Case: 23-1175 Document: 48 Page: 1 Filed: 05/03/2023
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SOMONA LOFTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2023-1175
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:22-cv-00782-CFL, Senior Judge Charles F. Lettow.
______________________
Decided: May 3, 2023
______________________
SOMONA MARIE LOFTON, Fairfield, CA, pro se.
JOSHUA A. MANDLEBAUM, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,
DOUGLAS K. MICKLE.
______________________
Before TARANTO, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1175 Document: 48 Page: 2 Filed: 05/03/2023
2 LOFTON v. US
PER CURIAM.
Somona Lofton sued the United States in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court), seeking an award
of two million dollars and other judicial action (including
imprisonment of the California Governor and other per-
sons). Ms. Lofton alleged that several federal agencies,
along with federal and state officials, “use[d] [her] for an
illegal human experiment” in violation of several federal
constitutional and statutory provisions, a federal regula-
tion, and a California state statute. SAppx. 4. The United
States moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, but Ms.
Lofton never filed a response. Eleven days after the dead-
line to respond had passed, the Claims Court sua sponte
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute under Claims
Court Rule 41(b). Ms. Lofton appeals that dismissal. Be-
cause we conclude that the Claims Court lacked jurisdic-
tion, we affirm the Claims Court’s dismissal.
I
On July 19, 2022, Ms. Lofton, proceeding pro se, sued
the United States in the Claims Court, alleging that sev-
eral federal agencies, Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Claims Court violated the following: the First, Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution;
18 U.S.C. § 242 (a criminal statute prohibit-
ing the deprivation of any person’s constitutional rights un-
der color of state or territorial law);
18 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (a
criminal statute prohibiting the destruction or removal of
public records); 50 U.S.C. § 1520a (a statute generally pro-
hibiting the Secretary of Defense from testing chemical
agents on civilian populations); and
49 C.F.R. § 801.56 (a
National Transportation Safety Board regulation exempt-
ing, under certain circumstances, personal or medical files
from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA),
5 U.S.C. § 552)—the violations committed by
“invading [her] privacy,” “follow[ing] [her] everywhere,”
“tortur[ing] [her] by using [her] accounts for fraud,”
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LOFTON v. US 3
“communicat[ing] to [her] using ultrasonic audio,”
“spray[ing] [her] with chemicals,” and “us[ing] her for an
illegal human experiment.” SAppx. 3–6, 12. 1
Ms. Lofton also alleged that California state officials
violated
18 U.S.C. § 371 (a criminal statute prohibiting
conspiring to defraud or to commit any offense against the
United States) by using “electronic devices to . . . defraud
Government funds” and by bribing “U.S. citizen[s] to tam-
per with witness[es] and victims.” SAppx. 1. She further
alleged that those state officials violated California Educa-
tion Code § 48900 (a California state statute listing the
grounds for suspension or expulsion of a student) by
“kick[ing]” her second-grade son “out of school.” SAppx. 11.
Finally, Ms. Lofton alleged that federal and state offi-
cials did not adequately address the purported wrongdo-
ings after she reported them. Specifically, Ms. Lofton said,
“Gavin Newsom . . . used his relationship with the Judges,
clerks and Joe Biden [and] Kamala Harris[]” to “delete foot-
age from the Old Solano Courthouse to protect the employ-
ees who destroyed [her] case,” SAppx. 12; see also SAppx.
13, 18, possibly referring to complaints that Ms. Lofton
1 Ms. Lofton subsequently filed two more actions not
addressed in the present opinion. One is case no. 22-1335
in the Claims Court, which appears to have been dis-
missed. See Lofton v. United States, No. 1:22-cv-1335-AOB
(Fed. Cl.), ECF No. 1 (Complaint), ECF No. 14 (Order of
Dismissal). Ms. Lofton’s appeal in that matter is sepa-
rately pending in this court. Lofton v. United States,
No. 2023-1181 (Fed. Cir.). The second is case no. 21-1348
in the Claims Court, which also appears to have been dis-
missed. See Lofton v. United States, No. 1:21-cv-01348-
MBH (Fed. Cl.), ECF No. 1 (Complaint), ECF No. 6 (Order
of Dismissal). Ms. Lofton’s appeal in that matter is sepa-
rately pending in this court. See Lofton v. United States,
No. 2023-1632 (Fed. Cir.).
