In re N.D. , 2021 Ohio 4506 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as In re N.D., 
    2021-Ohio-4506
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    IN RE: N.D., A MINOR CHILD                      :   JUDGES:
    :
    :   Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    :   Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
    :
    :   Case No. 21 CA 0040
    :            21 CA 0041
    :
    :
    :
    :   OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                              Appeal from the Licking County Court of
    Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, case
    nos. A2017-0471 and A2017-0439
    JUDGMENT:                                             AFFIRMED
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                               December 17, 2021
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                             For Defendant-Appellant:
    WILLIAM HAYES                                       OFFICE OF THE OHIO PUBLIC
    DEFENDER
    LICKING CO. PROSECUTOR                              LAUREN HAMMERSMITH
    PAULA M. SAWYERS                                    Assistant State Public Defender
    20 South Second St., Fourth Floor                   250 East Broad St., Suite 1400
    Newark, OH 43055                                    Columbus, OH 43215
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       2
    Delaney, J.
    {¶1} Appellant N.D. appeals from the April 30, 2021 Judgment Entry of the
    Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
    {¶2} The instant appeals are related but not consolidated. This matter arose
    from two separate juvenile court case numbers: AXXXXXXXX and AXXXXXXXX. The briefs
    and sole assignment of error in both cases are identical.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶3} In case number AXXXXXXXX, appellant was adjudicated to be a delinquent
    child upon three counts of gross sexual imposition (G.S.I.), all felonies of the third degree
    pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), and one count of G.S.I. pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(1),
    a felony of the fourth degree. In case number AXXXXXXXX, appellant was adjudicated to
    be a delinquent child upon one count of G.S.I., a felony of the third degree pursuant to
    R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). Each count is a “sexually oriented offense” pursuant to R.C.
    2950.01(A)(1). Four of the counts are subject to discretionary classification pursuant to
    R.C. 2152.83(B).
    {¶4} A single count--Count VII in case number AXXXXXXXX—rendered appellant
    subject to mandatory classification pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) because the offense
    occurred between the dates of September 1, 2016 to March 1, 2017, when appellant was
    16 to 17 years old.
    {¶5} A dispositional hearing was held on November 3, 2017, and appellant was
    classified as a Tier II juvenile sex offender registrant for a period of 20 years with in-
    person verification every 180 days.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                         3
    {¶6} On January 9, 2020, appellant’s classification was modified following a
    classification review hearing after his discharge from a secure facility. Appellant was then
    classified as a Tier I juvenile sex offender registrant for a period of 10 years with in-person
    verification annually.
    {¶7}   Appellant was released from parole on September 16, 2020.
    Motion and hearing for declassification
    {¶8} Appellant filed a motion for declassification pursuant to R.C. 2152.84 and
    the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on April 29, 2021. The following evidence
    is adduced from the record of the hearing.
    {¶9}   The trial court noted the following evidence submitted by the parties:
    * * * *.
    I’ve recently reviewed the contents of each of the files before
    me, including the motion filed on behalf of [appellant], each progress
    review summary, the release decision summary, and discharge
    decision summary all previously submitted to the Court by the Ohio
    Department of Youth Services regarding [appellant]. I have also
    reviewed all written reports submitted to this Court by the Probation
    Department included in the written report of Probation Officer Lindsay
    Rogers filed on April 27th, 2021, recommending a continuation of
    [appellant’s] current classification requirements.
    And I have reviewed the notice of supplemental exhibit to
    motion for declassification that was filed by [defense trial counsel] on
    April 28th, 2021, being an email from [appellant’s] former parole
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                        4
    officer, * * * [and] a letter from [appellant’s] treatment provider at
    Osterlen? * * * *.
    T. 10-11.
    {¶10} Appellee reiterated its position that it opposed appellant’s declassification.
