Feridon Pirgu v. United Services Automobile Association , 499 Mich. 269 ( 2016 )

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Syllabus Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions:
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Corbin R. Davis
PIRGU v UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION
Docket No. 150834. Argued on application for leave to appeal January 14, 2016.
Decided June 6, 2016.
Feridon Pirgu sustained closed head injuries after he was struck by a vehicle driven by an
individual insured by defendant, United Services Automobile Association. Plaintiff, Feridon’s
wife Lindita, was appointed as Feridon’s guardian and conservator. Plaintiff filed a complaint
against defendant in the Oakland Circuit Court after defendant discontinued payment of personal
protection insurance (PIP) benefits previously provided for Feridon’s care. Plaintiff sought a
judgment of $200,000 to $400,000 and the reinstatement of benefits. The jury awarded plaintiff
$70,237.44. Plaintiff requested attorney fees totaling $220,945. Plaintiff’s counsel claimed that
he spent more than 600 hours prosecuting the case, and that his normal billing rate was $350 an
hour. The trial court, John J. McDonald, J., concluded that plaintiff was due attorney fees
because defendant’s failure to pay the PIP benefits was unreasonable. The trial court noted that
the jury awarded plaintiff approximately 33 percent of the amount plaintiff sought, and thus the
court awarded plaintiff $23,412.48 in attorney fees, approximately 33 percent of the jury verdict.
Plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, BECKERING, P.J., and
HOEKSTRA, J., (GLEICHER, J., dissenting), affirmed the trial court in an unpublished opinion per
curiam issued December 16, 2014 (Docket No. 314523). The Supreme Court scheduled oral
argument on plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal, and in lieu of granting leave, reversed the
trial court’s judgment, vacated the trial court’s award of attorney fees, and remanded the matter
to the trial court for reconsideration.
In a unanimous opinion by Justice VIVIANO, the Supreme Court held:
A trial court must begin its calculation of a reasonable attorney fee under
MCL 500.3148(1) by multiplying the reasonable hourly rate customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services by the reasonable number of hours expended on the case. Thereafter, a
trial court must consider the following eight factors to determine whether an up or down
adjustment to that baseline number is appropriate: (1) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services, (2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,
(3) the amount in question and the results obtained, (4) the expenses incurred, (5) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client, (6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer,
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances, and (8) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent. These factors are not exclusive, and the trial court may consider additional
relevant factors. To facilitate appellate review, a trial court should briefly discuss its view of
each of the factors on the record and justify the relevance and use of any additional factors.
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply this framework, and the Court of
Appeals’ majority erred to the extent that it affirmed the trial court’s attorney fee award.
Reversed, trial court fee award vacated, and case remanded to the trial court for
reconsideration.
©2016 State of Michigan
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
OPINION Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen
FILED June 6, 2016
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
LINDITA PIRGU, Guardian and
Conservator of FERIDON PIRGU, a Legally
Incapacitated Person,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 150834
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE
ASSOCIATION d/b/a USAA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
VIVIANO, J.
The issue in this case is whether the framework for calculating a reasonable
attorney fee set forth in Smith v Khouri 1 applies to attorney fee determinations under
1
Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich. 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008).
MCL 500.3148(1) of the no-fault insurance act. 2 The Court of Appeals’ majority
affirmed the trial court’s calculation of the attorney fee award, concluding that the Smith
framework does not apply to attorney fee determinations under § 3148(1). We disagree
with this conclusion and instead hold that the Smith framework—as described in Justice
CORRIGAN’s concurring opinion, and as modified herein—applies to attorney fee
determinations under § 3148(1). 3 Therefore, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the fee award, and remand to the
trial court for reconsideration of its attorney fee award in light of this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2008, Feridon Pirgu sustained closed head injuries after he was struck by a car
driven by an insured of defendant, United Services Automobile Association. Plaintiff,
Feridon’s wife Lindita, was appointed as his guardian and conservator. Shortly
thereafter, plaintiff sought various personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits for
Feridon. Because Feridon was uninsured, the claim was initially assigned to the
Michigan Assigned Claims Facility, which then assigned the claim to Citizens Insurance
Company. Following a priority dispute between Citizens and defendant, defendant was
determined to have first priority for payment of PIP benefits. Defendant began adjusting
the claim in 2010, and immediately discontinued payment of the benefits.
