In re D.R. , 2021 Ohio 1797 ( 2021 )

[Cite as In re D.R., 2021-Ohio-1797.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: D.R. : APPEAL NO. C-190594
TRIAL NO. 18-901Z
:
: O P I N I O N.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 26, 2021
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Ohio,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant D.R.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
CROUSE, Judge.
{¶1} D.R. has appealed the judgment of the juvenile court continuing his
classification as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant under Ohio’s version of the
Adam Walsh Act. We hold that D.R.’s continued classification as a Tier I juvenile-
offender registrant violated his procedural due-process rights. Therefore, we reverse
the juvenile court’s order continuing D.R.’s Tier I classification and remand this
cause for a new completion-of-disposition hearing under R.C. 2152.84, during which
the juvenile court may exercise its discretion to continue D.R.’s classification as a
Tier I juvenile-offender registrant or declassify him.
I. Procedural Background
{¶2} On April 5, 2018, D.R. admitted in juvenile court to an act which, if
committed by an adult, would have constituted gross sexual imposition against a
victim under the age of 13. D.R. was 16 at the time of the offense; the victim was a
12-year-old friend. D.R. was committed to the Department of Youth Services
(“DYS”) until age 21. The commitment was suspended, and he was placed on
probation and ordered to complete the Lighthouse Youth Services Sex Offender
Program. Because D.R. was 16 at the time of the offense, the juvenile court was
required to classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant under R.C. 2152.83. On
August 23, 2018, the juvenile court classified D.R. as a Tier I juvenile-offender
registrant.
{¶3} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.84, the juvenile court magistrate held a
completion-of-disposition hearing on June 7, 2019. D.R. raised constitutional
challenges to R.C. 2152.83 and 2152.84, which the magistrate overruled. The
magistrate noted in her decision that the court had no discretion to declassify D.R.
because he was 16 at the time of his offense, and therefore, D.R’s “classification
status will remain a Tier I.” After continuing D.R.’s Tier I classification, the
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
magistrate stated in her decision, “Additionally, the Court notes that [D.R.] has
successfully completed all conditions imposed upon him by this Court. He has not
been convicted of any subsequent offense. He is successfully completing a period of
probation; and he has successfully completed an appropriate sex offender treatment
program. He is also enrolled in college. Thus, the Court terminates the juvenile’s
period of probation.” D.R. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, which the
juvenile court judge overruled. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s decision
as the order of the court, but the court stated that D.R.’s due-process argument had
some merit as it pertained to the mandatory classification of 16- and 17-year-old
offenders. The juvenile court invited D.R. to raise his due-process argument on
appeal. As the juvenile court’s initial entry of September 17, 2019, failed to state that
the court had continued the Tier I classification, the court entered an order on
October 4, 2019, nunc pro tunc to September 17, 2019, stating that the Tier I
classification was continued. D.R. has appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶4} R.C. 2152.83 treats juvenile sex offenders differently with respect to
classification as juvenile-offender registrants based on their ages at the time of their
offenses. A child who was 13 or younger at the time of his offense is not subject to
sex-offender classification. R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and (B)(2). A 14- or 15-year-old
offender is subject to discretionary classification in that the juvenile court has
discretion to decide whether the child will be classified and into which tier he will be
placed. R.C. 2152.83(B)(1). An offender who was 16 or 17 years old at the time of his
offense is subject to mandatory classification as a juvenile-offender registrant, but
the juvenile court has discretion as to what tier the juvenile will be placed in. R.C.
2152.83(A)(1).
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶5} R.C. 2152.84(A)(1) provides that upon the completion of the
disposition of the child for the sexually oriented offense, the juvenile court “shall
conduct a hearing to review the effectiveness of the disposition and of any treatment
provided for the child, to determine the risks that the child might re-offend, to
determine whether the prior classification of the child as a juvenile offender
registrant should be continued or terminated” pursuant to R.C. 2152.84(A)(2), and
“to determine whether its prior determination” as to which tier the child should be
placed in “should be continued or modified.” The court can only lower the child’s
tier, it cannot increase it. R.C. 2152.84(B)(2); In re M.I., 2017-Ohio-1524, 88 N.E.3d
1276, ¶ 2 (1st Dist.). But pursuant to R.C. 2152.84(A)(2), if the child is a mandatory
juvenile-offender registrant who has been placed in the lowest tier classification, Tier
I, the juvenile court can do nothing but continue the Tier I classification.
{¶6} We first turn to D.R.’s second assignment of error, which asserts that
his continued mandatory classification as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant
pursuant to R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(a) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States and Ohio Constitutions.
