Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC , 471 Mass. 248 ( 2015 )

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SJC-11756
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, trustee,1 vs.
FITCHBURG CAPITAL, LLC, & others.2
Suffolk. January 5, 2015. - April 15, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk,
& Hines, JJ.
Mortgage, Real estate, Discharge, Foreclosure, Dragnet clause.
Real Property, Mortgage. Limitations, Statute of.
Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Statute of limitations.
Statute, Retroactive application, Construction. Due
Process of Law, Retroactive application of statute, Statute
of limitations. Constitutional Law, Contract clause.
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on July
2, 2012.
A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Robert
B. Foster, J., and entry of separate and final judgment was
ordered by him.
1
Of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-backed
Pass-through Certificates, Series 2004-R11 under the Pooling and
Service Agreement dated as of December 1, 2004.
2
Lee Bourque; Federal National Mortgage Association; and
John Burdick, trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Bernard
Saulnier.
2
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Jeffrey T. Angley (Robert K. Hopkins with him) for
Fitchburg Capital, LLC.
Jeffrey B. Loeb for the plaintiff.
Thomas O. Moriarty, for Real Estate Bar Association for
Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Philip F. Coppinger, for Ry-Co International, Ltd., amicus
curiae, submitted a brief.
HINES, J. Under a 2006 amendment to the so-called
"obsolete mortgage" statute, a mortgage becomes unenforceable
after a certain number of years: a mortgage in which the term
or maturity date is stated becomes unenforceable five years
after the expiration of the term and a mortgage in which the
term or maturity date is not stated becomes unenforceable
thirty-five years after recording.3 G. L. c. 260, § 33, as
amended by St. 2006, c. 63, § 6. The defendant Fitchburg
Capital, LLC (Fitchburg), foreclosed on two mortgages at a time
when both mortgages would be unenforceable under the amended
statute if the five-year statute of limitations was applicable.
In this appeal, we interpret the amended statute to determine
whether a mortgage stating only the term or maturity date of the
underlying debt is a "mortgage in which the term or maturity
date of the mortgage is stated" under G. L. c. 260, § 33, and
3
The limitations periods may be extended by recording an
extension or an affidavit or acknowledgment of nonpayment.
G. L. c. 260, §§ 33-34.
3
whether the retroactive application of § 33 to mortgages
recorded before the effective date of the amendment is
constitutional.
The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as
trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-backed
Pass-through Certificates, Series 2004-R11 under the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement dated as of December 1, 2004 (Deutsche
Bank), filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a
declaration that the mortgages are discharged under the obsolete
mortgage statute and the foreclosure auction conducted on the
property securing those mortgages is null and void.4 In a well-
reasoned opinion, a Land Court judge granted partial summary
judgment for Deutsche Bank, concluding that reference in the
mortgages to the term of the underlying debt was sufficient to
state the "term or maturity date of the mortgage"; that the
mortgages became obsolete pursuant to G. L. c. 260, § 33; and,
4
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-backed Pass-through
Certificates, Series 2004-R11 under the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement dated as of December 1, 2004 (Deutsche Bank), also
sought summary judgment on its equitable subrogation claim,
arguing that the mortgages held by Fitchburg Capital, LLC
(Fitchburg), should be equitably subordinated to the mortgage
held by Deutsche Bank because the Fitchburg mortgages were
junior liens when granted and that the priority liens were paid
off from proceeds from loans from Deutsche Bank's predecessors
in title. Because of his conclusion that the mortgages were
discharged, the judge did not reach Deutsche Bank's equitable
subrogation claim. We affirm and therefore decline to reach
Deutsche Bank's equitable subrogation claim.
4
therefore, that the foreclosure sale conducted by Fitchburg was
null and void. The judge rejected Fitchburg's constitutional
challenge to the statute. We transferred Fitchburg's appeal to
this court on our own motion and now affirm.5
1. Background. The following facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, are drawn from the
summary judgment record. On or about April 30, 2012, Fitchburg
conducted a foreclosure auction purporting to sell a property
located at 11 Nutting Street, Fitchburg (property). Lee
Bourque, a defendant, held record title to the property at all
relevant times.