    T. 12.
    {¶11} Appellant’s probation officer appeared and stated that in addition to the
    written report she submitted, allegations existed that appellant contacted two of the
    victims upon his release from detention and was dating a minor child as of the hearing
    date. T. 12.
    {¶12} The Victim Advocate noted the victims report ongoing trauma from
    appellant’s offenses, and also stated appellant contacted two of the victims upon his
    release from detention. The victims and their families collectively opposed appellant’s
    declassification. T. 14.
    {¶13} Appellant’s guardian ad litem (G.A.L.) opined appellant was statutorily
    ineligible for declassification, but added that if the trial court deemed him eligible, she
    supported declassification. The G.A.L. stated:
    * * * *.
    It’s my opinion that he has gone above and beyond what’s
    been asked of him. He successfully completed treatment. He’s
    become employed. He completed parole successfully; in fact, that
    he had no violations. And I believe that if there had been some sort
    of contact with the victim, I would have to believe that that would have
    been reported to the parole officer upon his release from DYS.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       5
    So at this time, I would be in support of that if the Court deems
    that he is eligible.
    * * * *.
    T. 14-15.
    {¶14} Appellant’s Father testified on his behalf. Father said appellant lives alone
    in an apartment in Columbus, and Father and son for the same communications firm.
    They install Wi-Fi and internet service. Someone observed appellant working in a
    children’s hospital and reported him to security because they were aware of the instant
    case. The employer did not fire appellant but instead transferred his work location. When
    cross-examined about appellant’s current girlfriend, Father said she was 18 years old.
    Exhibit: probation officer’s report of April 27, 2021
    {¶15} Appellant’s probation officer testified at the hearing and provided a written
    report dated April 27, 2021. The report is in the record for our review and we note the
    following pertinent facts.
    {¶16} Appellant applied for judicial release while committed to DYS, but his
    request was denied because appellant was engaged in a consensual sexual relationship
    with another youth in the facility, resulting in his removal from the program and not having
    completed Phase 2 of substance abuse training.
    {¶17} Appellant’s parole officer told probation that appellant did “fantastic” and
    successfully completed parole, including graduating from high school, beginning an
    apprenticeship with a heating and cooling provider, and engaging in aftercare services to
    address problematic sexual behaviors.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                        6
    {¶18} Appellant first became involved in the juvenile justice system in 2015 when
    he was placed on diversion for possession of criminal tools. The nature of the offense
    was sending nude photos of himself and receiving photos of a peer-aged female.
    Appellant was found to be in violation of the diversion contract when he was found in
    possession of a cell phone which he used to access Facebook, send more nude photos
    to a female via Snapchat, and to send a sexually-explicit note to a female at school.
    These offenses occurred while appellant was on court supervision. Diversion was
    terminated and he was placed on probation.
    {¶19} In the instant G.S.I. cases, appellant offended against five victims ranging
    in age from 5 years old to 15 years old. Appellant self-reported that each victim was
    victimized two to three times with the exception of one.
    {¶20} An element of physical force was involved in terms of appellant preventing
    smaller victims from resisting such as grabbing the victim’s arm and forcing her to touch
    his penis.
    {¶21} Appellant did complete sex-offender-specific programming while at DYS.
    He also continued in aftercare and worked on addressing problematic sexual behaviors.
    {¶22} Appellant reported that he forced others to engage in sexual encounters.
    His older victims asked him to stop on several occasions however their pleas were
    ignored. He used physical force with at least one victim by forcefully taking that victim’s
    hand and placing it on his penis. He did not consider how this made his victims feel and
    the long-term effects that his actions could cause.
    {¶23} Appellant displayed a history of sexual abuse and acting out as evidenced
    by his prior court contact. During his court supervision his level of risk increased and then
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                     7
    continued when in a secured facility by engaging in a sexual relationship with another
    youth knowing that it was against the policy causing him to be removed from the program.
    He has only recently begun to display any remorse or empathy for his actions/victims.
    {¶24} The report concludes:
    * * * *.