{¶7} In In re M.I., this court held that the mandatory classification of 16-
and 17-year-old sex offenders under R.C. 2152.83(A) and 2152.84(A)(2)(c) does not
violate equal protection because the statutes are rationally related to the legitimate
governmental interest of protecting the public from sex offenders. We noted the
presumption of constitutionality afforded to the statutes and the burden on the
juvenile to prove that they are unconstitutional. We stated that the purpose of sex-
offender registration is to protect the public, and that the legislature’s concern for
recidivism and public safety provides a rational basis for treating juvenile sex
offenders differently based on their ages. In re M.I. at ¶ 2-6. M.I. did not raise, and
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
therefore, we did not address whether M.I.’s due-process rights were violated,
leaving that question open. D.R.’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶8} D.R.’s first assignment of error asserts that his continued classification
as a Tier I offender violated his right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio
Constitution. D.R. argues that although R.C. 2152.84(A)(1) entitles him to a
completion-of-disposition hearing, his status as a 16-year-old mandatory juvenile-
offender registrant who has been classified in the lowest tier, Tier I, means that the
hearing is meaningless because the juvenile court has no discretion to declassify him.
He argues that although the court is required to hold the hearing and consider the
statutory factors, the result of the hearing is a foregone conclusion because the
juvenile court can do nothing but continue his classification as a Tier I offender. The
rehabilitative goal of the juvenile court is undermined by eliminating the discretion
of the juvenile judge. This, he argues, does not comport with procedural due process.
{¶9} The Due Course of Law provision in Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution is the equivalent of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489,
2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 15. “The Due Process Clause is applicable in
juvenile proceedings, and although its requirements are inexact, fundamental
fairness is the overarching concern,” and “a balanced approach is necessary to
preserve the special nature of the juvenile process while protecting procedural
fairness.” In re D.C., 2019-Ohio-4860, 149 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 35 (1st Dist.), citing State
v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 51. “Procedural due
process requires ‘that an individual be given an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” In re Raheem L., 2013-Ohio-2423,
5
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
993 N.E.2d 455, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.), quoting Morrison v. Warren, 375 F.3d 468, 475 (6th
Cir.2004), citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d
18 (1976). This court noted in In re M.I. that the “Ohio Supreme Court has held that
under the Due Process Clause of the Ohio Constitution, a juvenile has a right to
‘fundamental fairness’ that is violated where mandatory provisions in the juvenile
statutes eliminate the ‘ “essential element of the juvenile process”—the judge’s
discretion.’ ” In re M.I. at ¶ 7, quoting In re D.S., 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-
1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 30, citing In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446,
967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 77.
{¶10} In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 2152.86 violated
due process to the extent that it imposed lifelong registration and notification
requirements on juvenile sex offenders who were tried within the juvenile system. In
re C.P. at ¶ 86. The court stated that “fundamental fairness is the overarching
concern” in determining due-process standards as they relate to juveniles. Id. at ¶ 71,quoting D.H. at ¶ 44. The court noted that in requiring the imposition of a lifetime
punishment with no chance of reconsideration for 25 years, R.C. 2152.86 eliminated
the discretion of the juvenile judge. Id. at ¶ 77. The juvenile judge has no
opportunity to determine whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated. Id. at ¶ 82-83.
The court stated that an “automatic longterm punishment is contrary to the juvenile
court’s emphasis on individual, corrective treatment and rehabilitation.” Id. The
imposition of an adult penalty with no input from the juvenile judge, who does not
decide the appropriateness of the penalty, violates fundamental fairness. Id. at ¶ 78.
Additional procedural safeguards were required in order to meet the juvenile court’s
goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Id. at ¶ 85. “The protections
and rehabilitative aims of the juvenile process must remain paramount; we must
recognize that juvenile offenders are less culpable and more amenable to reform than
6
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
adult offenders.” Id. ¶ 84. The court ultimately held that imposing automatic,
lifetime requirements of sex-offender registration and notification without the
participation of a juvenile judge violated due process. Id. at ¶ 86.
{¶11} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the imposition of registration
and notification requirements on a juvenile that continue beyond age 18 or 21 does
not violate due process. In re D.S., 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d
1184. But the court pointed out in In re D.S. that the juvenile judge exercised
discretion to determine the appropriate tier classification in which to place the
juvenile, unlike the automatic classification at issue in In re C.P. The court stated,
“Thus, the offending aspect of the sentence was the inability of the juvenile court
judge to exercise discretion in fashioning the disposition. When it comes to juvenile
offenders facing penalties into adulthood, ‘[f]undamental fairness requires that the
judge decide the appropriateness of any such penalty.’ ” Id. at ¶ 31, citing In re C.P.
at ¶ 78. The court noted that the classification scheme in In re C.P. was different
from the one in In re D.S. in that the In re C.P. statutory scheme precluded the
juvenile judge from determining whether the juvenile had responded to
rehabilitation. Id. at ¶ 35, citing In re C.P. at ¶ 83. The court also pointed out that
the statutory scheme in In re D.S. provided for periodic review of the juvenile
offender’s registrant status for purposes of modification or termination; the juvenile
judge maintained discretion throughout the course of the offender’s registration
period as to whether to continue, modify or terminate the classification. Id. at ¶ 36.