2
MCL 500.3101 et seq.
3
Smith, 481 Mich. at 538-543 (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.).
2
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for reinstatement of the discontinued benefits
and for attorney fees, seeking a judgment in the amount of $200,000 to $400,000. 4
Following trial, the jury awarded plaintiff $70,237.44. 5 Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel
sought $220,945 in attorney fees, claiming that he had expended more than 600 hours
prosecuting the case and that his normal billing rate was $350 per hour. Because the trial
court concluded that defendant’s failure to pay the PIP benefits was unreasonable, it
found that attorney fees were warranted under § 3148(1). 6 The trial court noted that the
jury awarded plaintiff approximately 33 percent of the judgment amount sought, and
therefore, the trial court awarded $23,412.48 in attorney fees, approximately 33 percent
of the jury verdict.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split, unpublished opinion. 7 The majority
concluded that it was bound to follow University Rehab Alliance, Inc v Farm Bureau Gen
Ins Co of Mich, 8 which held that the Smith framework does not apply to reasonable
4
The variance in the amounts is accounted for by the two different hourly rates for
attendant care that plaintiff’s counsel offered to the jury in his closing argument.
5
The jury awarded $54,720 for attendant-care benefits, $7,992 in wage-loss benefits, and
$7,525.44 in penalty interest.
6
Defendant has not challenged this ruling.
7
Pirgu v United States Auto Ass’n, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued December 16, 2014 (Docket No. 314523). We note that the Court of
Appeals incorrectly identified defendant as the United States Automobile Association.
8
University Rehab Alliance, Inc v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 279 Mich. App. 691,
700 n 3; 760 NW2d 574 (2008).
3
attorney fee awards under § 3148(1). 9 Applying University Rehab’s totality of the
circumstances analysis, the Court of Appeals’ majority concluded that the trial court’s
award was reasonable. The majority gave the following justifications: (1) the results
achieved were considerably less than the amount sought, (2) the fee award was
commensurate with what plaintiff’s counsel would have received under a contingency fee
arrangement, and (3) the trial court expressly found that not all of the hours plaintiff’s
counsel expended were necessary. 10
Dissenting in part, Judge GLEICHER would have held that the trial court abused its
discretion by neglecting to consider the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel invested in
the case and his appropriate hourly rate. 11 The dissent also opined that no-fault cases
require a court either to fully apply the factors detailed by this Court in Wood v Detroit
Auto Inter-Ins Exch 12 or to fully apply the Smith framework. 13 The dissent also criticized
the trial court for only considering the amount in question and the results achieved. 14
This Court scheduled oral argument on the application, directing the parties to
address whether reasonable attorney fee determinations under § 3148(1) are governed by
9
Pirgu, unpub op at 3-4.
10
Id. at 5.
11
Id. at 4 (GLEICHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12
Wood v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 413 Mich. 573, 588; 321 NW2d 653 (1982).
13
Pirgu, unpub op at 7 (GLEICHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14
Id. at 6-7.
4
Wood and/or Smith, and whether the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the
attorney fees due to plaintiff.15
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of
discretion. 16 An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. 17 A trial court necessarily abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law. 18 Questions of law are reviewed de novo. 19
III. ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is the proper method for calculating a reasonable attorney fee
under MCL 500.3148(1), which provides that:
An attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee . . . in an action for
personal or property insurance benefits which are overdue . . . if the court
finds that the insurer unreasonably refused to pay the claim or unreasonably
delayed in making proper payment.
15
Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 498 Mich. 860 (2015).
16
Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich. 507, 516; 759 NW2d 833 (2008).
17
Id.
18
People v Duncan, 494 Mich. 713, 723; 835 NW2d 399 (2013).
19
Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Kneeland, 464 Mich. 491, 496; 628 NW2d 491
(2001).
