United States v. Joshua Woolridge ( 2023 )

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 23a0064p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Plaintiff-Appellee, │
> No. 22-3243
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v. │
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JOSHUA L. WOOLRIDGE, │
Defendant-Appellant. │
│
┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
No. 5:21-cr-00145-1—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: April 6, 2023
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Stephanie F. Kessler, PINALES STACHLER YOUNG & BURRELL CO., L.P.A.,
Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Damoun Delaviz, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
Akron, Ohio, for Appellee.
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OPINION
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SUTTON, Chief Judge. After police detained Joshua Woolridge but before they read
him the required Miranda warnings, Woolridge told the officers that he was out on parole and
that he had carried a gun. Woolridge said the same after the officers gave him the Miranda
warnings minutes later. The district court refused to suppress Woolridge’s post-warning
No. 22-3243 United States v. Woolridge Page 2
statements and imposed a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines range. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
I.
After visiting a convenience store just before midnight, Joshua Woolridge walked
through an Akron neighborhood toward his girlfriend’s apartment. As it happens, police officers
were searching for a fugitive in the area. When Woolridge cut across a vacant lot, Officer
Brandon Collins approached him and asked for his name. Woolridge turned and ran. As he
sprinted, Woolridge tossed several items. Within a few hundred yards, two officers caught
Woolridge.
Woolridge began talking immediately. As Officer Collins searched him, Woolridge said,
“I got a warrant” out for me. R.19 at 2. Moments later, he added “I got a parole violation, sir.”
Id. Collins moved Woolridge to a containment van and took his biographical information. All
the while, Woolridge tried to speak with Collins: “Let me tell you something, sir.” Gov’t
Exhibit 1 at 3:32–35. “Can I talk to you, sir?” Id. at 3:40–45. “Sir, let me talk to you for one
second.” Id. at 4:00–03. “Listen, sir, I got to tell you something else.” Id. at 4:40–45. Collins
brushed him off each time: “Not right now, man.” Id. at 3:43–44. “Just hang tight, okay?” Id.
at 7:15–20.
After a few minutes, Collins asked Woolridge about the items he threw during the chase:
“Nothing illegal then, right?” Id. at 6:20–30. Woolridge said no. As Collins turned away,
Woolridge called him back. “Sir? So, we’ll keep it 100, sir. Let me tell you.” Id. at 6:30–35.
Woolridge explained that his brother had been murdered, and that Woolridge had been trying to
stay out of the way. “I understand that,” Collins said. Id. at 6:50–53. Woolridge added “I had a
firearm on me, sir.” Id. at 6:53–55. “Where’s it at now?” Collins asked. Id. During the next
few minutes, officers searched for the gun. They spotted it only after asking Woolridge to
specify where he threw the gun.
With the gun secured, Woolridge remained talkative. “Can I just talk to you though?” he
asked Collins several times. Id. at 15:55–16:00; id. at 16:20–35. Eventually, Collins promised
that they would talk soon. “But listen,” Woolridge insisted, “‘cus I’m telling you the reason I
No. 22-3243 United States v. Woolridge Page 3
had the gun and everything.” Id. at 16:10–33. “I understand that,” Collins responded. Id. “Now
that we have [the gun], . . . I’ll talk to you. I promise.” Id. at 16:30–40.
Collins returned a few minutes later. As he began to read the Miranda warnings,
Woolridge interrupted, saying “I know my rights, sir.” Id. at 21:20–23. Collins explained that
he needed to give the warnings anyway and proceeded to give them. At the end, Collins added
“and you can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer the questions.” Id. at
21:38–42. “Okay,” Woolridge acknowledged. Id. at 21:41–43.
Collins returned to the subject that Woolridge raised earlier: “Do you want to tell me
what happened and why you were carrying a gun?” Id. at 21:43–46. Woolridge did not hesitate.
He again explained that he had carried the gun due to his brother’s murder. “I had a firearm on
me,” he added, “but I had no intent to try to hurt nobody.” Id. at 22:00–30.
A grand jury charged Woolridge with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). Woolridge moved to suppress the statements he made to Collins before receiving the
Miranda warnings. He did not argue that the post-warning statements violated Miranda. After a
hearing, the district court suppressed the unwarned statements and permitted the admission of the
post-Miranda statements.
Woolridge pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the rejected suppression motion
and any sentence outside his Guidelines range. At sentencing, the court varied upward by 13
months, imposing a 46-month sentence. Woolridge appeals.
II.
Suppression challenge. Woolridge claims that we must vacate his conviction because the
district court should have suppressed the statements he made after he received Miranda
warnings. We review the district court’s fact finding for clear error and its legal decisions afresh.
United States v. Prigmore, 15 F.4th 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2021).
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.” To protect this right, Miranda requires police officers to warn
suspects taken into custody of the right to remain silent and the risk of speaking without a lawyer
No. 22-3243 United States v. Woolridge Page 4
present, along with other warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966).