    At this time due to information above such as the age of all
    but one of the victims being under the age of 13, the number of times
    the abuse occurred, [the] fact that he has a history of inappropriate
    sexual behaviors leading to multiple delinquency adjudications,
    acting out sexually while in a secure placement, and displaying little
    victim empathy, Probation Department would recommend that
    [appellant] continued to register as a TIER I Juvenile Sex Offender
    Registrant at this time.
    * * * *.
    Exhibit: parole officer’s email dated April 26, 2021
    {¶25} Appellant offered an email from his parole officer as an exhibit at the
    hearing. The email states the following in pertinent part:
    * * * *.
    My name is Kyle L. Dickinson Parole Officer for the Ohio
    Department of Youth Services and I was the parole officer for
    [appellant] from co 12/21/19 to 9/16/20. During that period of time
    [appellant] complied with any and all that was requested of him.
    Upon release [appellant] was placed in Springfield, Ohio, living with
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                   8
    his mother. [Appellant] enrolled in OIC and completed class work
    allowing him to obtain his diploma. [Appellant] contacted Oesterlen
    for Youth and was involved in Sex Offender counseling. His
    counselor was Bob Hayes and he attended the entire time he lived
    in Springfield and was terminated successfully by Mr. Hays. Bob
    said that [appellant] was very knowledgeable concerning his flags
    and triggers and had a solid plan of prevention and thought process
    not to re-offend. [Appellant] was registered as a tier one sex offender
    in Clark Co. he [sic] signed up with Andria Trego SORN Officer with
    Clark Co. Sheriff’s Dept. phone number [XXX]. When [appellant] was
    getting ready to be successfully terminated from parole he contacted
    Officer Trego and asked about transferring his registration to Licking
    County and she assisted him. [Appellant] completed his 20 hour[s]
    of community service at the Clark County Humane Society, without
    any complaint whatsoever. I met with [appellant] weekly either at his
    home or at various work sites. [Appellant] was always willing to meet
    with this writer and was always polite and pleasant. [Appellant] was
    employed the entire time he was on parole aftercare. [Appellant]
    took the initiative to find employment in heating and cooling. He
    worked in Springfield and surrounding areas for [Heating and
    Cooling Company]. [Appellant] obtained an apprenticeship with
    them while he worked there. I met with [appellant] on the job on
    several occasions and they said he did a good job.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       9
    [Appellant] has successfully completed every aspect of his
    parole above and beyond expectations.
    * * * *.
    {¶26} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court noted appellant was subject
    to mandatory classification pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(A) and the effectiveness of his
    disposition was subject to review pursuant to R.C. 2152.84 to determine the risk that
    appellant might re-offend and to review the prior classification and tier level.
    {¶27} The trial court did note that pursuant to R.C. 2151.84(A)(2), it was limited
    to continuing appellant’s classification as a Juvenile Offender Registrant and the prior
    determination as a Tier I sex offender. However, the trial court noted, “Regardless of
    statutory limitations, based upon this Court’s review and the information presented, the
    Court does find that [appellant]’s classification as a juvenile offender registrant and prior
    determination as a Tier I sex offender shall continue.” T. 35-36.
    {¶28} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s decision to continue his
    classification as a Tier I sex offender.
    {¶29} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶30} “THE LICKING COUNTY JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
    N.D.’S MOTION FOR DECLASSIFICATION FROM THE JUVENILE SEX OFFENSE
    REGISTRY, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
    AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
    16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
    ANALYSIS
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                      10
    {¶31} Appellant argues he was denied due process of law because he was
    statutorily prevented from declassification as a Tier I juvenile sex offender. We disagree.
    {¶32} In the instant case, the relevant count at issue is Count VII in case number
    A2017047, rendering appellant subject to mandatory classification pursuant to R.C.