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4 LOFTON v. US
filed in California state court, see generally Lofton v. United
States, No. 1:22-cv-00782-CFL (Fed. Cl. July 19, 2022),
ECF No. 1-1 (attaching the state court filings). And Ms.
Lofton alleged that the judges and clerks of the Claims
Court “are paid to cover for the president, vice president
and governor Gavin Newsom,” SAppx. 14, and that the
state officials directed the Claims Court to “reject [her]
claim,” SAppx. 9.
As relief, Ms. Lofton requested two million dollars—
$500,000 in “[p]unitive damages” for each year that Gavin
Newsom has served as governor of California—and life im-
prisonment for the alleged wrongdoers. SAppx. 30.
On September 15, 2022, the United States moved to
dismiss Ms. Lofton’s complaint under Claims Court Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ms. Lofton’s
response was due on October 17, 2022 (based on an exten-
sion of the original deadline of October 13). Having re-
ceived no response to the government’s motion by the due
date, the Claims Court, on October 28, 2022, dismissed Ms.
Lofton’s complaint under Claims Court Rule 41(b)—which
allows the Claims Court to “dismiss [an action] on its own
motion” “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or a court order”—and entered final judg-
ment on the same day. Ms. Lofton timely filed a notice of
appeal on November 14, 2022, within the 60 days allowed
by
28 U.S.C. § 2107(b). We have jurisdiction under
28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II
On appeal, Ms. Lofton and the government only briefly
contest the propriety of the Claims Court’s dismissal under
Rule 41(b). See Ms. Lofton’s Informal Opening Br. at 1;
United States’ Informal Response Br. at 9. Rather, before
us, the parties principally dispute whether the Claims
Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. See
Ms. Lofton’s Informal Opening Br. at 1–3; United States’
Informal Response Br. at 9–18. Because we conclude that
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LOFTON v. US 5
the Claims Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
Ms. Lofton’s claims, we need not and do not decide whether
all the requirements of Rule 41(b) were met.
A
“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ pos-
sessing ‘only that power authorized by [the] Constitution
and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton,
568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of Amer-
ica,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Consequently, “every fed-
eral appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself
not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower
courts in a cause under review.’” Bender v. Williamsport
Area School District,
475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (quoting
Mitchell v. Maurer,
293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)); see Corus
Group PLC v. International Trade Commission,
352 F.3d
1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 13 Charles A. Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3522 (3d ed. up-
dated Apr. 2023).
We decide de novo whether the Claims Court had sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Lofton’s claims. See Petro-
Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States,
862 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (citing Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Under-
writers, Inc. v. United States,
805 F.3d 1082, 1087 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). Although we interpret pro se plaintiffs’ complaints
liberally, see Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), Ms.
Lofton still bears the burden of establishing the Claims
Court’s jurisdiction, see Brandt v. United States,
710 F.3d
1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Taylor v. United States,
303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
The Claims Court may not entertain a monetary claim
against the United States unless the United States has
consented to that suit—i.e., has waived its sovereign im-
munity. See, e.g., United States v. King,
395 U.S. 1, 4
(1969); see also United States v. Bormes,
568 U.S. 6, 9–10
(2012); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586–87
(1941). The Tucker Act is one such waiver. United States
Case: 23-1175 Document: 48 Page: 6 Filed: 05/03/2023
6 LOFTON v. US
v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). It grants the Claims
Court jurisdiction only over “any claim against the United
States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department,
or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases
not sounding in tort.”
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
“The Tucker Act itself,” however, “does not create a
substantive cause of action.” Fisher v. United States,
402
F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Mitchell,
463 U.S.
at 216; United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)).
Instead, to invoke the Claims Court’s jurisdiction under the
Tucker Act, the “plaintiff must identify a separate source
of substantive law that creates the right to money dam-
ages”—i.e., a “money-mandating” law.
Id. (citing Mitchell,
463 U.S. at 216–17; Testan,
424 U.S. at 398). At the plead-
ing stage, a substantive law is money mandating if the
plaintiff makes “a non-frivolous allegation,”
id., that the
law “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation
by the [United States],” United States v. Navajo Nation,
556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009) (quoting Testan,
424 U.S. at 400);
see Maine Community Health Options v. United States,
140
S. Ct. 1308, 1327–28 (2020).
B
Ms. Lofton did not plead any qualifying money-man-
dating source of substantive law. Ms. Lofton’s invocation
of
18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 371, and 2071(a), which are only crim-
inal statutes, not money-mandating statutes, is insuffi-
cient because the Claims Court does not have jurisdiction
to hear criminal matters. See Joshua v. United States,
17
F.3d 378, 379–80 (Fed. Cir. 1994). To the extent that Ms.