Generally speaking, courts honor the Miranda rule by suppressing unwarned statements and by
admitting warned statements, the latter because the warnings enable a suspect “to exercise his
own volition in deciding whether” to speak again. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985).
But the warnings do not always suffice to admit post-Miranda statements. If police
officers coerce a suspect in custody or “undermine the suspect’s ability to” stay silent, courts will
refuse to admit even post-Miranda statements. Id. at 309. One fact pattern that has caught
judges’ attention in this area arises when the police withhold warnings until a suspect confesses,
administer Miranda, then pressure the suspect to repeat the confession. Missouri v. Seibert, 542
U.S. 600, 612–13 (2004) (plurality); United States v. Ray (Ray I), 803 F.3d 244, 272 (6th Cir.
2015) (adopting the Seibert plurality).
Even in such cases, post-warning statements remain admissible if the Miranda warnings
nevertheless functioned effectively—if the warnings informed the suspect that he had a genuine
choice to continue speaking. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611–12 & n.4. Absent an interrogation of this
sort or another coercive tactic, the admissibility of a post-warning statement turns “solely” on
whether the suspect spoke “knowingly and voluntarily.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
The district court correctly admitted Woolridge’s post-Miranda statements. Woolridge
spoke voluntarily after receiving Miranda warnings. No coercion or coercive interrogation tactic
compromised the voluntariness of his statements or impaired the effectiveness of the warnings.
Woolridge talked voluntarily. He eagerly spoke to the officers at every opportunity,
“unquestionably” seeking “to volunteer information.” R.19 at 5. He also “freely acknowledged”
his parole status and pressed for a chance to explain why he was carrying a gun that night.
Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 29, 31 (2011) (per curiam); see Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301, 315. That
holds true both before and after the Miranda warnings.
For their part, the officers showed little interest in getting Woolridge to talk. They did
not compel Woolridge to speak through abuse, threats, or incentives. Dixon, 565 U.S. at 29–30;
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 302, 315. Nor did they employ improper tactics to secure a confession. They
did not initiate the conversations, and in fact they hardly spoke to him at all, repeatedly resisting
No. 22-3243 United States v. Woolridge Page 5
his efforts to talk. Officer Collins refused to talk to Woolridge numerous times. And
Woolridge’s own insistence led Collins to speak with Woolridge after the officers found the gun:
“Can I just talk to you for a minute?” Gov’t Exhibit 1 at 16:20–25. Before doing so, Collins
read the Miranda warnings. And Woolridge “cho[se] to speak after being informed of his
rights,” a reality that proves “highly probative” of voluntariness. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
This case does not present the coercive qualities that undermined the Miranda warnings
in Seibert. Police officers subjected Patrice Seibert to “systematic, exhaustive” questioning.
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616. Seibert confessed a half hour later. Id. at 605. Only after they had a
confession in hand did the officers administer Miranda warnings. Then they pressed Seibert to
confess again by recounting her earlier confession. Id. at 616–17. The Court found that this
strategy undermined Miranda. Id. at 613, 616.
Today’s facts do not “remotely resemble the police protocol invalidated in Seibert.”
Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); see Dixon, 565 U.S. at 31(distinguishing Seibert); United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 497 (6th Cir. 2008) (same).
Officer Collins did not employ systematic, exhaustive, or coordinated questioning. And he never
pushed for a confession or exploited Woolridge’s unwarned statements. Cf. Elstad, 470 U.S. at
316.
But even if this had not been the case, even in other words if the police officers had used
improper tactics, the post-warning statements would be admissible because the Miranda
warnings “effectively” conveyed that Woolridge “could choose to stop talking.” Seibert, 542
U.S. at 612. When Collins read the Miranda warnings, he explained that Woolridge had the
“right to remain silent” and that he could “decide at any time to exercise these rights and not
answer the questions.” Gov’t Exhibit 1 at 21:25–42. Collins’ question bolstered those warnings,
asking “Do you want to tell me what happened and why you were carrying a gun?” Id. at 21:43–
46. Woolridge grasped the message. After hearing his rights, Woolridge acknowledged that he
understood them. Id. at 21:41–43. Even before Collins finished the warnings, Woolridge
interrupted to assert “I know my rights.” Id. at 21:20–25. By every indication, Woolridge knew
he had a choice, and he decided to speak anyway.