    2152.83(A)(1) because the offense occurred when he was 16 to 17 years old. Appellant
    argues that because R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(c) prevents his declassification, he has been
    denied due process.
    Classification of juvenile sex offenders
    {¶33} The Ohio Supreme Court provided a helpful overview of the classification
    process for juvenile sex offenders in In re R.B., 
    162 Ohio St.3d 281
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5476
    , 
    165 N.E.3d 288
    , reconsideration denied sub nom. In re R.B, 
    160 Ohio St.3d 1511
    , 2020-Ohio-
    6835, 
    159 N.E.3d 1167
    , at ¶ 4-5:
    When a juvenile commits a sex offense, the juvenile court has
    the ability to classify the juvenile as a sex offender. See generally
    R.C. 2152.82 through 2152.86; 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (Ohio's
    Adam Walsh Act). A juvenile who has been classified as a sex
    offender has certain legal obligations, such as registering and
    periodically verifying his address in person with the sheriff. See R.C.
    2950.07. The frequency with which the juvenile must report and the
    duration of his reporting requirements depend on the level of the
    classification imposed. 
    Id.
    Unlike adult offenders, whose classification levels are based
    solely on the underlying offense, see R.C. 2950.01, the juvenile court
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                         11
    has discretion to determine the appropriate classification for a
    juvenile offender, see R.C. 2152.83(A)(2) and (B)(2). Additionally,
    while adult classifications flow directly from the conviction and are
    not subject to modification, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to
    review a juvenile offender's classification. The classification process
    is set forth in a series of statutes (the “classification statutes”). The
    juvenile court conducts a hearing at the time of the juvenile's
    disposition, see R.C. 2152.83, and at the time the juvenile completes
    the disposition, see R.C. 2152.84. After that, the juvenile may petition
    the juvenile court for review every three or five years. See R.C.
    2152.85.
    {¶34} R.C. 2152.83 addresses the “initial classification hearing” in the words of
    the Ohio Supreme Court. In re R.B., 
    162 Ohio St.3d 281
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5476
    , 
    165 N.E.3d 288
    , reconsideration denied sub nom. In re R.B, 
    160 Ohio St.3d 1511
    , 
    2020-Ohio-6835
    ,
    
    159 N.E.3d 1167
    , ¶ 8. In the instant case, appellant was subject to R.C. 2152.83(A)
    because he was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the relevant offense.1 The trial court
    1   R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) states:
    The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall issue as
    part of the dispositional order or, if the court commits the child for the
    delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, shall issue at the time of
    the child's release from the secure facility an order that classifies the child
    a juvenile offender registrant and specifies that the child has a duty to
    comply with sections 2950.04, 2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the
    Revised Code if all of the following apply:
    (a) The act for which the child is or was adjudicated a delinquent child
    is a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense that the child
    committed on or after January 1, 2002.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                          12
    must notify the juvenile of his registration and reporting requirements. R.C. 2152.83(C)(3).
    The court is also required to tell the juvenile that a second hearing will be held at the end
    of his disposition pursuant to R.C. 2152.84 and that his classification may be modified or
    terminated at that time. R.C. 2152.83(C)(3). R.C. 2152.83(E) provides that the initial
    classification order “shall remain in effect for the period of time specified in section
    2950.07 of the Revised Code, subject to a modification or termination of the order under
    section 2152.84 of the Revised Code.”
    {¶35} R.C. 2950.07 outlines the duration of a juvenile offender's duty to register.
    For a juvenile classified as a Tier I offender, the duty to register lasts for 10 years; for a
    Tier II juvenile offender, the obligation continues for 20 years; and a juvenile classified as
    a Tier III offender must register for life. R.C. 2950.07(B). Further, “[t]he child's attainment
    of eighteen or twenty-one years of age does not affect or terminate the order, and the
    order remains in effect for the period of time described in this division.” R.C. 2152.83(E).