At the time of the purported foreclosure sale, Fitchburg
held two mortgages secured by the property: (1) a mortgage
dated April 13, 1999, from Lee Bourque to John Christiano,
recorded May 14, 1999 (Christiano mortgage);6 and (2) a mortgage
dated December 16, 2002, from Lee Bourque to Bourque Development
5
We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Real Estate
Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and Abstract Club; and
by Ry-Co International, Ltd.
6
The Christiano mortgage states, "Lee Bourque . . .
grant[s] to John Christiano . . . with mortgage covenants, to
secure the payment of $9,722.00 . . . in one year with twenty
percent interest per annum, payable in one year . . . , as
provided in the promissory note of even date, the [property]."
5
Corp., recorded December 18, 2002 (BDC mortgage).7 There is no
evidence that any party recorded an extension for either
mortgage, an acknowledgement or affidavit that either of the
mortgages was not satisfied, or a discharge of either mortgage.
The original mortgagee assigned the BDC mortgage to Fitchburg by
agreement dated March 19, 2010. The Christiano mortgage was
assigned to Fitchburg on August 5, 2011, by the then-current
holder and prior assignee, the estate of Jack Rosenblit.
The obligation underlying the Christiano mortgage is a note
dated April 13, 1999, with a maturity date of May 1, 2000. The
only obligation indicated in the record as underlying the BDC
mortgage is a note dated December 16, 2002, with a maturity date
of December 31, 2003. Fitchburg asserts that the maturity date
of the loan underlying the BDC mortgage was extended to December
1, 2007, but the agreement extending the note was never
recorded.
7
The BDC mortgage states:
"Lee Bourque . . . the 'Mortgagor' . . . HEREBY GRANTS to
Bourque Development Corporation . . . with MORTGAGE
COVENANTS, to secure the payment of . . . $88,958.65 . . .
with interest thereon, as provided in the Mortgagor's note
of even date, . . . and all other debts, covenants and
agreements of or by the Mortgagor to or for the benefit of
the Mortgagee now existing or hereafter accruing while this
mortgage is still undischarged of record, [the property and
other properties not at issue here]. Mortgagor has
promised to pay the debt under this note in full not later
than December 31, 2003."
6
Deutsche Bank holds a mortgage dated September 10, 2004,
granted by Lee Bourque to Ameriquest Mortgage Company and
recorded October 1, 2004 (Ameriquest mortgage). The mortgage
was assigned to Deutsche Bank by agreement dated March 5, 2007.
On April 20, 2011, Lee Bourque filed a Chapter 13 petition
for bankruptcy, which was later converted to Chapter 7. During
bankruptcy proceedings, the parties discussed the relative
priority of the mortgages and Deutsche Bank's counsel
represented to Fitchburg's counsel that Fitchburg's mortgages
held first and second priority on the property and that Deutsche
Bank's mortgage was third priority. On September 26, 2011,
Deutsche Bank filed a motion for relief from automatic stay to
allow it to commence foreclosure proceedings, which acknowledged
Fitchburg's first and second priority positions. Fitchburg did
not oppose the motion, and asserts that it did not oppose
because of the acknowledgment in the motion and conversation
with Deutsche Bank's counsel in which the counsel recognized
Fitchburg's first and second priority positions. On October 24,
2011, Fitchburg filed a motion for relief from automatic stay to
allow it to commence foreclosure proceedings, which was granted
on February 21, 2012. Fitchburg conducted an auction purporting
to foreclose on the property on April 30, 2012. Fitchburg was
the high bidder at the auction and recorded a foreclosure deed
purporting to grant fee simple title to itself on that date.