5
The statute is an exception to the “American rule,” which provides that “attorney fees
generally are not recoverable from the losing party as costs in the absence of an exception
set forth in a statute or court rule expressly authorizing such an award.” 20
At the outset, it is helpful to understand the current state of the law regarding the
determination of a reasonable attorney fee. In Wood, which also involved an attorney fee
award under § 3148(1), we enumerated the following factors for determining the
reasonableness of an attorney fee:
(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill,
time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results
achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.[21]
We held that a trial court should consider the factors outlined in Wood, but that it is not
limited to them in making its determination. 22
In Smith, we reviewed a reasonable attorney fee award as part of case-evaluation
sanctions under MCR 2.403(O), and revisited Wood’s multifactor approach. 23 We held
that a trial court must begin its reasonableness analysis “by determining the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services,” and then multiplying that
number “by the reasonable number of hours expended in the case.” 24 After a trial court
20
Haliw v City of Sterling Heights, 471 Mich. 700, 707; 691 NW2d 753 (2005).
21
Wood, 413 Mich. at 588 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
22
Id.
23
Smith, 481 Mich at 527-529 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.).
24
Id. at 530-531.
6
has calculated this baseline figure, it must consider and briefly discuss on the record the
remaining Wood factors and the factors in MRPC 1.5(a) 25 to determine whether any up or
down adjustments from the base number are appropriate. 26
There was a split in Smith, however, regarding whether two factors, “the amount
in question and the results achieved” (factor 3 under Wood and factor 4 under MRPC
1.5(a)), and “whether the fee is fixed or contingent” (factor 8 under MRPC 1.5(a)),
should be considered when determining a reasonable attorney fee for case-evaluation
sanctions. The lead opinion concluded that the two factors are not relevant. 27 Justice
CORRIGAN, joined by Justice MARKMAN, concurred with the reasoning and result of the
25
The MRPC 1.5(a) factors are:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
26
Smith, 481 Mich. at 531, 533 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.).
27
Id. at 534 n 20.
7
lead opinion, but argued that there was no principled basis or textual support for
excluding the two factors from consideration. 28
Subsequently, in University Rehab, the Court of Appeals relied on our decision in
Wood, and on the MRPC 1.5(a) factors, to uphold a reasonable attorney fee award made
under § 3148(1). 29 Pertinent to this case, the Court of Appeals held that our decision in
Smith did not affect its analysis, stating:
First, Smith addressed MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), which explicitly requires that
the reasonable-attorney-fee portion of actual costs be based on a reasonable
hourly or daily rate as determined by the trial court. Second, while two
justices would have held that whether an attorney has a contingent-fee
agreement with a client is not an appropriate factor when considering a
reasonable attorney fee as a case-evaluation sanction, that part of the
opinion is not binding precedent because a majority of justices did not
agree.[30]
Although the University Rehab panel applied a combination of the Wood and
MRPC 1.5(a) factors in a manner that is similar to the Smith concurrence’s approach, it
did not require the trial court to begin its analysis by making the baseline calculation
pursuant to Smith, and instead adopted a totality of the circumstances approach. 31
As noted, the Court of Appeals’ majority in this case followed University Rehab to
conclude that the Smith framework does not apply to reasonable attorney fee
28
Id. at 538 (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.).
29
University Rehab, 279 Mich. App. at 698-704.
30
Id. at 700 n 3 (citations omitted).
31
Id. at 700.
8
determinations under § 3148(1). We disagree with this conclusion. Instead, we conclude
that the Smith framework applies in this context.
In Smith, we refined the analysis that applies when a fee-shifting statute or rule
requires a trial court to determine a reasonable attorney fee. 32 We have held that the
Smith framework applies beyond the case-evaluation sanctions context in appropriate
circumstances. 33 Of course, whether it applies in a given case must depend on the plain
language of the statute or rule at issue. 34 As we often note, any statutory construction
must begin with the plain language. 35 “We must give effect to the Legislature’s intent,
32
See Smith, 481 Mich. at 535 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (“We merely aim to provide a
workable, objective methodology for assessing reasonable attorney fees that Michigan
courts can apply consistently to our various fee-shifting rules and statutes.”).