    {¶36} The issue presented by the instant appeal involves appellant’s completion-
    of-disposition hearing described in R.C. 2152.84. That section states in pertinent part:
    (b) The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of
    committing the offense.
    (c) The court was not required to classify the child a juvenile offender
    registrant under section 2152.82 of the Revised Code or as both a juvenile
    offender registrant and a public registry-qualified juvenile offender registrant
    under section 2152.86 of the Revised Code.
    (2) Prior to issuing the order required by division (A)(2) of this section,
    the judge shall conduct a hearing under section 2152.831 of the Revised
    Code, except as otherwise provided in that section, to determine whether
    the child is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sex
    offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender.
    When a judge issues an order under division (A)(1) of this section, the judge
    shall include in the order the determinations identified in division (B) (5) of
    section 2152.82 of the Revised Code.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                     13
    (A)(1) When a juvenile court judge issues an order under * * *
    division (A) * * * of section 2152.83 of the Revised Code that
    classifies a delinquent child a juvenile offender registrant and
    specifies that the child has a duty to comply with sections 2950.04,
    2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Code, upon
    completion of the disposition of that child made for the sexually
    oriented offense or the child-victim oriented offense on which the
    juvenile offender registrant order was based, the judge or the judge's
    successor in office shall conduct a hearing to review the
    effectiveness of the disposition and of any treatment provided for the
    child, to determine the risks that the child might re-offend, to
    determine whether the prior classification of the child as a juvenile
    offender registrant should be continued or terminated as provided
    under division (A)(2) of this section, and to determine whether its
    prior determination made at the hearing held pursuant to section
    2152.831 of the Revised Code as to whether the child is a tier I sex
    offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sex offender/child-victim
    offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender should be
    continued or modified as provided under division (A)(2) of this
    section.
    (2) Upon completion of a hearing under division (A)(1) of this
    section, the judge, in the judge's discretion and after consideration of
    all relevant factors, including but not limited to, the factors listed in
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                         14
    division (D) of section 2152.83 of the Revised Code, shall do one of
    the following as applicable:
    (a) Enter an order that continues the classification of the
    delinquent child as a juvenile offender registrant made in the prior
    order issued under section 2152.82 or division (A) or (B) of section
    2152.83 of the Revised Code and the prior determination included in
    the order that the child is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender, a
    tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-
    victim offender, whichever is applicable;
    (b) If the prior order was issued under division (B) of section
    2152.83 of the Revised Code, enter an order that contains a
    determination that the delinquent child no longer is a juvenile
    offender registrant and no longer has a duty to comply with sections
    2950.04, 2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Code. An
    order issued under division (A)(2)(b) of this section also terminates
    all prior determinations that the child is a tier I sex offender/child-
    victim offender, a tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III
    sex offender/child-victim offender, whichever is applicable. Division
    (A)(2)(b) of this section does not apply to a prior order issued under
    section 2152.82 or division (A) of section 2152.83 of the Revised
    Code.
    (c) If the prior order was issued under section 2152.82 or
    division (A) or (B) of section 2152.83 of the Revised Code, enter an
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       15
    order that continues the classification of the delinquent child as a
    juvenile offender registrant made in the prior order issued under
    section 2152.82 or division (A) or (B) of section 2152.83 of the
    Revised Code, and that modifies the prior determination made at the
    hearing held pursuant to section 2152.831 of the Revised Code that
    the child is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sex
    offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-victim
    offender, whichever is applicable. An order issued under division
    (A)(2)(c) of this section shall not include a determination that
    increases to a higher tier the tier classification of the delinquent child.
    An order issued under division (A)(2)(c) of this section shall specify
    the new determination made by the court at a hearing held pursuant
    to division (A)(1) of this section as to whether the child is a tier I sex
    offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sex offender/child-victim
    offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender, whichever is
    applicable.