The court held that the “allowance for periodic review and modification” was
consistent “with the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile system.” Id. ¶ 37.
{¶12} Because D.R. was 16 at the time he committed his offense, the trial
court was required to classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant. R.C. 2152.83(A).
The juvenile court classified him at disposition as a Tier I juvenile-offender
7
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
registrant, the lowest tier. Upon the completion of D.R.’s disposition, the juvenile
court was required to hold a hearing at which it was “to review the effectiveness of
the disposition and of any treatment provided for [D.R.], to determine the risks that
[D.R.] might re-offend, to determine whether the prior classification * * * should be
continued or terminated * * * and to determine whether its prior determination * * *
as to whether [D.R.] is a tier I sex offender * * * should be continued or modified.”
R.C. 2152.84(A)(1). But pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(A) and 2152.84(A)(2)(b), the court
was prohibited from entering an order declassifying D.R. Even though the juvenile
court was required to hold a hearing and consider the statutory factors, because D.R.
had been classified as a Tier I offender at disposition, the juvenile court had no
discretion to discontinue his classification as a Tier I offender. Therefore, the
completion-of-disposition hearing was meaningless. D.R. was not “ ‘given an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ ” in
violation of his due-process rights. See In re Raheem L., 2013-Ohio-2423, 993
N.E.2d 455, at ¶ 6, quoting Morrison, 375 F.3d at 475, citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18.
{¶13} “Fundamental fairness is the overarching concern” in determining
due-process standards as they relate to juveniles. In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513,
2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 71, quoting D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-
Ohio-9, 901 N.E.22d 209, at ¶ 44. Procedural safeguards are required to meet the
juvenile court’s goals of rehabilitation and correction. Id. at ¶ 85. As a juvenile
offender, D.R. is less culpable and more amenable to reform than adult offenders.
See id. at ¶ 84. “The disposition of a child is so different from the sentencing of an
adult that fundamental fairness demands the unique expertise of a juvenile judge.”
Id. at ¶ 76, citing D.H. at ¶ 59. “The protections and rehabilitative aims of the
juvenile process must remain paramount * * *.” Id. When a juvenile offender such
8
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
as D.R. is facing a penalty that continues into adulthood, “[f]undamental fairness
requires that the judge decide the appropriateness of any such penalty.” Id. at ¶ 78.
Where the statutory scheme prevents the juvenile court from determining whether
the juvenile has responded to rehabilitation, it offends due process. In re D.S., 146
Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184, at ¶ 35, citing In re C.P. at ¶ 83.
{¶14} Here, the essential element of fundamental fairness as it applies in the
juvenile system, the discretion of the juvenile judge in fashioning a disposition, is
missing. Even though the juvenile court was required to hold a hearing and consider
the statutory factors as they related to D.R., the court had no discretion to do
anything but continue D.R.’s classification as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant.
This is at odds with the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile court in that it precluded
the juvenile court from determining whether D.R. had responded to rehabilitation,
which “undercuts the rehabilitative purpose of Ohio’s juvenile system and eliminates
the important role of the juvenile court’s discretion in the disposition of juvenile
offenders and thus fails to meet the due process requirement of fundamental
fairness.” See In re C.P. at ¶ 85. We hold that R.C. 2152.84 as applied to D.R., a
juvenile-offender registrant who had already been placed in the lowest tier
classification, Tier I, violates due process. D.R.’s continued classification as a Tier I
offender is unconstitutional as a violation of his due-process rights.
{¶15} We note that this case is distinguishable from the Eighth Appellate
District cases of In re D.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103854, 2016-Ohio-4571, and In
re R.A.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101936, 2015-Ohio-3342, rev’d in part on other
grounds, 148 Ohio St.3d 531, 2016-Ohio-7592, 71 N.E.3d 1015, which held that the
mandatory classification of 16- and 17-year-old offenders as juvenile-offender
registrants did not violate due process. In those cases the juveniles were challenging
the constitutionality of the initial classification under R.C. 2152.83(A), and not the
9
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
completion of disposition under R.C. 2152.84. Further, D.C. had been classified as a
Tier II juvenile-offender registrant.
{¶16} The second assignment of error is sustained. Because we hold that
D.R.’s continued classification as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant violated his
procedural due-process rights, we do not reach his argument under his second
assignment of error that it violates his right to substantive due process or his
argument under his third assignment of error that it violates the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.
{¶17} The juvenile court’s order continuing D.R.’s Tier I classification is
reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new completion-of-disposition hearing
under R.C. 2152.84, during which the juvenile court may exercise its discretion to
continue D.R.’s classification as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant or declassify
him.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MYERS, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
10