7
2. Statutory background. The obsolete mortgage statute
was enacted in 1957 to create a statute of limitations on
foreclosures against mortgages that had been recorded for fifty
years or more, unless either an extension or a document
asserting nonsatisfaction of the mortgage was recorded in the
ten years preceding the end of the fifty-year period. G. L.
c. 260, § 33, inserted by St. 1957, c. 370. In 2006, the
statute was amended to create two different limitations periods,
one for any "mortgage in which the term or maturity date of the
mortgage is stated" and one for any "mortgage in which no term
of the mortgage is stated." G. L. c. 260, § 33, as amended by
St. 2006, c. 63, § 6. The limitations period for stated term
mortgages is five years after expiration of the term or maturity
date, and the limitations period for nonstated term mortgages is
thirty-five years from the recording of the mortgage.8 Id. The
8
General Laws c. 260, § 33, as amended by St. 2006, c. 63,
§ 6, provides as follows:
"A power of sale in any mortgage of real estate shall not
be exercised and an entry shall not be made nor possession
taken nor proceeding begun for foreclosure of any such
mortgage after the expiration of, in the case of a mortgage
in which no term of the mortgage is stated, [thirty-five]
years from the recording of the mortgage or, in the case of
a mortgage in which the term or maturity date of the
mortgage is stated, [five] years from the expiration of the
term or from the maturity date, unless an extension of the
mortgage, or an acknowledgment or affidavit that the
mortgage is not satisfied, is recorded before the
expiration of such period. In case an extension of the
mortgage or the acknowledgment or affidavit is so recorded,
8
amended statute allows enforcement of the mortgage if an
extension or a document asserting nonsatisfaction of the
mortgage had been recorded, but reduced the ten-year period in
the prior statute to five years. Id. The amended statute also
became self-executing so that any mortgage rendered obsolete by
the terms of the statute is discharged without further legal
action. Id.
3. Standard of review. We review a grant of summary
judgment de novo. Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 267
(2014), citing Ritter v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 439 Mass.
214, 215 (2003). "Summary judgment is appropriate where there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Twomey, supra, citing
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716
the period shall continue until [five] years shall have
elapsed during which there is not recorded any further
extension of the mortgage or acknowledgment or affidavit
that the mortgage is not satisfied. The period shall not
be extended by reason of non-residence or disability of any
person interested in the mortgage or the real estate, or by
any partial payment, agreement, extension, acknowledgment,
affidavit or other action not meeting the requirements of
this section and [G. L. c. 260, §§] 34 and 35. Upon the
expiration of the period provided herein, the mortgage
shall be considered discharged for all purposes without the
necessity of further action by the owner of the equity of
redemption or any other persons having an interest in the
mortgaged property and, in the case of registered land,
upon the payment of the fee for the recording of a
discharge, the mortgage shall be marked as discharged on
the relevant memorandum of encumbrances in the same manner
as for any other mortgage duly discharged."
9
(1991). Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404(2002).
4. Limitations period applicable to Fitchburg's
foreclosure under obsolete mortgage statute. The judge allowed
partial summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank after
concluding that Fitchburg's purported foreclosure was void
because the BDC and Christiano mortgages had been discharged as
a matter of law before foreclosure.9 Although neither mortgage
expressly contained the "term or maturity date" of the mortgage
itself, the judge reasoned that "the dates and terms [of the
underlying debt] set forth in the Christiano Mortgage and the
BDC Mortgage are statements of 'the term or maturity date of the
mortgage' that make these two mortgages subject to the five-year
period." We agree.
We answer the question presented by applying well-settled
rules of statutory construction. When the meaning of a statute
is at issue, "[w]e begin with the canon of statutory
construction that the primary source of insight into the intent
of the Legislature is the language of the statute."
9
We assume without deciding that Fitchburg invoked its
rights under both the BDC and Christiano mortgages. The
foreclosure deed recorded by Fitchburg stated that it foreclosed
on the property under the powers granted to it by the BDC
mortgage and "every other power." The resolution of this
question is not pertinent to the issue on appeal because both
the BDC mortgage and the Christiano mortgage were discharged as
a matter of law prior to Fitchburg's purported foreclosure.
10
International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853
(1983). The language is interpreted in accordance with its
plain meaning, and if the language is clear and unambiguous, it
is conclusive as to the intent of the Legislature. Commissioner
of Correction v. Superior Ct. Dep't of the Trial Court, 446
Mass. 123, 124 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. Clerk-Magistrate
of the W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 439 Mass. 352,
355-356 (2003).