    (B)(1) If a judge issues an order under division (A)(2)(a) of this
    section that continues the prior classification of the delinquent child
    as a juvenile offender registrant and the prior determination included
    in the order that the child is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender,
    a tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex
    offender/child-victim offender, whichever is applicable, the prior
    classification and the prior determination shall remain in effect.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       16
    (2) A judge may issue an order under division (A)(2)(c) of this
    section that contains a determination that reclassifies a child from a
    tier III sex offender/child-victim offender classification to a tier II sex
    offender/child-victim offender classification or to a tier I sex
    offender/child-victim offender classification.
    A judge may issue an order under division (A)(2)(c) of this
    section that contains a determination that reclassifies a child from a
    tier II sex offender/child-victim offender classification. A judge may
    not issue an order under that division that contains a determination
    that reclassifies a child from a tier II sex offender/child-victim offender
    classification to a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender
    classification.
    A judge may not issue an order under division (A)(2)(c) of this
    section that contains a determination that reclassifies a child from a
    tier I sex offender/child-victim offender classification to a tier II sex
    offender/child-victim offender classification or to a tier III sex
    offender/child-victim offender classification.
    If a judge issues an order under this division that contains a
    determination that reclassifies a child, the judge shall provide a copy
    of the order to the delinquent child and the bureau of criminal
    identification and investigation, and the bureau, upon receipt of the
    copy of the order, promptly shall notify the sheriff with whom the child
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                    17
    most recently registered under section 2950.04 or 2950.041 of the
    Revised Code of the determination and reclassification.
    (3) If a judge issues an order under division (A)(2)(b) of this
    section that declassifies the delinquent child as a juvenile offender
    registrant, the judge shall provide a copy of the order to the bureau
    of criminal identification and investigation, and the bureau, upon
    receipt of the copy of the order, promptly shall notify the sheriff with
    whom the child most recently registered under section 2950.04 or
    2950.041 of the Revised Code of the declassification.
    (C) If a judge issues an order under division (A)(2)(a), (b), or
    (c) of this section, the judge shall provide to the delinquent child and
    to the delinquent child's parent, guardian, or custodian a copy of the
    order and, if applicable, a notice containing the information described
    in divisions (A) and (B) of section 2950.03 of the Revised Code. The
    judge shall provide the notice at the time of the issuance of the order
    and shall comply with divisions (B) and (C) of that section regarding
    that notice and the provision of it.
    (D) An order issued under division (A)(2)(a) or (c) of this
    section and any determinations included in the order shall remain in
    effect for the period of time specified in section 2950.07 of the
    Revised Code, subject to a modification or termination of the order
    under section 2152.85 of the Revised Code, and section 2152.851
    of the Revised Code applies regarding the order and the
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       18
    determinations. If an order is issued under division (A)(2)(a) or (c) of
    this section, the child's attainment of eighteen or twenty-one years of
    age does not affect or terminate the order, and the order remains in
    effect for the period of time described in this division.
    * * * *.
    {¶37} Finally, R.C. 2152.85 allows a juvenile classified as a sex offender to
    petition the juvenile court at certain intervals to have his classification modified or
    removed (we will call this the “periodic-review provision”). The juvenile may first petition
    the court for review three years after the completion-of-disposition hearing. R.C.
    2152.85(B)(1). The juvenile may petition the court a second time three years after the first
    petition was filed, R.C. 2152.85(B)(2), and then every five years after that for the duration
    of the registration period, R.C. 2152.85(B)(3). See also In re D.S., 
    146 Ohio St.3d 182
    ,
    
    2016-Ohio-1027
    , 
    54 N.E.3d 1184
    , ¶ 36.
    Procedural due process and classification of juvenile sex offenders
    {¶38} Appellant argues R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(a) effectively prevents the juvenile
    court from declassifying mandatory registrants, thereby rendering the hearing
    meaningless. Appellant asks us to agree with the First District Court of Appeals in finding
    R.C. 2152.84 violative of the due process rights of mandatory Tier I registrants. In re
    D.R., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190594, 
    2021-Ohio-1797
    , 
    173 N.E.3d 103
    , ¶ 16, appeal
    allowed, 
    164 Ohio St.3d 1460
    , 
    2021-Ohio-3594
    .
