Matter of D.L.B. , 2017 MT 1 ( 2017 )

01/03/2017
DA 15-0489
Case Number: DA 15-0489
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 1IN THE MATTER OF:
D. L. B.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Fergus, Cause No. DI 2015-11
Honorable Jon A. Oldenburg, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Kristen L. Peterson, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Thomas P. Meissner, Fergus County Attorney, Craig R. Buehler, Special
Deputy County Attorney, Lewistown, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 2, 2016
Decided: January 3, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 D.L.B. appeals the order of the Tenth Judicial District Court, Fergus County,
recommitting him for a period of up to six months to the Montana Mental Health Nursing
Care Center (Nursing Care Center) in Lewistown. We affirm, and state the issue as
follows:
Did the District Court err by extending D.L.B.’s commitment to the Nursing Care
Center?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 D.L.B. is a 75-year-old male who, unfortunately, has suffered from mental illness
his entire adult life. He was originally diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia after his
first psychotic episode, at age 22. Since this initial diagnosis, D.L.B. has been
involuntarily committed to mental hospitals throughout his life. D.L.B.’s May 2015
Mental Health Assessment for Recommitment states that he has been involuntarily
committed to mental health hospitals at least six times and that other “[r]ecords indicate
[that] he [has] likely had other psychiatric hospitalizations through the years, but
[complete] information is not available.”1 D.L.B.’s last four hospital commitments, in
2004, 2011, 2012, and 2014, were to the Montana State Hospital (MSH).
¶3 D.L.B.’s psychosis centers around a fear of the Nazis and of being persecuted by
them. He also suffers from delusions regarding an imaginary wife and children who
1
The record also includes an October 2015 Mental Health Assessment for Recommitment that
was filed with the District Court on December 18, 2015, as part of a subsequent recommitment
proceeding that led to the filing of another recommitment order. D.L.B. has also appealed that
matter, which is pending before the Court as Cause No. DA 16-0281. Briefing has not been
completed. The October 2015 Assessment was not part of the record before the District Court in
the subject proceeding.
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reside in Canada. Critically, he has a pervasive history of medication noncompliance
arising from his belief that he does not suffer from a mental illness.
¶4 D.L.B.’s 53-year history of mental illness evidences a relatively predictable and
cyclical pattern, typically beginning with a psychotic episode. During these episodes, he
acts out and is a physical danger to himself, as well as to others. The episodes typically
result in an involuntary commitment of D.L.B. to a mental health hospital, where he is
medicated and begins to stabilize. After improving, D.L.B. is transferred from the
hospital to a mental health nursing care facility, where supervision helps him to stay on
his medication and maintain stability. After he is released from the mental health nursing
care facility to a community based rehabilitation center or treatment program, he
typically stops taking his medicine, leading to another psychotic episode and a repeat of
the cycle.
¶5 At the July 8, 2015, recommitment hearing, the District Court verbally
summarized D.L.B.’s condition as follows:
[D.L.B.] does suffer from a mental disorder that being paranoid
schizophrenia which in his case causes him to have a lack of insight in to
his own mental disorders and how those affect him and leads to a persistent
desire and a pattern of medication refusal and removing himself from the
medication which then causes his mental disorder to spiral out of control
and causes [D.L.B.] to decompensate and have to start over again with his
treatment. This presents a danger to [D.L.B.] as each and every time he has
to start over it takes more and more to get him back to normal and during
those psychotic episodes he’s a danger to himself and could be a danger to
others just basically due to his lack of insight and ability to control himself.
¶6 In 2014, D.L.B. was living at a rehabilitative center in Dillon when he again
refused to take his medicine. He decompensated to the point that he “believed staff at the
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facility were contracting with the Nazi’s [sic] to torture him and inflict pain on him with
infrared devices.” He became verbally aggressive and attempted to physically strike the
staff, leading to his commitment to MSH on September 23, 2014. On March 24, 2015,
after he had stabilized, D.L.B. was transferred from MSH to the Nursing Care Center.
Based on his behaviors, however, D.L.B. was considered an elopement risk. At the
Nursing Care Center, D.L.B. received regular medical and psychiatric care. Despite this
care, D.L.B. continued to have visual hallucinations and paranoid delusions, be verbally
and physically aggressive toward the staff, refuse to take his medication, and isolate
himself. On June 2, 2015, the State filed the subject petition to extend D.L.B.’s
commitment to the Nursing Care Center for further evaluation and treatment.
¶7 In support of the petition, the State submitted a report by Susan Stevens (Stevens),
a Mental Health Professional.2 Stevens’ report explained that D.L.B. had a long history
of medication noncompliance and, consequently, a recurring inability to successfully live
independently in community-based placements, despite his receipt of supportive services.