When interpreting the phrase, "mortgage in which the term
or maturity date of the mortgage is stated," that triggers the
five-year statute of limitations, "[w]ords and phrases shall be
construed according to the common and approved usage of the
language." G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third. According to Black's Law
Dictionary 478, 1163 (10th ed. 2014), "maturity date" means
"[t]he date when a debt falls due, such as a debt on a
promissory note or bond," and "mortgage" means "[a] conveyance
of title to property that is given as security for the payment
of a debt or performance of a duty and that will become void
upon payment or performance according to the stipulated terms."
Thus, the common meaning of the "maturity date of the mortgage"
is the date on which the underlying debt is due because a
mortgage derives its vitality from the debt that it secures.
This definition comports with the treatment of mortgages
under our common-law principles. Although a mortgage and a note
11
are separate entities in Massachusetts that can be split, it has
long been recognized that "a mortgage ultimately depends on the
underlying debt for its enforceability." Eaton v. Federal Nat'l
Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 576, 578 n.11 (2012), citing Crowley
v. Adams, 226 Mass. 582, 585 (1917), Wolcott v. Winchester, 15
Gray 461 (1860), and Howe v. Wilder, 11 Gray 267, 269-270
(1858). By its nature, a mortgage does not mature distinctly
from the debts or obligations that it secures. See Eaton, supra
at 577-578 ("the basic nature of a mortgage [is] security for an
underlying mortgage note"); Barnes v. Lee Sav. Bank, 340 Mass.
87, 90 (1959) ("The debt having been extinguished, a bond or
mortgage given as security for the debt is necessarily
discharged"). Accordingly, a mortgage is a device for providing
security for a loan, but it does not generally have a binding
effect that survives its underlying obligation.10 See Piea
Realty Co. v. Papuzynski, 342 Mass. 240, 246 (1961), quoting
Pineo v. White, 320 Mass. 487, 489 (1946) (unless other
equitable considerations apply, "payment of the mortgage note .
. . terminates the interests of the mortgagee without any formal
10
"Equitable considerations . . . may affect the questions
whether mortgage security has been discharged or (if discharged)
will be reinstated and whether, by subrogation or upon analogous
principles, it still remains available to a mortgage creditor."
Piea Realty Co. v. Papuzynski, 342 Mass. 240, 246, 250 (1961)
(remanding for consideration whether principles of unjust
enrichment or other equitable considerations should reestablish
mortgage otherwise discharged by parties).
12
. . . discharge and revests the legal title in the mortgagor").
Therefore, the judge's interpretation of the statute corresponds
to the plain meaning of the language chosen by the Legislature.
Fitchburg argues that the judge's interpretation conflicts
with the language of the statute by citing the definition of
"mortgage" provided in G. L. c. 260, § 35. Under this
provision, a "mortgage," for the purposes of the obsolete
mortgage statute, "includes any deed of trust or other
conveyance made for the purpose of securing performance of a
debt or obligation." G. L. c. 260, § 35. Fitchburg argues that
the definition in § 35 requires that the applicable maturity
date be tied directly to the mortgage and not to the underlying
obligation. Fitchburg also cites language in Eaton, 462 Mass.
at 575, "A real estate mortgage in Massachusetts has two
distinct but related aspects: it is a transfer of legal title
to the mortgage property, and it serves as security for an
underlying note or other obligation," to support its argument
that the maturity date of the note may not be exported to the
mortgage because a mortgage and a note each have separate legal
significance in Massachusetts. Fitchburg's argument is
unavailing for several reasons.
The flaw in Fitchburg's argument is the misconception that
considering the maturity date of the note to be the maturity
date of the mortgage requires the note and the mortgage to lose
13
any independent properties. The question, rather, is whether
the term or maturity date of the underlying obligation is
commonly understood as the term or maturity date of the mortgage
when that date is stated on the face of the mortgage. To this
question, the definition in § 35 is unhelpful. Not only is the
definition inclusive instead of limiting, it only sets forth the
types of security applicable to the obsolete mortgage statute;
it does not define the particularities of a mortgage's
provisions. See G. L. c. 260, §§ 33-35. Moreover, we noted in
Eaton that the "essential nature and purpose of a mortgage [i]s
security for a debt." Eaton, 462 Mass. at 584. As noted above,
because the scope of a mortgage is necessarily tied to the reach
of the underlying obligation, considering the term or maturity
date of the underlying obligation to be the term or maturity
date of the mortgage comports with the common-law understanding
of the words "mortgage" and "note." See Barnes, 340 Mass. at
90.