    {¶39} Due process in the context of the juvenile justice system is guided by
    principles of fundamental fairness. “Constitutional procedural safeguards in the juvenile
    context find their genesis in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       19
    United States Constitution.” In re D.R., 5th Dist. Knox No. 13CA27, 
    2014-Ohio-588
    , ¶ 17,
    citing State v. D.H., 
    120 Ohio St.3d 540
    , 2009–Ohio–9, 
    901 N.E.2d 209
    , ¶ 44. “Due
    process standards as they relate to juvenile proceedings are inexact; this court has held
    that ‘fundamental fairness is the overarching concern.’” Id. at ¶ 51; In re C.P., 
    131 Ohio St.3d 513
    , 2012–Ohio–1446, 
    967 N.E.2d 729
    , ¶ 71.
    {¶40} The right to procedural due process is found in the Fourteenth Amendment
    to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The
    United States Supreme Court has explained, “From the inception of the juvenile court
    system, wide differences have been tolerated—indeed insisted upon—between the
    procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles.” In re Gault, 
    387 U.S. 1
    , 14,
    
    87 S.Ct. 1428
    , 
    18 L.Ed.2d 527
     (1967). Although certain constitutional protections afforded
    adults, including notice, confrontation, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-
    incrimination, and freedom from double jeopardy, are applicable to juvenile proceedings,
    other protections, including trial by jury, are not. See Schall v. Martin, 
    467 U.S. 253
    , 263,
    
    104 S.Ct. 2403
    , 
    81 L.Ed.2d 207
     (1984); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 
    403 U.S. 528
    , 545, 
    91 S.Ct. 1976
    , 
    29 L.Ed.2d 647
     (1971); In re Agler, 
    19 Ohio St.2d 70
    , 78, 
    249 N.E.2d 808
    (1969).
    {¶41} The United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that “the
    Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles.”
    Schall at 263. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the “acceptance
    of juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile
    offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from adults.” Bellotti v. Baird, 
    443 U.S. 622
    , 635, 
    99 S.Ct. 3035
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 797
     (1979). This different treatment is justified
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       20
    because of the state's interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child. Schall;
    McKeiver.
    {¶42} Juvenile proceedings are “civil” rather than criminal and, in theory, the
    priority of the juvenile system has been rehabilitation, rather than punishment. Society
    generally refuses to penalize youth offenders as harshly or to hold them to the same level
    of culpability as adults, who are older and, presumably, wiser and more mature. Unless
    bound over to the adult criminal system by a discretionary process, youthful offenders are
    adjudicated to be “juvenile delinquents” and are placed in special juvenile rehabilitation
    and detention centers. In line with the traditional view of the treatment of juveniles,
    punishment is not the goal of the Ohio juvenile system, except as necessary to direct the
    child toward the goal of rehabilitation. In re Caldwell, 
    76 Ohio St.3d 156
    , 157, 
    666 N.E.2d 1367
     (1996).
    {¶43} Fundamental fairness requires that juveniles be protected from “oppression,
    harassment, or egregious deprivation.” In re W.Z., 6th Dist. No. S-09-036, 
    194 Ohio App.3d 610
    , 
    2011-Ohio-3238
    , 
    957 N.E.2d 367
    , ¶ 63.
    {¶44} Turning to appellant’s argument, we find R.C. 2152.84 does not violate his
    right to procedural due process because we do not find that appellant has a substantive
    due process right to removal of the Tier I classification at the R.C. 2152.84 completion-
    of-disposition hearing.