She also opined that:
[A]s a result of [D.L.B.’s] mental illness he presents as a danger to self and
potentially others when he is medication non-compliant. Commitment
proceedings should not be dismissed. [D.L.B.] presents as a danger to self
due to florid psychosis (delusions and hallucinations). He has an extensive
history of becoming medication non-compliant then decompensates very
quickly and becomes confused and unable to meet and maintain his most
basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety. He potentially
2
Stevens holds a MS and is a LMFT. She is a Mental Health Professional, her certification
number is MHF-436, and she is employed as a Psychology Specialist at the Nursing Care Center.
“Mental health professional” is defined at § 53-21-102(11), MCA.
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presents as a danger to others due to his recent history of becoming verbally
and physically aggressive towards others.
¶8 On July 8, 2015, an adjudicatory hearing was held at the Nursing Care Center.
Debbie Moore (Moore), Director of Nursing at the Center, testified that D.L.B. continued
to exhibit characteristic behaviors of paranoid schizophrenia such as auditory
hallucinations, delusions, false beliefs that people were plotting against him, and
delusions of grandeur. While noting that D.L.B. was “beginning to do well,” she stated
that he continued to deny the need for medication and to make statements about not
wanting to take medication. Moore opined that D.L.B. continued to meet the admission
criteria for the Nursing Care Center based on his continued delusions, paranoid thoughts,
and a lack of judgment and insight into his mental health needs. Stevens testified that the
Nursing Care Center was a lesser restrictive environment than D.L.B.’s prior placement
at MSH, and opined that D.L.B. was not yet ready for a less restrictive, community based
placement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court orally extended D.L.B.’s
commitment to the Nursing Care Center for a period of not more than six months. A
written order was entered on July 16, 2015, which did not specify under what statutory
provisions D.L.B. was being re-committed.
¶9 D.L.B. appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 We review commitment orders to determine whether a district court’s findings of
fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law are correct. In re S.G.R., 2016 MT
70, ¶ 13, 383 Mont. 74, 368 P.3d 1180 (citing In re S.M., 2014 MT 309, ¶ 13, 377 Mont.
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133, 339 P.3d 23). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by
substantial evidence, if the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence or if,
after a review of the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake had been made. In re S.G.R., ¶ 13 (citing In re Mental Health of L.K.-S., 2011
MT 21, ¶ 14, 359 Mont. 191, 247 P.3d 1100 [hereinafter In re L.K.-S.]). Whether a
district court’s findings of fact meet statutory requirements is a question of law that we
review for correctness. In re S.G.R., ¶ 13 (citing In re L.L.A., 2011 MT 285, ¶ 6, 362
Mont. 464, 267 P.3d 1).
DISCUSSION
¶11 Did the District Court err by extending D.L.B.’s commitment to the Nursing Care
Center?
¶12 Arguing that Montana’s involuntary commitment statutes require that a
recommitment meet the identical standards of an original commitment, D.L.B. contends
that the District Court’s findings are insufficient to satisfy the commitment criteria under
§ 53-21-126(1)(a), (b), or (c), MCA, and that the evidence satisfies recommitment only
under § 53-21-126(1)(d), MCA. Commitments ordered pursuant to § 53-21-126(1)(d),
MCA, may only be made “to a community facility or program or an appropriate course of
treatment . . . and may not require commitment at the state hospital, a behavioral health
inpatient facility, or the Montana medical health nursing care center.” Section
53-21-127(7), MCA. D.L.B. thus argues that his recommitment to the Lewistown
Nursing Care Center violates these provisions. In essence, D.L.B. asserts that these
statutes must be narrowly interpreted and that the criteria stated in § 53-21-126(1)(a)-(d),
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MCA, are the only appropriate considerations in determining whether recommitment
should be ordered.
¶13 The State responds that the § 53-21-126(1), MCA, criteria must be evaluated in
the context of a recommitment. Noting that this statute states that, when “determining
whether the respondent requires commitment and the appropriate disposition. . . ., the
court shall consider” the listed criteria, the State argues the statute does not prohibit
consideration of additional circumstances related to a respondent, including, in a
recommitment proceeding, a respondent’s relevant medical history and continuing
treatment requirements. Section 53-21-126(1), MCA (emphasis added). The State
contends that, when placed in this context, the District Court’s findings are sufficient to
support recommitment.
¶14 Section 53-21-128(1), MCA, provides that “[n]ot less than 2 weeks” before the
expiration of a commitment, the professional person in charge of the patient at the place
of commitment may petition the district court “for extension of the commitment period.”
The same hearing procedures used for an initial commitment are followed in a
recommitment proceeding, except the respondent is not entitled to a jury trial. Section
53-21-128(1)(c), MCA. If the district court “finds that the patient continues to suffer
from a mental disorder and to require commitment, the court shall order commitment as
set forth in 53-21-127.” Section 53-21-128(1)(d), MCA. In turn, § 53-21-127(7), MCA,
governs dispositional hearings, commitment options, least restrictive alternatives, and
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necessary findings of fact to be made by the district court, and provides that
“[s]atisfaction of any one of the criteria listed in 53-21-126(1) justifies commitment.”
