Starla Gough v. Dale Gough (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Jun 30 2015, 7:46 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Robert A. Plantz                                         Samantha M. Joslyn
    Robert A. Plantz & Associates, LLC                       Rensselaer, Indiana
    Merrillville, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Starla Gough,                                            June 30, 2015
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    37A03-1411-DR-414
    v.                                               Appeal from the Jasper Superior
    Court
    Dale Gough,                                              The Honorable Robert M. Hall,
    Appellee-Respondent.                                     Senior Judge
    Cause No. 37D01-1212-DR-1156
    Najam, Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Starla Gough (“Mother”) appeals the dissolution court’s final decree, which
    ended her marriage to Dale Gough (“Father”). Mother presents the following
    issues for our review:
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    1.      Whether the dissolution court abused its discretion when it
    awarded Father parenting time pursuant to the Indiana
    Parenting Time Guidelines.
    2.      Whether the dissolution court abused its discretion when it
    calculated Father’s child support obligation.
    3.      Whether the dissolution court abused its discretion when it
    divided the marital pot.
    4.      Whether the dissolution court abused its discretion when it
    denied Mother’s request that Father pay her attorney’s
    fees.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   Father and Mother married in 1996, and they have three children together:
    W.G., born November 20, 2000; and twins C.G. and L.G., born January 22,
    2003 (collectively “the children”). During the marriage, Father worked full
    time and, after W.G.’s birth, Mother was a stay-at-home mom. In January
    2012, Mother was hospitalized for a serious illness, and, after undergoing three
    surgeries during early 2012, Mother suffered a stroke in June 2012. As a result
    of the stroke, Mother developed various mental and physical impairments.
    [4]   On December 13, 2012, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage.
    Following a hearing, the dissolution court issued a provisional order whereby
    Mother was awarded physical custody of the children; Father was awarded
    parenting time every other weekend, but with “no overnights until further court
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    order”; Father was ordered to pay $475 per week in child support; Father was
    ordered to pay certain “ongoing marital debts and obligations”; and Father was
    ordered to pay $1500 to Mother’s attorney for fees. Appellant’s App. at 19-20.1
    Mother and the children continued to reside in the marital residence, with
    Father paying the mortgage and bills. Father moved in with his fiancée, who
    was living in a one-bedroom apartment.
    [5]   At the final hearing in June 2014, Mother testified that, as a result of the stroke
    she suffered in 2012, she is unable to work. Mother presented evidence that she
    is currently seeking employment through a program called IMPACT, which
    helps disabled2 people seek employment. But Mother testified that IMPACT
    has been unsuccessful in finding her work that she is able to do. Still, when
    asked to describe her daily activities, Mother testified that she “do[es] laundry
    and cook[s], clean[s], take[s] care of the dogs, the cats, the birds, the fish tank,
    the kids—help[s] them with their [sic] driving them for their games [and other
    activities].” Tr. at 48. Mother did not testify that she had any difficulty
    completing those tasks. And Mother submitted two child support obligation
    worksheets to the trial court—one worksheet listed her income as zero and the
    second listed her income at minimum wage.
    1
    We note that we had difficulty finding relevant pleadings in the Appendix submitted on appeal because, in
    her table of contents, Mother did not specify the page numbers associated with each pleading.
    2
    Mother has applied for Social Security disability benefits, but she has been denied.
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    [6]   Mother did not submit a list of marital assets to the trial court. Father
    submitted a list of personal property that he wanted the trial court to award
    him, but neither party submitted evidence of the value of any of those items. It
    is undisputed that the parties have no equity in the marital residence. The
    evidence shows that Father used to have a 401(k) account, but that account had
    no value as of the final hearing. And the evidence shows that Father has a
    pension through his employment, but neither party presented any evidence
    regarding the value of that pension or whether Father’s interest in the pension
    has vested.
    [7]   Following the hearing, the dissolution court took the matter under advisement
    and subsequently issued the decree, which provides in relevant part:
    CUSTODY, SUPPORT AND VISITATION
    As to custody, the court finds the parties should have joint legal
    custody with primary physical possession with Mother subject to
    Father’s rights as provided in the Indiana Parenting Time
    Guidelines, with no restrictions thereon.
    Support is established pursuant to Wife’s Exhibit 4 with Father to
    pay Four Hundred Forty-seven Dollars ($447.00) per week
    commencing on Friday July 11, 2014. . . .
    ***
    PROPERTY:
    The court finds there are no assets of the marriage with any
    value, based on the evidence submitted. The court finds that
    there are debts incurred by the parties during the marriage that
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    need to be determined, including the payment of the debts
    ordered in the Provisional Order. The court finds that the
    marital residence, which has no equity, should be and hereby is
    awarded to Father subject to the debt thereon. Father shall hold
    Mother harmless thereon. Mother has requested and Father has
    agreed that Mother may continue to reside in the marital
    residence. Father shall keep Mother informed as to the status of
    the foreclosure on the marital residence. Absent a court order
    evicting Mother from said residence, of which Father is unaware,
    he shall give her at least thirty (30) days notice of any
    requirement to vacate said residence.