Fitchburg also argues that the judge's interpretation was
erroneous because the title of the act modifying the statute,
"An Act providing remedies to consumers for clearing title after
payoff of mortgages," signifies that the Legislature only
intended the five-year limitations period to apply to mortgages
where the underlying obligations have been paid in full.
St. 2006, c. 63. The title of the act, however, is ineffective
14
to modify the language of the statute because that language is
clear. "Although we have recognized that the title of an act or
statutory provision may be helpful in clarifying ambiguity,
. . . or identifying the act's 'proper limitations,' . . . the
title may not replace or limit otherwise clear language in the
act itself" (citations omitted). Olmstead v. Department of
Telecommunications & Cable, 466 Mass. 582, 589 n.12 (2013).
Because the ordinary meaning of "term or maturity date of the
mortgage" is clear based on common usage of that language, the
title of the act cannot control. American Family Life Assur.
Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 388 Mass. 468, 474, cert. denied,
464 U.S. 850 (1983) ("title of an act cannot control the plain
provisions of the act"). Even if we took the title into
account, the language of the title comports with the common
usage of mortgage and note. The Legislature chose the words,
"after payoff of mortgages," for the title. However, a mortgage
cannot be paid off; only its underlying obligation can be paid
off. Accordingly, the Legislature referred to the mortgage in
the title as possessing characteristics of underlying
obligations similar to the phrase, "maturity date of the
mortgage," used in the statute.
Furthermore, although our conclusion yields a workable
result and thus ends our inquiry, review of the entire act that
modifies the obsolete mortgage statute would not provide a
15
contrary result. Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 454
(2008), quoting Bronstein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 390 Mass. 701,
704 (1984) ("When the use of the ordinary meaning of a term
yields a workable result, there is no need to resort to
extrinsic aids such as legislative history"). The revisions to
the obsolete mortgage statute were contained within an act
comprising nine sections and affecting multiple statutes.11
Although the title references mortgages "after payoff," review
of the entire act demonstrates an over-all scheme to streamline
conveyancing and provide remedies to clear title blemished by
mortgages in various levels of standing, including mortgages
whose obligations have been satisfied, St. 2006, c. 63, §§ 2-4;
mortgages granted by mortgagors who have been in possession of
the secured property for a specified period without recognizing
the mortgage as valid, St. 2006, c. 63, § 5; and mortgages that
have become obsolete, St. 2006, c. 63, §§ 6-7.12 Accordingly,
11
A search of legislative history has not produced any
detailed official purpose of St. 2006, c. 63 (act), or its
various sections.
12
Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act expanded the statutes
regulating mortgage discharges, G. L. c. 183, §§ 54B, 54C, 54D,
and 55, and provided specific timeframes in which a discharge
must be recorded after payoff. Sections 4A and 4B of the act
updated the disclosures required during the mortgage application
process by amending G. L. c. 184, § 17B, and repealing §§ 17C
and 17D. Section 5 of the act amended the statute governing
actions to quiet title, G. L. c. 240, § 15, and provides
additional avenues for discharging a mortgage when the
underlying obligation has been satisfied or when a mortgagor
16
although the Legislature used the words "after payoff" in the
title of the act, it is clear from review of the entire act that
the Legislature did not intend to limit all changes in the act
to affect only mortgages where the underlying obligations had
been paid off or satisfied.
In that regard, Fitchburg does not argue that applicability
of the revised limitations period for mortgages in which the
term is not stated depends on satisfaction of the underlying
obligations. The obsolete mortgage statute created a
limitations period for bringing foreclosure actions against
mortgages. G. L. c. 260, § 33. Under the amendment, the
statute requires the holder of a mortgage to foreclose on the
mortgage, record a document asserting nonsatisfaction, or record
an extension before the mortgage has been on record for thirty-
five years or before the secured debt is overdue by five years
(and the due date is stated on the face of the mortgage). See
St. 2006, c. 63, § 6. The statute has never been interpreted to
require satisfaction of a mortgage's underlying obligations
before the mortgage becomes unenforceable. Conversely, the
statute provides a mortgagee options to preserve its rights
under a mortgage that has not been satisfied by recording an
acknowledgment or affidavit asserting nonsatisfaction, or by
claims that the mortgage is invalid and that claim is not
contested.