    {¶45} Appellant argues the mandatory nature of the continued Tier-I classification
    in the case of a 16- or 17-year-old offender effectively removes the discretion of the
    juvenile court. Brief, 7. “However, the special discretion of the juvenile court judge
    sometimes yields to the directives of the legislature.” In re D.C., 1st Dist. No. C-180354,
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                        21
    
    2019-Ohio-4860
    , 
    149 N.E.3d 989
    , ¶ 37. The legislature could have rationally determined
    that sex offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds were sufficiently serious that the
    juvenile offenders are not to be declassified at the completion-of-disposition hearing.
    See, State v. McKinney, 
    2015-Ohio-4398
    , 
    46 N.E.3d 179
    , ¶ 23 (1st Dist.) [legislature
    could have “rationally determined that crimes involving firearms committed by older
    juveniles were sufficiently serious that society would not be adequately protected by the
    more lenient juvenile court system”]. Especially under the circumstances of the instant
    case, fundamental fairness does not require elimination of appellant’s Tier I juvenile sex
    offender classification.
    {¶46} We also find that R.C. 2152.84 does not eliminate all meaningful discretion
    from the juvenile court. The court retains discretion to determine which tier to apply to
    the offender. The completion-of-disposition hearing requires the court to evaluate the
    offender’s progress. Finally, the duty to register may be removed in three years.
    Appellant is not consigned to perpetual registration as a Tier I sex offender; his
    classification remains subject to review pursuant to R.C. 2152.85.
    {¶47} Finally, we note that we are not convinced the instant case is ripe for review.
    Underlying appellant’s argument is the unfounded assertion that he would have been
    declassified at the hearing if the statute permitted the trial court to do so; this premise is
    belied by the record of the hearing. The trial court noted that regardless of the
    unchangeability of the Tier I classification, declassification was not appropriate in the
    instant case regardless. T. 35-36.
    {¶48} Thus, the timing of appellant’s due process challenge is questionable
    because he is not a candidate for declassification at this time. The Ohio Supreme Court
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                       22
    discussed the concept of ripeness for review in State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus.
    Comm., 
    82 Ohio St.3d 88
    , 89, 
    1998-Ohio-366
    , 
    694 N.E.2d 459
    :
    {¶49} Ripeness “is peculiarly a question of timing.” Regional Rail Reorganization
    Act Cases, 
    419 U.S. 102
    , 140, 
    95 S.Ct. 335
    , 
    42 L.Ed.2d 320
    , 351 (1974). The ripeness
    doctrine is motivated in part by the desire “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
    premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
    administrative policies * * *.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 
    387 U.S. 136
    , 148, 
    87 S.Ct. 1507
    , 
    18 L.Ed.2d 681
     (1967). As one writer has observed:
    “The basic principle of ripeness may be derived from the
    conclusion that ‘judicial machinery should be conserved for problems
    which are real or present and imminent, not squandered on problems
    which are abstract or hypothetical or remote.’ * * * [T]he prerequisite
    of ripeness is a limitation on jurisdiction that is nevertheless basically
    optimistic as regards the prospects of a day in court: the time for
    judicial relief is simply not yet arrived, even though the alleged action
    of the defendant foretells legal injury to the plaintiff.” Comment,
    Mootness and Ripeness: The Postman Always Rings Twice, 65
    Colum. L.Rev. 867, 876 (1965).
    State v. Clark, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 00017, 2020-
    Ohio-5013, ¶ 9-10.
    {¶50} We find appellant’s argument that he was entitled to declassification
    unavailing, further undermining his contention that he was deprived of procedural due
    Licking County, Case Nos. 21 CA 0040 and 21 CA 0041                                  23
    process. Appellant had no substantive right to declassification because the trial court
    would not have declassified him regardless of the effect of R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(a).
    {¶51} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the
    Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed.
    CONCLUSION
    {¶52} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the
    Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed.
    By: Delaney, J.,
    Gwin, P.J. and
    Wise, Earle, J., concur.