    Father may have a 401k Pension and the evidence discloses that
    there is no value therein for division by the court. The court
    finds that the same should be set over to Father as his sole and
    separate property.
    As to the van that is in possession of Mother, she has had it
    refinanced, it is in her name, and shall be set over to her as her
    sole and separate property subject to the debt thereon. Mother
    shall hold Father harmless on said debt.
    As to the personal property set forth in Husband’s Exhibit C, the
    court finds the tangible property listed thereon, with the
    exception of the thirty-nine (39) inch TV, shall be set over to
    Father and all remaining tangible personal property, including
    the thirty-nine (39) inch TV, shall be set over to Mother. Counsel
    stipulated in open court that they would make arrangements for
    Father to acquire the property set over to him and are to do so.
    All intangible personal property shall remain in the possession of
    whoever currently has any such property in his or her name.
    MARITAL DEBT:
    Father shall be responsible for paying all bills of the marriage,
    specifically including those set forth in the Provisional Order and
    shall hold Mother harmless from any such debts. Further the
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    court notes that Father’s requirement to pay any ongoing bills
    during the pendency of the case pursuant to the Provisional
    Order terminates on the entry of this Decree.
    ATTORNEY FEES:
    The court further finds that each of the parties shall be
    responsible for his or her own attorney fees, except for the
    allowance made in the Provisional Order herein.
    Appellant’s App. at 25-27. Father and Mother filed cross motions to correct
    error, which the dissolution court denied. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    Standard of Review
    [8]   The dissolution court entered findings and conclusions sua sponte. Sua sponte
    findings control only as to the issues they cover and a general judgment will
    control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Mullin v. Mullin, 
    634 N.E.2d 1340
    , 1341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). A general judgment entered with
    findings will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by
    the evidence. 
    Id. When a
    court has made special findings of fact, an appellate
    court reviews sufficiency of the evidence using a two-step process. First, it must
    determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact;
    second, it must determine whether those findings of fact support the trial court’s
    conclusions of law. Estate of Reasor v. Putnam Cnty., 
    635 N.E.2d 153
    , 158 (Ind.
    1994). Findings will only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. 
    Id. Findings are
    clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to
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    support them either directly or by inference. 
    Id. A judgment
    is clearly
    erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. State v.
    Van Cleave, 
    674 N.E.2d 1293
    , 1296 (Ind. 1996), reh’g granted on other grounds, 
    681 N.E.2d 181
    (Ind. 1997). In order to determine that a finding or conclusion is
    clearly erroneous, an appellate court’s review of the evidence must leave it with
    the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
    Id. at 1295.
    Issue One: Parenting Time
    [9]    Mother first contends that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it
    awarded Father parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time
    Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). In particular, Mother objects to Father having
    overnight visits with the children. We review a trial court’s determination of a
    parenting time issue for an abuse of discretion. J.M. v. N.M., 
    844 N.E.2d 590
    ,
    599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. No abuse of discretion occurs if there is
    a rational basis in the record supporting the trial court’s determination. 
    Id. We will
    neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. 
    Id. In all
    parenting time controversies, courts are required to give foremost consideration
    to the best interests of the child. 
    Id. [10] Mother
    begins by directing us to Indiana Code Section 31-17-4-1(a), which
    provides that a parent who is not granted custody of the child is entitled to
    reasonable parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that
    parenting time by the noncustodial parent might endanger the child’s physical
    health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development. Mother
    asserts that Father’s “one bedroom apartment with his girlfriend is not a proper
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    or safe environment, physically or emotionally, for these three small children.”
    Appellant’s Br. at 12. Thus, she maintains that the dissolution court abused its
    discretion when it ordered parenting time under the Guidelines.
    [11]   Mother’s contention on this issue is merely a request that we reweigh the
    evidence, which we will not do. Mother supports her argument on appeal with
    her self-serving testimony at the final hearing. The dissolution court was
    entitled to discredit that testimony. Moreover, Father testified that he would
    provide air mattresses and a couch for the children to use when they stayed at
    his residence, and he also testified that he was seeking a new residence with
    more than one bedroom to accommodate the children. Mother has not
    demonstrated that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it awarded
    Father parenting time under the Guidelines, including overnight visits.
    Issue Two: Child Support
    [12]   Mother next contends that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it
    calculated Father’s child support obligation. In particular, Mother asserts that
    the dissolution court erred when it imputed her income at a minimum-wage
    level. Mother states that, because of her physical disabilities, she is unable to
    work, even at a minimum-wage job. But at the final hearing, Mother submitted
    as Exhibit 4 a child support obligation worksheet that attributed minimum-
    wage income to her. The dissolution court adopted the calculation of Father’s
    child support obligation as indicated on that exhibit. As such, any error was
    invited, and Mother cannot now complain. Balicki v. Balicki, 
    837 N.E.2d 532
    ,
    541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reiterating doctrine of invited error is grounded in
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    estoppel and precludes a party from taking advantage of an error that she
    commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or
    misconduct), trans. denied.