17
recording an extension of term. G. L. c. 260, § 33, as amended
by St. 2006, c. 63, § 6. Discharge under the obsolete mortgage
statute has never rested on satisfaction of a mortgage's
underlying obligations, and we decline to adopt a contrary
position today.
Determining that the term or maturity date of an underlying
obligation, when stated on the face of the mortgage, can become
the term or maturity date of the mortgage does not end our
inquiry. We must still review the actual language used in the
Christiano and BDC mortgages. The BDC mortgage states,
"Mortgagor has promised to pay the debt under this note in full
not later than December 31, 2003," and the Christiano mortgage,
dated April 13, 1999, states that the mortgage is granted to
"secure the payment of $9,722.00 . . . in one year with twenty
percent interest per annum, payable in one year . . . as
provided in the promissory note of even date." Based on the
reasoning above, we read the quoted language in each mortgage to
state the term or maturity date of that mortgage, making each
subject to the five-year statute of limitations.
Beyond the language quoted above, the BDC mortgage also
contains a dragnet clause, in which "all other debts, covenants
and agreements of or by the Mortgagor to or for the benefit of
the Mortgagee now existing or hereafter accruing while this
mortgage is still undischarged of record" become secured by the
18
mortgage in addition to the original underlying obligation.
Dragnet clauses are mortgage provisions that provide security
for future advances and "are usually held valid in
Massachusetts, at least where such advances are made prior to
the intervention of other liens." Everett Credit Union v.
Allied Ambulance Servs., Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 346
(1981), citing Barnard v. Moore, 8 Allen 273, 274 (1864).
Fitchburg argues that the presence of the dragnet clause
indicates that the parties intended the BDC mortgage to outlive
the underlying note for an indefinite duration. This argument,
however, conflicts with the nature of a mortgage as being tied
to the life of its underlying obligations. See Piea Realty Co.,
342 Mass. at 246; Barnes, 340 Mass. at 90. Although Fitchburg
asserts a pattern of frequent lending between the original
mortgagee of the BDC mortgage and the mortgagor that culminated
in the creation of the BDC mortgage,13 Fitchburg does not assert
the presence of any debts incurred after the date of the BDC
mortgage that would have been secured under its dragnet clause,
and thus possibly extend the term of the mortgage beyond the
term of the original note. Without holding that a dragnet
13
The mortgagor, Lee Bourque, is the brother of the
principal of Bourque Development Corporation and of Fitchburg,
Paul Bourque. Paul, through his company, made a series of loans
to his brother to be used in real estate development activities.
These loans culminated in the BDC mortgage.
19
clause may never extend the term or maturity date of a mortgage,
we conclude that the dragnet clause here did not extend the term
of the BDC mortgage or take that mortgage out of the realm of
mortgages in which the term is stated.14
5. Constitutionality of retroactive application of
limitations period. After determining that the Christiano and
BDC mortgages were discharged under the obsolete mortgage
statute, the judge rejected Fitchburg's constitutional challenge
to the retroactive application of the shortened statute of
limitations, reasoning that there were no constitutional
infirmities where the Legislature allowed sufficient time after
enacting St. 2006, c. 63, § 6, for affected parties to bring a
foreclosure and where G. L. c. 260, § 33, as amended, does not
totally abrogate existing property rights. Fitchburg argues
that, assuming we agree that the judge correctly interpreted the
obsolete mortgage statute, we must reverse because the
application of the statute in this case violates due process and
14
Under Massachusetts case law, the dragnet clause would
only have provided security for new debt incurred before the
presence of an intervening lien. Debral Realty, Inc. v.