¶15 In relevant part, § 53-21-126(1), MCA, states:
In determining whether the respondent requires commitment and the
appropriate disposition under 53-21-127, the court shall consider the
following:
(a) whether the respondent, because of a mental disorder, is substantially
unable to provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of food, clothing,
shelter, health, or safety;
(b) whether the respondent has recently, because of a mental disorder and
through an act or an omission, caused self-injury or injury to others;
(c) whether, because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent threat of
injury to the respondent or to others because of the respondent’s acts or
omissions; and
(d) whether the respondent’s mental disorder, as demonstrated by the
respondent’s recent acts or omissions, will, if untreated, predictably result
in deterioration of the respondent’s mental condition to the point at which
the respondent will become a danger to self or to others or will be unable to
provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter,
health, or safety.
As noted by D.L.B., if the court relies solely upon the criterion provided in subsection
(1)(d), “the court may require commitment only to a community facility or program,” and
not “the Montana mental health nursing care center.” Section 53-21-127(7), MCA.
¶16 The recommitment statute, § 53-21-128, MCA, incorporates the procedures and
standards for commitment provided in §§ 53-21-126 and -127, MCA, but states the
inquiry is whether the respondent “continues to suffer” from a mental disorder and
continues “to require commitment.” Section 53-21-128(1)(d), MCA. The recommitment
statute thus includes a time component, which requires a determination of whether the
respondent’s condition has improved, since his original commitment, to the point where
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he no longer suffers from a mental disorder requiring commitment. The inquiry can
include consideration of the respondent’s medical history, the original commitment
proceeding, the treatment received since the original commitment, as well as the
respondent’s current status and treatment needs. While the stated legal standards for
recommitment are the same as in an original commitment proceeding, the record and
necessary considerations may not be. Further, the longer-term view called for by the
recommitment statute permits an additional perspective of the evidence. Of course,
respondents are not bound by their past medical histories, but histories and continuing
treatment requirements are relevant considerations in the recommitment context.
¶17 Unfortunately, in its Order for Recommitment, the District Court neglected to cite
in its findings and conclusions to the particular criteria under § 53-21-126(1), MCA, upon
which it based D.L.B.’s recommitment to the Nursing Care Center, a problem we have
previously highlighted. See generally, e.g., In re B.D., 2015 MT 339, ¶ 8, 381 Mont.
505, 362 P.3d 636 (the District Court’s “failure to specify the subsection relied upon [for
commitment] was clearly an oversight to be avoided.”). Similarly, we have noted the
paucity of written findings in commitment orders, which we are again presented with in
this case. See generally, e.g., In re M.P.-L., 2015 MT 338, ¶ 20, 381 Mont. 496, 362 P.3d
627 (concluding that while “the District Court’s written findings are bare-boned,” they
provided “sufficient reasoning to justify the commitment.”). We have looked to a court’s
oral findings to supplement its written findings, In re S.M., ¶ 27, and have applied the
doctrine of implied findings that were necessary to the court’s determination. In re S.M.,
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¶ 28; In re M.P.-L, ¶ 20; In re S.G.R., ¶ 21. However, we will “decline to expand the
doctrine of implied facts to the degree necessary to affirm a commitment order that is
beyond ‘bare-bones’ and ‘spartan.’” In re C.C., 2016 MT 174, ¶ 23, 384 Mont. 135, 376
P.3d 105. These holdings underscore the necessity of “strict adherence” by district courts
with the statutory requirements governing involuntary commitment proceedings, despite
the commonly urgent nature of the proceedings, In re L.K.-S., ¶ 15, including the entry of
findings of fact. Section 53-21-127(8), MCA.
¶18 Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that the District Court’s findings
of fact establish a need for continued commitment to the Nursing Care Center under
§ 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA. D.L.B. “continues to suffer,” § 53-21-128(1)(d), MCA, from a
mental disorder that renders him “substantially unable to provide for [his] own basic
needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety.” Section 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA. The
District Court’s oral findings determined that D.L.B. continues to suffer from paranoid
schizophrenia, causing him to “have a lack of insight in to his own mental disorders” and
a lack of “ability to control himself,” including a continuing “medication refusal” that has
not resolved, even with current treatment. The record includes a May 28, 2015 Mental
Health Assessment for Recommitment, which noted D.L.B. has continuing problems with
hallucinations and paranoid delusions along with verbal and physical aggressiveness
toward staff, including:
05/19/15 When [D.L.B.] asked why he had to be here Dr. Whitworth
stated ‘because you are mentally ill’. [D.L.B.] replied in a loud voice ‘The
hell I am doctor, the hell I am’. . . When [D.L.B] was asked about prior
reports of Nazi’s [sic] he leaned forward in his chair and shouted at Dr.