33
In Coblentz v City of Novi, 485 Mich. 961 (2009), we considered an award of
reasonable attorney fees under the Freedom of Information Act. At the time,
MCL 15.240(6) provided that “[i]f a person . . . prevails in an action commenced under
this section, the court shall award reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . .” In determining the
reasonable attorney fees due to the plaintiffs, the trial court considered whether the city’s
conduct was corrupt enough to justify fees and whether the fees would bankrupt the city
or burden the public welfare. Coblentz, 485 Mich. 961. We held that “[n]othing in
MCL 15.240(6), or decisions of this Court, authorizes consideration of such factors in
determining a reasonable attorney fee award.” Coblentz, 485 Mich. 961. Accordingly,
we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney
fees using the Smith factors.
34
The answer to Justice CAVANAGH’S question of whether the rule applies to other fee-
shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich. at 554-555 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting), must be
determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case.
35
Driver v Naini, 490 Mich. 239, 246-247; 802 NW2d 311 (2011).
9
and the best indicator of the Legislature’s intent is the words used.” 36 These same
principles govern the interpretation of court rules. 37
Smith considered a fee award under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), which provides for “a
reasonable attorney fee based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by the
trial judge for services necessitated by the rejection of the case evaluation . . . .” Section
3148(1) contains slightly different language, providing that “[a]n attorney is entitled to a
reasonable fee for advising and representing a claimant in an action for [overdue PIP
benefits].”
Although § 3148(1) is phrased differently than MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), those
differences are not material to determining whether the Smith framework applies. The
plain language of the statute and the court rule both speak in terms of a reasonable fee.38
The operative language triggering the Smith analysis is the Legislature’s instruction that
an attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee. The University Rehab panel erred by
disregarding this language in § 3148(1) when it concluded that Smith was distinguishable
because it only applies to case-evaluation sanctions. 39 Because the plain language of
36
Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich. 417, 436; 818 NW2d 279 (2012).
37
Duncan, 494 Mich. at 723.
38
We agree with Justice CORRIGAN’s statement in Smith that the plain language of
MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) “merely requires that the court award a ‘reasonable attorney fee’; it
does not suggest that ‘reasonable attorney fee’ means something different for case
evaluation sanctions than for any other situation.” Smith, 481 Mich. at 539 (opinion by
CORRIGAN, J.).
39
University Rehab, 279 Mich. App. at 700 n 3. The University Rehab panel also
disregarded Smith’s repeated use of language of general applicability, which clearly
10
§ 3148(1) speaks in terms of awarding a “reasonable fee,” we conclude that the Smith
framework governing reasonable fee determinations is equally applicable in this context.
Despite reaching the wrong conclusion, University Rehab properly recognized the
non-binding nature of the lead opinion’s conclusion in Smith that two of the factors—“the
amount in question and the results achieved” and “whether the fee is fixed or
contingent”—are not relevant in the case-evaluation context. 40 While we do not decide
today whether those factors should be considered in that context, we hold that they must
be considered by a trial court when awarding attorney fees under § 3148(1). 41 We have
long recognized that the results obtained are relevant to determining the reasonable value
of legal services. 42 The results obtained are indicative of the exercise of skill and
contemplated that the methodology announced therein could be applicable to reasonable
attorney fee determinations outside the case-evaluation context. See e.g., Smith, 481
Mich. at 522 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (“We take this opportunity to clarify that the trial
court should begin the process of calculating a reasonable attorney fee . . . .”) (emphasis
added); id. at 530 (“We conclude that our current multifactor approach needs some fine-
tuning.”); id. at 533 (“Having clarified how a trial court should go forward in calculating
a reasonable attorney fee . . . .”) (emphasis added).
40
University Rehab, 279 Mich. App. at 700 n 3, citing People v Sexton, 458 Mich. 43, 65;
580 NW2d 404 (1998) (“[A] majority of the Court must agree on a ground for decision in
order to make that binding precedent for future cases.”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
41
This is in accord with the lead opinion in Smith, since it recognized that both factors
“may be relevant in other situations.” Smith, 481 Mich. at 534 n 20 (opinion by TAYLOR,
C.J.). See also Beach v Kelly Auto Group, Inc, 482 Mich. 1101, 1102 (2008) (YOUNG, J.,
concurring). And, in any event, the parties have offered no justification for excluding
these factors when awarding attorney fees under § 3148(1).
