Commonwealth of Virginia v. Jacob Ryan Tolley ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Huff, O’Brien and AtLee
UNPUBLISHED
Argued by videoconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0087-23-3 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN
MAY 23, 2023
JACOB RYAN TOLLEY
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY
Christopher B. Russell, Judge
Adam L. LaFon, Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney, for appellant.
No brief or argument for appellee.1
Jacob Ryan Tolley, charged with possessing a Schedule I or II controlled substance, moved
to suppress evidence obtained by police during a search of his vehicle. After an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court granted Tolley’s motion, finding that the police did not have reasonable, articulable
suspicion to initiate an investigatory traffic stop. The Commonwealth appealed pursuant to Code
§ 19.2-398(A)(2).
BACKGROUND
“In an appeal by the Commonwealth of an order of the trial court suppressing evidence, the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant and findings of fact are
entitled to a presumption of correctness unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to
support them.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App. 486, 487 (1992).
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
1
Tolley failed to timely file his brief with this Court, and so we do not consider it. See
Code § 19.2-404.
On April 4, 2022, several officers with the Rockbridge Regional Drug Task Force (the task
force) were surveilling a house for illicit drug activity. During their surveillance, they saw Tolley
drive away from the house in a 1992 black GMC Sonoma at the same time a 2005 orange Chevrolet
Aveo left. An officer contacted Deputy Chris Wade, a canine handler with the Rockbridge County
Sheriff’s Office and task force member, and asked him to be “on the lookout” for the two vehicles.
Wade found Tolley’s vehicle parked in a Sheetz parking lot, and later saw the Chevrolet Aveo park
two spots down from Tolley. Wade watched the driver of the Chevrolet walk up to Tolley’s
window, lean in, and engage in a “possible hand to hand transaction.” Both Tolley and the driver of
the Chevrolet then drove away from the parking lot.
Investigator David Anderson, another member of the task force, began searching for
Tolley’s GMC Sonoma after overhearing Wade announce what he had observed over the radio.2
Anderson located Tolley’s vehicle at a stop sign. Anderson saw Tolley drive west, and then
“abruptly ma[ke] an illegal U-turn.” Anderson activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop. When
the vehicles stopped, Anderson drew his firearm and ordered Tolley out of the GMC Sonoma.
Wade arrived afterward with his drug-sniffing dog. The dog responded with a “positive alert,”
indicating the presence of drugs in the vehicle. A subsequent search of Tolley’s vehicle revealed
digital scales and a plastic bag containing methamphetamine.
Tolley moved to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle, asserting that Anderson lacked
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop him.3 The court agreed with Tolley and held that, although
the illegal U-turn provided a “possible reasonable basis” for the stop, “to stop someone for a U-turn
2
Tolley stipulated to a proffer of Anderson’s testimony at the hearing on his motion to
suppress.
3
Tolley also challenged the search of his vehicle. The trial court did not reach that issue,
and it is not before us on appeal.
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and jump out and draw your firearm . . . it puts in a different light the actual basis for the stop.”
Accordingly, the court granted Tolley’s motion and suppressed the evidence. The Commonwealth
appealed.
ANALYSIS
The Commonwealth contends the court erred by considering Anderson’s “actual basis” for
stopping Tolley, and not the objective circumstances justifying the stop. We agree.
When reviewing a motion to suppress, “we review de novo the trial court’s application of
defined legal standards, such as whether the police had reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a
search or seizure.” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 412 (2016).
“Police officer[s] may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, make a brief investigatory
stop of a person when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that criminal
activity may be afoot.” Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 367 (2016); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 (1968). “In making reasonable-suspicion determinations, reviewing courts must look at the
‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized
and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Mason, 291 Va. at 368 (quoting United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).
Our review of whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify an investigatory stop “involves
[the] application of an objective rather than a subjective standard.” Bland, 66 Va. App. at 412.
“Subjective intentions play no role” in the analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996). An officer’s “action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the
individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the]
action.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
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Here, the court incorrectly “limit[ed] itself” to “evidence of [Anderson’s] subjective
rationale,” and should have “look[ed] instead to what a reasonable, objective officer could have
concluded from the totality of the circumstances.” Armstead v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 569,
579 n.7 (2010) (quoting Raab v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 577, 583 n.2 (2007) (en banc)). The
objective circumstances at issue here justified the investigatory stop—Tolley stipulated that he
made an illegal U-turn in front of Anderson, in violation of Code § 46.2-845. “An officer may
effect a traffic stop when he has reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic or equipment violation has
occurred.” McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 553 (2008); see also Mason, 291 Va. at 370-71(holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that a parking pass hanging from the
rearview mirror of a vehicle could have obstructed a clear view of the highway in violation of
Code § 46.2-1054, justifying an investigatory stop of the vehicle). The traffic infraction “clearly
established reasonable articulable suspicion (if not probable cause)” that Tolley had violated the
law, rendering the traffic stop “constitutionally permissible.” Lawson v. Commonwealth, 55
Va. App. 549, 556 (2010); McCain, 275 Va. at 553.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred by disregarding the objective circumstances
justifying the investigatory stop and basing its decision on the officer’s subjective state of mind.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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