Marlborough Coop. Bank, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 92, 94 (1999). In
this case, the next lien following the BDC mortgage was incurred
April 13, 2004. Accordingly, even if the dragnet clause were
operative to extend the term of the mortgage separate from the
term of the original note, the dragnet clause would only extend
the mortgage's maturity date from December 31, 2003, to April
13, 2004, and the five-year statute of limitations would still
have expired before Fitchburg's purported foreclosure sale on
April 30, 2012.
20
contracts clause protections under the Massachusetts and Federal
Constitutions. In that connection, Fitchburg argues that
retroactive application of the five-year limitations period to
the BDC and Christiano mortgages is unreasonable and
unconstitutional.
"There are constitutional limitations on the Legislature's
power to enact retroactive statutes -- in brief, such statutes
must 'meet the test of "reasonableness."'" Anderson v. BNY
Mellon, N.A., 463 Mass. 299, 307 (2012), quoting American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 189
(1978). "A statute is presumed to be constitutional and every
rational presumption in favor of the statute's validity is
made." Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 441 Mass. 188, 193
(2004), citing Leibovich v. Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568, 577
(1991). The challenging party bears the burden to prove that
the statute is irrational in its application. Doe, Sex Offender
Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass.
780, 788 (2008). Where the applicable statute is one affecting
a limitations period, a "shortened statute of limitations may be
applied to causes of action already accrued 'if sufficient time
be allowed, between the passing of the act and the time fixed
for the limitation, to afford a full and ample time to all
persons, having such causes of action, to commence their
21
suits.'" Cioffi v. Guenther, 374 Mass. 1, 3 (1977), quoting
Loring v. Alline, 9 Cush. 68, 71 (1851).
Here, the act revising the obsolete mortgage statute was
approved April 13, 2006, and the Legislature extended the
effective date of the operative section until October 1, 2006.15
St. 2006, c. 63, §§ 6, 9. Accordingly, the Legislature
determined that five and one-half months was a reasonable time
for mortgagees to enforce their rights under mortgages that
would be deemed obsolete under the revised statute or to record
one of the other documents permitted by statute to preserve the
mortgagee's rights.16 G. L. c. 260, §§ 33-34. We have
considered shorter periods of time before the effective date of
a shortened statute of limitations to be reasonable. See, e.g.,
Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 278 Mass. 343, 346 (1932); Mulvey v.
Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 183-185 (1908) (thirty days). See also
Evans v. Building Inspector of Peabody, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 805,
805-806 (1977) (ninety days).
15
The Legislature provided an additional extension for
enforceability of mortgages affected by §§ 5 and 6 of the act,
where the term would expire during the one year following the
effective date, so that those mortgages would be enforceable
through October 1, 2007. St. 2006, c. 63, § 8.
16
As previously noted, a mortgagee may record an extension
or affidavit or acknowledgment that the underlying obligation
has not been satisfied in order to extend the time before a
mortgage is deemed obsolete under G. L. c. 260, § 33.
22
We conclude that the period of five and one-half months
provided by the Legislature is reasonable in light of the fact
that a mortgagee is provided other options under the statute,
other than commencing foreclosure, to extend its rights under a
mortgage. "What shall be considered a reasonable time must be
settled by the judgment of the Legislature, and the courts will
not inquire into the wisdom of its decision in establishing the
period of legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so
insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice."
Mulvey, 197 Mass. at 183, quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S.
55, 63 (1902). Fitchburg contends that the statute is a denial
of justice as it applies to its mortgages, both commercial in
nature, with unsatisfied underlying obligations and an
unrecorded extension agreement. While this contention has some
force, it should be addressed to the Legislature, because the
time allotted by the Legislature for mortgagees to preserve
their rights makes retroactive application of the 2006 amendment
constitutional. See Cioffi, 374 Mass. at 4. There is no denial
of justice in this case because Fitchburg was entitled to record
an extension or an affidavit or acknowledgment that the
underlying obligation had not been satisfied in order to extend
the time before its mortgages were deemed obsolete under G. L.
c. 260, § 33. Fitchburg's failure to follow these clear
23
directives does not make the statute unconstitutional. Cioffi,
supra.
6. Conclusion. The order allowing in part Deutsche Bank's
motion for partial summary judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.