42
See Becht v Miller, 279 Mich. 629, 640; 273 N.W. 294 (1937) (“In ascertaining the
reasonable value of legal services, the court should consider . . . the results obtained.”).
11
judgment on the part of the attorney. 43 Similarly, the nature of the fee arrangement is
also a relevant factor because a contingency fee percentage may “express an attorney’s
expectations of the case and the risks involved.” 44 Accordingly, a trial court must
consider both of these factors when making adjustments to the baseline fee award.
Thus, while we agree with portions of University Rehab, we disagree with that
Court’s conclusion that Smith is inapplicable to reasonable attorney fee determinations
under § 3148(1). In particular, the University Rehab panel erred by failing to begin its
analysis by calculating the baseline figure pursuant to Smith. Therefore, we take this
opportunity to overrule University Rehab to the extent that it is inconsistent with our
opinion today. Having done so, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by holding
that the Smith framework does not apply to reasonable attorney fee determinations under
§ 3148(1).
In sum, we hold that when determining the reasonableness of attorney fees
awarded under § 3148(1), a trial court must begin its analysis by determining the
reasonable hourly rate customarily charged in the locality for similar services. 45 The trial
court must then multiply that rate by the reasonable number of hours expended in the
43
Fry v Montague, 242 Mich. 391, 393-394; 218 N.W. 691 (1928).
44
Smith, 481 Mich. at 540 (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.).
45
Id. at 530-531 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.). We emphasize that the burden of proving
reasonableness rests with the party requesting the fees. Id. at 528-529. With respect to
the reasonable hourly rate, “the fee applicant must present something more than
anecdotal statements to establish the customary fee for the locality.” Id. at 532. “The
fees customarily charged . . . can be established by testimony or empirical data found in
surveys and other reliable reports.” Id. at 531-532.
12
case to arrive at a baseline figure. 46 Thereafter, the trial court must consider all of the
remaining Wood and MRPC 1.5(a) factors to determine whether an up or down
adjustment is appropriate. 47
Unfortunately, Smith requires trial courts to consult two different lists of factors
containing significant overlap, which unnecessarily complicates the analysis and
increases the risk that courts may engage in incomplete or duplicative consideration of
the enumerated factors. Therefore, we distill the remaining Wood and MRPC 1.5(a)
factors into one list to assist trial courts in this endeavor:
(1) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services,
(2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,
(3) the amount in question and the results obtained,
(4) the expenses incurred,
(5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client,
(6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer,
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances, and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
These factors are not exclusive, and the trial court may consider any additional relevant
46
Id. at 531.
47
Id.
13
factors. 48 In order to facilitate appellate review, the trial court should briefly discuss its
view of each of the factors above on the record and justify the relevance and use of any
additional factors. 49
IV. APPLICATION
Having clarified the proper framework that applies to reasonable fee awards under
§ 3148(1), we turn to the award in the instant case. The trial court erred by not starting
its analysis by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours
expended. Further, although it acknowledged some of the Wood and MRPC 1.5(a)
factors, the trial court also erred by primarily relying on only one factor—the amount
sought and results achieved—and failing to briefly discuss its view of the other factors.
Therefore, the trial court necessarily abused its discretion, and as a result, the Court of
Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s attorney fee award. Accordingly, we reverse
the Court of Appeals, vacate the fee award, and remand to the trial court for
reconsideration in light of this opinion. 50
48
Id. at 530.
49
Id. at 529 n 14, 531, 531 n 15.
50
Defendant argues that plaintiff entirely failed to meet her burden of proof to support
her claim for attorney fees. See Smith, 481 Mich. at 528-529 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.).
Because the trial court failed to properly apply Smith, it is unclear whether plaintiff met
her burden. Accordingly, the trial court should consider this issue on remand when it
applies the Smith framework.
14
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that when calculating a reasonable attorney fee award under § 3148(1), a
trial court must follow the Smith framework, as outlined by Justice CORRIGAN’s
concurring opinion and as modified by this opinion. The trial court abused its discretion
by failing to do so, and the Court of Appeals’ majority erred to the extent that it affirmed
the trial court’s attorney fee award. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, the fee award is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for
reconsideration in light of this opinion.
David F. Viviano
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen
15