Lofton refers to those criminal statutes in an attempt to
allege tort claims, the allegations fail because the Claims
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear tort claims. See Brown v.
United States,
105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[The
Claims Court] lacks jurisdiction over tort actions against
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LOFTON v. US 7
the United States.” (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Keene
Corp v. United States,
508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993))).
Ms. Lofton’s complaint also cites 50 U.S.C. § 1520a, a
statute that generally prohibits the Secretary of Defense
from conducting “any test or experiment involving the use
of a chemical agent or biological agent on a civilian popula-
tion,” id. § 1520a(a)(1);
49 C.F.R. § 801.56, a regulation of
the National Transportation Safety Board that exempts
personal or medical files from public disclosure under the
FOIA,
5 U.S.C. § 552, “if [the files’] disclosure would harm
the individual concerned or would be a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of the person’s personal privacy”; and Cal-
ifornia Education Code § 48900, a state statute listing the
circumstances under which a student may be “suspended
from school or recommended for expulsion.” None of those
provisions can fairly be read to mandate compensation by
the United States. In addition, “[c]laims founded on state
law are . . . outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of
the [Claims Court].” Sounders v. South Carolina Public
Service Authority,
497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (cit-
ing
28 U.S.C. § 1491; Mitchell,
463 U.S. at 215–18).
Ms. Lofton’s complaint cites the First, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. But putting aside the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is not invoked here,
no decision of which we are aware holds any of those provi-
sions to be money-mandating for the purposes of the
Tucker Act, and we have in fact recognized the contrary.
See United States v. Connolly,
716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (“[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment, standing alone, cannot
be so interpreted to command the payment of money.”); Le-
Blanc v. United States,
50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“His complaint included counts alleging violation of his
rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the doctrine of separation
of powers. None of these is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
because they do not mandate payment of money by the
Case: 23-1175 Document: 48 Page: 8 Filed: 05/03/2023
8 LOFTON v. US
government.”); J & L Janitorial Services, Inc. v. United
States,
231 Ct. Cl. 837, 838 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (due process and
equal protection guarantees of Fifth Amendment not
money-mandating); see also Omran v. United States,
629 F.
App’x 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“The Sixth
Amendment does not itself create a right to recover money
damages . . . .”). In particular, for at least that reason, the
Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Ms. Lofton’s dam-
ages claim for a due-process violation based on the alleged
inadequate treatment of her allegations of wrongdoing.
Further, to the extent that Ms. Lofton, while caption-
ing her case to list only the United States as a defendant,
is seeking relief from a state or local government, or from
federal or state officials as individuals, the Claims Court
lacks jurisdiction over those claims. See Sherwood,
312
U.S. at 588 (“[I]f the relief sought is against others than the
United States the suit as to them must be ignored as be-
yond the jurisdiction of the [Claims Court].”); Brown,
105
F.3d at 624 (“The Tucker Act grants the [Claims Court] ju-
risdiction over suits against the United States, not against
individual federal officials.”). And finally, Ms. Lofton in
this court invokes
42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Ms. Lofton’s Infor-
mal Opening Br. at 1–2, but the Claims Court lacks juris-
diction over this claim even if we set aside the absence of
invocation of that statute in the Claims Court and the fact
that the statute is limited to persons acting under state or
territorial law, see Settles v. U.S. Parole Commission,
429
F.3d 1098, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Coleman v.
United States,
635 F. App’x 875, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam). Congress provided for jurisdiction in the district
courts for § 1983 claims of the sort at issue here (wholly
aside from inapplicability to the United States), see
28
U.S.C. § 1343, and jurisdiction under the “Tucker Act is
displaced . . . when a law assertedly imposing monetary li-
ability on the United States contains its own judicial rem-
edies,” Bormes,
568 U.S. at 12.
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LOFTON v. US 9
III
We have considered Ms. Lofton’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
conclude that the Claims Court lacked subject-matter ju-
risdiction over Ms. Lofton’s claims, so we affirm the Claims
Court’s dismissal of Ms. Lofton’s complaint.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
AFFIRMED