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Whitworth ‘The Nazi’s [sic] are right here in this fuckin room doctor, they
are invisible’.
. . .
04/06/15 [D.L.B.] exhibited both grandiose and paranoid delusions
(e.g. Nazi’s [sic] are trying to torture him, invisible wife and
children) [ . . . D.L.B.] did inquire about taxi service and related ‘I fled
Washington for my life, I put on heavy clothes and walked away before the
Nazi’s [sic] found me. I may need to flee here if they find me!’ [D.L.B.] is
an elopement risk due to his delusions.
. . .
04/01/15 Nursing noted “[D.L.B.] is refusing to take any of his
breakfast meds. . . ‘I’m refusing; take me back to Warm Springs’. Gave a
cooling off time, reapproached, he hangs his head and refuses to answer or
acknowledge . . . []
(Internal punctuation original; emphasis added.)
¶19 Consistent with this evidence, the District Court’s written findings state that
D.L.B. continues to suffer from paranoid schizophrenia, and cites Stevens’ testimony that
D.L.B. “is a danger to himself due to his lack of insight . . . .” Stevens’ report stated
“[D.L.B.] presents as a danger to self due to florid psychosis (delusions and
hallucinations) . . . . He potentially presents as a danger to others due to his recent history
of becoming verbally and physically aggressive toward others,” which we can add to the
District Court’s findings by implication. In re S.M., ¶ 28. The District Court found “the
most appropriate and least restrictive placement for [D.L.B.] is the Montana Mental
Health Nursing Center,” and the treatment plan filed with the District Court was
appropriate, subject to “regular review.” The District Court authorized involuntary
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administration of medication to D.L.B., finding that “he is unable to appreciate the
necessity for a proper medication regimen to control his mental illness.”
¶20 Although the District Court’s findings were sparse, we conclude they were
sufficient to support a conclusion that recommitment to the Nursing Care Center was
authorized under §§ 53-23-128(1)(d) and 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA. Despite treatment,
D.L.B.’s condition has not sufficiently improved, since his original commitment, to the
point where he no longer suffers from a mental disorder requiring commitment.
¶21 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
Justice McKinnon, dissenting.
¶22 These proceedings are indistinguishable from S.G.R. in which I dissented because
the order extending commitment was statutorily insufficient for failing to set forth
adequate factual findings and for failing to indicate which subsection, (a), (b), (c), or (d),
required recommitment under § 53-21-126(1), MCA. Again, this Court combs the
transcript to “imply” both factual findings and conclusions of law, despite the statute
clearly requiring “a detailed statement of the facts upon which the court found the
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respondent to be suffering from a mental disorder and requiring commitment[.]” Section
53-21-127(8)(a), MCA. We have often “stressed the critical importance of strict
compliance with the statutory requirements addressing involuntary commitment.” In re
C.C., ¶ 14.
¶23 Here, the statutory language of Montana’s involuntary commitment statute
requires that an extension of a commitment meet the standards of an original
commitment. See § 53-21-126(1), MCA (providing that for an original commitment the
court must determine the person suffers from a mental disorder and “requires
commitment”); § 53-21-128(1)(d), MCA (providing that for an extended commitment the
court must determine the person continues to suffer from a mental disorder and to
“require commitment”). Thus, the statutory criteria to grant the original commitment
under § 53-21-126(1), MCA, also applies to an extension of a commitment pursuant to
§ 53-21-128(1)(d), MCA.
¶24 Section 53-21-126(1), MCA, explains that “requiring commitment” means the
court consider whether there is sufficient evidence of at least one of the four criteria
which result from the person’s mental disorder. In my opinion, for the simple reason that
the statutory provisions are plain and that involuntary commitment statutes are to be
strictly construed, this Court errs when it adds to the four criteria which justify
commitment by including a “time component.” Opinion, ¶ 16. The Legislature has
indicated that both initial commitments and recommitments are not pro forma
proceedings. Even where the initial confinement of an individual was constitutionally
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permissible, the confinement may not constitutionally continue if the reasons for the
initial confinement no longer exist. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75,
95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493 (“Nor is it enough that [the respondent’s] original confinement was
founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact it was, because even if his
involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue
after that basis no longer existed.”).
¶25 Here, we have no indication from this Court’s opinion or the District Court’s order
which statutory criteria were satisfied making it necessary to recommitment D.L.B. I
therefore would reverse the District Court’s order of commitment, based upon the
foregoing and the analysis I set forth more thoroughly in In re S.G.R., ¶¶ 26-31
(McKinnon J., dissenting). To the extent we hold otherwise, I dissent.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
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