultimate
    resolution. As we have stated above, when a petition is filed in the
    district court, the parties and that court should approach the
    proceedings with a keen awareness of the ballot preparation
    deadline if an appeal is filed; and they should collaborate to make
    every reasonable effort to expedite the proceedings in a manner that
    will allow us adequate time for addressing that appeal. And, once an
    appeal is filed, the appellant has the obligation to provide prompt
    and adequately documented notification of the specific deadline for
    action if the relief requested is to be granted. Our clerk of court is not
    obligated to sua sponte expedite an appeal; and a proper and specific
    motion to expedite the appeal may be required. It also should be
    kept in mind that, regardless of whether a case before us is time
    sensitive, we have the obligation to afford all the parties due process
    with respect to written briefs and oral argument, to carefully review
    the record and pleadings below, and to devote sufficient attention to
    the issues that have been properly raised.
    3 We allowed Pleasant Grove to rely on its prior response to the
    earlier petition insofar as the subsequent petition raised the same
    issues and the earlier response had addressed the merits.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Case No. 20170651

Citation Numbers: 2017 UT 71, 416 P.3d 360

Filed Date: 10/10/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023