United States v. Chisholm , 59 M.J. 151 ( 2003 )


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  •                                   IN THE CASE OF
    UNITED STATES, Appellant
    v.
    Dathan O. CHISHOLM, Sergeant
    U.S Army, Appellee
    No. 03-5003
    Crim. App. No. 9900240
    United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
    Argued October 8, 2003
    Decided November 18, 2003
    Counsel
    For Appellant: Captain Gregory M. Kelch (argued); Colonel
    Robert D. Teetsel, Lieutenant Colonel E. Allen Chandler Jr.
    and Captain Terri J. Erisman (on brief); Captain Mary E.
    Card.
    For Appellee: Captain Abraham F. Carpio (argued); Colonel
    Lauren B. Leeker, Lieutenant Colonel Margaret B. Baines and
    Major Mark L. Johnson (on brief).
    Military Judges:      Stephen V. Saynisch and Nancy A. Higgins
    THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
    United States v. Chisholm, No. 03-5003/AR
    PER CURIAM
    At a general court-martial composed of officer members,
    Appellee was convicted, contrary to his pleas, of conspiracy to
    commit rape, conspiracy to obstruct justice, making a false
    official statement, and rape, in violation of Articles 81, 107
    and 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 881
    , 907 and 920 (2000), respectively.   He was
    sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for four
    years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted
    grade.   The convening authority approved these results.    Before
    the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, he requested a reduction in
    sentence based upon a claim of dilatory post-trial processing in
    light of a sixteen-month delay between the completion of trial
    and the convening authority action.   The court, after concluding
    that the post-trial delay was unexplained and excessive, reduced
    the period of confinement by three months, and otherwise
    approved the findings and sentence.   United States v. Chisholm,
    
    58 M.J. 733
    , 739 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2003).    The Government filed
    a motion for reconsideration en banc, which the court denied in
    an unpublished decision.   United States v. Chisholm, ARMY
    9900240 (A. Ct. Crim. App. March 18, 2003).
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    United States v. Chisholm, No. 03-5003/AR
    Pursuant to Article 67(a)(2), UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. § 867
    (a)(2)
    (2000), the Judge Advocate General of the Army submitted the
    case to our Court, certifying the following issues:
    I. WHETHER THE UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF
    CRIMINAL APPEALS’ OPINION IN UNITED STATES
    V. CHISHOLM, ARMY No. 9900240 (Army Ct.
    Crim. App. January 24, 2003) IMPROPERLY
    VESTED MILITARY TRIAL JUDGES WITH POWER TO
    ISSUE INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND AUTHORITY TO
    ADJUDCATE AND REMEDY POST-TRIAL PROCESSING
    DELAY CLAIMS?
    II. WHETHER THE UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF
    CRIMINAL APPEALS’ DECISION CONCERNING THE
    ROLE OF THE MILITARY JUDGE IN ADJUDICATING
    AND REMEDYING POST-TRIAL PROCESSING DELAY
    CLAIMS CONSTITUTES AN ADVISORY OPINION?
    In the present appeal, the Government does not challenge
    the conclusion of the court below that the post-trial processing
    of Appellee’s case was “dilatory,” 58 M.J. at 734, nor does the
    Government challenge the court’s modification of the sentence.
    Likewise, Appellee does not challenge the adequacy of the relief
    provided by the court below.   Neither party contends that the
    court erred in approving the findings and sentence as modified.
    Exercising our authority to review cases submitted under Article
    67, we have determined that there are no legal impediments to
    affirming the findings and sentence as approved by the Court of
    Criminal Appeals.   The certified issues, and the Government’s
    brief, focus solely on the portion of the opinion below
    concerning alternative means of addressing post-trial delays,
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    United States v. Chisholm, No. 03-5003/AR
    with particular emphasis on the role of military judges in post-
    trial processing.   See 58 M.J. at 736-39.
    We shall address the certified issues in reverse order,
    considering first the question of whether the court below issued
    an impermissible advisory opinion.    An advisory opinion is an
    opinion issued by a court on a matter that does not involve a
    justiciable case or controversy between adverse parties.     See
    Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 
    142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997
    (1994).   Courts established under Article III of the
    Constitution may not issue advisory opinions.    See U.S. Const.,
    Art. III, § 2; Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
    § 3-9, at 328-30 (3d ed. 2000).   Courts established under
    Article I of the Constitution, such as this Court, generally
    adhere to the prohibition on advisory opinions as a prudential
    matter.   See United States v. Clay, 
    10 M.J. 269
     (C.M.A. 1981).
    In the present case, the Court of Criminal Appeals had
    jurisdiction to review Appellee’s court-martial conviction under
    Article 66(b)(1), UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. § 866
    (b)(1)(2000). The court
    was obligated by Article 66(b)(1) to address the validity of the
    findings and sentence of the court-martial.    In particular, the
    court was presented with a concrete dispute between adverse
    parties, Appellee and the Government, regarding the
    appropriateness of the sentence in light of unreasonable post-
    trial delay.   Under these circumstances, the opinion of the
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    United States v. Chisholm, No. 03-5003/AR
    court below did not constitute an impermissible advisory
    opinion.   See United States v. Campbell, 
    52 M.J. 386
    , 387
    (C.A.A.F. 2000) (“The parties in a subsequent case are free to
    argue that specific aspects of an opinion . . . should be
    treated as non-binding dicta, but such a possibility does not
    transform a decision into an inappropriate advisory opinion.”)
    Accordingly, we answer Issue II in the negative.
    Issue I raises two separate questions: (1) whether the
    pertinent portion of the opinion below represents a valid
    analysis of the law concerning the post-trial responsibilities
    of a military judge; and (2) whether that aspect of the opinion
    constitutes a precedential holding or non-binding dicta.     These
    are the type of questions that may be resolved in the normal
    course of trial and appellate litigation, should such questions
    arise in an adversarial setting in a future case.   In the
    present case, however, neither party has challenged the post-
    trial actions of the military judge who presided at Appellee’s
    court-martial, and Appellee has no personal stake in the outcome
    of any views that we might express on the post-trial
    responsibilities of military judges.
    In the absence of a challenge by a party to a concrete
    ruling by a military judge in an adversarial setting, we
    conclude that consideration of Issue I under the circumstances
    of the present case would be premature.   Cf. Tribe, supra, § 3-
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    United States v. Chisholm, No. 03-5003/AR
    10 at 334 (discussing prudential aspects of the ripeness
    doctrine).   Accordingly, we decline to answer the first
    certified issue.
    Decision
    The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
    Appeals is affirmed.
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