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Other clues confirm the point. Officer Collins did not treat the pre- and post-Miranda
periods as a single interrogation. Nor did Collins “exploit” Woolridge’s unwarned admission to
pressure him into speaking a second time. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316. Collins instead “began [his]
questioning anew.” R.19 at 6. Fifteen minutes separated Woolridge’s post-Miranda statements
from his first admission that he carried a gun that night. That gap sufficed for Woolridge to
refuse to repeat himself. Cf. McConer, 530 F.3d at 493. The discovery of the gun also
differentiated the pre- and post-Miranda periods. That “change in circumstances” shifted the
questioning from the gun’s location to the consequences of possession, Dixon, 565 U.S. at 32—a
shift that facilitated effective warnings, see Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Woolridge disputes this conclusion. He claims that the Seibert plurality’s test turns
exclusively on five factors: (1) the completeness of the initial questions; (2) the overlap between
the pre- and post-warning statements; (3) “the timing and setting”; (4) “the continuity of police
personnel”; and (5) “the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as
continuous with the first.” Id. at 615 (plurality). But we do not read the inquiry that rigidly. The
Seibert plurality did not “condemn[] us to a mechanical counting of items on a list.” United
States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 887 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court’s decision in Dixon did
not do so either. See Dixon, 565 U.S. at 31–33. And Elstad “direct[ed] courts to avoid” “a rigid
rule” and to instead “examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police
conduct.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318. In Ray I, to be sure, we adopted the “Seibert plurality’s
multi-factor test” and listed some considerations that the plurality employed. Ray I, 803 F.3d at272–73. But we also said that the analysis “hinges on” an encompassing question: Did the
Miranda warning give the suspect “a genuine choice whether to follow up on [his] earlier
admission”? Id. (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616). On this record, the answer is yes.
A blinkered focus on Ray I’s factors would do little for Woolridge’s cause anyway.
Some factors partially weigh in Woolridge’s favor: the officer and the setting stayed roughly the
same, and some of the content of the statements overlapped. But others clearly do not. Fifteen
minutes separated Woolridge’s initial statements from his post-Miranda admissions. McConer,
530 F.3d at 493 (ten-to-fifteen-minute gap). And Officer Collins asked few questions and did
not treat the sessions as continuous. With only a few signals partially favoring Woolridge, the
No. 22-3243 United States v. Woolridge Page 7
district court did not err. See Heron, 564 F.3d at 886–87 (finding no error in admitting
statements because one factor favored that outcome).
Woolridge persists that two cases dictate the outcome today, United States v. Ashmore,
609 F. App’x 306 (6th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Ray (Ray II), 690 F. App’x 366 (6th Cir.
2017). Not true. For one, these unpublished cases do not bind. For another, they treat Seibert as
if it created a rigid test for midstream-Miranda cases, thus misreading Seibert, Elstad, and Dixon.
For still another, these cases do not match this one. Ashmore involved coercive tactics absent
here, Ashmore, 609 F. App’x at 318–19, and Ray II involved a far more formal, detailed
interrogation, Ray II, 690 F. App’x at 368–69, 372–73. In neither case, notably, did the suspect
try over and over to speak to the officers as Woolridge did.
Woolridge also claims that the district court erred in finding that Officer Collins treated
the pre- and post-Miranda periods as distinct. But Woolridge points to no evidence showing that
the court erred in concluding that Collins began his questioning “anew.” R.19 at 6.
One last point. Although no opinion commanded a majority in Seibert, our circuit
adopted the plurality opinion’s objective approach to midstream Miranda warnings, which does
not consider the intent of the officer’s conduct. Ray I, 803 F.3d at 272. In that conclusion, we
are alone. Eight circuits hold that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence controls, which also asks
whether police deliberately undermined Miranda. See United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470,
476 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2005); United States
v. Khweis, 971 F.3d 453, 461 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Fernandez, 48 F.4th 405, 410 &
n.1 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Magallon, 984 F.3d 1263, 1283 (8th Cir. 2021); United
States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Guillen, 995 F.3d 1095,
1116 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006). Two more
have not decided. See United States v. Faust, 853 F.3d 39, 48 n.6 (1st Cir. 2017); United States
v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2015). And one has an intra-circuit split. See United
States v. Hernandez, 751 F.3d 538, 539–40 (7th Cir. 2014); Heron, 564 F.3d at 884–86. On
another day, we should ask whether we must keep our side of this circuit split open.
No. 22-3243 United States v. Woolridge Page 8
III.
Sentencing challenge. Woolridge separately challenges the substantive reasonableness of
his sentence, arguing that the court erred by imposing a sentence above the Guidelines range.
No abuse of discretion occurred. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir.
2018). After calculating the Guidelines range of 27–33 months, the court sentenced Woolridge
to 46 months in prison. The court ably explained its reasons, pointing to Woolridge’s numerous
offenses, his pattern of illegally possessing firearms, and many prison rule infractions. Looking
to Woolridge’s statements at the sentencing hearing, the court also found that Woolridge would
again “try to obtain a gun.” R.39 at 26. Together, these reasons support the court’s decision to
vary the sentence upward in order to deter Woolridge, instill respect for the law, and protect the
public.
Woolridge faults the court for considering his criminal history, pointing out that the
Guidelines range accounts for that history already. But a sentencing court must look to a
defendant’s “history and characteristics.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); United States v. Dunnican,
961 F.3d 859, 881 (6th Cir. 2020). Saying otherwise “would have the practical effect of making
the Guidelines again mandatory.” United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 636 n.1 (6th
Cir. 2010). Besides, the court did not rely exclusively on Woolridge’s criminal history. It also
factored in Woolridge’s conduct during incarceration, his behavior at sentencing, and his pattern
of carrying firearms—all relevant, none fully captured in the Guidelines.
We affirm.