    Issue Three: Marital Pot
    [13]   Mother appears to raise several issues regarding the marital pot. We address
    each in turn. Mother first contends that the dissolution court abused its
    discretion when it excluded Father’s pension from the marital pot. In an action
    for dissolution of marriage under Indiana Code Section 31-15-2-2, the court
    shall divide the property of the parties, whether:
    (1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;
    (2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:
    (A) after the marriage; and
    (B) before final separation of the parties; or
    (3) acquired by their joint efforts.
    [14]   This statute requires all property to be considered in the marital estate. Fobar v.
    Vonderahe, 
    771 N.E.2d 57
    , 60 (Ind. 2002). With certain limited exceptions, the
    “one-pot” theory of Indiana family law specifically prohibits the exclusion of
    any asset from the scope of the trial court’s power to divide and award.
    Thompson v. Thompson, 
    811 N.E.2d 888
    , 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
    “Only property acquired by an individual spouse after the final separation date
    is excluded from the marital estate.” 
    Id. Court of
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    [15]   Here, Mother asserts that Father has a pension and that the dissolution court
    abused its discretion when it excluded that pension from the marital pot. But it
    is well established that, for a pension to be included in the marital pot, the
    pension must be vested. See Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98; Dowden v. Allman, 
    696 N.E.2d 456
    , 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). And neither party presented evidence to
    show that Father’s interest in his pension is vested.3 Absent any evidence that
    Father’s interest in his pension is vested, the trial court appropriately excluded it
    from the marital pot. See 
    Dowden, 696 N.E.2d at 458
    ; see also Grammer v.
    Grammer, 
    566 N.E.2d 1080
    , 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding trial court
    erroneously included the husband’s pension plan in the marital assets where the
    record was not clear that the pension had vested); Livingston v. Livingston, 
    583 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding trial court did not err by
    excluding husband’s 401(k) plan from the marital assets where the “evidence
    does not establish unequivocally a vesting or present value of the plan”), trans.
    denied. Therefore, the dissolution court did not err when it excluded from the
    marital pot the value of Father’s pension plan, if any.4
    [16]   Next, to the extent Mother contends that the dissolution court erred when it
    found that there are no assets of the marriage with any value, Mother does not
    support that contention with cogent argument, and the issue is waived. Ind.
    Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Waiver notwithstanding, Mother did not present
    3
    There is no indication that Mother attempted to obtain this crucial information through discovery.
    4
    We also note that neither party presented evidence regarding the value of Father’s pension.
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    evidence showing that the parties had any assets other than items of personal
    property of unknown value discussed at the hearing. And the parties stipulated
    to the division of the bulk of the personal property during the hearing. Because
    Mother did not present any evidence regarding the values of various marital
    assets to the dissolution court, again, any error was invited, and she cannot now
    complain. 
    Balicki, 837 N.E.2d at 541
    ; see also In re Marriage of Church, 
    424 N.E.2d 1078
    , 1081-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (noting “that any party who fails to
    introduce evidence as to the specific value of the marital property at the
    dissolution hearing is estopped from appealing the distribution on the ground of
    trial court abuse of discretion based on that absence of evidence”).
    [17]   Finally, to the extent Mother contends that the dissolution court abused its
    discretion when it “order[ed] an equal division of the parties’ debts,” again, that
    contention is not supported by cogent argument. Appellant’s Br. at 14.
    Regardless, the evidence clearly shows that the dissolution court ordered Father
    to pay the majority of the parties’ marital debts, totaling approximately $20,000,
    and it ordered Mother to pay only the debt associated with her van, which is
    approximately $5,000.5 Thus, the dissolution court did not order an equal
    division of the parties’ debts. This contention is entirely without merit. Mother
    has not demonstrated that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it
    divided the marital pot.
    5
    The evidence does not show the present value of that van, which was awarded to Mother.
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    Issue Four: Attorney’s Fees
    [18]   Mother contends that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it denied
    her request that Father pay her attorney’s fees. Indiana Code Section 31-15-10-
    1 provides that a trial court may order a party to pay a reasonable amount to
    the other party for the cost of maintaining or defending any action in
    dissolution proceedings. We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees in
    connection with a dissolution decree for an abuse of discretion. Hartley v.
    Hartley, 
    862 N.E.2d 274
    , 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The trial court abuses its
    discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances before it. 
    Id. When making
    such an award, the trial court must
    consider the resources of the parties, their economic condition, the ability of the
    parties to engage in gainful employment and to earn adequate income, and
    other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award. 
    Id. [19] Mother’s
    sole contention on this issue is that, because she is unable to work and
    Father makes approximately $100,000 per year, the dissolution court should
    have ordered Father to pay her attorney’s fees. But this court has held that,
    “while disparity of income may be considered in awarding attorney[’s] fees, a
    trial court is not required to award fees based on disparity of income alone.”
    Russell v. Russell, 
    693 N.E.2d 980
    , 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. There
    is no abuse of discretion for the trial court not to do that which it is not required
    to do. 
    Id. [20] Affirmed.
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    Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.
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